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Old and New Insights on the History of Intelligence and Diplomacy in the Balkans

Edited by
Bogdan Teodor, Jordan Baev, Matthew Crosston, and Mihaela Teodor

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About the book

This volume analyses and puts into debate various practical facets of intelligence and diplomatic activities in the Balkans and provides a better understanding on what an historical perspective can add to our explicit understanding of intelligence and diplomacy. The book consists of twelve chapters by authors from various academic institutions in nine European countries. The proposals themselves organically imposed a thematic selection, which clarified the chronological issue as well: new insights, sources, and interpretations from young promising scholars and their various national historiographic schools. There are some logical limits to the scope of the volume and some challenges of writing on Balkan intelligence and diplomatic history. In the end, as Winston Churchill said and as this book shows, the Balkans have always produced more history than it could consume. A similar regional approach for the Balkans has not yet been done. This is the first contribution of the present volume, filling this obvious gap in the existing literature. Despite a temporal range of centuries and radically different historical conditions, the studies in this volume are united by a common idea: the intimate relationship between diplomacy and intelligence. The authors highlight historical perspectives that solidify this connection and emphasize that their working unity can add value to an understanding of intelligence and diplomacy more generally. The authors hope it pushes new insights today and, even more importantly, new research in the future amongst all who know the Balkans will forever be critical when it comes to both intelligence studies and diplomacy.

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

A.C.P.	Albanian Communist Party
A.f.Z.	Archiv für Zeitgeschichte [Swiss Archives of Contemporary History]
A.M.F.A.	Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague
A.T.G.M.I.	Archive of the T. G. Masaryk Institute, Prague
A.T.S.H.	Agjencia Telegrafike Shqiptare [Albanian Telegraphic Agency]
A.Y.	Archives of Yugoslavia
B.A.F.	Balkan Air Force
B.A.N.U.	Bulgarian Agrarian National Union
B.A.R.	Swiss Federal Archives
B.C.P.	Bulgarian Communist Party
B.L.Os.	British Liaison Officers
B.S.P.	Bulgarian Socialist Party (former Bulgarian Communist Party)
B.T.I.T.R.O.	Bulgarian-Turkish Internal Thracian Revolutionary Organization
C.I.A.	Central Intelligence Agency
C.P.A.	Communist Party of Albania
C.P.Y.	Communist Party of Yugoslavia
C.S.A.	Central State Archives of Bulgaria
←ix | x→C.S.C.E.	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
D.A.M.F.A.R.S.	Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia
Dodis.ch.	Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland
E.D.A.	Eidgenössisches Departement für auswärtige Angelegenheiten [Swiss Federal

	Department of Foreign Affairs]
E.P.D.	Eidgenössische Politisches Department [Swiss Federal Department of Political Affairs or Federal Political Department]
E.T.H.	Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule [Federal Institute of Technology from Zurich]
F.N.R.Y.	Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
F.P.R.Y.	Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia
G.N.A.	Grand National Assembly of Turkey
H.A.	Historical Archive
H.R.-D.A.Z.D.	National Archival Information System Venetian dragoman fond
H.S.S.	Croatian Peasant Party
I.M.R.O.	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization
I.T.R.O.	Internal Thracian Revolutionary Organization
J.N.A.	Yugoslav Army
K.O.S.	Yugoslav Army Counterintelligence
L.N.C.	Albanian National Liberation Movement
M.E.F.A.	Historical Archive of the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs in Tirana
M.F.A.	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
M.O. (R.)	Military Intelligence (Research)
M.P.	Minister Plenipotentiary
M.Ps.	Member of Parliament
M.R.F.	Movement for Rights and Freedoms (Bulgaria)
N.A.	The National Archive, Prague
N.A.T.O.	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
N.C.P.N.I.	National Committee for the Protection of National Interests
N.D.H.	Nezavisna Država Hrvatska [Independent State of Croatia]
N.D.H.R.	Independent Society for the Protection of Human Rights in Bulgaria
N.I.S.	National Intelligence Service (Bulgaria)
Oe.St.A./H.H.St.A.	Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv [Austrian State Archives]
←x | xi→O.I.C.	Organization of the Islamic Conference (Turkey)

O.K.Z.N.I.	National Committee for the Protection of National Interests (Bilgaria)
O.P.C.	Office of Political Coordination (S.U.A.)
Opera	Odeljenje za propagandni i elektronski rat [Department of Propaganda and Electronic Warfare] (Bulgaria)
O.P.M.-O.R.O.	Office of the Prime Minister-Ordinary Record Office (Bulgaria)
P.A.	Political Archives
P.R.	Political Reports
P.R.B.	People's Republic of Bulgaria
P.S.B.	Polski Słownik Biograficzny [Polish Biographical Dictionary]
R.M.	Republic of Macedonia
S.D.C.	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
S.E.C.O.	*Swiss* State Secretariat for Economic Affairs
S.F.R.Y.	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
S.I.S.	Secret Intelligence Service (also known as M.I.6 or "C.")
S.O.E.	Special Operations Executive
T.A.P.	Trans Adriatic Pipeline
T.N.A.	The National Archives (Great Britain)
T.N.L.M.B.	Turkish National Liberation Movement in Bulgaria
Ts.D.A.	Tsentralen Darzhaven Arhiv [Central State Archives of Bulgaria]
U.D.F.	Union of Democratic Forces (Bulgaria)
U.N.	United Nations
U.N.D.P.	*United Nations Development Program*
U.S.	United States
U.S.A.	United States of America
U.S.D.	United Stated Dollar
U.S.S.R.	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
W.H.O.	World Health Organization
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II
Y.C.P.	Yugoslav Communist Party

Introduction: The Connection between Intelligence and Diplomacy from a Regional Perspective

While International Relations (I.R.) theories and Diplomatic History have been among the most developed areas in Social Sciences and Humanities, Intelligence Studies started initially in the United Kingdom and U.S.A. less than fifty years ago as a part of Security Studies. As Matthew Crosston points out in a recent work, "there is no doubt that Intelligence Studies will always be a close cousin to Security Studies, with both researching many of the same problems and concerned about similar dangers and riddles".[1] Thus, a significant part of I.R. studies in the postwar years became International Security Studies (I.S.S.). As Barry Buzan indicated, I.S.S. was viewed in the beginning as an independent field of study. However, it later became an I.R. "sub-field" and one of its core elements.[2] I.S.S. was also viewed as directly aligned with Strategic Studies and parallel to ←1 | 2→Military, Defense, and War studies. Moreover, Intelligence History was usually described as an interdisciplinary hybrid area between Military and Diplomatic History.[3] It was within the border zone somewhere "between war and peace". However, as Oxford professor in Intelligence History Christopher Andrew underlined, scholars of international relations must take greater account to study the role of intelligence, which is all but absent in most contemporary international relations theory.[4]

Contemporary historiography on International Security and Intelligence Studies had its most intensive development in what is called the

Anglosphere, especially within a variety of existing I.R. research schools (like neorealism, liberal revisionism, social constructivism, etc.).[5] In the last decade, some multidisciplinary volumes revealed the European context of Intelligence History as various intelligence and national security services across the continent engaged in bilateral and multilateral interaction and cooperation.[6] Several multinational scholarly projects revealed the extent of collaboration between Central and East European communist security services during the Cold War era.[7] However, a similar regional approach for the Balkans has not yet been done. This is the first obvious contribution of the present volume, filling this obvious gap in the existing literature.

While the study of diplomacy has been a centuries-long subject of academic discussion, sustained but still somewhat inconsistent scholarship on intelligence began only in the late 1950s. At the beginning, most of the works were at the descriptive level and from a biographical perspective and focused on a single country. Any mentions of an intelligence–diplomacy connection and their explicit interactions were more peripheral than central.[8] Only since the mid-1980s did scholars like M. Herman, S. Breckinridge, A. Codevilla, A. Bozeman, ←2 | 3→K. Hamilton, R. Langhorne, and James Der Derian raise questions about the relationship of intelligence to policy and diplomacy. At the time, more often than not, intelligence was seen as a direct rival to diplomacy.[9] In the 2000s, issues in conducting intelligence and relating it to diplomacy became more prominent. The bulk of this work was from American and British authors (see for example M. Howard, G.R. Berridge, John D. Stempel, Len Scott).[10] Two major contemporary compendiums on intelligence, including the relationship between intelligence, policy, and diplomacy, sum up the state of the field: Loch K. Johnson and J. J. Wirtz, *Strategic Intelligence: Windows into a Secret World*[11] and *Strategic Intelligence*, edited by Loch K. Johnson.[12]

The first significant Intelligence History publications in Central and Eastern Europe appeared only in the post-Cold War era. These regional studies require the elaboration of some basic terms and methodology to better frame this present study. When viewing Intelligence as a "normal function of government" and a key instrument in policy formation of states[13],

it is easy to find similarities and differences between Intelligence and Diplomacy. In the last two decades there have been a few efforts to publish original periodic journals covering regional intelligence and security history in Southeastern Europe. The first such journal was launched in 2000 in Zagreb (*National Security and the Future*) under the editorship of the first head of the Croatian intelligence service, Prof. Miroslav Tudjman. In 2009, a new professional journal appeared in Bucharest under the auspices of the National Intelligence Academy, the *Romanian Intelligence Studies Review*, which has had an English edition since 2014. Another regional exemplar was published ←3 | 4→in Athens under the auspices of an independent expert institution R.I.E.A.S. (Research Institute for European and American Studies) in 2014, initially known as the *Journal of Mediterranean and Balkan Intelligence*, but since renamed in 2018 to the *Journal of European and American Intelligence Studies*.

The present volume is a new effort to unpack the nature of the connection between intelligence and diplomatic history. It is not an exercise in abstract theorizing, but a volume of empirical studies paying attention to Balkan intelligence and diplomatic activities, and to their impact on both politics and societies. This regional focus on the Balkans was determined by the fact that the area has always carried a prominent role in European intelligence/diplomatic activities over the centuries, with numerous intelligence organizations still being present in the Balkans, whether openly or covertly. The aim of this volume is to analyze and put into debate various practical facets of intelligence and diplomatic activities in the Balkans and to provide a better understanding on what a historical perspective can add to our explicit understanding of intelligence and diplomacy more generally. The book consists of twelve chapters by authors from various academic institutions in nine European countries. The academic status of the contributors ranks from young researchers and doctoral students to well-established scholars. This diversity of geography, voices, and career status provides one of the most unique approaches on the subject in recent memory.

There are some logical limits to the scope of the volume and some brief observations about the challenges of writing on Balkan intelligence and

diplomatic history. It was necessary to clarify selection criteria and frameworks in order to make a final selection of the numerous received proposals, which overall came from 13 countries (eight of them from the Balkan region directly). It was very hard to ensure a balance between thematic, geographic, and chronological criteria when there were so many disparate proposals that really were only loosely connected to one another. Therefore, the proposals themselves organically imposed a thematic selection, which clarified the chronological issue as well: new insights, sources, and interpretations from young promising scholars and their various national historiographic schools. Most of the proposals are based on the case study approach, which is quite logical since the area of Intelligence History and Intelligence Studies is still new for contemporary historiography in the Balkans. There were a few proposals on public diplomacy and on "diplomacy without a state," as was the case of Adam Czartoryski's "embassy" in Paris and its intention to construct the first intelligence network in the Balkans. It was agreed to include several well-known topics and personalities for national historiography, but also some that were not well known from a regional or international perspective, such as the case of Stojan Novakovič.

From a geographic perspective, the papers selected correspond with the main goal of the volume, to view the Balkans both as object and subject in a regional ←4 | 5→European perspective. We had to exclude some topics, such as the evolution of intelligence organizational structures and analysis, multilevel regional diplomacy, and Great Power influence, and in part a theoretical dimension, which is logical since the size and scope of the present volume needed to stay consistent and not too unwieldy in terms of size. As Winston Churchill said and as this book shows, the Balkans have always produced more history than it could consume. We believe one chief reason for that is because of how intelligence and diplomacy have always been intertwined, creating a nexus of political, ethnic, economic, and strategic importance that far exceeds what the region should rightfully be able to produce. In this respect, the potential of an eventual second volume about the Russian influence in the Balkans is quite promising. Perhaps even

the idea of developing a Balkan Network for Intelligence and Diplomatic History can emerge from the present volume's success.

The volume is divided into two balanced parts. Part I is *People Who Shaped Intelligence and Diplomacy in the Balkans*, comprised of six semi-biographical chapters with a focus on a little researched area: "the impact of culture on intelligence gathering and perceptions, where qualitative understanding of individual and group interpretations is essential to expanding upon existing work".[14] Special attention was paid to the human factor, with several studies focused on quite prominent national individuals in the field of diplomacy and intelligence: Stojan Novakovič, Adam Czartoryski, Josip Djerdja, and Jovan Dučić. Specific references were made to archives from various national archival departments, such as the diplomatic reports of Venetian dragomans kept in the State Archives of Zadar, Croatia; Stojan Novakovič's personal collection from the Serbian Archives; diaries and memoirs from the Czartoryski Archives and the Czartoryski Museum in Krakow; the Josip Djerdja reports from the Archives of Yugoslavia and the Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia; and the Jovan Dučić reports from the Archives of Yugoslavia.

Part II is entitled *The "Shades" of Intelligence and Diplomatic Activities in the Balkans,* presenting six more chapters, mainly focused on the development of bilateral relations between Balkan states and their contacts and collaborations with other European countries. These were largely researched from national archives such as the Bulgarian and Czech National Archives, the Great Britain Foreign Office Archives, the Archive of the T. G. Masaryk Institute from Prague, the Swiss Federal Archives, the U.N. and League of Nations Archives in Geneva, the Archives of Contemporary History from Zurich, and the Historical Archives of the Albanian Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs in Tirana. Taken together, the volume's two parts present readers with little-known documentation of both people and engagements that in fact had significant impact ←5 | 6→on intelligence/diplomatic history across this critically important region from the fifteenth all the way to the twenty-first century.

The first chapter from Part I discusses the early modern diplomatic history of frontier societies in the border zone of coexistence and conflict between the Ottoman Empire and the catholic Republic of Venetia in the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries. Maja PERIĆ reveals more thoroughly some not very well-known cross-cultural regional diplomatic sources in the state archives of Zadar, Croatia, viewing the specific function of Dragomans not just in their formal role of translators but also as special messengers, negotiators, and de facto intelligence actors.

The second chapter is dedicated to the intelligence mission of a young officer with noble German-Swedish-Finnish origin in the Russian army—Otto von Essen. During the Russian-Turkish War of 1828–29, he was entrusted to gather and provide to the army staff actual military intelligence information from his trips to the current territories of Moldova, Romania, and Bulgaria. Sabira STÅHLBERG explains "the human side of spying in a historical context", analyzing the 1830 memoirs of an intelligence officer with a multicultural background and who acted in the totally different sociocultural environment of early nineteenth-century Balkans.

Abdurrahman İÇYER dedicates his biographical study to the prominent Serbian historian, politician, and diplomat Stojan Novaković. His life and legacy were viewed not only from a national, but also transnational perspective, since Novaković was mentioned by historians with Austrophile, Turkophile, and Russophile approaches. However, Stojan Novakovic ultimately remained an ardent supporter to the national doctrine for a Greater Serbia.

Tomasz Jacek LIS focuses his research on a unique story of European diplomacy and intelligence in the nineteenth century. Though an independent Polish state did not exist in the mid-nineteenth century, the activity of Prince Adam Czartoryski in exile in France (after serving as Russian foreign minister) was considered service in favor of his fatherland. Even official Polish historiography nowadays describes the residence of Czartoryski in Hotel Lambert in Paris as the temporary but official location of the Polish foreign ministry.[15] At the same time, the Polish Prince and his noble collaborators established an intelligence network in the Balkans, operating

from Constantinople, that worked for France and Great Britain against Russian and Austrian activities in the Balkans. Later, some of them offered their services in favor of the Ottoman Empire. The most popular was Michal Czajkowski (known as Mehmet Sadık Paşa), who fascinatingly created, at the beginning of the Crimean War in 1853, the first regular Christian military unit inside the Muslim Ottoman army (a Cossack regiment) to fight against the Russians.[16]

←6 | 7→The last two chapters of Part I examine episodes of twentieth-century Yugoslav diplomacy. Božica SLAVKOVIĆ MIRIĆ studies a significant period in postwar Yugoslav-Albanian bilateral relations (1945–48), with the special role played in its intensive development by Ambassador Josip Djerdja. The research is based on newly revealed documents from political and diplomatic archives in Belgrade. Danilo BOSNIĆ and Djordje MILIĆ present the profile of "poet-diplomat" Jovan Dučić, who performed his diplomatic duties in one of the most difficult moments in the history of interwar Yugoslavia. During his long-term diplomatic career, Dučić had 13 missions in eight European countries, including serving as head of the Yugoslav mission in Italy (1933–37) and Romania (1937–39).

Part II discusses specific issues of diplomatic and intelligence activities in the Balkans, such as diplomatic relations through informal diplomacy, special operations, and covert actions. The first chapter of Tsvetelina TSVETKOVA presents an almost unknown story of confidential contacts and negotiation between representatives of defeated nations Bulgaria and Turkey after the First World War. In these acts of *informal diplomacy* between the governments of Sofia and Ankara, where significant roles were played by former key figures of the intelligence services—like General Todor Markov—some parallel secret actions were taken by representatives of national-revolutionary organizations in Macedonia and Thrace. Tsvetkova analyzes these intensive secret negotiations and revolutionary activities, revealing the most important "shades" within Bulgarian-Turkish informal relations.

In the next chapter, Bisser PETROV analyzes the aims and scope of British intelligence operations in Albania during the Second World War. The

wider declassification of records of the famous Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.) branch of the Secret Intelligence Service in the last two decades allows the clarification of motives that shaped British policy toward Albania and furthermore answers the question why these covert actions failed to save the country from communist dictatorship. It is shown that conflicts occasionally occur between diplomats and intelligence folk, often because of clandestine or covert activities.

The chapter of Milan SOVILJ focuses on the renewing of contacts between Czechoslovakia and Balkan states in the first postwar years. The situation in the Balkans in 1945–48 is viewed through the eyes of Czechoslovak diplomatic representatives in Yugoslavia (Yaroslav Lípa and Josef Korbel), Romania (Jaroslav Kraus), and Bulgaria (František Kubka). Sovilj proposes a novel view between traditional Czechoslovak policy toward the Balkan states in the interwar period and the totally changed political environment after WWII.

Quite a different story is made in the next chapter by Franziska Anna ZAUGG and Samantha GUZMAN about an extraordinarily complex process of negotiations which led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between ←7 | 8→Switzerland and totally self-isolating Balkan country Albania in 1970. The role of Hans Keller, who had previously served as ambassador for neutral Switzerland in China and Yugoslavia, is key to the chapter.

The chapter written by Krasimira TODOROVA discusses a strange case of an “arms delivery scandal” in 1992 Bulgaria, which pitted the Prime Minister’s office against the National Intelligence Service. The bureaucratization of intelligence in the twentieth centuries multiplied the potential areas of conflict between politicians and agents, especially when views and priorities differed between organizations. In fact, the story had broader roots in the sharp political confrontation of transition from authoritarian rule to pluralist democracy and civil society in the country. At the same time, the case was a classic example for the more conceptual issue of developing genuine civil-military relations and of the unacceptable politicization of intelligence and the national security system overall. Moreover, the study contributes to the larger argument that formal and direct

diplomatic responses to intelligence operations (and the nature of the relationship between said parties) are influenced by the degree of exposure the incident has in the public sphere.

The last chapter of Part II, presented by Petya PAVLOVA, focuses on another difficult problem in the bilateral relations of two aforementioned Balkan countries—Bulgaria and Turkey. The dramatic fate of Bulgarian Turks in the last Cold War and the issue of their forceful emigration to Turkey in the summer of 1989, which contributed in some way for the discreditation and overthrow of the Zhivkov regime in Bulgaria, provoked sharp diplomatic confrontation and obvious stagnation in Bulgarian-Turkish relations. Pavlova reveals the political steps and negotiations of the new Bulgarian government of 1989–1990, trying to normalize bilateral relations with Turkey, the (re)incorporation of ethnic and religious minorities in the political life of the country, and the establishing of a new atmosphere of dialogue across the Balkans in general within the framework of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Despite a temporal range of centuries and radically different historical conditions, the studies in this volume are united by a common trend. They reveal little-known data on various dramatic events in the development of Balkan nations that sustain our support for the idea that "intelligence is part of the diplomatic effort, from the very beginning, with both activities having the aims to promote the strategic goals of the state".[17] The common point that characterizes them is the intimate relationship between diplomacy and intelligence, both in the policy formation of great European powers toward the region and in the actions and policies of the inner ruling circles of the Balkan countries themselves. Even if ←8 | 9→the prevailing assumption among academics and practitioners is that the relationship between intelligence and diplomacy must be managed very carefully and whenever possible avoided, we highlight historical perspectives that solidify this connection and emphasize that their working unity can add value to our understanding of intelligence and diplomacy more generally. The case studies in the volume most certainly reflect the complexity of the relationship, but it cannot be classified as purely antithetical or rival. Historically speaking, both

institutions have always shared the same functional roots. Each of these studies makes its own specific contribution to general research in the fields of Diplomacy and Intelligence Studies as well bringing new insights and knowledge about the Balkans, specifically in the periods of building modern nation-states and in the nascent stages of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. We hope, by specifically aiming to be relevant at both the specific regional and general discipline levels, we have provided a new volume that will appeal to and be useful for a very wide range of academicians and practitioners.

Moreover, we hope it pushes new insights today and, even more importantly, new research in the future amongst all who know the Balkans will forever be critical when it comes to both Intelligence Studies and Diplomacy.

The Editors

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1 Matthew Crosston, *Cultures, Conditions, and Cognitive Closure: Pulling Intelligence Studies out of the Shadow of Security Studies* (aka Intelligence Cultures vs. Conditions), paper presented to ISAC-ISSS Annual Conference (Austin Texas, November 2014), Dr. Matthew Crosston – Academia.edu

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PART I

DIPLOMACY AND INTELLIGENCE IN THE BALKANS: CULTURAL AND HUMAN FACTORS

CHAPTER 1

The Venetian Dragomans of Zara. A Proposal for Research of Diplomatic Sources from the State Archives of Zadar

MAJA PERIĆ

Abstract: The State Archives of Zadar in Dalmatia contain large amounts of sources that can contribute to the study of the Balkan region's early modern diplomatic history. Due to the prominent presence of the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire in Dalmatia, there was a need for diplomatic institutions and interpreters that helped in negotiations and decisions. One of the least researched diplomatic archive troves is that of the Venetian Dragoman [Mletački Dragoman]. This chapter will clarify new perspectives in diplomatic history concerning the Dalmatian Eastern Adriatic coast and the Balkan hinterlands in the early modern period in order to encourage other researchers to make more use of them in the future.

Keywords: Venetian dragomans, Zadar, Ottoman Empire, New Diplomatic History.

INTRODUCTION: BALKAN DIPLOMACY—ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN VENICE AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The Dalmatian coast and its vast Balkan hinterlands have been an important part of the territories of the Republic of Venice since the Middle Ages and of the Ottoman empire since the middle of the fifteenth century. Both superpowers considered Dalmatia one of the most important regions in order to have access and power over the Adriatic coast.[1] When looking

specifically at premodern ←13 | 14→Dalmatia, the region was located at the border between the Christian West and the Ottoman East, which made a "possible dialectical encounter with neighboring territories become a reality of everyday life."[2] Consequently, conflicts over this part of the Balkan region often took place between Venice and the Ottoman Empire.

The region was "a theater of war in which the Venetians sought to compensate for the great loss in the Mediterranean by absorbing even larger portions of territory within the border line, which until then had divided the areas under its rule from those under Ottoman domination."[3] As different types of groups, which some historians refer to as "frontier societies", came into contact with each other at these porous borders, dynamic and symbiotic relationships were formed.[4] However, "not all border relationships were amenable, and states attempted to use local officials and political proxies to maintain order and control over subjects who failed to acknowledge political frontiers."[5] The period between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries is not only characterized by constant tension and conquests, but also by moments of peace and, above all, of engagement and negotiation. "Coexistence as much as conflict characterized Venetian-Ottoman relations."[6] The Ottomans and Venetians attached great importance to peaceful coexistence. "The frontier was an area of osmosis, contact, inter-penetration, interdependence, tolerance, and diplomacy."[7]

These negotiations, of course, required sophisticated diplomatic institutions, which were developed from the advent of the Ottoman Empire. After all, both superpowers knew that for economic reasons the importance of understanding was crucial.[8] As Noel Malcolm and other historians argue, commerce and trade ←14 | 15→were key for both.[9] Peace was often kept because both superpowers received income from trade. After Lepanto and the Cyprus War (1570–73), there was a period of peace between Venice and Constantinople which would last until the Cretan War of 1645.[10] Because of the many losses Venice had suffered during those wars, the Republic decided to actually trade with the enemy, which made diplomatic negotiations extremely important.[11] Angela de Maria describes it as follows: "it was really important to Venice to promote and incentivize trade with enemies to

the point that, if on one hand the Republic defended the possession of its land and maritime territories, on the other it considered the protection of Ottoman merchants a priority as well. Al of this therefore refers to interrelations, communication and cooperation."[12] Furthermore, because of the great losses Venice experienced with the arrival of the Ottoman Empire, the Republic began to see this opponent as an ally against the other European countries that posed a threat to Venice's properties in Italy.[13]

By means of diplomatic practices and the exchange of diplomats, negotiations were made about daily life happening within their territories and at the boundaries. Because of the flexibility and porosity of the borders and border regions that characterized the Balkans, "groups to live in close proximity and in relative harmony over long periods of time provide important insights into the nature of Veneto-Ottoman coexistence in the early modern era."[14] Initially, it was mainly dignitaries who were given these diplomatic functions to make negotiations between Venice and Constantinople over the Balkans possible. As a result, in the historiographical context of diplomatic history, the focus has mainly been on these important formal political rulers such as (aristocratic) ambassadors.[15]

STUDYING EARLY MODERN DIPLOMACY IN THE BALKANS

In recent decades, however, a historiographical turn has taken place. Historians have shifted their focus for the study of the *New Diplomatic History* to the influence of so-called intermediaries, trans-imperial subjects, or intermediators in the diplomatic process. From travelers, merchants, and writers to dragomans, all these individuals played a role in the diplomatic game of the early modern period. The importance of interdisciplinary research has gained more attention, and researchers are trying to leave the Eurocentric vision to explain encounters between East and West or the black and white "us" versus "them".[16] Historians should "go beyond the

historiographical impasse of imaging the Mediterranean as a zone of either peaceful exchange or permanent conflict."[17] In this chapter, therefore, we will focus on the role of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Venetian dragomans or translator-interpreters of Zara. By means of the present historiographical context and by focusing on the influence of dragomans in the Balkan region, a proposal is made to enthuse future historians to study these dragoman sources from a New Diplomatic Historical point of view. Specific reference will be made to the archive troves of the dragomans kept in the State Archives of Zadar, Croatia.[18]

The study of diplomatic encounters between both superpowers is in fact nothing new. In the past, historians frequently made use of diplomatic sources such as the popular Venetian *Relazioni* to find out the secrets of early modern politics and Veneto-Ottoman relations in the Mediterranean.[19] The Venetian *Relazioni* were ←16 | 17→diplomatic reports written by Venetian ambassadors during their travels within the Venetian territory or to the Ottoman Empire and beyond. The *Relazioni* have helped many historians in the past not only to form a clearer picture of the diplomatic interests of Venice in its own territory, but also of its positions in relation to the Ottoman Empire. Recently, however, the use of these official diplomatic reports has become more critical for various reasons. Eric Dursteler argues that the *Relazioni* and similar documents often have disadvantages such as the cultural biases that the Venetian ambassadors had already formed about the Ottoman "other", for example.[20] Moreover, the documents were formed in such a way that, as already mentioned, their purpose was to be shared publicly. The *Relazioni* were consequently formed in a premeditated manner of forethought.[21] So, like many other historians, it is recommended to take these aspects into account when using the *Relazioni*. The "reconsideration of the *Relazioni* and other European sources is part of a larger reaction against the binaries of the Orientalist model."[22]

While it seems that a lot has already been said about diplomacy between Venice and the Ottoman Empire, only recently has there been a shift in the research field. Historians and other social scientists believe that their predecessors went wrong in some areas when studying diplomatic sources.

What today's historians try to do often goes under the name *New Diplomatic History*. A kind of interdisciplinary method is applied in which diplomatic sources cannot merely provide answers to political-historical questions but can also tell a lot about cultural, social, and economic aspects of early modern life.[23] It can talk more about ←17 | 18→encounters along the border regions and how Venice and Constantinople tried to maintain control over these fluid parts of their territories where cross-cultural encounters took place regularly.

This *New Diplomatic History* does not focus on the over-simplistic dichotomy between Venice and the Ottoman Empire or the "us" versus "them" story that has trapped many historians in the past. The supremacy of early modern Europe over a "less sophisticated system" in the East is brushed aside with the help of Said's well-known orientalist argument.[24] Eurocentric thought in the field of diplomacy has been challenged.[25] As John Watkins argues, historians' work "centered on a restricted European geography" and scholars in the past paid little attention to "diplomatic contacts between Western and Eastern Europe, or between European and non-European powers like the Arabs and the Ottomans."[26]

Nathalie Rothman can be considered one of the main pioneers of this new interpretation of diplomatic sources. By speaking of "cross-cultural diplomacy" or "cross-confessional diplomacy", the focus is shifted to intercultural mediation and actors that were situated between the different cultures and confessions that characterized the Mediterranean.[27] Rothman has published many articles and recently several books highlighting the importance of these intermediaries for mediating diplomatic relations between the superpowers in the Mediterranean. In her own work, Rothman focuses on the (linguistic, political, religious, etc.) strategies with which trans-imperial subjects, especially dragomans, "operated as members of multiple social formations and on how in their sustained interactions across linguistic, religious, and political lines they helped shape – and were in turn shaped by – shifting imperial boundaries."[28] She argues that "trans-imperial subjects played a vital role as imperial boundary makers."[29] Furthermore, she has tried to underscore the importance of linguistic communication, for

which she tried to find out "how the translation techniques of Venetian-born, Istanbul-based dragomans who were systematically trained in secretarial and notarial arts differed from those of an Istanbul-raised, Venetian-based, and ad-hoc trained dragoman."[30] This linguistic perspective to better understand diplomatic contacts in the Mediterranean of the early modern period clarifies the role of interdisciplinarity ←18 | 19→and of the dragoman as translator-interpreters and trans-imperial subjects in this *New Diplomatic History*.

Researchers nowadays are literally looking for the different languages and words that people used to communicate with each other "in addition to the symbolic languages of rituals and space, and of material culture, such as gifts exchanged and the values placed on them."[31] Furthermore, in this new form of diplomatic history, historians try to look at people who also engaged in diplomacy in daily life, these "go-betweens", which also broadened the scope of what could be understood by studying "diplomacy" in the early modern period.[32] Emrah Safa Gürkan argues that these "go-betweens mediated political, cultural, religious, and linguistic boundaries in the encounters between Ottoman grandees and European diplomats."[33] Jocelyne Dakhlia adds in her work that these actors "often described as hybrid dominate recent discussions of diplomacy and cross-cultural phenomena, whereby their in-betweenness as purported members of 'two worlds' is considered a prerequisite for bridging cultural and linguistic divides."[34] In general, it has been stated that academics who devote their research to the various possibilities and angles of this *New Diplomatic History* will "emphasize the importance of viewing cultural, political, and social relationships beyond the context of a particular community. (…) similar cultural practices, shared business interests and participation in cross-cultural networks represented forms of contact that defined how certain individuals lived and how they interacted socially."[35]

The perspectives and critiques of *New Diplomatic History* are mainly used by researchers such as Nathalie Rothman, Eric Dursteler, Stephen Ortega, John Watkins, and the like, where the general focus of research is usually on the mediators active in Venice or Istanbul. In recent decades, however, historians and other researchers have also focused on the

importance of areas that previously belonged to the "periphery" of the two empires, such as Dalmatia or the continental parts of the Balkan region. Nedim Zahirović, for example, came to fascinating conclusions about the problems faced by the border regions by studying *firmans*[36] written in the Ottoman language.[37] He concludes that the main purpose of the ←19 | 20→diplomatic negotiations was to keep the peace in order to preserve economic trade interests.[38]

However, the sources used have nothing to do with the main character of this chapter, the dragoman. There are only a few researchers who have studied dragoman sources for the specific region of the Balkans. One of the most important researchers who has focused on the importance of dragomans as intermediaries in Veneto-Ottoman diplomatic relations is Vesna Miović-Perić. She has mainly tried to find out what important role the dragomans of the city of Dubrovnik or Ragusa played in the diplomatic interests with the Ottoman Porte during the premodern period.[39] As is generally known, in the early modern period Dubrovnik had status as a city-state, which paid tribute to the Ottoman Empire. The economic importance and strategic location of Dubrovnik in this period should not be underestimated and helps to explain the presence of dragomans from both ←20 | 21→Constantinople and Venice.[40] Miović-Perić has done a lot of research in recent years and has tried to bring the importance of the Dubrovnik dragomans' archives to the attention of other scholars.[41] One of the best examples of this is the work of Selma Zečević, who, using the available sources in Dubrovnik, has tried to find out from a *New Diplomatic History* perspective how the Dubrovnik dragomans used linguistic strategies to influence certain documents in court cases and the like as mediators.[42] The analysis showed, among other things, that the dragomans were often deliberately accused of ambiguously translating texts for the benefit of the accused Venetian subject.[43]

Like Dubrovnik, the Dalmatian coastal city of Split was an important base for dragomans. Ljerka Šimunković's research on the dragomans of Split has attempted to explain why these intermediaries were important in facilitating communication between ordinary citizens and the political institutions. Above all, she has clarified what characterized the linguistic situation in

Dalmatia during the rule of various superpowers. In order to facilitate communication between the different layers of the population, who often spoke a different language, dragomans were used by authorities to make everyday life easier and conflict-free, both in the city itself and in the border regions.[44]

For the specific case of Zadar, one researcher deserves more attention. Throughout his research career, Ivan Pederin made use of a lot of information that ←21 | 22→can be extracted from the various early modern sources that exist in the Zadar archives. Most of his known works focus on the relations between Zadar and the rulers around and in its territories. Due to the immense knowledge of languages that Pederin acquired during his years of study, several of his published works deal with the aspect of language in early modern Dalmatia and specifically the region of Zadar. It is therefore not surprising that Pederin is not unfamiliar with the archives of the "Mletački dragoman".[45]

Studying the dragomans could help figure out "how sociocultural practices created political relationships."[46] Shifting the focus to those transnational mediators justifies the complexity of diplomacy in the early modern period. Defining diplomatic encounters in black and white has been changed to highlight the "complex processes of improvisation, hybridization, and accommodation intrinsic to cross-cultural negotiation."[47] It must be acknowledged that these intermediary actors still had a certain way of looking through the society in which they grew up. However, it is beneficial to study these mediators like the dragomans through their daily encounters with different people. But what is a dragoman specifically? How did it come into being and what were its main functions?

THE DRAGOMANS' FUNCTIONS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DRAGOMANATE OF ZARA/ZADAR

The word dragoman is derived from the Syrian and Ottoman Turkish word *Tercüman*, itself derived from the Arabic word *Tarjumān*. From there, the

Italian word *Dragomanno* emerged, which meant "translator".[48] As the Ottoman Empire began to develop diplomatic relations and commercial ties with various European powers, there was a need to develop a person who could help the Ottoman authorities understand the various languages. The dragomanate was soon ←22 | 23→established in Constantinople in the fifteenth century and the main purpose of the translators-interpreters was to assist dignitaries in their contacts with others.[49] Soon, other European states such as the Republic of Venice followed, for obvious reasons, in developing the function of dragoman for their own advantage. "For multiple political, economic, cultural, and religious reasons, the European powers started to train their own personal translators. The mistrust in the Ottoman dragomans appointed by the sultan was also a great factor. The Venetians were the first to send young local men to their embassy in the Ottoman capital in the second half of the sixteenth century and to undertake systematic efforts to train them. The great linguistic diversity in the Ottoman capital also made the need of translation services inevitable for the imperial diplomats."[50] There were different kinds of dragomans with various functions. There were court dragomans (divided into provincial and legal court dragomans), grand dragomans, port dragomans, local dragomans, trade dragomans, etc.[51]

A dragoman's main task was to translate and interpret texts and letters.[52] The tasks given to dragomans were very diverse and they also varied from client to client. For example, a dragoman could be sent on a mission with someone from the court, while on the other hand he could also be used at the local level to provide linguistic support to the administration in border regions or economically ←23 | 24→important cities. Dragomans were in fact not only translators-interpreters but, depending on their position, had various other duties. They needed to "interpret, translate correspondence and official reports, go together with Ottoman officials as to facilitate communication, travel in order to be present during territorial and border conflicts, and accompany merchants during their negotiations with other traders."[53] The advantageous thing about dragomans was that they were not merely attached to official governing bodies of the superpowers. Merchants, who often did not understand a particular language such as Ottoman, used dragomans to

help them translate important letters or meetings. In this way, even if there was a language barrier, negotiations went more smoothly. Venetian dragomans had to travel extensively and had contacts with various Ottoman dignitaries. These dragomans "were used as messengers of important communications, mediators in peace agreements or negotiations, even as advisers. Their interpretive work brought to the foreign diplomat useful knowledge about Ottoman society and politics."[54] They received access to "confidential discussions and to sensitive documents."[55] Becoming a dragoman thus had many advantages. Because of their important position between both superpowers and the access they had to sensitive information, "European ambassadors found it expedient to buy their goodwill by making regular payments and acquiescing to their occasional requests for rewards and favors."[56] Many dragomans knew very well the privileged situation they were in when they came into possession of important information. The clients realized that it was extremely crucial to provide the dragoman with enough wealth and gifts as a result, so that the translator-interpreter who was proficient in the unknown language could give a correct and complete translation of the required information. To this, of course, the dragomans capitalized on over a longer period. The more they found out, the more money and other additional luxurious goods or functions they demanded.

Furthermore, because of their "linguistic monopoly", they succeeded in playing a key role in translating important documents, which makes it unsurprising that "they were able not only to take part in diplomatic negotiations, but also managed them and sometimes diverted their course."[57] Therefore, correct translations of important documents not only depended on the linguistic abilities of a certain dragoman, but also on his or her honesty and whether or not he or she had a separate personal agenda.[58]

←24 | 25→Dragomans were also regularly involved in espionage practices and there are situations where some translators were not afraid to express loyalty to both camps.[59] This made them suspicious beings to both states, which was a pitfall of their job.[60] Another disadvantage of being a dragoman to either the Venetian or Ottoman authorities was the fact that for many men five years of intensive study was not enough to understand the language.[61]

Furthermore, some men even had to give up earlier because they became ill during their trips or travels or other adverse situations occurred. Others converted to Islam, which made them not suitable for the job, or they became disenchanted with the profession.[62]

To become a dragoman, a young Venetian man (often from a well-to-do family) had to master Turkish and Arabic through intensive study.[63] They were sent by the Venetian authorities to Constantinople, where they spent several years studying under the guidance of an Ottoman master.[64] The position of a dragoman was a coveted one that brought great status to the families from which the young man came.[65] In the following centuries, the position of dragoman became hereditary and the functions were monopolized by powerful Venetian families.[66] In addition, they tried to establish their positions within the web of dragoman families through strategies of intermarriage.[67] Thus, dragomans managed to strengthen their function additionally by familial association, passing on important information from generation to generation in a secure manner. Moreover, in this strategic ←25 | 26→way of intermarriage, the wealth of a particular family was also assured and naturally increased.

These families did not originate solely from Venice, however. Wealthy Dalmatian families also produced dragomans, largely because Dalmatian families had the advantage of being familiar with the Slavic language often spoken across the Balkans.[68] As Rothman says, "interpreters for Greek and Slavic especially were in great demand in the Venetian Adriatic, Mediterranean, and Aegean colonial chancelleries."[69] The late seventeenth century has been considered the heyday of the Venetian dragomanate, which "came to consist of no more than a dozen families, who supplied the bailate with most of its new apprentice dragomans generation after generation."[70]

Dragomans were thus not active in only Venice or Constantinople. It was common for dragomans to be sent to Venetian authorities in the *Stato da mar* (State or Domains of the Sea), of which Dalmatia was a major part.[71] It is therefore not surprising that in the seventeenth century, cities such as Split, Šibenik, Trogir, and Zadar became the most important offices for dragomans.[72] This is where the importance of Zadar in the story of

dragomans begins. Zadar and its surroundings were bought by Venice from Ladislaus of Naples at the beginning of the fifteenth century, in 1409.[73] Because of its strategic location and economic advantages, Venice decided to make Zadar its maritime headquarters, where the Venetian governor or *Provveditore* was also located.[74] In the seventeenth century, dragomans were even sent to those headquarters for months, sometimes years, ←26 | 27→instead of Constantinople.[75] This is why there are so many sources of dragoman documents in the Zadar archives and why most of the contents are from the seventeenth century.

DIGGING INTO THE ARCHIVAL TROVES OF THE VENETIAN DRAGOMAN IN ZADAR

Besides the fact that this *New Diplomatic History* has only recently received attention, it is especially remarkable that no one has yet considered the sources of the dragomans in Zadar as prime ground for research. It is only recently that several historians, including Tea Mayhew, Ivan Pederin, and Nathalie Rothman have investigated the mountains of information to be found in Zadar.[76] The archives of Zadar consist of many kinds of sources, which help reveal more about the importance of this Dalmatian city during many different historical periods. The archival troves of the Venetian dragoman in Zadar are only a very small subset of the thousands of documents that can be studied for various historical contexts and domains. The summary inventory of the Mletački dragoman or Venetian dragoman published by the State Archives of Zadar reveals that the archive troves consist of 58 boxes filled with thousands of letters between Venetian dignitaries and Ottoman officials with the provided translations of important letters by the dragomans. The letters can be dated between the middle of the sixteenth century and the end of the eighteenth century (1797), when the Republic of Venice was abolished.[77] Most of the boxes are dated from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

A major drawback that prevents many historians from studying these sources is the fact that the letters appear in several languages. When opening one random box in the Zadar archives, letters were found in Ottoman (written in Arabic script), Croatian Cyrillic, or the so-called Bosančica-script (regularly used by the Ottoman authorities in Bosnia when answering Venetian letters), Venetian, Greek, and Latin.[78] The first three scripts are the most common. For many researchers this naturally creates a language barrier, which makes them decide to work with other sources.

The summary inventory provides some short descriptions on the contents and themes of the various boxes which the interpreter and mediator had to deal with. It varies from the release of slaves, discussing situations in Greece or Albania, tobacco trade, salt trade, and sunken ships to discussing conflict situations and criminality at the border regions. The sources reveal dragomans encountering *emins*, *pashas*, *begs*[79] and the like from Constantinople, Albania, and Bosnia. By studying these sources, historians and other researchers cannot necessarily focus solely on political aspects, for they also reveal something about the sociocultural and religious aspects hidden within dragoman documents from Zadar. The sources help understand not only how diplomatic contacts between the two Mediterranean rulers proceeded, but also how they negotiated in order to resolve certain situations at the Balkan border and can help find answers to questions related to the dynamic and complex set of rules and norms recognized and understood by both stakeholders. Not only do they provide information about themes, but it is also clear who specifically functioned as a dragoman in certain periods, making it possible to do research about personal networks and how they could be an advantage in state negotiations. In what follows, examples will be taken to show what various themes are dealt with in the Zadar dragoman sources and what contributions they can make to interpreting the Dalmatian part in specific or the Balkan region in general when considering diplomatic contacts between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Venice.

SALT QUESTS AND HORSE THEFTS: EXAMPLES OF COMMUNICATION ABOUT THE BORDER REGIONS

On the 14th of June 1680, the Venetian *Provveditore* (governor) of Zadar received a letter from two Ottoman representatives, of which one was the *emin* of Makarska. The issue revolved around problems with salt in Makarska and the request to the ←28 | 29→Venetian governor of Zadar by the Ottoman representatives to find a solution to the problem:

> To the most illustrious and most distinguished lord and noble lord.
> From us Alibeg Imbrahimagić and Omeraga Mesiović, emin of Makarska.
>
> We bow, and send lordly greetings, to the most illustrious lord, knight, provveditore and general of Dalmatia and Albania, our faithful friend and neighbor, Girolamo Cornaro. Furthermore, we received your illustrious letter, which you wrote, from our man, and the salt which you sent and on which we are utmost grateful, and we are staying true to your service because we see that you do all that is lordly and noble. And now we are going to file a claim to your illustrious lordship against the appaltatore[80] of salt as he is responsible for us being out of salt for forty-seven days. We had such losses on this marketplace that we are now begging your lordship to furnish us in advance and help us in claiming losses from Jerman's heirs, which inherited all Jerman's benefits based on the old deal between the emin and the appaltatore of salt. The deal is that the emin is due to be given twenty-five groschens for every day that there is lack in the salt supply. Thus, we are writing to your lordship so that it doesn't seem that we are claiming losses based on our will. And if you are not going to claim these losses for us, we are going to write to the Grand Vizier to claim the losses from the bailo. We are hoping you will be able to make the claim by your own means. We stay loyal to your service. We await response from your lordship as soon as this man is here.
>
> From Makarska on June 10, 1680.[81]

From this letter one can extract a lot of information that can be used for various types of research. The focus of this letter is, of course, the problem the Ottomans had with salt production in the Makarska region, which was at the time of the letter under their jurisdiction.[82] The Ottomans testify to a problem with the local *appaltatore* of salt, which caused the salt supply to run out for forty-seven ←29 | 30→days. This led to great losses which the Ottomans wished to solve with the help of their "friend", the Venetian governor of Zadar. Salt was an important income in the main cities of the Dalmatian coast during this period. Both Venice and the Ottoman Empire

brought in a lot of income through the export of salt to various regions in Europe.[83] The region of Zadar benefited greatly from its salt production, which shows once again why that part of Dalmatia was so sought after by both powers.[84]

Moreover, it is fascinating to note the way in which the Ottoman dignitaries addressed the Venetian *Provveditore*, here Girolamo Cornaro (1632–90), in the letter. They address him as a "good friend and honorable neighbor", which makes it clear that in diplomacy, friendly encounters between the two great powers were a regular occurrence. However, the way in which both parties addressed each other in diplomatic correspondence was not exceptional. Rothman, among others, argues that "these recurrent expressions of friendship as well as the underlying fear of the consequences of cross-border raids, were themselves highly conventionalized commonplaces in Veneto-Ottoman discourses about the Dalmatian borderlands, having been mediated, transacted and translated by dragomans employed by Venetian colonial chancelleries across the Adriatic and Eastern-Mediterranean over the centuries".[85] It is also interesting to note, when looking at the bibliographical aspect of the Provveditore of Zadar, that Cornaro (governor from 1685 to 90) was known for trying to establish more peaceful relations with the Ottomans on the border during this time.[86]

Another aspect worthy of further investigation is to see in which language the dragoman, who most probably translated this letter into Italian on June 14, 1680, received it. The letter was originally written by the Ottoman dignitaries in the so-called Bosančica or Croatian Cyrillic script. Researchers who have already investigated in dragoman sources testify that many letters in the dragoman ←30 | 31→archives were written in this Bosančica script.[87] This can be explained by the fact that the inhabitants of the region of Dalmatia, who did not have an aristocratic background, largely used the Slavic language in everyday life. Croatian was spoken in everyday life in Dalmatia, while Italian was the *lingua franca* of the higher classes—the nobility and merchants.[88] Italian or the Venetian variant was on the rise in Dalmatia from the Middle Ages. Consequently, people from the lower classes at the local level also started to use Italian in everyday life.[89]

However, historians have noted that in many regions of Dalmatia, Italian was not always predominant. Benjamin Arbel, for example, believes that Italian culture and language only penetrated to a minority of the local elite and that in most cases Croatian or Slavic was retained.[90] Dursteler adds that Slavic was in fact the language used in everyday life by most of the inhabitants of Dalmatia. Italian would only be more widely used in political-administrative situations.[91]

The arrival of Ottomans in the region also influenced language. Ottomans who settled in the border areas also began to use Slavic in everyday life, and Christians who decided to convert to Islam often retained their language habits.[92] The fact that there was such linguistic diversity can be explained from the fact that governance of the regions ultimately fell under the administration of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans, as Douglas A. Howard also explains, accepted "regional variety as a given." The Ottoman Empire grew to such a size in Eastern Europe that it would not have been realistic or advantageous to introduce the speaking of only one language or practicing only one religion, Islam.[93]

←31 | 32→The surnames of the Ottoman representatives who sent the letter also reveal a Slavic linguistical background. They were probably converts or Ottomans who deliberately made their names sound more Slavic. Eric Dursteler explained this by saying that "almost all high officials [belonging to the Ottoman Empire] came from non-Turkish backgrounds" from the seventeenth century on.[94] Studying the dragoman sources written in the Croatian Cyrillic or Bosančica may help to explain how the language situation stood in Dalmatia at that time and how newly settled inhabitants of the border region adapted or did not adapt to linguistic variation.

Another letter, this time written in Italian, would appear almost a century later, on July 7, 1761, from the Venetian *Provveditore* of Zadar to the *Kaymakam*[95] of Bosnia:

> By your subject named Simo, living in Villa Graovo, I was shown your kind paper. He reported to him that his mare was stolen from a certain Frane, son of Bacich. But this is not what happened, since with legal proofs and witnesses, it has been found from the Provveditore of Knin that he, Simo, sold a mare to our subject Marco Vuchdelia, which mare such Vuchdelia

sold, in turn, to another subject of ours, Stefano Malessavich. With legal proofs and witnesses it was discovered that the aforementioned Simo stole this very mare from the same Frane Bacic' thanks to the ministry of the Provveditore of Knin, whom he turned to, and he judged that those who bought it [the mare] from Simo, which stole it, it should have been returned to Bacich. It is also true that a horse was taken from our subject Vuchdelia to your subject Simo. From these things you will know, with your honesty, that Simo dared to cheat your justice and authority with false claims, and moreover, as a thief, guilty of having stolen Bacich's mare, he deserves to be punished. Vuchdelia is still willing to return his horse once he would have returned the money, he spent to buy the aforementioned mare. Being you informed that the facts are entirely different from what was falsely told you by Simo, your subject, I hope that it will be your decision that, if he [Simo] wants his horse to be returned from Vukdelia, he should return him the money paid by the very Vukdelia. Rest assured that, if the claims made by your subject were true, I would have made you justice according to the sacred Capitolazioni that from my side will always be served, and it will be carried on the good friendship and correspondence with the Commanders.

Zara, June 7, 1761[96]

The content of this letter from the Venetian governor of Zadar to the Ottoman governor of Bosnia, regarding an alleged horse theft, was written in a form ←32 | 33→of Venetian dialect. It is clear from the text that the governor of Zadar is drawing attention to a claim made by a citizen of the villa "Graovo" (today's Bosansko Grahovo in Bosnia and Herzegovina near the border with Croatia and the city of Knin), named Šimo, alleging horse theft. In the end, however, it turned out that this same person had stolen a horse from one of the Venetian inhabitants, thus making the situation complicated and leading to possible tensions between border residents, who were subjects of both the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire. The letter showed how tempers could flare at the border regions between the various confessions and subjects of both superpowers, testifying to the need to find a common solution before the conflict could assume greater proportions.

The way in which the Venetian governor showed that the problem had been going on for some time, because authorities from Knin were also involved, indicated the seriousness of the situation and the pressure to solve the problem. The word "justice" and the search for punishment of Simo, who lied to the authorities, is frequently noted in the original Venetian text, which emphasizes a peaceful solution rather than shifting to conflict and fighting. Again, it would be interesting to find out how the dragoman may or may not have exerted an influence in the translation and may have been encouraged

by, for example, the governor to emphasize these words in order to clarify the gravity of the situation to the addressee. How the horse theft finally ended, however, cannot be determined from this letter. It is clear that the authorities were asking to punish the suspicious subject from Graovo. Finally, the sender also emphasized the "friendly" relationship with the Ottoman governor, clarifying once more how both states tried to pursue some kind of policy of peace and common solutions to problems occurring at the borders.

CONCLUSION: SECURING THE FUTURE OF THE DRAGOMANS' PAST

The main purpose of this chapter was to contribute to increasing the knowledge of researchers about the part played by dragomans and their sources in the rich diplomatic history between Venice and the Ottoman Empire. More importantly, the contribution they can make to the part played by the border regions in the Balkans that were divided at the time between two great powers, making them a kind of "peripheral region," but no less important than the centers of both superpowers. From the historiographical point of view, the attention to dragomans as intermediaries has only recently increased and the sources of these trans-imperial subjects can be used to investigate several early modern themes. When looking at *New Diplomatic History* and its pioneers, it becomes clear that studying ←33 | 34→dragomans and their sources can help find questions on new research focused not merely on politics and rule, but also on encounters and diplomacy in early modern everyday life at the border region, where Dalmatia was located. *New Diplomatic History* leaves behind the mainly Eurocentric idea of the dichotomy of "us" versus "them" and tries to find a path between, to give attention to the intermediators instead of focusing only on high officials for research about diplomacy in the Balkans. The importance of words such as "cross-cultural", "cross-confessional", "go-betweens", and "mediators" received more attention here through the scope of *New Diplomatic History*,

by which the idea of constantly clashing superpowers was replaced with the idea of negotiation and interaction, eventually leading to peaceful coexistence within the everyday realm.

Studying dragoman sources, not only from Zadar but also in general, can teach researchers more about how diplomatic interaction between the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire took place, how dragomans did and did not exert influence linguistically, how they influenced border formation, what daily life was like in the Balkan region during Ottoman and Venetian rule, and so on. After all, dragomans, who were not previously considered important factors in the diplomatic relations of the early modern Mediterranean because their involvement was largely informal, were in fact critical and influential players within key political and economic discussions. These individuals were more often in close contact with ordinary people living at the border regions, for example, and therefore had the advantage of mastering the languages spoken by said subjects, thus becoming critical in negotiations between two powers.[97]

The influence of the Venetian dragoman remains understudied to this day largely due to the language barrier that exists among researchers. Researchers need to continue to shift their focus from "the office of the ambassador to a large number of informal diplomatic actors (Jewish brokers, dragomans, renegades, go-betweens, etc.) with different areas of competence, functioning in diverse networks of contact and exchange."[98] Additionally, the profile and function of the dragoman alone raises many questions that are still waiting for answers. We have seen that a dragoman was not merely given the task of translating and interpreting but was also an individual interwoven in a web of relationships and connections – within his own family and across influential groups within larger society – to secure personal power and acquire wealth. The linguistic advantages the dragoman had, which only a few other fellow dragomans shared, put him in a crucial place in society to continue to encourage and simplify daily life in border regions in the Balkans. In turn, original sources show the many diverse types of situations the dragoman had to deal with. The fact that the two letters featured in ←34 | 35→this chapter also appeared in a different language

demonstrates how linguistically diverse the Balkan region was in the early modern period and the ways in which language barriers were only resolved using dragomans. As such, dragomans have been relatively unrecognized key figures in positively pushing daily life forward in the early modern Balkans. Keeping in mind that the letters highlighted here were just two of the tens of thousands of letters in the State Archives of Zadar waiting for researchers, it is hoped that this chapter will encourage and increase their study in the near future, thus revealing many hidden secrets about the diplomatic past and everyday life of this important historical region and undervalued figure.

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10 To know more about the wars and conflicts between Venice and the Ottoman Empire regarding the Balkan region, see for example: Tracy, *Balkan wars*.

11 Zahirović, "The Beylerbey of Bosnia", 5 and 15.

12 de Maria, "Making borders", 69.

13 Tracy, *Balkan wars*, 51.

14 Dursteler, "Identity and coexistence", 114.

15 Toby Osborne and Joan-Pau Rubiés, "Introduction: Diplomacy and Cultural Translation in the Early Modern World", *Journal of Early Modern History* 20, (2016): 319. Birgit Tremml Werner and Dorothée Goetze, "A Multitude of Actors in Early Modern Diplomacy", *Journal of Early Modern History* 23, (2019): 410. Emrah Safa Gürkan, "Mediating Boundaries: Mediterranean Go-Betweens and Cross-Confessional Diplomacy in Constantinople, 1560–1600", *Journal of Early Modern History* 19, (2015): 109. John Watkins, "Toward a New Diplomatic History of Medieval and Early Modern Europe", *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 38, no. 1 (2008): 3. Maartje Van Gelder and Tijana Krstić, "Introduction: Cross-Confessional Diplomacy and Diplomatic Intermediaries in the Early Modern Mediterranean", *Journal of early modern history* 19, (2015): 102. Natalie Rothman, "Afterword: Intermediaries, Mediation, and Cross-Confessional Diplomacy in the Early Modern Mediterranean", *Journal of Early Modern History* 19 (2015): 246. Donald E. Queller, *Early Venetian Legislation on Ambassadors*, (Geneva: Droz, 1966).

16 Osborne and Rubiés, "Introduction Diplomacy and Cultural Translation", 323. Werner and Goetze, "A Multitude of Actors", 411 and 419.

17 van Gelder and Krstić, "Introduction: Cross-Confessional Diplomacy", 99.

18 More information about the importance of these Archives and its sources will follow when some specific cases will be studied.

19 See for example, Eric Dursteler, "Describing or distorting the 'Turk'? The Relazioni of the Venetian ambassadors in Constantinople as historical source", *Acta Histrae,* 19, no. 1–2 (2011): 231–48. Suraiya Faroqhi, *Approaching Ottoman History: An Introduction to the Sources*, (Cambridge University Press, 1999). Eric Dursteler, *In the Sultan's Realm: Two Venetian Ambassadorial Reports on the Early Modern Ottoman Empire*, (C.R.R.S., 2018). Donald E. Queller, "The Development of Ambassadorial Relazioni", in *Renaissance Venice*, ed. J. R. Hale (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), 174–96. Daniel Goffman, "Negotiating with the Renaissance State: The Ottoman Empire and the New Diplomacy", in *The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire*, eds. Virginia Aksan and Daniel Goffman (Cambridge: Cambridge

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20 Dursteler, "Describing or distorting the 'Turk'?", 236.

21 Dursteler, 237.

22 Dursteler, 244.

23 Osborne and Rubiés, "Introduction: Diplomacy and Cultural Translation", 321–3. Werner and Goetze, "A Multitude of Actors", 416. Gürkan, "Mediating Boundaries", 108.

24 Edward W. Said, *Orientalism. Western conceptions of the Orient*, (Vintage, 2003). Werner and Goetze, "A Multitude of Actors", 422.

25 Gürkan, "Mediating Boundaries", 128.

26 Watkins, "Toward a New Diplomatic History", 3.

27 Osborne and Rubiés, "Introduction: Diplomacy and Cultural Translation", 317.

28 Nathalie Rothman, *Brokering Empire. Trans-Imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul*, (Cornell University Press, 2011), 6.

29 Rothman, *Brokering Empire*, 14.

30 Rothman, "Afterword: Intermediaries", 249. The word "Istanbul" has been used by Rothman to refer to Constantinople.

31 Osborne and Rubiés, "Introduction: Diplomacy and Cultural Translation", 314.

32 Osborne and Rubiés, 318–9.

33 Gürkan, "Mediating Boundaries", 107.

34 van Gelder and Krstić, "Introduction: Cross-Confessional Diplomacy", 97.

35 Ortega, *Negotiating Transcultural Relations*, 69.

36 A *firman*, or *ferman* was a sultanic, imperial edict or decree which was made up only by the Sultan. See: Gábor Ágoston and Bruce Masters, *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Facts on File, 2009), 234 and 617.

37 Zahirović, "The Beylerbey of Bosnia".

38 Zahirović, 5 and 15.

39 See for example: Vesna Miović, *Na razmeđu (odnosi na dubrovačko-osmanskoj granici 1667–1806) [At the crossroads (relations on the Dubrovnik-Ottoman border 1667–1806)]*, (Dubrovnik: The Institute for historical sciences in Dubrovnik H.A.Z.U., 1997). Vesna Miović, *Dubrovačka diplomacija u Istambulu [Dubrovnik diplomacy in Istanbul]*, (Dubrovnik-Zagreb: The Institute for historical sciences in Dubrovnik H.A.Z.U., 2003). Vesna Miović, *Dubrovačka Republika u spisima namjesnika Bosanskog ejaleta i Hercegovačkog sandžaka [The Republic of Dubrovnik in the writings of the governor of the Bosnian eyalet and the Herzegovinian sancak]*, (Dubrovnik: State archives in Dubrovnik, Matica

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43 Zečević, p. 418; Antonis Savva, "*Dragomans—The interpreters and translators of the Ottoman Empire*", (Unpublished essay, Centre for Translation Studies University College London, 2019), 9–11.

44 Ljerka Šimunković, "Služba tumača i dragomana u Splitu za vrijeme mletačke uprave" ["The service of interpreters and dragomans in Split during the Venetian reign"], *Cultural Heritage*, 30, (1999); 65–86.

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67 Rothman, *Dragoman Renaissance,* 31–3. This recently published book by Nathalie Rothman is a handy way to start and get to know the different dragoman families.

68 See for example: Gürçağlar, "Patterns of patronage". Rothman, *Dragoman Renaissance.* Rothman has also included tables and diagrams in her book showing, for example, which families the Venetian dragomans came from and how they were linked, by marriage or otherwise. Nathalie Rothman, "Families Represented in the Venetian Dragomanate, ca. 1570–1720", accessed June 23, 2021, https://ark.digital.utsc.utoronto.ca/ark:/61220/utsc5883.

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70 Rothman, *Dragoman Renaissance,* 23.

71 When looking specifically at the situation of premodern Dalmatia, the region was located at the border between the Christian West and the Ottoman East, which made a "possible dialectical encounter with neighboring territories become a reality of everyday life."

72 Šimunković, "The service of interpreters", 72. Monique O'Connell, *Men of Empire. Power and Negotiation in Venice's Maritime State*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2009), 22.

73 O'Connell, *Men of Empire,* 23 and 27.

74 Rothman, *Dragoman Renaissance,* 46. Ivan Botica and Marko Rimac, "Mletačko i turkso dopisivanje ćirilicom na istočno-jadranskom prostoru" ["Venetian and Turkish correspondence in Cyrillic in the eastern Adriatic area"], *Croatian Magazine*, 4, (2012): 24. Pederin, *Venetian Administration*. Josip Vrandečić and Miroslav Bertoša, *Dalmacija, Dubrovnik i Istra u ranome novom vijeku (1420–1797). [Dalmatia, Dubrovnik, and Istria in the Early Modern Age (1420–1797)]*, (Zagreb: Leykam international, 2007).

75 Rothman, *Dragoman Renaissance,* 46.

76 Tea Mayhew, *Dalmatia between Ottoman, and Venetian Rule. Contado di Zara 1645–1718*, (Roma: Viella, 2008), 160–2; Pederin, *Venetian Administration*, 243. Rothman, *Dragoman Renaissance*.

77 Ivana Ćubela (ed.), *D.A.Z.D.-2/SI – 1 Venetian dragoman (summarized inventory)*, Zadar, 2002. More information can be found here: "Archival Material: H.R.-D.A.Z.D.-2 Venetian dragoman fond", *National Archival Information System*, accessed June 23, 2021, http://arhinet.arhiv.hr/details.aspx?ItemId=1_15109.

78 Reading the sources was a personal hurdle and challenge. I do not have any prior knowledge of the languages mentioned, so it does not make it easy to understand and discover anything in the sources. This once again makes it clear for what reason the dragoman sources have not been widely used for research to date and why they are a great challenge for many researchers including myself.

79 An *Emin* was an Ottoman official, which could be best translated as intendant or commissioner. His primary task was to control a specific department or a source, such as salt in this case. See: Bernard Lewis, "Emīn", in: *Encyclopedia of Islam*, second Edition, eds. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573–3912_islam_SIM_2185. A *Pasha* or *Paşa* was "The highest title given to military or civil officials in

the Ottoman Empire". See: Ágoston and Masters, *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire,* 618. A *Beğ* or *Bey* was "military commander; prince, ruler of an emirate or principality; Ottoman governor of a province or sub province". See: Ágoston and Masters, 617.

80 *Appaltatore*, written in the original text as *apaltadur*, could be interpreted as someone who took on a public contract or company. This person received from the Venetian government the exclusive right, the patent, to sell a particular product, which was salt here. *Appaltatore* is still used in present-day Italy with similar interpretations. See: Guiseppe Boerio, *Dizionario del dialetto Veneziano [Dictionary of the Venetian dialect]*, (Venezia: 1586, Republished in Torino: Bottega d'Erasmo, 1964), 38.

81 H.R.-D.A.Z.D.-2 Venetian dragoman fond, FLXVII, Br. 55 St. 9 recto. I would like to thank my colleague Lovre Katić for helping me by providing a transcription and translation of this letter.

82 See for example: Vrandečić and Bertoša, *Dalmatia, Dubrovnik, and Istria*. Baldo Šutić, "Makarsko primorje pod turskom upravom (1475–1684.)" ["Makarska littoral under Turkish rule (1475–1684)"], *Makarska littoral*, 10, (2012): 51–66. Marinko Tomasović, "Zidine grada i položaj muslimanskog groblja u osmanskoj Makarskoj 16–17- stoljeća" ["The city walls and the position of the Muslim cemetery in Ottoman Makarska in the Sixteenth–Seventeenth Senturies], *Makarska littoral,*10, (2012): 69–89.

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84 Serđo Dokoza, "Zadarsko plemstvo i sol u drugoj polovici 14. i početkom 15. stoljeća" ["Zadar nobility and salt in the second half of the fourteenth century"], *Historical contributions*, 49, (2015): 85–125. Tomislav Raukar, "Zadarska trgovina solju u XIV i XV stoljeću" ["Zadar salt trade during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries"], *Works of the Faculty of Philosophy: History Department*, no. 7–8, (1970): 19–79.

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86 Kenneth M. Setton, *Venice, Austria, and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century*, (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1991), 350, 362, 398, and 428.

87 Lejla Nakaš, "Hrvatsko-Bosanska ćirilična korespondencija 16. i 17. stoljeća" ["Croatian-Bosnian Cyrillic correspondence of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries"], *Croatian Magazine*, 4, (2012): 12–16. Botica and Rimac, "Venetian and Turkish correspondence", 24–5.

88 See for example: Benedikta Zelić-Bućan, *Bosančica ili Hrvatska ćirilica u srednjoj Dalmaciji [Bosančica or Croatian Cyrillic in Central Dalmatia],* (Split: State Archives of Split, 2000). Šimunković, "The service of interpreters", 70–1.

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90 Benjamin Arbel, "Venice's Maritime empire in the early modern period", in *A companion to Venetian History, 1400–1797,* ed. Eric Dursteler (Brill's companions to European History, Vol 4, BRILL publishers, 2013), 127.

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92 Eric Dursteler, "Speaking in tongues: Language and communication in the early modern Mediterranean", *Past and Present*, no. 217, (2012): 55. Ljerka Šimunković, *Zlatna knjiga grada Splita [The Golden Book of the city of Split]*, (Split: Literary association, 2006), 43.

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94 Howard, A history of the Ottoman Empire. Dursteler, "Speaking in tongues", 43.
95 A *Kaymakam* or *caimacam* was an Ottoman governor of a sancak, here the governor of Bosnia, "caimacam", Collins English Dictionary, accessed June 23, 2021, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/caimacam.
96 H.R.-D.A.Z.D.-2 Venetian *Dragomans fond*, FLXVII, Br. 36 St. 2 r.-v. I would like to thank my colleague Giovanni Grandi for helping me by providing a translation of the Italian letter.
97 Gürkan, "Mediating Boundaries", 111.
98 Gürkan, 107.

CHAPTER 2

Sipping Coffee with the Enemy: Otto von Essen in Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bulgaria (1829–1830)

SABIRA STÅHLBERG

Abstract: Gathering intelligence is a delicate task: it brings the agent or spy into close contact with local peoples. The agent is exposed to cultures and languages while forming friendships and alliances. These in turn create emotional bonds. A captivating example of such a struggle is the narrative of Otto von Essen (1805–60) from the Grand Duchy of Finland. He took part in the Russian-Ottoman War of 1828–29 and spent more than a year in Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bulgaria as an intelligence officer of the Russian army. This study presents the human side of spying in a historical context in the Balkans. It calls attention to the pitfalls for a foreign agent, such as cultural shock and the intricate emotional and social processes accompanying intelligence-gathering. It also discusses the importance of studying an agent's multicultural and multilingual background, his cultural learning processes, construction of a new mindset, and strategies for coping with encountered discrepancies.

Keywords: Cultural Competence, Cultural Shock, Intelligence Gathering, Intercultural Communication, Otto von Essen.

AN OFFICER FROM FINLAND AS RUSSIAN SPY IN THE BALKANS

Sipping coffee with Ottoman civil servants and military officers was as interesting to lieutenant Otto von Essen as staying in a poor village house, where only maize porridge was available. During and immediately after the Russian-Ottoman War ←41 | 42→of 1828–29, he wrote a compelling, but largely forgotten, narrative of his experiences in the Balkans. Otto von Essen officially took part in the war in the capacity of junior officer and cartographer in the Russian army, but his real task was to gather intelligence in Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bulgaria. A young man apt at learning languages and talented in picking up cultural peculiarities, he soon became friendly with local inhabitants from different backgrounds. His growing empathy and respect for them soon caused a change in his views on the enemy and the intelligence work he was sent to do. The manuscript and journey of von Essen is presented here in English for the first time.[1]

Otto von Essen (1805–60) was born in Sweden's eastern province of Finland on October 1, 1805, into the Swedish-speaking, German-Baltic-Swedish aristocratic family von Essen af Zellie. The war in 1808–09 between Sweden and Russia ended in a major change for this province: the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland was established within the Russian Empire. Many Swedish nobles, who owned land and manors in Finland, opted to trust the Russian Emperor Alexander I. He promised among other things that the Grand Duchy could keep its Swedish laws and the Swedish language for its administration.

Following a family tradition and career paths of other young men from the same upper class, von Essen chose or was persuaded to embark on a military career. Two younger brothers also joined the army. When he was 16 years old, Otto von Essen was sent to the newly established Finnish Cadet Corpus in Fredrikshamn.[2] In addition to the art of war, natural sciences, and other subjects, students learned classical and major European languages, as well as Russian, which was necessary for a career in the Russian army. Five years later von Essen completed his education with the highest marks. After graduation he became a junior officer, *fänrik* (a Swedish title based on German *Fähnrich*) in the suite (retinue or general staff) of the Russian Emperor in Saint Petersburg. The order to join the active army, fighting in the

territory of the Ottoman Empire, arrived in December 1828. In January 1829, the 23-year-old man von Essen was promoted to junior lieutenant (Swedish, *underlöjtnant*) and he set out on a journey which strongly appealed to his youthful ideas about war and adventure.

←42 | 43→The Russian-Ottoman war of 1828–29 was one of a dozen clashes between the two empires. It was not the most significant one, although it had important consequences for the Caucasus and the Balkans: the map of the Ottoman Empire was partly redrawn both in the east and west, with Serbia receiving autonomy, Russia occupying Moldavia and Wallachia, and Greek independence being recognized. Otto von Essen arrived in the Balkans in the spring of 1829, when the war entered a more active phase. The Russian army had overrun Moldavia and Wallachia already in May 1828 and in June it crossed the Danube into Dobrudja. Three Ottoman fortresses in present-day Bulgaria were attacked: Silistria (Silistra) at the Danube, Shumla (Shumen), and Varna on the coast. Only Varna was captured with the support of the Russian Black Sea fleet in October before the army retired for the winter.[3] The next year it was back in Bulgaria: on June 11, 1829, during the Battle of Kyulevcha, the Russians defeated Ottoman forces.[4] A few weeks later, on June 30, the Silistra fortress fell after a prolonged siege. Otto von Essen took part in the Battle of Kyulevcha and the sieges at Silistra and Shumen. Most of the time, however, he gathered intelligence and drew maps in different locations: from the Austrian border in the Carpathian Mountains to the Balkan Mountains in Bulgaria; or with administrative tasks, which required knowledge of local languages and conditions.

Russian troops crossed the Balkan Mountains in the summer of 1829 and arrived at the end of August in Adrianople (today Edirne in Turkey). The Treaty of Adrianople signed on September 26, 1829[5] put an official end to the war, but only in the spring of 1830 did von Essen return to Russia, during the withdrawal of the main army. A plague epidemic caused him to remain in quarantine in today's Ukraine, where he also finished his manuscript. This was the end of his career as a soldier, although he remained in the army and held different administrative positions until retiring in 1853. Otto von Essen

passed away, unmarried and without descendants, on March 21, 1860, in Hakainperä manor, Lampis in southern Finland.

←43 | 44→Analyzing his manuscript, a specific situation must be considered: the journey took place during war when normal conditions could not prevail and the officer in question represented the enemy to local inhabitants. On the other hand, von Essen came from a multilingual and multicultural background, which helped him connect more easily with various people. Although he was young, he kept his own counsel and reflected constantly on his experiences. His narrative is open and clear, except when he discusses gathering intelligence. There is little chance to verify the accuracy of information in his narrative, as there is a lack of comparable sources, but the main events within do conform to general knowledge about the war. Detailed historical verification is outside the scope of this study. The aim here is to focus on the subjective challenges endemic to a spy or foreign agent.

EXPLORING A FORGOTTEN WAR

The Russian-Ottoman War of 1828–29 is internationally far less researched than the later Crimean War of 1853–56 or the war of 1877–78. One notable reason is that only a few countries received autonomy or independence while the situation after 1878 triggered several new national histories in the Balkans. The war in 1828–29 took place before romanticism and nationalism had become the norm in Europe, which limited its usefulness as a national cause. There were also no larger alliances involved as in the Crimean War, which garnered a copious amount of Western European research. A further cause is the advance of technology: the telegraph and photography were invented just after in the 1830s. During the Crimean War, they were adopted for news distribution and propaganda, too. In many countries across Europe, literacy was on the rise and in the second half of the nineteenth century a growing number of newspapers were followed daily by considerable numbers of readers.

The relevance of this early war for scholars and the general audience also remains marginal in Finland. An overall history has not yet been written about the officers and soldiers who served in the Russian army between 1809 and 1917. Attention is chiefly paid to the so-called "Finnish Guard"[6] and the Russian-Ottoman war of 1877–78, when more than a thousand soldiers and officers from Finland made a journey to the Balkans. The national myths created after this particular war still dominate the historical narratives.[7] Comparing von Essen's "wavering" story with the "politically correct" publications and studies created ←44 | 45→since 1878, a high degree of nationalism *ex post facto* can be discerned. In contrast, an international perspective is employed by the author of the present study in several writings on visitors and contacts between the Balkans and Nordic countries. Some of these works also include von Essen's account.[8]

Another problem is the lack of sources. In the National Archives of Finland, only one other junior officer's letters are present from the same period. In contrast to von Essen, who lived to finish his manuscript, Gustaf Ramsay succumbed to typhus in Adrianople.[9] Only one other officer from Finland, Victor Tuderus, a painter and officer, visited many of the same places as von Essen, but fifty years later.[10] Also, the topic of gathering intelligence is almost non-existent for the Nordic countries and the Balkans.[11] Unfortunately, time has not been kind to the documents of Otto von Essen. In the family archive at The Swedish Literary Society in Finland, only his passport for the journey is preserved.[12] The manuscript, written during and immediately after his journey, was published by the writer Harald Hornborg (1890–1976) in 1943. The original documents, together with fifteen letters, were at that time in the possession of family.[13] Otto von Essen himself wrote that he kept a diary because the burning heat kept him confined to his tent in the summer of 1829. The desire for change and escape from boredom motivated him to describe his experiences. The diary was in his view "nothing more than floating ideas and instant insights", which he jotted down "to possibly be able to laugh at them some time afterwards in the future."[14]

INTERCULTURAL LEARNING

The intercultural learning process and its challenges for a foreign agent are the focus of this study.[15] Today, sympathy and solidarity with locals and attempts to see the enemy as human still border on treason. This difficult balancing act between private engagement and state interests highlights the question of divided or oscillating loyalties. Thus, the human side of spying. A comparison between historical and modern situations would be interesting. For instance, using the experiences of international peacekeeping forces. But this kind of analysis is outside the scope of the present study.

Research about intercultural learning, communication, and linguistic and cultural competencies deals mostly with modern situations. The theoretical framework is useful only to a limited extent for historical narratives: there are wide gaps in the documentation and in our understanding of the mental perceptions and thinking processes two centuries ago. The subject of how awareness grows, and internal changes occur can, however, be raised for past periods. As no historical intercultural methodology exists, and methods from only one field are insufficient, the topic must be dealt with from several perspectives and through a cross-disciplinary approach, applying methods from linguistics, ethnology, anthropology, cultural studies, history, literature research, philosophy, psychology, etc. This study shows an example of how modern approaches, concepts, and methods can be applied to a historical source to extract more information than mere historical data.

The discussion of Otto von Essen's intelligence gathering and experiences are structured chronologically, following his journey and cultural learning cycle. This reveals the development of his involvement and gradually expanding understanding and empathy. An adapted version of the *cultural shock cycle* suggested by Kalervo Oberg in 1960 is used here as a framework. Cultural shock is a popular and widely used concept outside the academic world, but it has so far received only modest scientific debate or criticism. The cultural shock cycle tries to explain the adaptation process of a person, who encounters and integrates into a foreign culture.[16]

←46 | 47→The first phase of Oberg's cultural shock cycle, *honeymoon*, reflects roughly the first step here. As von Essen did not experience much of a honeymoon with the Balkans (after all, there was a war going on), it is here called *encounter*. The second phase, *crisis*, is here called *confrontation*: von Essen's crisis about the different cultures was combined with his discovery of the ugly side of war. The following phase, *recovery*, is split into two steps: *insight* and *understanding*, as recovery is far too limited. Indeed, the process of understanding and finding new reference points is much more complex. The final phase, Oberg's *adjustment*, corresponds here to the fifth step, *involvement*. Adjustment can appear in different forms, but here the fact is emphasized that von Essen's cultural learning cycle consisted not only of passive adaptation, but his newly found insights had to be converted directly into involvement and action. The war situation did not permit any delays or waiting for individual psychological processes to mature.

Earlier research has identified three main areas for intercultural learning: an objective domain dealing with tasks and observable behavior; a social domain including relationships and emotions; and a subjective domain, where individual cognitive patterns are brought into the interaction.[17] These aspects are analyzed, and questions are asked about the role of a multilingual and multicultural background for an agent. The influence of friendships for social support and strategies for dealing with discrepancies between personal and professional interests (i.e., intelligence-gathering) and preferences are discussed, as well.

STEP ONE: FIRST ENCOUNTERS WITH THE BALKANS

Junior lieutenant of His Majesty the Russian Emperor Nicholas I Suite Otto von Essen arrived in Kiev (the present capital of Ukraine) in February 1829. The young officer's expectations were high: he was surprised at being sent to war because his age (of 23 years) and position would not offer this privilege under normal circumstances. He wrote in his diary: "a sudden, stormy joy, like a child's, filled all my senses, and only with effort cool reason could,

together with all rational limitations, convince me about the importance of my vocation and the seriousness of the task ahead. Slowly my joy was replaced by a heavy melancholy, when I remembered how much I could lose, how uncertain and dark the future would be, compared to the gain I could draw from this assignment. Only the feeling that I had to fulfill my duty, and the orders of my superiors, restored my tranquility."[18]

←47 | 48→The first encounter with another world took place in the Principality of Moldavia: "after we passed the Dniester and arrived in Bessarabia, a great difference could be seen in everything. Worse horses and roads, enormous steppes, mostly Jews in the guest houses, the Moldavian language, in other words, a completely different country."[19] This is also the same place where fifty years later the Finnish Guard, who were transported by train from Saint Petersburg to Bucharest, suddenly awoke to the fact that they moved into a new cultural sphere. Otto von Essen received in comparison a less sudden cultural shock, probably because he traveled slowly on horseback or in carriages: the changes in the surrounding landscape and settlements unfolded gradually before his eyes. He also had more experience of Russia and knew several languages, which were useful in the communication with local people. Many of the Finnish Guard fifty years later had never been outside Finland and spoke nothing but Finnish.[20]

The next part of the journey was cumbersome: sleighs and carriages in Moldavia were uncomfortable and not strongly built. Wheels "screamed" because of lack of oil and often fell off. The roads were bad, and several horses collapsed on the way. Despite the difficulties, at the beginning of March 1829 von Essen arrived in Bucharest. His first accommodation was a "dirty" Jewish house where fleas attacked him. His multicultural skills were now engaged: to get a better house, he explained to the chief of police who oversaw housing for the Russian officers during the war that he was a very important person in Russia. Otto von Essen mentioned as many names of generals as he could remember, explaining that they were his protectors. He also presented himself as an engineer with a suitcase full of maps and drawings. The official was impressed by his talk and the uniform, removed his hat, and saluted von Essen as a great Boyar, "*mare Bojar"* [Romanian

mare boier]. Within minutes the visitor was brought to a big and beautiful house.[21]

The first experience of the Balkans was mostly negative for von Essen. Mentally the enemy—the "dirty" and "irregular" Ottoman Empire—was in a different category than his "clean" and "orderly" Finland and Saint Petersburg world. The difference between his home in Finland and the lifestyle among the higher social classes in the Balkans was not as big as the distance between upper classes and peasants, as he soon found out: during the first visit to Bucharest, von Essen ←48 | 49→thought the houses were uncomfortable and luxury was lacking except in dress. The streets were "dirty" and horses and carriages "nothing special." The question of women and gender roles is a usual topic when encountering another culture and the (lack of) female beauty a constant topic for most male travelers. In Bucharest, von Essen noted, the women were taught from an early age to look beautiful, but "time and the hot temper" destroyed their beauty. They liked flirting, but he did not dare discuss their morality. The men were much less amiable and socially capable: they looked degenerate, "very feminine, lazy, without scruples." They were uneducated and could hardly read or write their own language, but some spoke broken French. Still, he visited their houses, observed, and gained understanding of their habits and hospitality rituals. Then von Essen would reciprocate by inviting his local acquaintances home and impress them with his knowledge of their traditions.[22]

What kind of intelligence Otto von Essen exactly was tasked to gather in Wallachia is not clearly indicated. He probably had to be silent on the topic —it was a military secret—yet a few clues appear. He was skilled in drawing maps and making measurements. A few weeks after his arrival in Bucharest, von Essen was sent to the still snow-covered mountainous border with Austria. He hired a Moldavian covered carriage, acquired food for a month and set out with his "deputy", who was also his interpreter and organizer. Today the deputy would be called a "fixer": he was responsible for finding accommodation, food, horses or other animals, and carriages for transport. Two armed Cossacks from the Russian army were sent with von

Essen for protection, and four Wallachians were hired to help with the luggage, setting up camp, and other menial tasks.

On the way, von Essen stayed with peasants, merchants, and officials, at inns when available. He visited monasteries, fortresses, and other sights, including the salt mine in Slanik (today Slănic Prahova), where he found a "paradise-like" village. Here he went to the Greek director of the salt mine, acting according to a well-tested method: find other foreigners. The visit was at first unexpected and unwelcome, but soon von Essen was installed in the house. Here he found a world he was used to: luxurious food, intelligent and educated company, and chairs instead of Ottoman divans. He wanted to enter the salt mine but was told to not go down due to the fragile structures. 350 persons and 120 horses were working in the mine, yet it was only some ten meters deep. Otto von Essen threw a silver ruble to the workers, who gathered with torches around the entrance. He could see the salt walls glimmer in the light, but also the workers in rags, a "miserable sight." Only after running up a far hill to take in the beautiful landscape could he calm himself down from the wretchedness seen in the mine.[23]

←49 | 50→The tone in the narrative changed when von Essen found a situation (luxury) and a natural environment (pine and fir forests) he recognized. Everything points to the fact that he enjoyed himself in the Carpathian Mountains. He was on his own without an army and superiors at his back and he could communicate with at least part of the local inhabitants. He also had time to process his experiences so far. Back in Bucharest, von Essen reported in person to his colonel who apparently was satisfied with both the mapping and intelligence work. The maps of the Austrian border were copied and colored by topographers under von Essen's supervision. Now he felt relaxed and at home in Bucharest, visiting parks and taking long walks. He started to "have fun" in the city and its surroundings.[24]

STEP TWO: CONFRONTATION WITH OTHER REALITIES

After some time exploring Wallachia, Otto von Essen commented that peasants were treated abominably. They had "all the faults" of their superiors, but with less understanding. Only when no food was available would the peasants gather roots or prepare maize porridge or bread, trusting in God to give them food. For someone used to the harsh climate in Finland, where famines occurred regularly until the 1860s, this kind of thinking was utterly foreign. The Wallachian peasant family did not eat together, but everyone took a piece of *mamaliga* (maize porridge) from an earthenware jar and sat down to eat it in a corner. This was incomprehensible laziness and laxity to von Essen.[25]

At the beginning of the journey, von Essen held rigid attitudes and did not hesitate to enforce his interests through violence. He also mocked and imitated people. A Jew transported him on a sleigh to Moldavia. His quick ear picked up the Yiddish of the Jew, which he understood through his knowledge of German: "Ick habe gute färdes [Pferde]—gute färdes gäben sie mir 20 Robln—ick bin ein erliker mann—ein armer man[,] verstehe gar nicht zu [ver]handeln" [I have good horses—good horses, you give me 20 rubles—I am an honest man—a poor man, I do not understand how to negotiate]. When the sleigh crashed into a tree, von Essen felt justified in beating up the driver, who reacted with surprise: "Gewalt—wass ist tass? —Waj mir—Gewalt—Pardon" [Violence—what is that?—Oh, me—violence—sorry]. Reaching the destination, von Essen was "again in a good mood" and gave the driver some extra coins as a tip.[26]

Misunderstandings also hampered the journey. At a village near Ursizeni (Urziceni), von Essen wanted to change horses. His carriage scared the villagers, ←50 | 51→who fled from what they thought a local official. Then the villagers tried to convince the foreigner that the Muscovites (Russians) had taken all their horses: "Unused to their cunning and artifice, I was ready to accept, but my deputy said that they usually refuse everything." The deputy told him to change the tone and threaten the villagers with violence: "This farce seemed to me extremely difficult." The locals were not impressed by his tone, so von Essen was forced to give "a hint" to his Cossacks. Half of the peasants were kept as hostages and the rest ran off to get horses. "Half an

hour is the shortest time for a Moldavian to get even the simplest thing—they are so slow by nature", he complained.[27] Otto von Essen commented also on the Wallachians, who "needed convincing" by force: only money or a whip could bring a man to do what he was told. Even a public official or a noble did not feel dishonored when beaten, "he only complained how heavy the beating hand was".[28] These attitudes and actions might be surprising for a modern European reader, but corporal punishment was common in the nineteenth century. Serfdom in Russia was abolished only in 1861, but physical punishment of the lower classes continued and was considered normal. During the war of 1877–78, Cossack whips regularly "danced" on the backs of Moldavians, Wallachians, and Bulgarians.[29]

At the beginning of May 1829, Otto von Essen was sent to Silistra at the Danube, where the Russian army continued to besiege the fortress. From the northern shore he witnessed his first battle, but much regretted not participating in it himself. After crossing the river, his task was to prepare drawings of the Ottoman fortifications and the trenches Russian sappers and soldiers expanded daily. Under the "song of bullets" he learned to work in difficult field conditions. An officer was killed, and von Essen almost got hit by a grenade while standing up in one of the trenches. His work was not finished before he was sent to Shumen, another important Ottoman fortress protecting the northeastern part of Bulgaria.[30] On the way he rode through Küçük Kaynarca (now Kaynardja village near Silistra). Here the peace treaty of an earlier Russian-Ottoman war (1768–74) had been signed. To von Essen the place had historical significance, but he confronted for the first time the cruelty of war: the previously large and rich village was completely in ruins. He noted that it still had many fountains.[31] A similar experience was told in a letter by his contemporary Gustaf Ramsay. He could not explain to his family the horrible sight of a village near Varna: it had "paradise gardens" but the buildings were destroyed.[32]

←51 | 52→The first skirmish Otto von Essen participated in took only ten minutes, a great disappointment. The Battle of Kyulevcha on 11 June, an expected culmination of military success, instead became a turning point: despite fighting bravely and receiving a medal,[33] von Essen was deeply

depressed. Possibly he suffered from post-traumatic stress syndrome. The destruction, killings, plunder, and the sight of corpses of both Russian and Ottoman soldiers were simply too much. The most challenging discrepancy for von Essen was the crushing of his illusions about his "own" people. The booty was rich: food, ammunition, and cannons were taken by less sensitive Russian soldiers, who were both brutal and destructive in his eyes.

A helpless anger at the way the Russians behaved toward captives, local inhabitants and their possessions and houses, and the destruction of food and other important resources permeates the narrative at this point: one soldier filled his tobacco pouch and then let the rest of the tobacco fly away in the wind. Another found a bag of rice and a barrel of prunes or olives, filled his ink bottle, crushed the rest of the fruit with his gun and scattered the products. A visit to enemy positions caused shock: everything was burning and there were hundreds of dead and wounded: "my sober stomach was violently upset when I saw the wounded and distorted corpses, the swollen hands and faces, and this showed me the fate I had avoided myself; it was something I did not think about at all during the battle." When an order came for return to the Danube, von Essen was happy to leave. The road was littered with the traces of war, and the villages previously inhabited by Turks stood silent, wrecked, and empty.[34] In Silistra his heart shuddered when he saw the fortress he knew so well. It had been captured by the Russians a few weeks after the Battle at Kyulevcha: "Now the fortress is only a skeleton", he wrote in his diary, "and not even one house has escaped from the bullets or the fires."[35]

From Silistra Otto von Essen traveled via Kalarasch [Călărași] to Bucharest. An outbreak of the plague limited his movements within the city, and he did not have much time to visit his acquaintances. Soon he was ordered back to the Danube, this time to a camp close to the river on the northern side. The climate was terribly hot. Fog, mosquitoes, and flies attacked the Russian troops. The nights were cold and dark, "like October in Finland", and many of the soldiers and ←52 | 53→officers became ill. He seldom met local people and was confined to the company of his army colleagues. At the beginning of August, von Essen was sent to the fortress of Turnau (Turnu Măgurele) opposite Nikopol in Bulgaria to collect information

about Ottoman troops, who were plundering and burning Wallachian villages. He led a few expeditions, but the enemy crossed back over the river as soon as he approached. The nearby Kalé (Turkish *kale* "fortress") had been destroyed by the Russians. The place was also bombarded from Nikopol when von Essen tried to explore it with his patrol. At the Danube he caught "a cold or some other illness," which was most probably malaria, present until the 1950s in the Balkans. He suffered from a very high fever for two weeks.[36] The fever returned several times during the following months and possibly also shortened his life. At this time the causes and cures for malaria were not yet very clear although the effects of quinine were known.

STEP THREE: INSIGHTS AND DISCOVERIES IN BULGARIA

In September 1829, Otto von Essen was sent to the western part of Bulgaria for intelligence work. From Rahova (Oryahovo), on the Bulgarian shore of the Danube, he rode southwest into the country ahead of Russian troops. The town had been strongly fortified and the reward was rich: the Russian army took a vast amount of booty from the merchant river town. The destination for von Essen was the town of Wratza (Vratsa). The news about the Treaty of Adrianople signed on September 26 reached him on the road. He was dissatisfied and relieved at the same time: "I had expected more [fighting and adventures] from this campaign", he wrote in his diary. He expected an order to return home and homesickness attacked him as never before. The Russian government, however, delayed the withdrawal of its army.[37]

When von Essen understood that a removal was not imminent, he installed himself comfortably in Vratsa. The Balkan Mountains "presented themselves in a fairly advantageous perspective", an understatement showing his admiration for the impressive walls of gray rock rising above the town. His task was to gather intelligence about the Ottoman fortifications and garrison, but the few hundred soldiers left the town before Russian troops arrived. The first accommodation was in the house of the Ottoman commander, which he shared with the Russian general, "living like a prince", but also with a lot of

other officers. Throughout his journey, von Essen looked everywhere for fellow officers from Finland, and he rejoiced in meeting old friends, relatives, and acquaintances. Together with ←53 | 54→his friend Karl Mauritz Martinau (1797–1863) he moved to a watchtower, where other Swedish-speaking officers from Finland often visited. This merry party of young men, many of them relatives and fellow students from the cadet school, caused the other officers to call the tower Helsingfors [Helsinki], after the capital of Finland.[38]

Having little else to do, von Essen explored the town. Another tower, the so-called Tower of the Meshchii, still stands in the town center. Otto von Essen believed that this tower and the solid bathhouse were built in Roman times, but both originate from the Ottoman period. The tower was used by the Ottoman administration for defense of the town, storage, and as living space. A visit to the tower showed that it had been abandoned quickly, probably just before the Russian troops arrived, because "all kinds of rubbish and female things" littered the premises. A rich Turk, von Essen mused, had surely kept his women here. Probably someone told him (he does not mention seeing it himself) that when Turks needed to transport their women, they did it in a "highly comical way". They covered oxen wagons with carpets and then stitched the carpets together with the women inside: "In this way they transport their women, sometimes for weeks, without letting them come out, or see any more daylight than the carpets let through."[39]

Excursions from Vratsa brought von Essen to Orthodox monasteries in the Balkan Mountains. He spent much time in visiting the region and exploring. Possibly he had received the task to investigate, draw maps, and gather intelligence, but from his descriptions the trips seem more like tourism. He enjoyed the fruits of autumn, apples, pears, prunes, peaches, and grapes. He learned to put the grapes into a fountain for cooling before consuming them, so that they "became like ice-cream". Some fruits like quince, similar to apples but harder, were completely new to him. He also observed the lifestyle of the local inhabitants and joined them in the cafes. Especially the Turks at the beginning were "very strange", yet not enemies. The Turkish men sat in the coffee houses and smoked but did not talk much. Sitting alongside

them and sipping coffee soon turned into a daily ritual for von Essen. He observed that the men visited the cafes regularly, but seldom each other at home, so that they did not "cause jealousy". With his cheerful companions from Finland, von Essen went regularly to the public bathhouse. The complex procedures of bathing he explained in detail, finding common traits with the Finnish sauna, a reference to his home.[40]

Otto von Essen's notes about urban life in Vratsa is a very interesting ethnographic account about Ottoman town culture, which disappeared with the flight ←54 | 55→of the Turkish inhabitants from this area during and after the Russian-Ottoman War of 1877–78 from this area. At this point his narrative changes again in tone and feeling. He talks more about details in daily life, his friends, and interactions with local inhabitants, both Turks and Bulgarians. The possibility to share his experiences in his mother tongue with others from the same background and in the same situation, certainly contributed to this attitude change. For persons suffering from cultural shock, or struggling with understanding a different culture, landscape, and language, the possibility to share and talk about experiences with people in a similar situation are useful for dissolving emotional knots and for processing gathered impressions. Recounting experiences to others induce a revision of the past, and offer a chance to begin seeing the events from a different perspective. This aspect of dealing with cultural shock and strengthening intercultural learning has been neglected in research, but it is well known among those who work with international students or migrants.

At the beginning of October 1829, von Essen was on the move again. The first stop was Plewna (Pleven).[41] A delegation of citizens met the Russian troops outside the town, asking them not to enter, as regular Ottoman troops were still present, and they feared clashes. They promised to bring food and, upon arrival in camp, von Essen realized that "it had turned into a real bazaar" with Turks, Bulgarians, and Armenians, selling bread, meat, fruit, tobacco, wine, and all kinds of trade goods to the Russian officers and soldiers.[42] This kind of joint effort to feed the enemy army would fifty years later look strange in the eyes of visitors, who observed the world through the spectacles of nationalism. Before national ideologies reshaped and

sharpened attitudes between different groups, and created the term "ethnic", multiculturalism and multilingualism were accepted as normal.[43] The relatively tolerant social environment in the Ottoman Empire enabled communication and close interaction between different language and religious groups. This openness and experience in multilingual and multicultural communication facilitated the work of an intelligence officer like von Essen, who could pick up information from all groups even though he represented the enemy. His linguistic and cultural competence seems to have overruled this unpleasant fact in the eyes of the local inhabitants.

←55 | 56→Otto von Essen's belief in the good "us" and evil "them" concept received another blow in the next town, Lowtje (Lovech). There he witnessed the return of a young Bulgarian, who had been brought up in Russia. The man was now a junior officer and generally liked by his peers. A trader in Bucharest asked the officer about his parents, and found out that he was a relative. When this Lovchev arrived with the Russian army in Bulgaria, he was met with great joy by his mother, her new Turkish husband, and relatives, who were deeply moved and happy. Yet the officer was "unnaturally cold" and condescending. This destroyed the respect von Essen had felt for him before. The officer should have embraced his family and not looked to the fact that his mother had married a Turk after his father's death.[44] Otto von Essen had by now taken the next step toward understanding the local people.

STEP FOUR: UNDERSTANDING AND ADAPTING

On the way from the nondescript Slivo (Sevlievo) southeast of Lovech, on the road between Sofia and Varna, the fever which had begun at the Danube returned in full force. Otto von Essen had to be left behind in the care of a rich Bulgarian merchant and his wife in the nearby town of Gabrova (Gabrovo) for several weeks. There was no bed, chair, or table, because, as von Essen commented, Bulgarians found all these things "completely superfluous". The floor was covered by a carpet. The men just folded their

caftans, removed their boots, and using the caftan as pillow they fell asleep. He followed the customs of the country, slept on the floor, and sat cross-legged "in the Turkish style". After a few gifts of money and small items, he became a favorite with the hosts and soon had dozens of curious visitors. He noted: "The Bulgarians are wiser than the Wallachians or Moldavians; and they are extremely industrious, and have too much desire for money."[45]

When his health permitted, von Essen was ordered to explore and collect intelligence in the region of the important Shipka pass in the Balkan Mountains. Only the enemy military remained a challenge for him, after friendship had been forged with coffee-sipping Turks in Vratsa and the Bulgarian neighborhood in Gabrovo. In a Turkish village, where von Essen stopped for a night, he encountered an Ottoman soldier. A conflict between his footman and villagers brought Mahmed into the house. The Turk had been wounded at Kyulevcha, but after a first clash of words, the two men sat down together for a coffee. Shared war experiences supported bonding and Mahmed treated Otto like a family member. From Mahmed von Essen received much valuable information about the region ←56 | 57→and he also received the privilege of being invited to visit and host the local village head, Mahmed's brother.[46]

In the autumn of 1829, in the rich Danube town of Svistow (Svishtov), the Russian army was being shipped over the river with the assistance of the local Ottoman administration. Nobody had counted on the crowding of troops, which probably was the result of chaotic organization within the Russian army.[47] Crisis was ripe when Otto von Essen arrived. The task put before him as an intelligence officer was to urgently find accommodation for the soldiers pouring into the town. He was raised in rank to commander of Svishtov. During daily visits he sat down for coffee with the person he called "First Boss of the Place", the "Ajan" or Ayan (Turkish *Âyan*). Mediating is a common balancing act in a multicultural situation and von Essen did not escape it. His actions in Svishtov showed that he had gained a broad understanding about so-called enemy cultures. A conflict between a Russian soldier and Turkish villagers was brought before the Pasha, who called in the

commander. Through diplomacy, von Essen managed to save the life of the Turk and stop excessive beating of the man.[48]

When intercultural learning has reached the point of understanding, communication and solving problems usually become somewhat easier. Having a common language improves mutual exchange. Surprisingly for von Essen, the Ayan understood Russian. He spoke it well but talking in a foreign language was below his dignity. The Ayan had spent some years as a prisoner of war in Russia during the previous war (Caucasus and Black Sea, 1806–12). The two men soon became close friends: the Ayan had a "happy disposition" and they talked about everything "with full trust in each other." All requests by von Essen were met without debate. The friendship gave von Essen the possibility to acquaint himself with other public officers, too. He observed that talking too much, laughing, or walking around the room was unacceptable for a person of higher rank. Silence and a "sour face" showed a renowned man with great wisdom. The Ottoman gentlemen often sat silently together, smoking their pipes, sipping coffee, and playing chess for hours, "to liberate them from the two most despised things: walking and talking." Otto von Essen, however, appeared to have chatted quite a lot with the ←57 | 58→Ayan and gained much information about the town, Ottoman administration, and Turkish customs.[49]

At the end of November 1829, von Essen left Bulgaria for Bucharest. His task was again the same: to find lodgings in the city and surrounding plague-free villages for Russian troops. The plague had created havoc throughout Wallachia and Moldavia and his goal was soon changed into dispatching as quickly as possible the returning army northward. He was also sent along the route toward Moldavia to organize accommodations. The fear of the plague was ubiquitous, and he could hardly get any information or accommodation. In Foktjani (Focșani), the local commander refused to accept him inside the house and told him to wait outside in the snow-covered courtyard. The townspeople avoided each other in the streets. Many villages and streets were completely empty. When he met a deputy from the Divan (cabinet) in Moldavia, he was at first a little suspicious, but this magnate with a long beard proved to be a useful and pleasant acquaintance. The deputy presented

von Essen to all his friends, relatives, and acquaintances in Butuschani (Botoșani) and organized all kinds of entertainment. They were educated and "civilized", and von Essen enjoyed their company very much, feeling at home and finding their contacts useful for his work.[50]

At first von Essen was quartered in the house of a middle-aged widow. Fearing Russian lodgers, she had destroyed all fireplaces in the rooms, except two which she kept for her own use. Arriving late at night in the freezing cold, von Essen was told that the hostess was absent. He did not even blink: "Fully acquainted with all these artifices, I explained that I could wait for her in the passage, and I gave orders to carry my things inside." The hostess rushed into the room in her nightgown, but he told her that he was tired and frozen. She could shout as much as she wanted, but it would have no effect on his decision to stay. Then he simply wished her good night and went to sleep. The next day they talked and when he asked her in the evening if she still thought he should move, she cried: "My God, what are you thinking about!" He stayed for eight days and commented: "My luck was that I didn't come ten years earlier or I might have lost my heart and mind, which I now so heroically defended."[51] In contrast to most later travelers to the Balkans, Otto von Essen's diary does not express the idea of any national or cultural superiority. He even suffered when someone treated him with too much servility. During his trip to the Carpathian Mountains, in Valeni di Munti (Vălenii de Munte), the local bailiff behaved so much like a servant or slave that von Essen felt tormented. The host was afraid to eat dinner with the ←58 | 59→foreigner and sat down only when entreated by the latter, while von Essen's deputy fumed with anger at this breach of etiquette.[52]

In the months he spent in Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bulgaria, von Essen became more aware of different communication and interaction patterns, and he formulated and expressed himself in a way the locals would understand. His cognitive flexibility clearly increased, and he started discarding previous attitudes and behavior while becoming more tolerant toward other human beings. Above countless cups of coffee, he learned not to judge his interlocutors according to their appearance, but to communicate with them in a way which opened floods of sympathy, interest, and information. If he was

biased before, at the end of his journey he had become involved with the people he met and could assess them after an analysis of their personal qualities. This did not save him from emotional clashes, but he could gather information more calmly and evaluate it more efficiently.

STEP FIVE: INVOLVEMENT AND FRIENDSHIP

Intercultural learning and its results depend on several factors, many of them not yet fully researched. Among known factors, which contribute to the intensity of cultural shock and the possible consequences of intercultural learning, are the cultural distance between the "own" and the "foreign" cultures; task discrepancy; social support from "us" and from "others"; duration and temporal clarity, which means that both shock and chances of managing it increase with length of stay; and choice or free will. Those who encounter a different culture of their own initiative usually experience less cultural shock. Also, personal traits like openness, interest, curiousness, capacity for managing cultural shock, experience of living abroad, and language, social skills, and competence influence the process of adaptation.[53]

The fifth step, *involvement*, is discernible already early in the travel narrative, but it grows and develops throughout Otto von Essen's journey. A typical example of his early behavior is a visit to Sinaj (Sinaia), where he tried to talk with the abbot of a monastery: "as my knowledge of the Moldavian language was quite small at the time, I could not talk to him as much as I wanted or know if he had received any literary education." He told the abbot he was Swedish, and the abbot smiled "as if he pitied my lost soul" (Swedes were reformist Lutherans). They drank toddy together in the evening, which "was very much to the taste of His ←59 | 60→Holiness." When von Essen met hard-working monks, he was ready to change his opinion: "They reduced in me the aversion I usually have for these privileged idlers."[54]

Otto von Essen stayed long enough in the Balkans to be able to process his reactions and get involved with local inhabitants. He did not participate

in the war of his own free will, but he had a strong feeling of duty, which however could be modified according to the situation. An incident outside the town of Pleven illustrates how the intelligence officer, in comparison with ordinary officers, managed a smaller crisis using his knowledge. He rode into the town with the Russian general and other officers. On the way back, the group lost its way, and the general became afraid for his life, as several Cossacks had experienced unpleasant "accidents" with Ottoman soldiers. Instead of debating with the general, von Essen, who had the map of the area in his head, dug the heels into the flanks of his horse and rode at full speed through the vineyards, thus forcing the others to follow him. They quickly found the way back to the camp.[55]

In January 1830, Otto von Essen left Botoșani for Iași, missing his friends exceedingly. He was quartered after many quarrels with a person who was defined as a local "prince" (a member of the aristocracy), but the lodgings were so cold that even the wine froze in the bottle. His health suffered and the fever reappeared. A much-expected journey to Botoșani in February ended in high fever and unconsciousness. His friends called a doctor and after two weeks the fever abated, but he was told not to move during the following fortnight. Returning to Iași, von Essen explored the town and the region. The inhabitants in Iași were more educated and richer than those in Bucharest, and the women were much more beautiful in his eyes. A subscription ball almost ended in catastrophe because the Moldavians were strict about rank and heredity. The lesser nobles were more educated than the high aristocracy, so the Russian officers decided to invite them to the ball, too, but this caused a huge uproar and the Russians had to calm the first-class nobles. They had not done their homework with the local inhabitants like von Essen had. He stopped going to the balls after a few visits.[56]

After Orthodox Easter in April 1830, Otto von Essen was transferred to another unit in Njemtza (Piatra Neamț). A month was passed in quarantine at the Russian border and in mapping out a suitable terrain for camps for returning Russian troops. A second quarantine was arranged at the Dniester and here von Essen's fever returned. Finally, in June 1830 he was sent away from the border to a new military unit.[57] Suddenly he felt many things to be

wrong in Russia. This ←60 | 61→would point to a *reverse culture shock* when a shift in values and world view has occurred, and a feeling of estrangement appears.[58]. The misery and mismanagement he could now observe in Russia made him almost wish he was back in Moldavia.[59] One positive result came from the return, however: a doctor told him to start taking "China" (quinine), as his right hand was swollen, and the fever again rose. After a few weeks, he could walk with the help of a stick.[60]

Otto von Essen gained another outlook on life, new values, and precious experience, which were recognized by his immediate superiors during his stay in Bulgaria, Wallachia, and Moldavia. After his return, it appears that his knowledge, skills, and competencies did not impress Russian army officials, because he was not sent for more intelligence work, but became an educator and administrator instead. However, he had gained much: he learned how to get what he wanted through talking, without violence or anger or resorting to forceful methods such as Cossack whips. The example of his attitude change to Jews is striking. Arriving on a Sabbath in a Jewish town in present-day Ukraine, no food was available. Instead of requiring dinner from the local inhabitants, as his colleagues would do, he spotted a Russian in the street and asked him to help with preparing tea. Otto von Essen noted that in some places the Sabbath ended at sunset while in others it ended only at midnight. Although he "did not find the Jews in general pleasant", he explained that they must be respected for their customs and loyalty to their traditions and religion.[61]

EPILOGUE: A FRIENDLY ENEMY?

Nationalism has brought the single, narrow perspective and so-called Other into the mindsets of practically all humankind, but in Otto von Essen's time multiple perspectives were allowed and, if not encouraged by the Russian army, at least not hindered. In contrast to modern spies, he received no formal training in how to deal with local peoples. Literature on the region and language materials were scarce, so he had to learn mostly on location in

the Balkans. In this his multilingual and multicultural background was an essential instrument, which enabled ←61 | 62→him to catch not only words and expressions, but also to be flexible in his dealings with local people.

An often-overlooked reason for rejecting another culture or elements of it is nationalist attitudes, which are clearly visible in the Finnish Guard narratives about the Balkans just fifty years after von Essen. The values and the setting in which a foreign agent worked before nationalism was quite different from the period, when nationalism had defined and constricted mental borders. Other criteria than nation was used for categorizing people: cleanliness and education were two of von Essen's major topics when it came to accepting or rejecting fellow humans. Otto von Essen had little distance to the class of people he himself came from: thus, the cultural shocks were mainly related to the lower strata in society.[62]

A rejection of the "other" culture can occur for diverse reasons according to modern research, but one of the most important reasons is the effort needed to understand and deal with a foreign environment. Processing other languages, cultures, and surroundings requires a lot of energy, concentration, and time. Failures often lead to helplessness, confusion, and negative feelings both toward oneself and the other culture. Homesickness also affects the relation to the other culture. Using one's own language and meeting with relatives and friends, like von Essen did, is a popular strategy. One factor, which also influences attitudes, is the loss of status, but in his case it did not happen, rather, the opposite occurred.[63]

The multilingual and multicultural background of Otto von Essen, his personality, and linguistic and cultural competencies, contributed much to his capability to move between languages and cultures and to succeed in his intelligence work. After the initial weeks of disorientation, when he tried out the languages he knew, he started picking up local languages. As he gathered both language and cultural knowledge, his understanding of the people he met, the value of the information they could give, and the consequences of his own intelligence gathering became clearer. However, the Russian army was interested mainly in his maps and information of the Austrian border, and

Ottoman fortifications and garrisons. Everything else he collected turned out to be important only for himself.

So, was Otto von Essen a friendly enemy? Did his friendships influence the quality of his information and his work as a spy? Certainly, they did. Through his many acquaintances and friends, he knew probably more about the region he visited than most of his colleagues. Yet at no point did his loyalty to the employer, the Russian army, to whom he had pledged his duty and life, seem to be questioned. Or if it was, he did not mention it. The question if the quality of his ←62 | 63→work was influenced by his friendliness must be viewed from the perspective of chronology: most of his intelligence gathering as a spy, a foreign agent, happened in the first half of his journey. After gaining understanding, the border between his intelligence acquisition and personal interest became increasingly blurred. After the war ended, tensions fell in the region. By then he possessed both the knowledge and opportunity to connect closer with local inhabitants and this is the period when he found true friends. Throughout the journey, however, his capability of patiently observing and sipping coffee with people from different social groups in various societies was one of the most important factors contributing to the successful collection of information.

This study has highlighted challenges and issues related to the human side of intelligence gathering, through applying and modifying modern concepts to a historical period. Using present-day concepts and methods naturally poses a risk of speculation, but they can also open up new perspectives in historical research. This sheds light on hitherto overlooked aspects. In the future, hopefully more precise methods can be developed for historical sources. Until then, we should embrace efforts like the ones in this chapter and the new results they reveal.

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1 The Swedish-language narrative was published by Harald Hornborg, ed., “Otto v. Essens minnen från turkiska kampanjen 1829. Med inledning och biografiska notiser,” [Otto von Essen’s memoirs from the Turkish campaign 1829. With introduction and biographical notes], *Historiska och litteraturhistoriska studier* [*Historical and literary studies*], 18–19 (Helsingfors: Svenska Litteratursällskapet, 1943): 187–268. Biographical details are provided on pages 187–91, and they are briefly summarized here. The published narrative is the main source for this study.

2 Fredrikshamn is the Swedish name in general use at the time. The Finnish name of the town is Hamina.

3 The Varna fortress has been swallowed up by the growing city, but the ruins of the Shumen fortress can be visited just outside the town. The present-day Medjidi Tabiya fortress in Silistra is newer than the fortress von Essen observed. Medjidi Tabiya was built between 1841 and 1853 and used during the Crimean War of 1853–56 and the Russian-Ottoman War of 1877–78.

4 The small village of Kyulevcha is located near Provadia and the U.N.E.S.C.O. World Heritage site Madara rock relief in Bulgaria, some 75 kilometers inland from Varna. Russian sources and some English call it Kulevicha or Kulevcha.

5 September 14, in the Julian calendar, still in use in Russia at the time. This date is often given as the official date for the Treaty. In this study, the new Gregorian calendar is used throughout.

6 Officially *The Third Rifle Battalion of the Imperial Lifeguard*.

7 Dorijan Hajdu and Sabira Ståhlberg, “A fly in amber? Nordic-Balkan citizen diplomacy and cultural connections then and now”, *The Romanian Journal for Baltic and Nordic Studies*, Vol.12, Issue 2 (2020): 19–20.

8 See Sabira Ståhlberg, *Färden till Bulgarien* [Journey to Bulgaria] (Varna: Lecti Book Studio, 2017); Sabira Ståhlberg, *Finländska fotspår i Bulgarien och Rumänien* [Finnish footsteps in Bulgaria and Romania] (Varna: Lecti Book Studio, 2016); Sabira Ståhlberg, *Finnish Guard in the Balkans* (Varna: Lecti Book Studio, 2015); Sabira Ståhlberg, ed., *Från Munksnäs till Konstantinopel* [From Munksnäs to Constantinople] (Varna: Lecti Book Studio, 2016); Sabira Ståhlberg, *Resan till Kolkis – Matka Kolkhiseen – Journey to Colchis* (Ekenäs: Villa Schildt, 2014).

9 Ståhlberg, *Journey to Bulgaria,* 30–8. *Gustaf Ramsay’s letters*: The National Archives in Finland, Ramsay family archive.

10 The Finnish Guard took another route through Bulgaria. Victor Tuderus, *Militär och målare. En skildring från rysk turkiska kriget 1877–78.* [*Military and painter. A description of the Russian-Turkish War 1877–78*], edited by Eva Gädda (Helsingfors: Svenska Litteratursällskapet, 2009); see also Ståhlberg, *Journey to Bulgaria*, 76–87.

11 Besides von Essen, ambassador Cay Sundström (1902–59), based in Moscow, gathered intelligence for the Soviet Union during his visits to Bulgaria and Romania 1950–53. See

Ståhlberg, *Journey to Bulgaria*, 176–91.

12 The Swedish Literary Society, Helsingfors/Helsinki, Släktföreningen von Essens arkiv, SLSA 1181. The passport is in the folder 1181.16 A.

13 Hornborg, "Otto von Essen's memoirs" 187, 192, 193; according to the editor, the manuscript consisted of six notebooks and a total of 214 pages; the letters offered no new information to the manuscript.

14 All translations from the Swedish-language manuscript are mine.

15 For a theoretical and practical discussion about intercultural learning, see for example Alexander Thomas, Eva-Ulrike Kinast and Sylvia Schroll-Machl, eds. *Handbook of Intercultural Communication and Cooperation. Volume 1: Basics and Areas of Application* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010).

16 See Oberg, Kalervo, "Cultural shock: Adjustment to new cultural environments," in *Practical Anthropology* 7 (1960), 177–82. The term "cultural shock" was not launched by him, but he quoted Cora DuBois, who already in 1951 held a lecture on the topic. See the reprint of his article and comments in *Curare* 29 (2006) 2–3: 142–46.

17 See Gabriel Layes, "Intercultural Learning and Acculturation," in *Handbook of Intercultural Communication and Cooperation. Volume 1: Basics and Areas of Application*, ed. A. Thomas, E-U. Kinast and S. Schroll-Machl (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010), 119.

18 Hornborg, "Otto von Essen's memoirs", 193.

19 Hornborg, 197. Although von Essen mentions them as separate languages, Moldavian and Wallachian were the same language, written in the Cyrillic script; today Romanian is written in the Latin script.

20 Ståhlberg, *Journey to Bulgaria*, 130. The knowledge about the world outside Finland among the Finnish Guard soldiers came mostly from hearsay, newspapers, journals, Russian war propaganda, and books.

21 Hornborg, "Otto von Essen's memoirs", 214.

22 Hornborg, 200–3.

23 Hornborg, 208–9.

24 Hornborg, 198–214.

25 Hornborg, 200–3.

26 Hornborg, 196–7.

27 Hornborg, 204–5.

28 Hornborg, 202.

29 Ståhlberg, *Journey to Bulgaria*, 55, 82, 109.

30 The fortresses were four: Ruschuk (Ruse) and Silistra at the Danube, Shumen, and Varna.

31 Hornborg, "Otto von Essen's memoirs", 214–17.

32 Letter 1 June 1829, Ramsay family archive, The National Archives in Finland.

33 Order of Saint Anna, third class with rose.

34 The Turks form the biggest minority in Bulgaria. The north-eastern part is still one of the main regions with a Turkish population. In the Ottoman period, Turks were present in the whole area of today's Bulgaria. The advance of the Russian army during the Russian-Ottoman war of 1877–78 however caused a mass exodus from the western parts, where few or no Turkish inhabitants remain.

35 Hornborg, "Otto von Essen's memoirs", 218–20.

36 Hornborg, 221–5.

37 Hornborg, 190, 226.

38 Hornborg, 198 and 226.

39 Hornborg, 227–8.

40 Hornborg, 228–9.
41 From Pleven onward von Essen provides the Russian names of Bulgarian towns in Cyrillic script. Fifty years later this town was besieged for five months by another Russian army, and conquering it became the key to the Russian victory over the Ottoman Empire in 1878.
42 Hornborg, "Otto von Essen's memoirs", 231–3.
43 Multilingualism and multiculturalism were and are still the norm; according to global estimates most of the humanity is both. Nationalism created the illusion that only a single language and culture are possible.
44 Hornborg, "Otto von Essen's memoirs", 231.
45 Hornborg, 231–3.
46 Hornborg, 233–5.
47 Outside Svishtov (now a memorial park marks the location), in 1877, the Russian army constructed a pontoon bridge, over which the soldiers and officers marched to invade the Ottoman Empire once more. The organization had not improved much, however.
48 Hornborg, "Otto von Essen's memoirs", 236–7. In the early nineteenth century, the local elites (*ayan*) were still powerful, especially in provincial towns of the Ottoman Empire. They often formed parallel structures to the state governor offices, *de facto* ruling the regions with the help of their own officials and intelligence officers. Many even had their own armies.
49 Hornborg, 236–8.
50 Hornborg, 237–40.
51 Hornborg, 241–2.
52 Hornborg, 206–7.
53 An overview of the factors, based on earlier research, is provided by Layes, "Intercultural Learning and Adaptation," 114–15.
54 Hornborg, "Otto von Essen's memoirs", 211–13.
55 Hornborg, 229–31.
56 Hornborg, 244–5.
57 Hornborg, 246–8.
58 See Layes, "Intercultural Learning and Adaptation," 115–16; Gerhard Winter, "Reintegrationsproblematik: Vom Heimkehren in die Fremde und vom Wiedererlernen des Vertrauten," ["Reintegration problems: from returning home to a foreign country and from relearning what is familiar"] in *Kulturvergleichende Psychologie. Eine Einführung* [*Comparative Cultural Psychology. An Introduction*], ed. A Thomas. Hogrefe: Göttingen, 1996, 365–81.
59 Hornborg, "Otto von Essen's memoirs", 251.
60 Hornborg, 254–5.
61 Hornborg, 253–4, and 258.
62 Ståhlberg, *Journey to Bulgaria*, 46.
63 For push and pull factors, theories and discussions about culture shock and dealing with it, see Colleen Ward, Stephen Bochner and Adrian Furnham. *The Psychology of Culture Shock* (Second edition. London: Routledge, 2001).

CHAPTER 3

Between (Trans)national and Imperial Perception: A Biographical Study of Stojan Novaković

ABDURRAHMAN İÇYER

Abstract: Stojan Novaković (1842–1915) was a versatile person whose profession could be described as historian, politician, and diplomat. His life could be seen as a circulation between scholarly interactions, his Progressive Party in Serbia, and imperial centers where he held the posts of envoy in Constantinople, Paris, and Petrograd. Novaković was affected by the political decisions he had to implement or became active according to his personal agenda, thus influencing political processes themselves. His career developed parallel national interests for the Serbian Kingdom: as a diplomat, his realist-rational skills gained benefits against various competing empires; as a scholar, he garnered achievements in terms of transnationality, with multiethnic and multilingual communication spaces, experiences, and networks.

Keywords: Stojan Novaković, transnational biography, historian, diplomat, politician.

INTRODUCTION: EMERGENCE OF A NEW ELITE CULTURE

Originally across most empires elites formed the majority of nobles. In time, this changed. The European nineteenth century was epitomized by state reforms (all empires had a monarchical form of government, but parliaments, constitutions, and local municipalities also emerged during this period). In

addition, there were emerging nationalisms within multinational empires, powered by the dynamics of industrialization and globalization and via the emergence of new civil expert cultures. Such professional experts came into being like civil servants, military ←65 | 66→officers, academics, and entrepreneurs, all of whom were able to advance socially and politically gain influence.

These new elites implemented their own ideas to somewhat change the old system with a new one. They tried to implement the concept of the nation-state and with developing technology they were able to provide a rapid transition to increased social mobility in various regions. Fortunately, they had the advantage of being a multiethnic empire with a heterogeneous society. As this Serbian intellectual evolution emerged in the 1830s, elites took steps to improve their relations with Western civilization and culture. Serbian leaders sought to modernize their system of government by raising a native-educated civil servant class. Later, the more culturally advanced and geographically nearby Austro-Hungarian Serbs formed the human capital base of this new official class. Thus, this new elite separated itself from the old elites and saw itself as the bearer of Western culture.[1]

The Serbian Principality got full independence *de jure* in 1878 during the process of implementing the nation-state concept, but in any case, it was still dependent on multiple imperial frameworks (for instance, Serbia maintained its dependency on Austria-Hungary with a secret agreement in 1881). As a consequence, the leading elites were referred to as Austrophilist, Russophilist, or Turkophilist according to their political orientations. Many of the elites were highly educated, spoke several European languages, and moved freely between European capitals. These fluid mobility dynamics gave them a duality for their careers and everyday life that few others had.

As a member of this new elite culture, Stojan Novaković and his transnational and still somewhat imperial perspective will be the focus for this study. Generally speaking, it could be said that he is a great national scholar and protagonist in Serbian historiography, a builder of Serbian history and nationhood in Western historiography. At first glance, it seems his life was national rather than transnational or imperial. There has not yet been

an extensive, detailed, and more transnational treatment of his biography, even if his life, career, and ideas have been adequately researched. Some monographs and many individual studies deal with the biography of Stojan Novaković and his political, propagandist, and diplomatic activities. A large number of works come from Serbian historians, whereby the historiography strongly[2] emphasizes his nationalist feelings. The perspective of Serbian nationhood, which was the central policy of the young nation-state and a major part of Stojan Novaković's career, is at the forefront of most studies. These studies on the whole remain limited to a purely political conjecture ←66 | 67→and documentation. Thus, they remain limited in a mental and theoretical categorization of his life.

The biggest contribution to the biography and life of Stojan Novaković comes from Mihailo Vojvodić, who deeply investigates his political career and activities.[3] The bulk of the contributions of books "Stojan Novaković. Licnost i Delo. Povodom 150-godisnjice rocenja (1842–1992)" ["Stojan Novaković. Personality and Work. On the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the birth"][4] and "Stojan Novaković Life, Work, Times"[5] do not need to be specifically discussed here. In those books, which contain more than 50 articles, authors study the ideas, thoughts, perceptions, friends, and scholarly life from a nation-state focus. Indeed, Ćorće Vuković argues that his efforts for Serbian culture de facto created the Serbian state.[6] Petar V. Krestic translates six letters from Stojan Novaković to Vladan Corcevic[7], where the author obtains a more complete picture of "Serbianness" in that time.[8] Lubisa Z. Antonijević[9] elaborates on the relationship between ←67 | 68→Stojan Novaković and society with a national narrative, without saying that he sought to spread Serbian identity among nonnational or religious communities as a main part of his career. These studies point out his devotion to Serbianness in his everyday life and what he did more specifically for the Serbian state long-term.

In the works that have been carried out on Serbian-Ottoman relations, multilateral relations with imperial actors, and Serbian propaganda in Kosovo and Macedonia, Novaković's diplomatic efforts and abilities get great attention for national initiatives.[10] Although the political and diplomatic

history of newly established states in the Balkans and the drafting of their activities in the Ottoman Empire is quite extensive and detailed, Novaković is but briefly mentioned and only considered as a national political actor without a larger activity horizon.[11] Aleksandra Novakov[12] documented his role in opening Serbian schools in Ottoman provinces and Klara Volarić established his contributions to the Ottoman-based Serbian newspaper *Carigradski Glasnik.*

The most innovative works highlight how Novaković's perception and ideas—scholarly and imperial—were shaped. For instance, Dimitrije Ćorćević,[13] in the book "Historians as National-Builders: Central and Southeast Europe", stresses his thoughts and perceptions about politics and historical science. He claims that he was not primarily a politician, but rather a modest scholar who got caught up in historical research with his sense of fairness and keen judgment. He interprets his life as very accomplished but still definitively nationalist from beginning to end. But considering the fictional approaches of nineteenth-century historians, who have noted that many of his books were censored by the Serbian state publishing house Srpska Drzavna Stamparija [Serbian State Printing House], it is possible that his ideas were not entirely limited to nationalist musings.

Some works emphasize that Novaković has a supranational approach rather than a national one. Thus, they draw attention to the fact that he aimed to create a superior civilization beyond national Serbia. The remarkable study of Aleksandar ←68 | 69→Ignjatović presents both a national and imperial imagination of Serbian historiography, as well as of Stojan Novaković, on Byzantium heritage.[14] Miograd Stojanović touches upon the Hellenic and Neo-Hellenic spirit in his works.[15] Bojan Aleksov argues for his approach to the supranational Yugoslavian idea concerning a greater Slavic Empire.[16] Stefano Aleo analyzes Novaković's notes on a book of the history of Serbia, published by Italian historian Angelo de Gubernatis. Comparing the concepts of both historians, he says that they were closer to supranational ideas and envisioned a confederation in the Balkans.[17] Being a "Turkophile, Austrophile, Russophile", as historians have argued for Stojan Novaković, means his ideas transcended to transnational and greater imperial terms.

Novaković grew up in the time of expanding nationalism and worked in national institutions until the Independence of the Serbian Principality. He was indeed a national worker and builder of nationhood. But Novaković, whose many parts of his life are clear and written, can be viewed from a transnational and imperial perspective.

I take into consideration Novakovic´s life and work by embedding them in the social and cultural history of the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, as well as the transnational networks of scientists, diplomats, and politicians he was a member of. Here the main research questions concern the interplay of science, diplomacy, and politics, as well as transnational knowledge transfer and circulation. How did he understand the homogenous nation-state and multiethnic imperial space? Why did he choose a progressive and peaceful method instead of revolutionary/military actions? What was the central point of reference for his ideas concerning Ottoman authorities? In the first part of the study, I try to show where Novakovic´s childhood and early career life without any national (ideological) frame took place, although he was born and grew up in national borderlands. In the second and third parts, I present his transnational communication, knowledge transfer, and scientific cooperation. This study claims that Novaković's life and career were not just nationalist and that the limits of a homogeneous nation-state narrowed his horizons. It is based on the biography of ←69 | 70→Stojan Novaković mainly from Serbian, English, and Turkish historiographies and also from Novaković's own works and commentaries.

THEORETICAL CONCEPT AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

In sociology and pedagogy, perception and experience were linked to everyday life, and communication was given a central role. Jürgen Habermas extends the *Lebenswelt* [*Lifeworld*] theory by relating structural elements of culture (interpretation patterns, social memory) and society (social order)

with personality and situation-related individual factors.[18] In doing so, he separates the system and *Lebenswelt* that affect the actor, describing the systems (state, capitalism, bureaucracy, market, ideology) as self-directed and not communicative, and *Lebenswelt* as communicative and oriented toward understanding. An individual interacts using his or her experiences with external conditions (e.g. political-social relationships), from which certain feelings and attitudes result. Based on an individual's living environment, social contexts and relationships can be analyzed; social, economic, and political relationships can be made visible and how these affect the individual.

Nationalism as a political concept and analysis category for the history of Balkan states has been done many times. Brubaker defines nationalism as a political and cultural form that is institutionalized in certain areas through practices and rejects the idea that a nation is based on supposedly objective definitions such as language and religion or subjective definitions such as common myths, memories, or self-image. In addition, he sees a dynamic interdependence between the political fields of external homeland, national minority, and nationalizing state, which should be checked in the case of Serbia and the Serbian-speaking Orthodox population in the Ottoman Empire. Billig describes *Banal Nationalism* as a form of nationalism that appeals to patriotic feelings in everyday life. He analyzes the way people experience this in everyday life and bond emotionally to certain nations without always consciously reflecting on it. Politics, networks, and social formations that transcended the borders of nation-states formed in the nineteenth century a new approach in sociology—*transnationalism*. The examined practices of transnationalism by Steve Vetrovec provide a different kind of analysis through social morphology (as social formations that are represented structures or systems ←70 | 71→of relationships or networks), through a type of consciousness (as dual or multiple identifications), through a mode of cultural reproduction (as a fluidity of constructed styles, social institutions, and everyday practices), through an avenue of capital (as a key for understanding globalization and supply, production, marketing, investment, information transfer, management etc.), through a site of political engagement

(as a global public space or forum with political participation), and through (re)construction of "place" or locality (as a creation of translocal understandings).[19]

This chapter aims to describe Novakovic's biographical information between two poles: trans- and (supra)national perception. What is the point of looking at the biography through a transnational approach? Terms such as *transnational* and *transnationalization* now have firm places as buzzwords in academia. Transnationalization stands for political, social, and organizational relationships that develop and move between nation-states and beyond their borders. Cross-border connections and exchange relationships between non-state actors—organizations, companies, individuals—are referred to as transnational.[20] The knowledge potential of a *transnational* approach enables a better understanding of the mobility patterns and fluid consciousness of national protagonists in the age of colonial empires.

Particularly with a view to Serbian history, it is obvious that new elites at the end of the nineteenth century had *transnational* or *imperial biographies*[21], even if they have not yet been examined as such. They did not fit into traditional national historiography. When the biographies of Serbian politicians are examined, more transnationalist moments or actions are encountered. Spiridon Gopcević was born in Triest, studied in Wien, worked as a diplomat in Berlin and Wien. Glisa (Gligorija) Elezović was born in Vucitm, studied in Galatasaray (Istanbul) and worked as diplomat in Skopje. Sima Andrejević Igumanov was born in Prizren and was a merchant in Istanbul, Kyiv, and Prizren. For them, it is true that their worldview was shaped in and by empires and that they were able to build up imperial networks before and after Serbia's independence, which they used for career and life advancement. Laura Meneghello's monograph "Jacob Moleschott: a transnational ←71 | 72→biography"[22] displays in full Moleschott's life and work with a transnational focus, made of networks of scientists, scholars, and politicians that were beyond borders. In much the same way, the transnational aspects of Novaković's career are the main subject of this research.

NONNATIONALIST FACTS OF NOVAKOVIĆ'S LIFE

Novaković was born in Šabac in 1842 and his first name was a Greek name, Kosta. According to Miodrag Stojanović, he got his name from the word Postojan, which means the same as the root of the Greek Kosta.[23] But some claim that the reference point for Novaković is nationalist motivation.[24] He used the name Stojan in his poems and novels and later continued in his books with this name. It is also seen that the two names were written together in his school in 1863.[25] In other words, no source indicates that Novaković was disturbed by being referred to by a non-Serbian name. Even if he was very sensitive about the issue, it would not prevent him from naming his son also by a non-Serian name Mileta, which seems to be of Ottoman-Turkish origin "Millet."

During this period, the Aromanians changed their identities and names to get into the newly formed Serbian elite. If he had an Aromanian ethnic origin, then it should not be overlooked that he may have changed his name for his career and to hide a particular ethnic background. The origin of the second name Novaković is also not clear. His father's name was Jovan and thus his surname should have been Jovanović, not Novaković according to the Serbian tradition. Novaković's parents were not elites and he was born to a poor family originating from Bosnia, Krajina. The father of the family was engaged in carpentry. He attended primary school in Šabac until 1857 with the financial assistance of his teacher. He stood out as a very hardworking student and his teachers, seeing his hard work, encouraged him to be sent to the Belgrade *Velika Škola* [*The Great School*] and supported him financially until 1863.[26]

He was educated in Belgrade, not abroad. According to his contemporaries who studied in Vienna or in other imperial centers, why Novaković chose to study in Belgrade at that time is a controversial issue. Dimitrije Ćorćević claims that ←72 | 73→he refused to study abroad.[27] In some literature there is an ideological bend to this, trying to show this as nationalist passion. In other words, this preference is interpreted by

emphasizing the privilege of having loved his homeland very much and having received his education there. However, the real reason why he could not go to study in other imperial centers was likely to be financial. His family was poor and that he found a scholarship to study even in Belgrade is remarkable. He was the only one of Daničić's students who did not study abroad.[28]

The fact that he was multilingual and could read works in various languages during his school years shows that his abilities developed heterogeneously. Novaković was fluent in French, Russian, German, Greek, and English. He could read Czech, Polish, and Italian. He never learned Turkish or Ottoman. According to Ćorćević[29], he learned languages when he was an adult, but according to Popovic's article, he took Latin, German, French, Greek, and Old-Slavic lessons while at school.[30] His non-nationalist background shaped his career path throughout life. After finishing school, his career alternated between science and education. He worked at the library from 1869 to 1873. In his capacity as a librarian, in 1872, he traveled to Berlin, Leipzig, Vienna, Graz, and Prague to learn about the organization of the work of foreign libraries and museums. According to Mihailo Vojvodić, the reason why he moved to the library was to increase resources to enable Serbs in other regions to read books.[31] In 1872, he became a member of the delegation to establish education for Slavic-speaking populations who remained in Ottoman provinces. In 1873–75 he was a minister of education and religion. In these years he brought and trained students from the Ottoman Empire to *Velika Škola* [*The Great School*] and sent them back to their regions for teaching in Serbian schools.

In addition to Novaković's career, several impactful political events for him and his family were "dirty". It is not clear whether Novaković participated in some national consciousness-raising historical events or even in the Ottoman-Serbian war (1876–78). The conflict that broke out on June 15, 1862 escalated and as a result of the attack on the castle, Belgrade Guard Asir Pasha slammed Belgrade. Afterward, an international conference was held in Kanlıca and the 12-item Kanlıca Protocol was signed on September 4, 1862.[32] He may have ←73 | 74→taken part, according to Mihailo Vojvodić,

in the 1862 Çukur fountain events in Belgrade, where "the Serbs and the Turks clashed" and subsequently played an important diplomatic role in the events of 1867.[33] Novaković's friends, who were in their school years, participated in these events, but it is clear that he did not participate because Novaković was in Sabac at that time.[34] Nevertheless, he wrote to his Montenegrin friend Valtazar Bogišić[35] in 1875, where his wife Jelena stated that she feared Novaković could become the victim of dirty politics in Serbia.[36] After 1875, he was already separated from the state apparatus, but many still came from the state administration to consult with him.[37] Dušan Berić contends that he stepped aside tactically in 1875–78 because of his political disagreements with Prince Milan. In a letter he wrote to Bogišić in 1877, he explained how the Ottoman-Serbian war was beneficial to merchants but harmful to peasants.[38] Mihailo Vojvodić states that the decisions of the Berlin Congress (1878) did not work for Serbia and Novaković struggled to get rid of these decisions throughout his life.[39] But Vojvodić does not take into consideration the internal turmoil within the Serbian Kingdom and ignores Austrian and other empires' dependency on foreign intrigue.

Since imperial dependence was important for politicians in domestic and foreign policy, Novaković participated in this framework. It is obvious that it was difficult to remain neutral in such a politically charged atmosphere and the perception among political parties after Serbia gained its independence was no different than that of the perception of an enemy.[40] He entered the politics of independent Serbia by founding the Progressive Party with the Austrophile Jovan Ristić in 1881. The party carried the ideals of Conservatism, Nationalism, and Reformism based on European Modernism. The author, Branislav Nedeljković, who published the party's letters into a book, interprets them by the way of a ←74 | 75→letter written by Jelena Novaković in the footnote: "Novaković and Bogišić corresponded regularly since 1867, but Novaković stopped correspondence with him, who was Russophile, and became angry against his friend when he entered politics."[41]

Novaković had a lot of knowledge and he always tried to offer a rational and retrospective approach to politicians.[42] In the Serbian case, before and

after independence, elites shaped an ideological and controversial framework for the state. Consequently, he complained that the infrastructure for modernism was not in Serbia. The society's low level of education, political inexperience, and internal political turmoil did not create a positive foundation for building democracy. He believed that in this atmosphere he had to work on educational reforms, constitutional drafting, and laws first and foremost. In 1884, according to Vojvodić[43], he resigned because of King Milan's rejection to move forward with Russia and to resolve the constitutional issue. Novaković thought King Milan damaged the *status quo* by encouraging war with Bulgaria (1886). The king realized how wrong he was with Serbia's defeat and accepted the Macedonian politics of the Garašanin government in 1885. This is what started in earnest the development of Serbian-Ottoman relations.

A DIPLOMATIC CAREER WITHIN IMPERIAL ORDER AND NATIONAL TURMOIL

The striking point is that Novaković endeavored to integrate national interests with imperial interests. Although his ideas and thoughts developed around instilling and spreading national consciousness, they did not constitute a contradiction for imperial policies. The Serbian national policy was not hindered by empire. On his way to Istanbul (1886), he was keenly aware that it was an imperial center and that the Austro-Hungarian empire was next to Serbia and that it was still bound by a secret agreement (1881) after independence. He was also aware that Russian support could be an option to apply. He captured a political coexistence within a certain framework, rather than propaganda in the spirit of constant struggle. In this way he was a sort of proto-transnational realist.

Before going to Istanbul, he met with the Ottoman Belgrade Ambassador Ziya Bey and wrote down his recommendations on a piece of paper. These notes contain interesting and notable advice:

←75 | 76→Ziya-bey said to me: That you should be comical and never despair about anything because everything is changing in Constantinople; that you should not trust anyone much, but that you should keep yourself, and examine the news well and measure it coldly; that dragomans are all big unreliable people; that the sultan is angry with England because of Egypt, but that he is not a friend to the Russians either; that you could insult him very much if you speak to him with Serbian aspirations; that he is very sad, and that he can be very uplifted by some flattering phrase. With one such flattering phrase, the American ambassador courted him and he later stood with him very well. In that flattery, he could be told about his merits for peace, for progress, for education; That the main Turkish policy is: expectivity and distrust towards everyone for the benefit of its independence; He praised Arif pasha, the president of the State Council; He warned the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Artin-efendi for the unreliability.[44]

He was first sent to Istanbul (Constantinople) as a part of the hierarchical order and representative of the Serbian Kingdom. He fitted the profile, as there was a need for a Turkophile diplomat who could ally with the Ottomans.[45] Although it is argued that he was a Turkophile, there is no clear information about his political approaches before he went to Constantinople. Thus, he was more concerned about limiting exacerbating propaganda. Ever the realist, he began to adopt the balance of power policy. It was also one of his strategic moves to meet with the representatives of the Great Powers and ask for nationalist Serbian gains. The general stance of Novaković was to sustain stable and appropriate relations with the Ottoman elites as evidenced by the Portes' fast approval of the Serbian government's request to open consulates.

The actors who provided the mechanism of action in Serbian national propaganda were aware that "small" Serbia needed imperial networks and allies. Therefore, the agreements were made not only for Serbia but also for the interests of the Ottoman Empire and even Austro-Hungary to make all the commercial and cultural mechanisms work. Here, Novaković established the Serbian network within the Ottoman Empire as a part of an imperial-nationalist system. Thus, he played a role in the development of diplomatic, cultural, and economic relations, which often related directly to the situation of Serbs who remained in Macedonia and on Ottoman territory. He also attempted to resolve ecclesiastical issues by persuading the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul to appoint Serbian priests in Macedonian dioceses,

as well as to get an allowance for the establishment of Serbian schools and religious-educational communities in order to bolster Serbian ←76 | 77→identity in the area. He forged a strategy in the Ottoman Balkans and put it into practice: the conclusion of Consular and Trade Conventions (1886, 1896); the establishment of the consulates in Skopje (1886), in Salonika (1886), Pristina (1889), and Bitola (1889); the realization of autonomous religious and educational projects; the foundation of printing houses, bookstores, and newspaper for Ottoman Serbs. It is also noteworthy that Novaković made diplomatic moves for establishing the Ottoman-based Serbian newspaper *Carigradski Glasnik* [*Constantinople Herald*].[46]

There is no concrete example in his life of supporting a revolutionary struggle. Rather, Novaković supported evolutionary struggle and rational methods among imperial politics. Vojvodić does not explain how Novaković achieved success with the Ottomans. He constantly describes Ottoman laziness and unwillingness to work things out, but Novaković tried very hard and often diplomatically danced around them.[47] In addition to Vojvodić, Terzić's argument seems more elegant: he was constantly trying to persuade Ottoman authorities by talking and begging when necessary. His most important *trump card* was that he always emphasized that Serbia should be in harmony with the Ottomans as natural allies.

Experiences through cultural dynamics now turned him to Russia. In 1891, the administration of Nikola Pasić came and recalled ambassadors from all over the Ottoman Empire. Due to such internal political turmoil, Novaković was engaged in scientific studies until 1895. The situation that enabled him to become the Prime Minister in 1895–6 produced solutions to problems through a good party program. The King expected to raise Serbia financially and to continue his Macedonian activities. Novakovic's desire to approach Russia in this administration was the end of his government because both the King and Austria-Hungary did not agree with this. So he resigned. The new government again sent Novaković to Istanbul as ambassador. He continued negotiations and renewed their commercial agreement. In 1899, while the Serbian church with Novaković's support was negotiating, trying to get Firmilian chosen by the Patriarchate as the metropolitan of Skopje and

accepted by the order of the Sultan, Novaković was appointed by special order of the King to Paris and later to Petrograd.

Later, with the 1903 revolution, the Karaćorćević dynasty was established and the Kingdom was now completely returning to Russia. When Novaković returned from Russia in 1905, his Yugoslavian ideas developed and he made statements in the parliament to protect Balkan Christians.[48] He continued his work in domestic politics but was not very active. He became Prime Minister in 1909 ←77 | 78→not because of his party but because of his national reputation as a scientist. In the last years of his life he reached again for the Yugoslavian idea and pushed the idea of a political Balkan Slavic union. As mentioned in his book[49], he tried to keep Serbian, Balkan peoples, and Christian initiatives united in his political thoughts.

AN EXPERIENCE THROUGH SCHOLARLY EXCHANGE

As a scholar, his bibliography totaled up to 400 papers and books in which he contributed to philology, literature, and history. He wrote one book and eight articles a year, and did this for 50 years, working from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.[50] Novaković was primarily a scientist.[51] The remarkable details in some of his works left romantic (nationalist) approaches behind. According to Michael Antolović, the education given at the Belgrade School in the 1860s was given by intellectuals who had been educated at universities in Paris, Vienna, Berlin, and Heidelberg. Furthermore, he had a transnational academic network and even memberships in Yugoslav, French, Czech, Polish, and Russian Academies.

In his historiography, he was influenced by Leopold von Ranke and Francois Guizot. This generation, on the other hand, had the romantic point of view of historiography and used the past for their nationalist ideologies.[52] Imperial aspects are not very common as a result of the alteration of his books in the Serbian State Printing House, done under censorship. His relationship with Leopold Ranke, who was influenced by historiography and his understanding of history, was important. “He was a great connoisseur of

the work of German historian Leopold von Ranke and he held in high esteem one of the greatest French historians, Francois Guizot. (…) One should not overlook the influence of Vuk Stefanović Karađič, Ilarion Ruvarać, and other romanticist historiographers, representatives of Vienna's philological school, and Russian positivists. His theoretical and historical inspirations were coming from the works of the French historian Fustel de Coulanges."[53]

←78 | 79→Novaković, who translated Leopold von Ranke's book the History of the Serbian Uprisings[54] and said that the Serbian nation owes him dearly, was expressed elsewhere by his contemporaries: "G. Novaković loves, loves Ranke a lot: this is nicely illustrated by the enthusiasm with which he pleads for Ranke against Gotschal and Sher."[55] Novaković, who also translated his book Serbia and Turkey in the nineteenth century[56], states in the introduction that the Serbs owe Ranke thanks for opening the European doors to the Serbian question and deserves respect for his actions.[57] Thus, the remarkable point in some works is that Novaković did not manipulate events in medieval history or under censorship push ideas for a nationalist agenda. He carried out his historical studies through rational, objective sources and was subsequently praised by *critical historians*.[58] He collected many documents and sources related to the history of the Middle Ages. Though he aimed to find the roots of the nation-state established from the Middle Ages, he was criticized by nationalist historians for his dispassionate historiography. Stefan Rohdewald argued that he was a scholar among historians who were trying to create the past, who opposed the nationalization of Cyril and Methodius. He attributed a supranational (neither Serbian nor Bulgarian) meaning to Cyrillic and Method.[59]

Novaković evaluated the Serbian and Byzantine, as well as Greek, relationship to assess nation-states with an imperial heritage which was also in his mind a criterion of civilization. His early scholarly life was based on Greek literature and he later studied Byzantine and Slavic manuscripts.[60] Byzantium was a supposed kind of transnational or imperial unity which was pertinent to all Balkan rivalries and Serbian elites.[61] Ignjatovic asserts the imperial imagination of Novaković as follows:

←79 | 80→Novaković emphasized the irrelevance of nation-states in the Middle Ages and also the prospects of revamping the 'Serbo-Byzantine Empire' opting for a more democratic and inclusive solution to future political cooperation of the Balkan nations. Nonetheless, despite anti-nationalistic rhetoric, his and similar accounts could have further helped challenge a nation-state political framework and encourage imperial enthusiasm simply through the fact that they formed a niche of counterclaims that would remain elitist and opposed to mainstream historical imagination.[62]

This could be applied to the *Turks*' imagination of Novaković. The main enemy in the Serbian nation-state and its policies is the Ottoman sovereignty, namely the *Turks*, who supposedly destroyed the Serbian culture and nation. But this propaganda is not explicitly seen in Novakovic's works. Especially when his writings about Ottomans or Turks were examined, when he brought Turks and Serbs together, there is no hard evidence of radical or nationalist ideology.[63] The book of Serbian history written by Belgradi Raşid[64] was translated into Serbian and the foreword was written by Novaković.[65] He researched the book, wanted to use it as a source in his history studies, and for that reason translated it into Serbian. According to Novaković, the Ottoman elements in Serbia consisted of two main groups: the first, those who had a soft policy toward the Serbs, who held a certain amount of property in their hands, and the former sipahis; the second, the Belgradi Raşid group comprised of urban merchants, artisans, and mostly Bosnians who struggled with the Serbs.[66] Novaković took a neutral stance regarding the 1804 uprisings[67] and stated that it was a peasant uprising. Nationalist historians, who claimed that there was a rebellion with Serbian consciousness, criticized him as he mentioned the moderate Ottomans and their administration. In Serbian literature, the death of Petar Ičko, who was the mediator between the Ottoman central administration and peasants and achieved diplomatic success, was spontaneous. But Novaković elaborated[68], while he was in Petrograd, that the ←80 | 81→Russians poisoned him. This was a common example where the obvious nationalist path was laid before him and he chose to go in the opposite, more rationalist, direction.

CONCLUSION: THE (TRANS)NATIONALIZATION OF A SERBIAN BIOGRAPHY

According to Maria Todorova's methodological approaches, while imagining the Balkans, newly established states and their elites in the Balkans have in many cases been relegated to the perception of European negotiators. This perception later deeply affected self-image in the Balkans. The elites who internalized this situation saw themselves as civilized at a lower level and turned into a mass in need of a "superior" civilization. The elites perceived this as a cultural deficiency, believed in the superiority of imperial policies politically, and even tried to establish connections with Western historiography, with European or imperial aspects as critical reference points.[69]

It is possible to draw a transnational biography of Stojan Novaković within the framework of his primary plan of action, with reference points to his academic, political, and diplomatic careers. Novaković has contributed to the development of national culture both through his publications and political and diplomatic actions. He tried to act within an agenda to make one supra(national)—even imperial—civilization. This civilization was in connection with European, Russian, and Ottoman cultures simultaneously. His biography was not encapsulated within nationalist and irredentist politics, but his *Lebenswelt* was repeatedly transnational. His thoughts and perceptions were about interaction between science and nationalism, coexistence and cooperation between nationalism and cross-border networks. Those supposedly opposite poles coexist in his career. He was born, raised, and studied in the imperial order but was also at the age of development of Serbian nationalist ideas. He had nationalist goals in his agenda and these provided him with constant mobility. But cultural rationalism, variability, and non-nationalist communities were a main target of his developing personal policies. One can clearly see the conciliatory aspect of Novaković's perceptions in his letters.

His understanding of the homogenous nation-state and multiethnic imperial space was within Novaković's biography a kind of togetherness. Imperium and Nation, which provided different loyalty and identity for him, always provided an ←81 | 82→environment of action. In general, he saw in the supranational structure of empire, despite criticisms, an integrative state model with which he could identify. The nationalist demarcation for Novaković appeared as a narrowing of spiritual horizons. He was a versatile scientist. It was not for him to deal with domestic politics and intrigues that he considered beneath humanity. Academic experience, as well as theoretical and practical scholarly exchange, enabled a transnational, and later supranational, vision in such a way that he retained the development of Yugoslavian ideas and the potential establishment of a Slavic Empire. Even though Novaković's student life was surrounded by nationalist propaganda, he was strongly influenced by teachers with imperial backgrounds and learned European languages. His education in European languages enabled him to develop European reference points, which led to the formation of a heterogeneous perception, not homogeneous. While working in the library he organized business trips to Europe and took samples from their holdings. He read books of many European writers and historians and later took examples from them in his works. The fact that he gives examples and quotes from Leopold Ranked and Belgradi Rashidi is testimony to his many diverse influences.

Novaković believed in the power of waging an evolutionary national ideological struggle in the interest of empires rather than war, conflict, or disagreement. Dealing with literature and poetry during his school years, working in cultural fields from the beginning of his career, and staying away from domestic political conflicts made Novaković's thought more logically peaceful and rational. It is clear his academic exchange and networks allowed him to have a look at different point of views without feeling threatened. Novaković's conciliatory national agenda was dependent on this grounding. Novaković was mentioned by historians with Astrophile, Turkophile, and Russophile approaches. But above all he was a rational realist. He was aware that it would be difficult for Serbia to achieve its

goals without the support of other imperial powers. His main ideas developed around protecting the Ottoman *status quo*, which was the central policy of Austria-Hungary. He had a good understanding of European diplomacy and developed good methods on how to act on the cultural diversity of the Balkans. Unlike Bulgarian bands, he preferred to consolidate a Serbian presence in the Ottoman provinces through a rational political educational movement—"book and pen".

Novakovic's transition from national borders to transnationality was not by accident. It can be attributed to his non-nationalist *Lebenswelt*, as he was moving among social structures that had not yet fully nationalized in the imperial age. The fact that he was making propaganda for an *external homeland* as a profession and representing it at the political level did not make every thought or interaction nationalist. Rather, his professions meant making an income, not crafting a personal philosophy. Because his books were written for the purpose of nationalist ←82 | 83→agendas more often than not, being in line with his diplomatic profession, and were commonly censored by Serbian state organs, they do not always reflect the reality of his thoughts and perceptions. This partially obscures the facts that have hopefully been elucidated by this chapter. In so doing, we have a more accurate representation of a remarkable diplomatic and scholarly career that has for too long been limited by the agendas of others.

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39 Vojvodić, "Stojan Novaković and Berlin Congress", 183–96.

40 Andrej L. Shemyakin, "Politicheskii Partii v nezavisimoj Serbii" ["Political Parties in the independent Serbia"], in: *Chelovek na Balkanah* [*The Man in the Balkans*], 2006. 199–215.

41 Nedelković, *Correspondence between Stojan* Novaković *and Valtazar Bogisić,* 152–53.

42 Djordjević, 57.

43 Vojvodić, "Stojan Novaković", 46.

44 Stojan Novakovič's note on Zija Beg's advice before Stojan Novakovič's departure to Tarigrad (Constantinople), Belgrad, 27, September, 9 – October 1886, Stojan Novakovič personal Fund, S.N.–119, Serbian Archive. Also see in: *Stojan Novakovič Izbrana Dokumenta* [*Stojan Novaković selectes documents*], eds. Aleksandr Rastovič, Bojana Miljković Kašić, Biljana Stojić, and Jovana Blažić Pejić, (SANU, Belgrad, 2017), 92–3.

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50 Djordjević, "Stojan Novaković: Historian, Politician, Diplomat", 51–2.
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58 Ignjatović, "Byzantium's Apt Inheritors", 60.
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61 Ignjatović, "Byzantium's Apt Inheritors", 87.
62 Ignjatović, 90.
63 Stojan Novaković, *Srbi i Turci XIV i XV veka: Istorijske studije o prvim borbama s najezdom turskom pre i posle Boja na Kosovu [Serbs and Turks: Historical studies on the first battles with the Turkish invasion before and after the Battle of Kosovo]*, (Belgrad, 1893).
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CHAPTER 4

Agents of the Hotel Lambert in the Balkans in the 1830s and 1840s

TOMASZ JACEK LIS

Abstract: This chapter presents selected figures and activities within the Hotel Lambert spy organization, which worked in the Balkan Peninsula during the 1830s and 1840s. It is based on extensive literature and archival documents from the National Museum in Krakow, where the Czartoryski family's legacy is located. After the November Uprising, Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, ex-minister of foreign affairs in Russia, created this organization. He supported the Polish rebellion in 1831 and therefore fell into conflict with the tsar and had to emigrate to France. Once there, he started diplomatic operations aimed at building the independent Polish Kingdom, where Czartoryski would be king. To accomplish this Prince Adam collaborated with France and Great Britain. He organized the spy ring in Constantinople from which spies were sent to the Balkans.

Keywords: Hotel Lambert, Balkans, Prince Czartoryski, intelligence networks.

INTRODUCTION

Adam Jerzy Czartoryski's[1] diplomatic activity occupies a significant position in Polish historiography. Especially in recent years, researchers have drawn their ←87 | 88→attention to Polish emigration history in the nineteenth century, focusing primarily on topics related to the activity surrounding the prince's political camp in the Balkan Peninsula. The reason behind the growing

interest for this topic is owed to three awards given by Jerzy S. Skowronek for the best books on the Balkans (awarded annually since 1997), to Radosław Grajewski aka Żurawski[2], Piotr Żurek[3], and Hubert Chudzio.[4] Jan Marie Kłoczowski and Marek Kornat can also be included in this group. They received the aforementioned award for the critical edition of the writings of Adam Jerzy Czartoryski.[5]

Interest in this topic can also be observed abroad. It comes from historians on the Balkan peninsula, Croatian[6], Bulgarian,[7] and Turkic historians[8], as well as representatives of Western historiography in general.[9] The interest revolving ←88 | 89→around Prince Jerzy Adam Czartoryski, as well as his political camp, is commonly centered around the "Hotel Lambert." It was Czartoryski's associates who were the instigators of many initiatives that they themselves organized, financed, and actively supported. The best example is "Načertanije" [The plane], the genesis of which is directly related to the agents' activities while with the "Hotel Lambert".[10] The opportunities to explore archives after the fall of communism became a prospect for historians from Eastern Europe to deepen studies about their own countries. The Czartoryski Archives and Museum are a perfect example of this. As for Polish historians, the resources of the Czartoryski Archives and Museum are of great value, especially after the destruction of the Rapperswille Museum[11] collections, as it happened to be the largest archival resource relating to Polish diplomacy in the nineteenth century.

Despite this growing interest there still seems to remain a lot of "terra incognita" about the Lambert Hotel. This is the topic of Czartoryski's agents. Nevertheless, they make up a very important factor for future study. Outside of single mentions in publications and broader discussions of particular individuals, we cannot really say much about who the agents of the Lambert Hotel were. In this chapter we will bring greater light to this issue, as well as provide an answer to the question as to why agents wanted to work for Czartoryski. What did their jobs look like? and what were their views and social origins for such an endeavor? The chapter is based on extensive literature, as well as diaries and memoirs from archives and the Czartoryski Museum in Krakow. I utilize the comparative method, bringing together a

dozen or so collaborators on the Prince, comparing their research in terms of origin, interests, and roads by which they ended up in the political camp of the "Hotel Lambert". In this comparison, we start to paint a more clear picture of Czartoryski's intelligence networks in the Balkans.

Naturally, discussing this topic first requires a wider background. Thus, I will also refer to the most important actions in which the intelligence network of Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski was involved. The period from 1834 is an appropriate place to begin due to the fact that the first plans to create an intelligence-agent network appeared then. By the year 1850, Michał Czajkowski[12], the most ←89 | 90→important agent of the Lambert Hotel and upon whose shoulders the responsibility for missions in the east were placed, largely came to an end.

THE FIRST ATTEMPTS TO CREATE AN INTELLIGENCE NETWORK

Adam Jerzy Czartoryski gained his experience in the diplomatic services alongside chancellor Alexander Vorontsov[13] of the Russian Empire. When the Russian aristocrat took the position of chancellor in 1802, he was already seriously ill. Therefore, having at his side a young but already experienced politician, who happened to be Czartoryski, was for him a great help. Despite the generally prevailing opinion that a Pole was supposed to be a "natural" enemy of Russia and the Tsar, Vorontsov was not afraid to entrust him with the most important and classified state secrets, thus placing an enormous responsibility on Czartoryski. Czartoryski returned the trust he received with the best he possessed—diligence and an analytical mind that helped him properly assess many different international situations. This period with Vorontsev was therefore a school of diplomacy for him. "(…) Gratefully I accept all the advice that your sincere friendship spares for me; please believe in my attachment"[14]—wrote Czartoryski to his protector a year before his death (1805).

It was then that he could see for himself how important it was that there be an appropriate network of agents for diplomacy. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, when fighting took place between Napoleonic France and Russia, Czartoryski was a member of Russian Foreign Office and was entrusted with the task of organizing a spy network in Montenegro. The first spy posted there was Marko Ivelić[15]. According to Piotr Żurek, it was the Polish prince who prepared Ivelić[16] for the mission in Montenegro with the aim of rebelling against ←90 | 91→Montenegrin Elders: ruler Petarov I Petrović-Njegošovi (1747–1830), who dangerously fought Russia alongside the French.[17]

Soon more agents came to Montenegro, creating a Balkan bridgehead for Russian spies. Recruiting agents, however, was not a simple thing as evidenced by the figure of another agent with whom Czartoryski cooperated, Aleksander Sapieha.[18] He too was a Polish prince from a family as well-off as Czartoryski. As Jerzy Skowronek claims, Aleksander was initially inclined to cooperate with Prince Adam[19], with whom he was connected not only by belonging to the same state but also by familial ties[20] but was finally convinced by others to abandon his service to Russia and join the ranks of French intelligence. It was on the recommendation of Paris that he made the famous expedition to the south of Europe during 1804–06[21].

Although he was a persistent politician, one of the brightest in Europe, Czartoryski represented the interests of a country (Poland) that was literally not on the map.[22] Besides, not even all his countrymen supported his actions, which can be seen by his rivalry with a political camp named the Polish Democratic Society.[23] Due to this, and especially after an unsuccessful November Uprising, interest in "Polish affairs" by French and English politicians declined. Czartoryski had to think of something new to help his country, as he hoped to finally take the Polish throne, even though he never said it outright. This was probably because of strong opposition among the Polish émigré community, which leaned more toward a republic than a monarchy.[24] Therefore, at the insistence of ←91 | 92→his friends, he decided to act for Poland indirectly, by supporting independence movements in the Balkan Peninsula.[25]

This area became in the nineteenth century, thanks to the deteriorating condition of the Ottoman Empire, an arena of bloody anti-Turkish uprisings. This, in turn, sparked the interest of the great powers: Austria, Great Britain, Russia, France and, to a lesser extent, Prussia.[26] They all wanted to capitalize on the fall of Turkey for their own benefit. Czartoryski, having known the harsh realities of international politics, decided to take advantage of the great powers´ involvement in the east to implement his own plans, namely fighting against the invaders of Poland, especially the Russian Empire. Thus, he decided to support the actions of France and Great Britain, which opposed the expansion of Austria and Russia in the Balkans. For France and Great Britain, Czartoryski's help was useful because he not only supported their actions, but most of all he offered them an opportunity to create an effective spy network, which neither Paris nor London could organize. Historians in the past pointed out that Czartoryski's entourage was surprised by the French and British elites' absence of elementary knowledge about both Russia and Turkey and, more broadly, how they failed to understand the east. Czartoryski then concluded that he was able to provide London and Paris with knowledge that they would not be able to do on their own with their own agents.[27] However, I would go a step further in these considerations. The advantages Czartoryski's intelligence network had was not just because of their valuable skills but more so to their origins. After all, Prince Adam Jerzy was a Pole and therefore also a Slav. Therefore, the spy network he organized was to be based on people of Slavic origin. It was a huge advantage when it came to conducting espionage activities in the Balkans that they employed Slavs who mostly lived there, rather than agents of French or British origin.

Marceli Handelsman, one of the first researchers dealing with the history of "Hotel Lambert", wrote in his multivolume monograph on Czartoryski this way:

> From the very first moment of Prince Adam's emigration life, his foreign policy was not only limited to his personal work and activities of his immediate surroundings, and to activities only in the Anglo-French Center. From the very beginning, he used the help of various people on missions. Moreover, The Prince's immediate surroundings, from which the most important agents were recruited were characterized by great determination and ←92 | 93→patriotic

motives. So, they were not only mercenaries who offered their spy services to someone who paid more, but like The Prince, they believed they had missions to fulfill.[28]

Michał Budzyński (1811–64) wrote about this in his memoirs: "I already felt strongly about him for being the only one to preside over our cause; So, I told the Prince that I always wanted to be ready at his orders, if he should find my weak abilities of any use."[29] In a way, this thesis is confirmed by the fact that the agents were underfunded and yet they remained faithful to the Prince and implemented his policies. Czartoryski was aware of the value of the Polish emigrants who surrounded him. Therefore, for the first time in 1834, he formulated plans for the establishment of an intelligence agency[30] in the Balkans that would cover the entire Peninsula. This date is not coincidental: a year earlier, Russia managed to sign the treaty of Unkiar-Iskielessi,[31] which allowed it to directly interfere in the politics of the Sultan. This in turn met with opposition from France, and especially Great Britain, who feared the loss of influence in the Dardanelles and Bosporus.[32]

THE AGENTS OF "HOTEL LAMBERT": CHRZANOWSKI, WORONICZ, WERESZYŃSKI, ŁYSZCZYŃSKI-LYNCH, CZAJKOWSKI, ILIŃSKI

These events prompted London to support the idea of sending a few Poles on a mission to Turkey, to identify the military strength of the main port, as well as to strengthen it in the event of a war with Russia. These plans were developed by Czartoryski.[33] It was then that several Polish agents came to Istanbul, of which the figure of Wojciech Chrzanowski (1793–1861) deserves special attention.

He was a participant in the November Uprising, who, after leaving for Istanbul in 1835, was to report not only about the Ottoman Empire, but also to help build a modern Turkish army. After the reforms of Sultan Mahmud II, it became ←93 | 94→obvious that the modernization of the army did not bring the expected outcome,[34] which is why more and more voices claimed one

should reach for professionals from other countries. One of them was to be Chrzanowski, who in a few years became a specialist within the Ottoman army.

He came from a middle-class noble family from the south of the Republic of Poland—the village of Biskupice near Krakow. As a teenager he joined the Napoleonic army. He became an artilleryman, even taking part in an expedition to Russia. After the French defeat he did not return to Galicia, but instead remained in the Kingdom of Poland as a member of the local army. During the November Uprising, he did not show much activity, for which he experienced unpleasantries later in exile. He was accused that as the governor of Warsaw he negotiated with Tsar Nicholas, which was partly true. Thanks to that he avoided exile to Siberia, but among Polish emigrants he was considered a traitor. This, of course, couldn't be further from the truth, because although Chrzanowski did make up his mind to surrender, he did it only when the fate of the uprising was already sealed.[35] Subsequently after coming to Istanbul, he became a very valuable agent, one of the best Ottoman military specialists. His broad specialist knowledge could be seen reading the reports he wrote to France, England, or the port itself in 1837, writing about the state the Turkish army was in. Namely, that it was weak, badly organized, and the officers poorly educated.[36] What is worth emphasizing according to Chrzanowski is that one of the reasons for the demoralization of the army was the beating of soldiers by their superiors: "I consider it necessary to order soldiers not beaten while exercising. Usually, if a soldier fails an exercise, it is the officer's fault, who had insufficiently explained it to them. (…) Bodily punishment, if it is to remain, must be used solely for punishing crimes and maintaining discipline, which should be severe but just, not persecutory."[37]

←94 | 95→The success of the Prince in Istanbul, who had become a key informant for Western intelligence, caused Czartoryski to start thinking intensively about expanding his spy network to individual countries in the Balkans, namely the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, whose residents conducted very intense diplomatic activities aimed at unifying areas largely inhabited by Romanians,[38] and also in The Duchy of Serbia

which in 1815 won its autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. The Polish prince was very interested in gaining local elite for his plans. He wanted to link independence actions of the Romanian nation alongside Polish and Serbian nationalist movements.[39] In order to reconcile politicians of both countries, he personally met with some of them (e.g., in 1835 when St. Paris met with Jan Ghiki).[40] His people also co-wrote with Romanian students a document that provided the theoretical foundations for the creation of a united state called Dacia, which was to consist of lands inhabited by the Romanian population.[41] All these activities, both in Paris and on the field in the Balkans, were based on his loyal agents: Janusz Woronicz (1805–74), whom he sent to Bucharest, as well as Aleksander Wereszczyński (?–1879) and Adam Łyszczyński-Lynch (1805–79), who at the turn of the 1830s and 40s were tasked with going to Serbia.[42]

The agents employed by Hotel Lambert can be divided into two types: people coming from the west—mostly Poles who came to cover a specific outpost or those who assisted Tchaikovsky in Istanbul when he became head of the Eastern mission; and the local population, or "natives" as they were called. The "natives" most often served as translators or guides. Such a person was Jan Saih dragoman (Arabic translator), the only, next to Tchaikovsky, permanent employee of the Eastern Mission working in Istanbul. The importance of this character is best evidenced by the fact that when "Czajka" took it upon himself to try to become ←95 | 96→independent from the Czartoryski camp after 1850, it was Saih whom he wanted to recruit to his side in the first place.[43] The locals also had "contacts", thanks to which the most important politicians were reached. One of these people was Nikola Vasojević (1797–1844). In 1840, he found his way to Czartoryski, whom he soon managed to persuade to support his own plans: he wanted to create a small Serbian Montenegrin border on Hołmje state, which would not only be his private principality, but was also important for the Prince as a bridgehead for agents.[44]

To finance these activities, Czartoryski along with Tchaikovsky and Vasojević sought support in various places, from the Vatican to the cabinets of English lords. Eventually it turned out that the Montenegrin prince was

more conflicting and unpredictable than initially thought, and therefore they were unable to convince Cardinal Lambruschini or Lord Beaumont.[45] The plans to establish the principality of Hołmje eventually remained a dream zone, while Vasojević, after triggering an anti-Turkish uprising, later ended up in prison in Constantinople. It is true that he managed to escape from it, but he was later murdered in not entirely clear circumstances.[46]

The selection of collaborators was not an easy task, which also applied to other issues. Please note that other countries (France, Britain, Russia) also had their own intelligence networks, and they had many more funds at their disposal than Czartoryski.[47] Therefore, you had to be very wary about new agents because you might have come across someone as controversial as Vasojević, or worse, a double spy like Antoni Rieth (1811–?). Antoni Rieth came from a Prussian family and was brought to Galicia during the German colonization that was carried out at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Rieth "bought" into Czartoryski's favors with a plan to create an anti-Habsburg uprising, the aim of which was to create a federal Slavic country uniting Western Slavs (Poles, Czechs, Slovaks) and southern people (Croatians, Slovenes). In fact, Rieth, also known as Zielonka-Ritter or Adam Rotter, was an Austrian agent, paid by Count ←96 | 97→Klemens Metternich. After having been exposed in 1846, Rieth, having nothing to lose, revealed all of his knowledge on the activities of the Lambert Hotel and their cooperation with the Illyrian movement Ljudevita Gaja to Austrian intelligence, to whom he offered further espionage services.[48]

Expanding the spying activity to other countries generated not only additional costs, but also problems in the efficient management of the entire project. First, the actions taken by the Prince and his entourage ceased to exist *ad hoc* in nature, but more and more often they were part of a formal policy whose goals were implemented over a sufficiently long time. This change made it necessary to reorganize the work of the Czartoryski camp. Of course, these changes were dictated not only by the needs of "Balkan politics", but also because the Prince became increasingly involved in activities in other parts of the world, including the Caucasus[49] and the Middle East.[50]

Still at the head of the whole undertaking was Prince Adam Jerzy, who was advised by a secretariat composed of his closest associates, including Hipolit Błotnicki[51], and above all Władysław Zamoyski.[52] There was no shortage of agents who were sooner or later sent to various places, e.g., Ludwik Bystrzonowski[53], or the already mentioned Woronicz. It was the so-called authorities who were responsible for managing the entire organization, known as the Lambert Hotel, since 1843. It was there that the most important decisions were made as to what "Balkan policy" would be and by what means it should be implemented. In this time, the Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski bought a building on Iceland St. Ludovic, where he created a center of Polish life in Paris. After Paris, his most important centers were Rome and Istanbul.

The Central Eastern Mission Agency was created in the capital of the Ottoman Empire, headed by Czartoryski's most important agent, Michał Czajkowski ←97 | 98→(Czaykowski) (1804–86), also known as Czajka (Czayka).[54] The establishment of the Eastern Mission was aimed at coordinating the process of managing agents during their missions. The authorities in Paris made the plans, while Istanbul implemented them. In addition, Czajkowski had individual field offices under him, whose agents were directly accountable to the head of the Eastern Mission. Tchaikovsky placed a lot of ambitious goals for the Mission. He wanted to set up one field agency in each of the Turkish provinces and its fiefdoms in the Balkans. Unfortunately, it ended with only plans, because in fact the continuity of activities could only find positive reception in the out-of-town headquarters of Hotel Lambert in Belgrade (Zach, Zwierkowski) and Dobrogea (Iliński). However, in Iași (Michał Dąbrowa-Budzyński[55]), Zagreb (Stijepan Car) and Bucharest (Woronicz), irregular single agents, were active where activities were mainly limited to reporting on the current political situation.[56]

The development of the Main Mission, as well as the field agencies, was first and foremost limited by the finances that barely allowed the agents to exist. The headquarters of the Main Mission was modest and limited to one multiroom rented apartment, where Tchaikovsky often worked with two or three of his co-workers. To remedy the difficult financial situation, he

decided to support the idea that came to the Lazarists, a Catholic order dealing with the redemption of Christians from the hands of Muslims. It consisted in buying a few hectares of land near Istanbul and creating a Polish village there. The agents of the Lambert Hotel, Czajkowski and Wereszczyński, became intrigued with this idea, and they later sought to gain necessary resources and financial aid from Adam Jerzy for the purpose. Before they were able to convince the Prince, which also came at an enormous cost, Czajka, showing excessive independence, did not wait for the consent of authorities and brought the matter to an end by taking over the area from the Lazarists. The resulting name given was Adampol.[57] Naming it after the leader of the Hotel Lambert was perhaps a way to somehow mitigate the rogue behavior of Tchaikovsky. Unfortunately, the Prince's collaborators from Great ←98 | 99→Britain and France failed to share the same enthusiasm, as they completely did not understand the need for this type of place. Consequently, the village which was to become the natural base for the Eastern Mission became just a financial burden for the Lambert Hotel.

It is true that it has become an important place for Poles, still playing an important role in relations between Warsaw and Istanbul. For Czartoryski it was, in turn, a failed initiative because it did not strengthen his position in Turkey, and it turned out to be yet another significant expense in an already severely strained budget. Heavily limited funds and continued underfunding of the intelligence network caused some agents to take out loans to cover their expenses connected with their stay. For example, Franciszek Zach[58], a Slovak who in 1843 took over the post in Belgrade, complained about such problems for many years while working for the Lambert Hotel.[59] He argued that the chronic lack of finance limited the possibilities of the agents to act, as they lost credibility in the eyes of the people they were to convince of the rightness of their actions. Another agent in turn, Ludwik Zwierkowski-Lenoir[60], who resided in Belgrade in the years 1842–43, was ordered to grant additional French lessons, which were partly aimed to help maintain the facility in Serbia.[61] The work that the agents undertook served not only as an opportunity to earn additional income, but also as good camouflage for espionage activities. It often happened that only after reaching a specific

person (consul, important politician) did they reveal their identity while their neighbors or co-workers knew nothing of their actual activity as agents.

The spying activity required a great deal of attention from agents because any inadequate movement could lead to exposure. Therefore, every person who went on a mission was first briefed with instructions which were to be followed thoroughly. For example, in 1847, the agent Wincenty Porczyński aka Czerkis Ahmed Aga received orders from Tchaikovsky to enlist into the services of Sadyk Pasha as a warden or inspector. If he did not succeed, he was still to be as close as possible to Pasha through various activities, trade, treatment, or teaching. He was supposed to take on the identity of Czerkies, who was in captivity; while being with Poles, he learned Polish. At that time, he was supposed to travel around Bulgaria and closely observe the local population. However, as the main agent ←99 | 100→pointed out: "Do all this very carefully so as not to raise any suspicion—in addition be aware of Austrian agents, be aware of agents from the Democratic Society and those who were discovered somewhere, try to get rid of all the ways of Nizu. Therefore, stay away from Poles and those who would not have the sign and password from me."[62]

In addition to observing and eliminating agents from opposing parties, Porczyński, as the alleged Circassian, was to raise anti-Russian sentiments among the peasants while encouraging loyalty to Istanbul. The instruction also contained a code which a given agent was supposed to communicate, as well as the things an agent was to receive. In this case there were 500 piastres [cash used in Ottoman Empire], which was increased by 200 piastres monthly from January 1848, as well as shotguns and broadswords.[63] The agents used false names and documents. Moreover, individual agents could not correspond with each other when they took part in some action, only through the main agency. When writing their reports, they had to use special ciphers that were made in the event that, if the documents fell into the wrong hands, the content would be unintelligible. There were many ways of transmitting reports from field offices to Istanbul agents and each had a different method of operation. The diplomatic French postal services were often used. Furthermore, in Istanbul, Tchaikovsky wrote based on the

information received from extensive reports, which he then summarized and sent to Paris via the hands of Czartoryski's own people.[64]

CZARTORYSKI'S CHARISMA AND ITS MOTIVATING FORCE

It is worth asking, what drove Czartoryski's agents that they swore to serve him faithfully?[65] Adam Jerzy was an outstanding diplomat. He possessed an abundance of contacts and great charisma. He was a conservative and a monarchist, which considering his origin is not particularly surprising. While he supported various independence movements, he was not an advocate of revolutions. He believed more in the outbreak of a conflict between superpowers from which ←100 | 101→an independent Poland[66] was supposed to emerge—preferably under his rule as the king. His associates also agreed with this vision—*Long live Adam, the king of Poland, the Lithuanian prince!*[67], wrote Budzyński in his memoirs. However, it does not seem that the enthronement of Czartoryski was an end, rather a necessity, associated with regaining independence.[68] Of course, the restoration of the monarchy in Poland was a very important element among the Prince's associates. Agents such as Woronicz, Bystrzonowski, or Ludwik Orpiszewski (1810–75), who stayed in Serbia for some time, were declared monarchists operating in the Monarchical Society of the Third May.[69] But among his agents who were later sent to the Balkans on various missions, we can find many people who were not so enthusiastic about the idea of establishing Poland with a king as the head of state. Moreover, several agents of the Lambert Hotel looked for opportunities first within the democratic camp. Ultimately being disappointed with this angle, they passed over to Czartoryski's side. Such a person was, for example, Michał Czajkowski, who would say to Zamoyski: "If I had not loved the Prince, I would not have joined the monarchical ranks so quickly."[70]

Another close associate of the Prince who initially was associated with democrats was Ludwik Zwierkowski-Lenoir. Interestingly, his contacts with the emigre left-wing turned out later to be valuable for the Czartoryski camp.[71] Even though the issue of Poland regaining its independence was a priority for all agents of the Lambert Hotel, the question of its final shape—republic or monarchy—were at least for some of them secondary. The most important agents of the Hotel Lambert working in the Balkan Peninsula were representatives of the so-called "young generation" who were born in the first or during the beginning of the second decade of the nineteenth century, i.e. in the Napoleonic era. This greatly influenced their upbringing because most of them came from the Kingdom of Poland, where the cult of Napoleon as well as the memories of the ←101 | 102→Polish nationalist uprising were still alive.[72] Małgorzata Willaume noticed that all Czartoryski's agents who operated in the Romanian area in the period from 1838 to 1849 had experience participating in the November Uprising.[73] Some of them even participated in it as teenagers. Therefore, the case of nationalism was very important to them, as was the hatred of Russia. The attitude toward the other partitioning powers were of an individual taste and varied.

It is also not without significance that all of them came from medium or small nobility, which certainly made them closer to Czartoryski's conservative monarchist views than the Polish Democratic Society. For example, the father of the aforementioned Adam Łyszczyński-Lynch was a deputy from Białystok, who later settled in his country estate.[74] The father of Ludwik Orpiszewski in turn was the owner of a small village in Kujawy region.[75] Communing with a representative of one of the most eminent noble families of the former Rzeczpospolita, and the Czartoryski family were definitely that, certainly gave off a proud feeling. After all, their fathers or grandfathers have never had the opportunity to serve someone so brilliant. We must remember that they belonged to a generation that was yet to turn into intellectuals, rejecting class unions in favor of the nation. Thus, young people still being nobly born felt strong class ties with an outstanding representative of their former state. Czartoryski captivated not only with his character, in essence, but also with his origin.

Although, as I have repeatedly mentioned, they could not count on too generous a remuneration, the missions as well as the meeting with various prominent political figures surely had to be attractive enough. For Stanisław Drozdowski[76], who was sent to France and Bulgaria to be the first of Czartoryski's agents to take over an entire post, the reward was enough apparently.[77] Staying in Bulgaria was ←102 | 103→the beginning of his brilliant career. In France, he succeeded with great difficulty to obtain a medical degree. However, in Bulgaria and later in Turkey, where he was sent to work in Adampol, he became one of the most important agents of the Lambert Hotel.[78]

Czartoryski's people designated for the Balkans knew foreign languages, were well-educated, easily made contacts, and had the appropriate charisma. Antoni Iliński[79] was a prime example. He was sent to Dobrogea in 1845, where he was assigned to convince local monks that they should turn against the tsar.[80] After spending two years in the east, for fear of expulsion from the subordinate territories because of anti-Russian actions, Iliński decided to move to the Ottoman Empire and convert to Islam and take the name of Muhamed Iskender. After converting to Islam, he continued his cooperation with Czartoryski. A Muslim could serve in the army of the Sultan and he was now an Ottoman Empire citizen, so his value as a Lambert Hotel spy only increased exponentially.

Although the agents had personal ties of sympathy with the Prince, as well as oaths of loyalty, they nevertheless showed a lot of independence, which was not always appreciated by the Prince and his colleagues from the management agency. Ludwik Bystrzonowski, one of Czartoryski's most respected agents, rejected the offer of accommodation at the Hotel's premises because he believed that he would become too dependent on the Prince. Moreover, he criticized in his memoirs the Czartoryski and Zamoyski conservatism, not understanding that they did not share his enthusiasm.[81] Also, Chief Agent Tchaikovsky was often accused of going too far independently, as in the case of the purchase of Adampol. The differences between him and Czartoryski, and especially with Zamoyski, were getting

bigger and bigger every year, which finally ended with the replacement of Czayke with Kościelski after he decided to convert to Islam in 1850.[82]

←103 | 104→For some agents, cooperation with Czartoryski was an opportunity to pursue their own plans. This is the way Franciszek Zach treated his service. A Slovak who, before enlisting in the service of Prince Czartoryski, was already known among southern Slavs.[83] At the same time, he was strongly associated with Poland's émigré community, as he took part as a volunteer in the November Uprising. Like most emigrants, he went to France where he was active in the Polish community. At the same time, he never ceased to be a "Czechoslovakian" as Handelsman called him.[84] Therefore, he was an extremely valuable asset of the Prince. On the other hand, however, it is difficult to say whether it was Czartoryski who benefited more from cooperation with Zach, or Zach with Czartoryski? Working for the Hotel Lambert did not actually affect his actions which were to unite south Slavs into one state entity.[85] Thanks to the Polish prince he gained an excellent protector as well as additional funds for the implementation of these activities.

CONCLUSION

The activities of Hotel Lambert's agents in the Balkans have been researched in the past mainly in the context of individual actions that were conducted in different countries. Agents have only been mentioned occasionally. This chapter tried to look at the issue a bit differently; therefore, the individual missions have been treated as an important background, with attention focused on specific people who swore allegiance to Czartoryski and decided to spy for him.

This group consisted mostly of young people, Poles, people who were very positive toward the Polish cause of independence and derived from middle-class nobility. They treated their operations primarily as missions that in the first place were intended to enable the restoration of an independent Poland as well as to weaken the influence of the partitioning

powers, especially Russia. The desire to restore the monarchy in Poland was also important, of course, as a part of the Czartoryski dynasty. Nevertheless, this goal was a priority for only some agents. Considering the financial problems that they struggled with, it is hard to presume that they cared about financial success, although it cannot be ruled out that an adventurous lifestyle, for which one was paid after all, might have been attractive for people like Antoni Iliński. The agents' attitude toward the inhabitants of the ←104 | 105→Balkan Peninsula was generally positive. They were not treated solely to achieve the goals of weakening Russia, but through the activities carried out, efforts were made to ensure their economic and political situation got better. This, in turn, meant that the local Ottoman administration had a negative attitude toward the agents.

The agents of Hotel Lambert had to be knowledgeable about the places and people where they were directed to, because their lack of knowledge made them commit simple mistakes which in turn were exploited by agents from enemy camps. Therefore, the services of people such as Franciszek Zach were gladly accepted, who before joining the ranks of Czartoryski´s agents, was a famous philosopher's activist among southern Slavs. It was this Slavic origin of the Prince's many associates that was one of the arguments that Czartoryski referred to when trying to win sponsors in Great Britain and France. In all honesty, most of the actions taken by the agents of Hotel Lambert were not successful. The agents aren´t the only ones to be blamed, but above all, Czartoryski´s very assumption that he will be able to seriously compete with the more professional and properly financed state spy networks of Russia and Austria was usually at fault. Focusing, however, on the agents, it should be noted that, despite their many positive qualities and so-called soft skills that allowed them to gain local acceptance, they were in fact *amateurs in terms of espionage*. They underwent no training, and their selection was highly subjective.

Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski was the main figure of Polish emigration after the November Uprising in France. Although he did not achieve his goal —he did not create an independent Kingdom of Poland over which he would be King—lot of his activities had far-reached consequences. For example,

there appeared a plan to create an independent land of South Slavs, which was provisionally accepted by Serbian politician Ilije Garšanin. The activities of the Lambert Hotel were important from the perspective of the many nationalist movements emerging in the Balkans. Prince Czartoryski was the author of the idea of creating a network of spies who could sabotage the activities of spies from Russia and Austria—the invaders of Poland. He chose young people as his collaborators, born at the turn of the nineteenth century, who just like him emigrated to France. Together, in what today could only be considered a rag tag band of compatriots, underfunded and under-equipped, they achieved far beyond what a realistic portfolio of espionage should have been. To date, these individuals and what motivated them have been under-appreciated and under-researched. Hopefully, this chapter is but a beginning step to put a stop to that oversight when it comes to the history of Balkan intelligence activities.

←105 | 106→

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1 Adam Jerzy Czartoryski (1770–1861) was a Polish prince, a member of the aristocratic family of Czartoryski. He was a friend and collaborator of the Russian Monarch Aleksander I Romanov and the Foreign Minister of the Russian Empire (1804–6). After the November Uprising (1831) he was the first President of the Polish National Government. As a result of the setback of this independence uprising, he first migrated to England and then to France, where he was a leader of the Polish diaspora in France. He was involved in non-official Polish diplomatic politics; the organization is called "Politic of Hotel Lambert" from his name because France was his home as well as that of Hotel Lambert at Sand-Louis Island.

2 Radosław Żurawski vel Grajewski, *Wielka Brytania w dyplomacji księcia Adama Jerzego Czartoryskiego w okresie kryzysu wschodniego (1832–41)* [*Great Britain in diplomacy of Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski with eastern crisis period*] (Warsaw: Semper, 1999). I would like to thank my colleague Krystian Horslund for helping me by translating the paper and the notes.

3 Piotr Żurek, *Czarnogórcy i Serbowie w rosyjskiej polityce księcia Adama Jerzego Czartoryskiego (1802–06)*, [*Montenegrins and Serbs in Russian political of Adam Jerzy Czartoryski*] (Cracow: Homini, 2009).

4 Hubert Chudzio, *Polityk Hotelu Lambert Ludwik Bystrzonowski (1797–1878)* [*Hotel Lamberts' politician Ludwik Bystrzonowski (1797–1878)*] (Krakow: Publishing House of the Pedagogical Academy in Krakow, 2008).

5 Adam Czartoryski, *Rozważania o dyplomacji* [*Thinking about diplomacy*], eds. Marek Kornat and Jan Maria Kłoczowski, (Warsaw: Literary Publishing House, 2011).

6 Jaroslav Šidak, "Hotel Lambert i Hrvati" ["Hotel Lambert and the Croats"], in *Studies in Croatian history of the nineteenth century*, ed. Jaroslav Šidak, (Zagreb: Institute of Croatian History, 1973), 167–77; Jaroslav Šidak, "Czartoryski i Hrvati" ["Czartoryski and the Croats"], in *Croatian Encyclopedia,* vol. 4, ed. Mete Ujević, (Zagreb: Croatian Consortium Encyclopedia, 1942), 174–5.

7 Wanda Smohovska-Petrova, *Михаил Чайковски-Садък паша и българското възраждане* [*Mikhail Tchaikovsky-Sadak Pasha and the Bulgarian Revival*], (Sofia: Publishing House of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, 1973); Aleksander Zlatanov, "Niepublikowane wspomnienia o Michale Czajkowskim-Sadyku Paszy" ["Unpublished memoires about Michal Tchaikovsku"], *Studies in the History of Russia and Central and Eastern Europe*, 53, no. 2, (2018): 111–30.

8 Hakan Demir, "Polonyali Hotel Lambert ve bűyűk sirbistan 'Načertanje' plani (1840–4)" ["Polish Hotel Lambert and great serbia 'Načertanje' plan (1840–4)"], *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, 2, no. 1, (2013): 271–310.

9 Hans Henning Hahn, *Aussenpolitik in der Emigration. Die Exidiplomatie Adam Jerzy Czartoryski 1830–40* [*Foreign policy in emigration. Exi-doplomacy of Adam Jerzy Czartoryski 1830–40*], (Műnchen-Wien: Verlag, 1978); Robert A. Berry, "Czartoryski's Hôtel Lambert and the Great Powers in the Balkans, 1832–48", *The International History Review*, 7, no. 1, (1985): 45–67.

10 Piotr Żurek, "Nova interpretacija geneze Nečertanija: serbocentralizam Hotela Lambert i Hrvati" ["New interpretation genesis of the Nečertanje: Hotel Lambert and Croats serbo-centrism"], *Scrinia Slavonica: Yearbook of the Branch for the History of Slavonia, Srijem and Baranja of the Croatian Institute of History,* 6 no. 1, (2006): 229–48.

11 Stanisław Chankowski, "Relikty rapperswilskie w zbiorach Archiwum Polskiej Akademii Nauk" ["Rapperswille relic in harvest of Archive the Polish Academy of science"], *Historical Review*, 52, no. 4, (1961): 759–64.

12 Michał Czajkowski (1804–86) was born in a Polish noblemen family which lived in Ukraine. He was a writer and political emigrate. He participated in the November Uprising, and after failure, he migrated to France. There he met Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, with whom he collaborated. He was the best of Czartoryski's agents: he worked in Turkey and the Ottomans province in Europe. In 1851 he converted to Islam.

13 Alexander Vorontsov (1741–1805) was a Russian count. All his life, he worked in diplomacy. He started work in the embassy in France and Spain. During Napoleon's period, he was the main opposition to France politics in Russian Empire.

14 "List do Woroncewa", Petersburg, May 29, 1804, in *Pamiętniki ks. Adama Czartoryskiego i korespondencja jego z cesarzem Aleksanderm I* [*Memoires of Prince Adam Czartoryski and their correspondence with Cesar Aleksander I*], vol. 2, eds. Lubmoir Gadon, Karol Scipio, Louis Charles Jean Robert de Mazane, (Krakow: Polska Publishing Company in Krakow, 1905), 20.

15 Marko Ivelić (1740–1825) was born in a Serbs family from Risan-Montenegro. Ivelić began his carrier in Venezia but moved to Russia when he was a soldier. He was fighting against the Turkish, and later against France in the Napoleon's period.

16 Żurek, *Montenegrins and Serbs*, 129.

17 Żurek, 133.
18 Aleksander Sapieha (1773–1812) was a Polish nobleman. He was a traveler and politician. During Napoleon's period he first worked as a Russian spy, but later moved to France's intelligence network. He was the author of some scientific texts, and he was a member of Warsaw Society of Friends of Learning.
19 Jerzy Skowronek, *Z magnackiego gniazda do napoleońskiego wywiadu. Aleksander Sapieha* [*With nobleman's nest to Napoleon's intelligences network*] (Warsaw: Polish Scientific Publishers P.W.N., 1992), 78–9.
20 Adam Jerzy Czartoryski was the husband of Anna Zofia Sapieha (1799–1864), the daughter of Aleksander.
21 Aleksander Sapieha, *Podróże w krajach Słowiańskich odbywane* [*Travels across Slavic countries*], ed. Ljubomir Durković-Jakšić, (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 2005), X.
22 As of 1795 to 1918, Poland did not exist, and the territory was part of Prussia, Russia, and Austro-Hungary.
23 Sławomir Kalembka, *Towarzystwo Demokratyczne Polskie w latach 1832–46* [*Polish Democratic Society in the years 1832–46*] (Toruń: U.A.M. Printing House, 1966), 52–4.
24 Jerzy Skowronek, *Adam Jerzy Czartoryski 1770–1861*, (Warsaw*: Common Knowledge*, 1994), 367–9.
25 Jerzy Skowronek, *Polityka bałkańska Hotelu Lambert (1833–56)* [*Hotel Lamberts' Balkan politic (1833–56)*] (Warsaw: The Publishing House of the University of Warsaw, 1976), 23.
26 Mieczysław Tanty, *Bosfor i Dardanele w polityce mocarstw* [*Bosfor and Dardanelles in the politic of European power*], (Warsaw*:* State Publishing Institute, 1982),
27 Hans Henning Hahn, *Dyplomacja bez listów uwierzytelniających* [*Diplomacy without credentials*], translated by Maryla Borkowicz, (Warsaw: State Publishing Institute, 1987), 215–16.
28 Marceli Handelsman, *Adam Czartoryski,* vol. 2, (Warsaw: Warsaw Scientific Society, 1949), 48.
29 Michał Budzyński, *Wspomnienia z mojego życia* [*Memories of my life*], vol. 1, (Poznań: J. K. Żupański, 1880), 397.
30 Czartoryski would like to create a spy network, having one agent in every Balkan country.
31 Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi (spelled Unkiar-Iskielessi) was a tractate between Russia and the Ottoman Empire signed on July 8, 1833.
32 Radosław Żurawski vel Grajewski, "Kaukaz w 'dyplomacji' księcia Jerzego Adama Czartoryskiego w okresie kryzysu wschodniego (1832–40)" ["Caucaus in 'diplomacy' of Prince Jerzy Adam Czartoryski in eastern period crisis"], *Review of Historical Sciences*, 24/2, (2004): 182–3.
33 Skowronek, *Hotel Lamberts' Balkan politic*, 23–4.
34 Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *Historia Imperium Osmańskiego i Republiki Tureckiej 1808–1975* [*History of Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic 1808–1975*], vol. 2, translated by Bartłomiej Świetlik, (Warsaw: Dialogos, 2012), 36.
35 Antoni Jackowski, "Chrzanowski Wojciech (1793–1861)", in *Geografowie polscy: słownik biograficzny* [*Polish Geographers: a biographical dictionary*], vol. *1,* eds. Antoni Jackowski, Kazimierz Krzemień, and Izabela Sołjan, (Krakow: Jagiellonian University, 2018), 234.
36 "Kilka uwag o armii tureckiej" ["Some comments about Turkish Army"] in *Pisma wojskowo-polityczne podawane rządom polskiemu, angielskiemu, francuskiemu, tureckiemu i piemonckiemu przez jenerała Wojciecha Chrzanowskiego w okresie od 1830 do 1856 r. wydał i objaśnił zarysami współczesnych zdarzeń dziejowych Leon Chrzanowski*

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37 "Some comments about Turkish army", 149.

38 Małgorza Willaume, "Działalność polityczna Hotelu Lambert w Mołdawii i Wołoszczyźnie w latach 1840–46" ["Politic activity of Hotel Lambert in Moldavia and Wallachia at the period 1840–46"], *Annales Universitatis Marie Curie-Skłodowska*, 33/34, (1978): 52–3.

39 At the beginning of nineteenth century, the Serbs and Romanian people revolted against Ottoman Empire. In Wallachia (from 1848 and parts of Romania), there was the Wallachian uprising of 1821; in Serbia, there was Revolution 1804–15, under the command of Đorđe Petrovića (Karađorđe) and Miloša Obrenovića.

40 Małgorza Willaume, "Polskie misje polityczne w Mołdawii w latach 1846/47–8" [Polish politics mission in Moldavia in period 1846/47–48], *Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska*, 31, (1976): 125.

41 Krzysztof Dach, *Polsko-Rumuńskie stosunki polityczne w XIX wieku* [*Polish-Romanian political relations*] (Warsaw: "Gryf" Publishing House, 1999), 47.

42 Antoni Cetnarowicz, "Misja Ludwika Zwierkowskiego-Lenoira w Belgradzie 1842–3" ["Mission of Ludwik Zwierkowski-Lenoir in Belgrade 1842–3"], *Historical Review*, 76 no. 4, (1985): 734.

43 Piotr Cichosz, "Władysław Kościelski jako Agent Główny Hotelu Lambert w Stambule w latach 1850–2" ["Władysław Kościelski how Central Agent of Hotel Lambert in Stambul at the period 1850–2"], *Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska,* 61, (2006): 33.

44 Antoni Cetnarowicz, *Tajna dyplomacja Adama Jerzego Czartoryskiego na Bałknach* [*Secret diplomacy of the Adam Jerzy Czartoryski in Balkan*] (Krakow: Jagiellonian University, 1993), 62.

45 Cetnarowicz, *Secret diplomacy*, 65–6.

46 Miloš Jagodić, "Failed Conspiracy: Organization and Preparation of the Serbian uprising against Ottoman Rule in 1840–41", *Limes Plus*, 12, no. 3, (2015): 55.

47 One of the Czartoryski' collaborators was Jan Prosper Witkiewicz, the Russian's agent who served in Afghanistan in 1837–79 and played as spy of Great Britain. See more on Alexander Morrison, "Twin Imperial Disasters. The invasions of Khivaand Afghanistan in the Russian and Britishof official mind, 1839–42", *Modern Asian Studies*, 48, no. 1, (2014): 273–82.

48 Piotr Żurek, "Hotel Lambert a dekonspiracja chorwackiego 'Branislava' (1844/45)" ["Hotel Lambert and deconspirency of croatians 'Branislav' (1844/45)"], *Studies in the History of Russia and Central and Eastern Europe,* 15, (2005): 261–6.

49 Żurawski, "Caucaus in the Polish independence", *Polish Studies*, 40, (2019): 105–14.

50 Czartoryski wanted to disorganize Russian politic in Caucaus and send there their spies.

51 Hipolit Błotnicki (1792–1886) was a Polish poet (author of satirical works) and political activist. He learned in Vilinus University. He was the teacher for the sons of Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, and young Juliusz Słowacki. After the November Uprising, he lived in France.

52 Władysław Zamoyski (1803–68) was a polish nobleman. He was the best friend of Czartoryski, but he didn't like Czajkowskis. In the Crimean war, he created the Ukrainian army which collaborated with the British army.

53 Ludwik Bystrzonowski (1797–1878), after the November Uprising, migrated to France, where he worked with Czartoryski. He was their agent. In the Crimean war, he was a general of Turkish army.

54 Janusz Pezda, "Emigracyjne gry dyplomatyczne" ["Emigration diplomatic games"], in *Polacy I świat, kultura i zmiana: studia historyczne i antropologiczne ofiarowanerofessorr Halinie Florkowskiej-Frančić* [*Poles and the world. Culture and change: historical and*

anthropological studies offered to Professor Halina Florkowska- Frančić], eds. Jan Lecznarowicz, Janusz Pezda, and Andrzej Zięba, (Krakow: Academic Bookshop, 2016), 69.

55 Michał Dąbrowa-Budzyński (1811–64) was a Polish poet and political activist. After the November Uprising, he was imprisoned in Austria where he spent four years. After this, he moved to France where he collaborated with Hotel Lambert; he was the redactor of *Trzeci maj (Third May)*—a paper of conservative Polish diasporas.

56 Skowronek, *Hotel Lamberts' Balkan politic*, 66–8.

57 Jerzy S. Łątka, *Adampol-Polonezkőy 1842–1992* [*Adampol polish village 1842–1992*], (Krakow: Universitas, 1997), 24–8.

58 Franciszek Zach (1807–92) was a Slovakian nobleman. He was a Slavophile, that's why he participated in the Prague Slavic Congress of 1848, and he cooperated with the Serbs' leader Ilija Garšanin. He was the author of the first plan of the Slavic country in the south.

59 Barbara Jelavich, "The Polish emigration, 1831–71: the challenge to Russia", in *L'émigration politique en Europe aux dix-neuviéme et vintiéme siècles*, 146, (1991), 240.

60 Ludwik Zwierkowski-Lenoir (1803–60), after the November Uprising, emigrated to France, where he worked in the Polish Democratic Society. Later he changed his political environment and cooperated with Czartoryski, and Hotel Lambert.

61 Pezda, *People and money*, 245.

62 Czajkowski Michał, "X[iążę] A[dam] C[zartoryski]. Depesze wschodnie–1847" [Eastern dispatches–1847], in *Materiały i korespondencja do działalności Misji Wschodniej w Konstantynopolu.3., 1847–48*, [*Materials and correspondence for the activities of the Eastern Mission in Constantinople.3., 1847–48*], National Museum in Krakow [N.M.K.], signature. 17-rkps-5421-IV, 327–9.

63 N.M.K, signature 17-rkps-5421-IV, 330.

64 Jerzy S. Łątka, *Carogrodzki pojedynek* [*Carogrodzki duel*], (Krakow: National Publishing Agency, 1985), 121–9.

65 All agents need to vow serving to Czartoryski.

66 Sławomir Kalembka *Wielka emigracja. Polskie wychodźstwo polityczne w latach 1831–62* [*Great Emigration. Polish politic exile at the 1831–62s*] (Warsaw: Common Knowledge, 1971), 135.

67 Budzyński, *Memories of my life*, 301.

68 Tadeusz Kozaniecki, "Maurycy Mochnacki i obóz Czartoryskiego: Inedita z września i listopada 1834 roku", ["Maurycy Mochnacki and Czartoryskis camp: Inedita from September and November 1834"], *Historical Review*, 47, no. 4, (1956), 744.

69 Maria Wierzbicka, "Myśl historyczna pisma 'Trzeci Maj' (1839–48)", ["Historical thinking of the paper 'Trzeci Maj' (1839–48)], *Historical Review*, 82, no. 3–4 (1991), 411–13.

70 Jadwiga Chudzikowska, *Dziwne życie Sadyka Paszy* [*Strange live of Sadyk Pasha*], (Warsaw: State Publishing Institute, 1982), 131.

71 Jadwiga Łuczakowa, "Adam Mickiewicz w listach Ludwika Zwierkowskiego-Lenoira do Władysława Zamoyskiego" ["Adam Mickiewicz at the correspondence between Ludwik Zwierkowski-Lenoir and Władysław Zamoyski"], *Diary of the Kórnik Library*, 6, (1958): 355.

72 More people, members of Napoleon's wars in old ages, wrote memoires. Barbara Kubis, "Pierwszym jego pragnieniem jest stać się na nowo niepodległym narodem"—wojsko Księstwa Warszawskiego w świetle wybranych pamiętników z epoki, ["First their desire was stated again independent nation"—the army of Duchy of Warsaw according to selected memoirs of the era], in The Ducat of Warsaw in Napoleonic History and tradition, eds. Katarzyna Bucholc-Srogosz and Maciej Trąbski, (Częstochowa: Częstochowa Museum, 2008), 303.

73 Małgorzata Willaume, "Bałkańscy wysłannicy Hotelu Lambert w latach 1838–49—portret grupowy", ["Balcans envoys of the Hotel Lambert at the years 1838–1849—group portrait"], *Universitas Gedanensis*, 22, no. 3, (2010): 152.

74 Mieczysław Paszkiewicz, "Łyszczyński Adam", in *Polski Słownik Biograficzny (*hereafter P.S.B.*)* [*Polish Biographical Dictionary*], vol. 18, ed. Emanuel Rostworowski, (Warsaw: Polish Academy of Sciences, 1973), 609.

75 Jan Wszołek, "Orpiszewski Ludwik", in P.S.B., vol. 24, 250.

76 Stanisław Drozdowski (1809–85) was a Polish Doctor of Medicine. He was doctor in Bulgaria in 1843 and Czartoryski's spy.

77 Krzysztof Popek, "Niewygodny acz bezsilny partner. Współpraca Hotelu Lambert z bułgarskimi działaczami narodowymi w latach czterdziestych XIX wieku" ["An uncomfortable and helpless partner. Cooperation between Hotel Lambert and Bulgarian national activists in the 1840s"], *Scientific Journals of the Jagiellonian University: Historical Papers*, 144, no. 1, (2017): 124.

78 Adam Lewak, "Drozdowski Stanisław", in P.S.B., vol. 5, 395.

79 Antoni Iliński (1812–61), after the November Uprising, lived in France and cooperated with Czartoryski's group. He was a Polish spy in the European part of the Ottoman Empire. In the Revolution of 1848, he fought like a Hungarian soldier. Later he moved to Stambul where he changed his religion and became a Turkish general. In 1850, he cooperated with Omer Pasha Latas and pacified the Bosnian's Muslim revolution.

80 Jerzy S. Łątka*, Lew nasz, lew polski. Pasza Iskender (Antoni Iliński)*, [*Our lion, Polish lion. Pasha Iskender (Antoni Iliński)*], (Krakow-Gdańsk: Yearbook of the Polish Tatars, 1996), 55.

81 Chudzio, *Hotel Lamberts' politician*, 111.

82 Plenty of Poles, who moved to Ottoman Empire, changed their religion because only Muslims could be soliders in the Sultan's army. Agnieszka Ayşen Kaim, "Konstanty Borzęckiprzypadkowy bohater w mikrohistorycznym studium dwukulturowości" ["Konstanty Borzęcki—some hero in mikrohistory study of two-cultures"], *Migration Studies: Review of the Polich Dispora*, no. 2/176, 2020: 285; Chudzikowska, *Strange live of Sadyk Pasha*, 310–15.

83 Ljubomir Djurković-Jakšić, *Z dziejów stosunków jugosłowiańsko-polskich 1772–1840*, [*From relationship Yugoslav-Polish 1772–1840*], (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1977), 223–4.

84 Handelsman, *Adam Czartoryski*, 109.

85 Petr Stehlílk, *Bosna v chorvatských národně-integračních ideologiích 19. století* [*Bosnia in national-integration ideology of the Croats in nineteenth century*], (Brno: Masaryk University, 2013), 82–3.

CHAPTER 5

Jovan Dučić: The Kingdom of Yugoslavia's First Ambassador

DANILO BOSNIĆANDDJORDJE MILIĆ

Abstract: A special phase in the development of Yugoslav diplomacy is the period between the two world wars. This phase is characterized by intensive diplomatic activity and is the Renaissance of a modern era of poet-diplomats. Yugoslav writers, who performed diplomatic duties, proved to be worthy and capable in one of the most difficult moments of their homeland. In this chapter, we will try to show the life path of Jovan Dučić. He, as the most representative Yugoslavian diplomat, was a perfect example of a true patriot. His diplomatic activity served as a model for numerous colleagues, especially those who, like him, were also engaged in literature. Jovan Dučić, as the first among equals, successfully represented his country in its most difficult moments. He performed his duties successfully, giving Belgrade very important information about the forthcoming war, especially regarding the problem with the Ustasha emigration in Italy. Bringing attention to this key figure is a much-needed contribution in Western historical literature.

Keywords: Jovan Dučić, Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Diplomacy, World War II.

INTRODUCTION: A SHORT DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE KINGDOM OF YUGOSLAVIA

A special phase in the development of Yugoslav diplomacy is the period between the two world wars. This phase is characterized by intensive diplomatic activity. The Kingdom of Serbia's diplomatic representatives,

who were trained during the First World War, took over a large part of the work related to elections and ←111 | 112→preparing diplomatic staff of the new state Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.[1] Thanks to war successes, this new state enjoyed a high reputation in the world of European diplomacy. Yugoslav diplomacy maintained this privileged status until the beginning of World War II. After the Great War, diplomatic and military-diplomatic relations were established with the Balkan's new states and already existing relations with France and England were further strengthened. Additionally, relations with former opponents were established in the 1930s and intensified after the assassination of King Aleksandar Karađorđević.[2] England and France ceased to dominate militarily, diplomatically, economically, and culturally in the Balkans and tacitly left their dominant position to an increasingly aggressive Germany. In this context, Yugoslavia was slowly but surely approaching Germany, with which it began intensive trade as well as other forms of cooperation. Yugoslavia sought to find a way to protect her endangered borders while her traditional allies did not seem ready to protect her from potential invasions. Despite this disappointing fact, Yugoslavia did not end diplomatic connections with them.

Thus, one important stage in Yugoslavia's foreign policy ended with the fall of the government of Bogoljub Jevtić[3] and the arrival of Milan Stojadinović[4] at the head of the new Yugoslav government, on June 24, 1935. Forced by European context and Yugoslav interests, Milan Stojadinović distanced the country from old allies and approached Germany and Italy. Moreover, following the example of Hitler and Mussolini, Stojadinović manifested his own dictatorial aspirations. ←112 | 113→With Aleksandar Cincar-Marković[5] becoming Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yugoslavia aligned even more toward the Third Reich. Some sources even claim that he was recruited by the German intelligence service (Abwehr) while serving as the chief of the Yugoslav diplomatic mission in Berlin.[6] It is certain that Cincar-Marković was in Berlin at that time and, having received information from Belgrade that he had become the new foreign minister, immediately asked German foreign minister von Ribbentrop to receive him in a farewell audience.[7]

Yugoslav diplomacy, now headed by Cincar-Marković, did not show adequate aspiration to improve relations with old allies. He deliberately strengthened relations with Germany, alongside his inner circle of supporters, including Milan Nedić. Also, Cincar-Marković influenced a large number of Royal Court members. However, Cincar-Marković considered that Prince Pavle Karađorđević[8] was the guarantor that Yugoslavia would continue the policy of friendship toward Germany and Italy, despite Prince Pavle being an Anglophile.

←113 | 114→Unlike many European countries in which members of aristocratic families played a significant role in diplomacy, aristocracy in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia largely did not exist. However, there was a rise of elite sociocultural circles from which diplomats were recruited. In this context some argued that within the Yugoslav system of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs meritocracy was endangered. In this respect, Ivo Andrić stated after the Second World War that "protectionism and nepotism had a very detrimental effect on Yugoslav diplomacy." He also claimed that many diplomats with a bourgeois background "were not able to learn foreign languages and to obtain adequate manners."[9] Regulations and exams served to make it easier to hire those who had a connection or recommendation. In this context between the two World Wars, several writers were recruited and performed diplomatic duties, holding important positions in diplomatic missions. Among the most important were Jovan Dučić, Ivo Andrić[10], Milan Rakić[11], Branko Lazarević[12], and Rastko Petrović.[13]

←114 | 115→Although the relationship between diplomacy and literature sounds like an oxymoron, the mentioned writers managed to bring diplomacy and literature closer to professionalism with their actions. Thus, this period brought writer-diplomats who were an important part of the diplomatic history of Serbia and Yugoslavia. A series of biographical studies on this circle of the most famous Serbian intellectuals, who built their careers in diplomacy, confirms the fact that writers entered diplomacy because they mostly acquired high education and knowledge abroad and because they had a more developed national consciousness with clearly defined nationalist goals.

Jovan Dučić (1869–1941) served as one of the best examples for writers who engaged in the diplomatic service of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In this chapter, we will bring to brighter light the life and diplomatic career of Jovan Dučić. He, as the most representative Yugoslavian diplomat, was a perfect example of a true career diplomat and patriot. A poet, true gentleman, and connoisseur of international relations, he left an impression on everyone. His diplomatic activity served as a model for numerous colleagues and for generations, especially those who, like him, were also engaged in literature. Jovan Dučić, as the first among equals, successfully represented his country in its most difficult moments. He performed his duties successfully in 13 missions in Greece, Spain, Italy, Switzerland, Egypt, Hungary, Romania, and Portugal over more than 30 years.

JOVAN DUČIĆ: DIPLOMAT AND POET[14]

Born in the vicinity of Trebinje in 1869[15], at a time when part of Bosnia Vilayet was within the Ottoman Empire, Jovan Dučić grew up during the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He received his teaching diploma in 1893 in Sombor (Serbia) and in the same year became a teacher in an elementary school ←115 | 116→in Bijeljina. He founded a teacher society in Bijeljina. His nationalist work, however, was soon noticed by the Austro-Hungarian authorities and he was soon questioned by the police for two songs. The Provincial Government forbade him to teach in Serbian schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[16] Consequently, Dučić did not stay long in Bosnia and Herzegovina. His desire for knowledge and ambition led him to study in Geneva in 1899, where he remained until the end of his studies in 1906. During his studies he often traveled to Paris where he met with famous diplomats and nationalist workers. These acquaintances, as well as the fact that he was already a recognized poet, an educated and ambitious man, introduced him to diplomatic intellectual circles upon his return to Belgrade.[17]

At the beginning of 1907, on the orders of Nikola Pašić (1845–1926), he went to Bosnia and Herzegovina, where he stayed until the annexation crisis[18], after which he was sent to Rome. Here he worked as an agent on propaganda against the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[19] Dučić was in Italy as early as 1908. During the annexation crisis of Bosnia and Herzegovina, his letter of December 7, 1908, addressed to Jovan M. Jovanović[20], gave us an insight into the political mood of Italy at the time. As Dučić himself says, the propaganda for which he became so well known —"(…) and from which, in the future, God will save every Serb"[21]— prevented him from writing even earlier. In an attempt to persuade Italian deputies and undermine Austro-Hungarian propaganda in Italy, Dučić wrote a booklet in Italian which he handed to deputies three days before the debate on Bosnia, which he said was part of the propaganda carried out with comrades in Italy.[22] Finally, in 1910, a royal decree came that introduced Jovan Dučić to ←116 | 117→the world of diplomacy, marking him as a first-class clerk of the Serbian Royal Embassy in Sofia.[23]

THE RETURN TO THE ETERNAL CITY

Dučić remained there until 1912, when he was promoted to secretary of the 5th class of the embassy in Rome. As soon as he arrived in the Eternal City, he immediately threw himself into winning over the Italian public to the righteousness of the Balkan war against Turkey. This is particularly reflected in his efforts to present the truth about Albanian attacks on the Serb-Albanian border during a London conference in 1913.[24] During his stay in Rome, he also met with Greek Prime Minister E. Venizelos (1864–1936), as well as with Christian Rakovsky (1873–1941), who was an opponent of Bulgarian King Ferdinand I (1861–1948) and one of the leaders of the international socialist movement. Dučić and Rakovsky met during Dučić's appointment in Sophia. At a meeting in Rome, Rakovsky talked about the mood of political circles in Bulgaria after the defeat at Bregalnica.[25] He presented him with earlier plans of Bulgaria during the annexation crisis in which they discussed

with Austria-Hungary the division of Serbia if the latter goes to war against Austria-Hungary.

In 1912, Dučić was given the task of formulating propaganda for the Serbian cause in the Italian press. So in his report from Rome on October 2, 1912, which he sent to Jovan M. Jovanovic, he not only stated the situation of public opinion, but also the way in which Bulgaria carried out propaganda within foreign reports.[26] "It was not difficult to get the Italian press on our side, especially because of their struggle in Africa," writes Dučić and assured Jovanovic to engage as much as possible so that the Italian press would be interested in the issue of Old Serbia and present the war as the only way out. However, he stated, "(…) but it is not only the dispatches that interest the readers, but they also want to know as much as possible about our people, the army and the country in which military operations are developing."[27] He admitted that Serbia had not used it while Bulgaria, on the other hand, had been sending pictures of its army and data of all kinds since the first day of mobilization and he took that as an example of how Serbia could increase their efforts to win over the Italian press in their favor. ←117 | 118→Because of this, Dučić asked Jovanović to go to the scene so that he could send reports to foreign correspondents who constantly came to the Embassy in Rome to get new information from the fronts.[28] Finally, he stated that as a contributor to the *Tribune* (Italy) newspaper, he could write articles and publish reports that Dučić would send.[29] He expressed his feelings that as an old contributor to the *Tribune* he could count on them to report his articles as he wrote them without censorship. His second appointment in Rome came to an end when he was transferred to Athens in June 1914. In this period before his return to Italy, Dučić moved to Spain and Greece, and then in 1924, received an appointment as delegate to the League of Nations[30], which had a great impact on his career.

THE GENEVA AFFAIR

Dučić came to Geneva in year 1925, taking the duty of delegate to League of Nations. His first report about the Yugoslav position in the League was very unfavorable.[31] Dučić stayed shortly in this position because of an affair that was prepared by former Yugoslav delegate Dr. Milutin Jovanović[32], Nikola Pašić's[33] nephew. Shortly after arriving in Geneva, the Swiss press started to publish articles about Dučić's alleged love affair with a woman who had a problematic history. Jovanović, who started these rumors probably because he was replaced as a delegate, persuaded this woman to make charges against Dučić and accuse him ←118 | 119→of raping her. This woman even sent a letter to the Yugoslav minister of foreign affairs. Dučić didn't sit with his hands crossed, preparing evidence which disproved her story and sent them to the minister. The court soon established that this was blackmail from the woman and her charges were dismissed.[34] Even with all this, Dučić was compromised and asked for a leave, which was approved. Soon after, he moved to a new position, transferred to Cairo.

His stay in Egypt was very satisfying for him because Dučić loved history passionately and he was delighted to stay in the land of the pharaohs. However, his stay was interrupted in 1927, when he came into conflict with M. Jovanović, who was now a Minister Plenipotentiary (M.P.) in Warsaw, during a visit to Belgrade. The conflict happened in the office of secretary for foreign affairs. Dučić accused Jovanovic of setting up the affair during his stay in Geneva and this quickly escalated into a fight which led to the retirement of Dr. Milutin Jovanović and Dučić's two-year "vacation." This episode led to the removal of Jovan Dučić from diplomatic service, which lasted until 1929. The conflict with M. Jovanovic later caused damage to Dučić, resulting in the Holy See refusing to accept him as an M.P. because, although unjustly, he was accused of having an extramarital sexual affair. However, by decree in the same year, he was appointed to Cairo and remained there until 1932. During his stay he sent detailed reports on the situation in the country where King Fuad I (1922–36) had introduced a personal dictatorial regime.

At the beginning of 1932, he received the long-desired title of M.P. and was appointed to Hungary, a country that had no intention of establishing

good neighborly relations with Yugoslavia.[35] Directed from Rome and Berlin, Hungary emitted a vengeful mood toward the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the interwar period. The stay of Ustasha detachments on Yugoslav territory, often backed by the Hungarian government, further damaged relations between the two countries. During Dučić's stay in Budapest, a press campaign was waged against Yugoslavia, and the Gombos regime turned Hungary into a totalitarian state eager to revise international treaties. The proximity of Belgrade allowed Dučić to go to the minister, about which unfortunately we do not have any public sources. But one of his reports from Budapest perfectly depicted the situation and Hungary's attitude toward the Serbs, which was influenced by the separatist actions of politicians and Ustasha emigration.

DUČIĆ'S MISSION TO HUNGARY AND THE PROPAGANDA AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA

The focus of this chapter is on Dučić's years in countries that helped various groups undermine the integrity of Yugoslavia. The first of them was Hungary, to which he came in 1932, and we can immediately deduce from his reports[36] what the mood of the Hungarian government was toward the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.[37] The crisis that engulfed Yugoslavia was closely followed in the domestic press and the idea spread that Hungary would have to intervene militarily against its neighbor because there was an impending revolution and likely disintegration: "government papers themselves have prepared all the capital and provincial newspapers for Hungary will soon be forced to take military action, since Yugoslavia is on the verge of revolution."[38] In his report[39] to Bogoljub Jevtić (1886–1960), Minister of Foreign Affairs from July 13, 1932, Dučić clearly stated that every event in Yugoslavia was perceived in Hungary as a possible trigger for a coup in Yugoslavia, as he cited Jacquerie in Rogatica, riots in Guča, the abduction of dr. Milos Tupanjanin, conflicts in Prijedor, conspiracy in Maribor, and the murders of

former deputies' priest Vasa Popović and Duke Luna. All this was reason for Hungarian propaganda to call Yugoslavia a non-state that does not function.

←120 | 121→Dučić also touched on the statements of Vlatko Maček[40] (1879–1964). As Dučić himself said, Maček inspired huge faith in the Hungarians that Yugoslavia had become impossible to functionally govern: "that this impasse could not be overcome by simple political compromises between the former parties, because they no longer exist, not even the party leaders, because they mean nothing anymore."[41] According to Dučić, this statement only strengthened the opinion of Hungarians about Yugoslavia as a rudderless ship and a failed experiment, believing that Maček wanted free elections to raise the issue of Croats—ethnically, not politically—at the first Constituent Assembly.[42]

On the other hand, the Hungarian press assured its people that they have nothing against the Croats because they were connected by 800 years of living together and their territory was taken away by the monarchy by force and they fought most bitterly on the Serbian front. This angle was welcomed by Dučić. In his report he mostly referred to Maček's statement—the Hungarian idea of a weak Yugoslavia and Italy, which was doing everything to maintain the situation and was doing the same in Bulgaria and Albania. In the end, he stated that the neglect of the cultural factor benefited the enemies of the state who wanted to present Serbs as an uncultured crowd, advising the Minister to draw attention to this problem. Dučić's solution was to state how he was available to develop a program to organize this work and offered his assistance.[43]

Dučić sent the next report on September 8, 1932[44], on the topic of Hungary and the Conference in Stresa. At the very beginning of his writing, he informed Minister Bogoljub B. Jevtić that Hungary was interested in the Conference in Stresa not only for economic reasons but also for political ones. For them, the Danube Confederation[45] was now an absurd idea and they considered it a French ←121 | 122→imperialist idea that wanted to undermine Berlin's influence on Central Europe. Hungarians were determined to support only that, which did not endanger its natural interests and national goals. Hungary saw it as aggression against its ideals for the

liberation of their brothers who were separated from their homeland by the Trianon Treaty.[46]

DUČIĆ AND HIS APPOINTMENT IN FASCIST ITALY

Dučić was transferred from Budapest in 1933, after which he went to Rome as an envoy of the Second Group of the Second Degree, where he again faced a difficult task. Hungarian and Bulgarian revisionism, Ustasha actions, as well as the idea of creating a greater Albania were all encouraged from Rome. After all, Italy itself had a claim to territory in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Under these conditions, Dučić spent the next four years meeting with the most important people from the palace of Chigi. The report of October 18, 1933, addressed to Bogoljub Jevtić, addressed the issue of Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations and Dučić expressed his opinion that Mussolini only pretended to be surprised and angry about this German action.[47] The next important report was from December 30, 1933.[48] In it, Dučić informed Bogoljub Jevtić about the letter he sent to Fulvio Suvich[49] (1887–1980) as a denial for the press, both of which concerned the mood of the Italian press toward King Alexander's visit to Zagreb. The news about the discovered conspiracy appeared in the press and the information came from Vienna. Dučić said he did not strongly support this theory, he himself thinking that the goal was to discredit the King's visit to Zagreb.[50]

←122 | 123→According to him, these attempts could have come from emigrants in Vienna or perhaps even was fabricated in the Italian Embassy in Vienna or Belgrade. Due to the action of the press, which began to extract various articles from the telegram, Dučić wrote a denial, which Suvich read and promised to print: "every time something comes out false, I will send a similar letter and a similar denial to the Ministry."[51] It should be noted that Dučić sent a denial to the press, not knowing that the assassination attempt was true, that the information arrived only later, and the Foreign Ministry informed the Italian side about this misunderstanding. Relations between Italy and Serbia were soon complicated by the assassination of King

Alexander in Marseilles. The Yugoslav government accused Italy of plotting the assassination in Italy and demanded the extradition of the Ustashas, including Pavelić (1889–1959), to be tried for the crime. For a long time, Dučić held talks with the Italian government on this issue as well as with diplomats from other countries in Rome. His report of January 16, 1935, described his conversation with British Ambassador Sir Eric Drummond (1876–1951) on Croatian emigrants in Italy.[52] According to Drummond, the increase in emigrants in Italy was a consequence of the turn in policy of Hungary and Austria in accepting emigrants and that terrorists from all over the world were counting on the territory of Italy.

As Mussolini himself said, he would like to resolve this situation, but Dučić answered that "it would be easy for Mussolini to say goodbye to ours and that is if he hired them and not have them dressed up in uniforms and kept in camps under arms. And he could prevent them from accumulating if he didn't accept newcomers and make new recruits."[53] He soon met with Mussolini, with whom he discussed terrorism, and reported this to the government on March 24, 1935. According to Mussolini, there were two things that hindered close cooperation between Yugoslavia and Italy: the first was Croatian emigration and the second ←123 | 124→was the Marseilles process.[54] Mussolini said that there were about 400 emigrants and that they were all in Lipari and that their issue must soon be resolved in agreement with Yugoslavia. He proposed an amnesty because no other country would accept them. In the report from Dučić, Mussolini said that the question of emigrants was a humanitarian cause, because those were people without country and very poor. He said to Dučić that Serbs were the old friends of Italians and not the Croats who threw themselves into Italian arms rashly in 1929.

Dučić admitted that he received confirmation from several parties about the number of emigrants in Lipari, but still added that there were a significant number of them in large cities in Italy and that new groups were constantly being recruited. From the view of Yugoslavia, they were terrorists who must be tried for their crimes of betrayal against the homeland. At the end of his report, Dučić expressed hope that the Italian side now understood that any

rapprochement could not come if the issue of Croatian emigrants was not resolved, saying that last year the authorities did not even recognize the existence of this group in Italy. As he mentioned, this was not the first time Italians talked about liquidating migrants, and whenever they mentioned it, they didn't find a resolution but wanted help from Yugoslavia. Dučić saw little progress about this problem and advised that Yugoslavia consider these words from Mussolini with caution. According to him, if they intended to start negotiations for the Danube Pact, the Italians knew that Yugoslavia would immediately raise the issue, so it was logical that the Italian side was considering the liquidation of these camps. Another major thing that influenced this turn was the existence of other forces that saw the Italian policy of terrorism toward Yugoslavia. At the end of his report, Dučić said that the Yugoslav government could agree to a joint solution to the issue of Croatian emigration, but he knew that something like this would provoke a certain reaction from a large group of people who wanted to achieve their ambitions through these emigrants with further terrorism.

With the arrival of Count Ciano as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy, there was a turn in relations between the two countries. The count was ready to improve relations and according to him the issues that hampered this progress were not important and could be easily resolved. During 1936 and 1937, Dučić held several talks with Ciano, as well as correspondence with Prime Minister Stojadinović, which resulted in an agreement between the two countries signed in 1937 in Belgrade. The agreement was by Prime Minister Stojadinović and Italian Foreign Minister Count Ciano. It represented the stabilization of relations between Italy and Yugoslavia. The agreement covered several fields and consisted of three parts: a friendship agreement, a trade agreement, and joint statements. Italy ←124 | 125→abandoned the policy of supporting the disintegration of Yugoslavia, promised to intern the Ustashas on its territory, and to cooperate with the Yugoslav police. Both countries pledged to respect the sovereignty and integrity of Albania. Count Ciano saw the agreement as an opportunity to prevent further expansion of German influence in the Balkans, while in Yugoslavia he encountered harsh criticism, especially in those circles that

believed that the state should turn to one of the two great powers in Europe at the time, Great Britain, or Germany.[55]

REPORTS FROM DUČIĆ DURING HIS APPOINTMENT IN ROMANIA

Shortly after the agreement was signed, Dučić was transferred to Bucharest as an M.P. Leaving Rome, he wrote in his Journal that he did not believe that he was needed in Romania but that he was superfluous in Rome. He thought that Stojadinović had plans by which he stood in the way. At the end he stated that if Louis XIV or Marcus Aurelius were ruling his country he would stay in Rome until the end of his life.[56] During his return, Romania underwent several important changes, of which Dučić carefully reported to Belgrade. In a report dated January 7, 1938, he paid great attention to the government of Octavian Goga (1881–1931). In this report, he gave a description of Goga, both in terms of his influences and those of others and said that he was an exceptional person. According to Dučić, he was a man who thought quickly, expressed himself richly and in every sentence showed his culture and critical thinking. A person who believed in his ability and a great patriot, as Dučić said, "As a former Hungarian parliamentarian, he was news in the stands, but as a former Transylvanian fighter, news in a conspiracy and a plot."

During his reporting, he described all the good and bad sides of Goga, as well as the conversations they had on the situation in Romania. From what can be read from the report, the Prime Minister blamed the Jews, who he says were "(…) carriers of corruption and debauchery." Looking back on Goga's nationalism, Dučić wondered how far his idea would go and whether he would accept Hitler's and Mussolini's programs, because if he accepted, he would also want to use Romanian propaganda to attract Romanians to Romania, especially those living in other countries. He sent a significant report on January 28, 1938,[57] where he informed Stojadinović that Goga had

told him that Romania intended to ←125 | 126→conclude a pact of friendship with Italy and Germany, but that this did not mean an alliance or a military alliance.

The next important report sent by Dučić on February 9, 1938, concerned Romania's attitude toward Fascism and Nazism. He talked about the many agents from Germany who lived in Romania. That was why Germany was conducting a national mission in Romania that fit into the doctrine of Nazism, making increasing efforts to embrace Romanians. This action was becoming more and more successful among the ruling class, but on the other hand, Dučić stated that the people did not lose sympathy for England and France, which they still saw as the most powerful countries with which to align. During February, several reports were sent about the change of government in Romania as well as the establishment of a dictatorship of Carol II, in which he focused not only on public opinion but also on possible new foreign policy and the growing influence of the Rome-Berlin axis in Romania. An important report was sent on February 28, 1938,[58] in which Dučić informed about the statement of Corneliu Zelea Codreanu (1899–1938)[59] and the dissolution of Codreanu's party, "All for the Fatherland", as well as the Iron Guard, after which Codreanu announced, he would go to Rome. Dučić also mentioned Goga's removal from power and news that he left for Vienna.

After this, most of the reports were reduced to an agreement between Hungary and Romania, which was in progress at the time, as well as the internal situation in the country. An interesting one came from April 17, 1938[60], where Dučić stated that the situation in Romania was complicated, but another report was sent informing of the discovery of a movement aimed at destroying the current situation. The Romanian government announced that Codreanu was at the head of the movement and that its members were legionaries: weapons, flags, and uniforms were found, as well as many letters that compromised Codreanu and his main people.[61] All this was published by the government in the newspapers, which, according to Dučić, represented the intention to prepare the people for future measures against

these “rebels”, which could be seen from the government’s emphasis on the information that a coup against Bucharest was planned.

←126 | 127→During April and May, reports mostly focused on the measures taken by the government against Codreanu and his legionaries, as well as on Romania’s negotiations with Hungary. Yet a brief report on May 30, 1938,[62] showed how closely Dučić followed the situation and tried to defend the country. He brought information about how Russian refugees in Romania looked with growing sympathy to Germany, which they saw as a deliverer from Soviet enemies. In the end, he added that it would be good if the feelings of Russian refugees in Yugoslavia were the same as in Romania, i.e. to check that they did not serve some ideas that went against politics in Yugoslavia. Dučić stayed in Romania until 1939. At the beginning of the war, when he was transferred to Spain, he sent dozens of reports from Romania that comprehensively portrayed the situation in the country and its foreign policy, which was divided between the Rome-Berlin and London-Paris axes. During 1939, most of the reports revealed a war that was getting closer with every step: the situation in the Sudetenland, Bulgaria’s adherence to the Axis powers, pretensions on Dobruja, an alliance with Turkey, and questions to Yugoslavia on whether to take up arms if Italy goes to war with Greece. Dučić reported on all these issues, always leaving his opinion and advice for possible actions.

CONCLUSION

During his stay in Spain, Yugoslavia was conquered, the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, N.D.H.) was created, and the government went into exile in London. When he came to Spain, he was appointed as a representative from the royal government of Yugoslavia during the celebration of the 800th anniversary of the founding of Portugal. Dučić talked with the minster of foreign affairs of Portugal for establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries. This idea was received favorably in Portugal’s official circles, and he was informed that a

representative of Yugoslavia would be received with great pleasure.[63] Thus, on November 15, 1940, Jovan Dučić became M.P. in Portugal with a seat in Madrid. Soon after this, the war came to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the government fled the country. Broken by the fall of his homeland and struck with an ear malady, he asked for a three-month leave, which was approved.

←127 | 128→When he saw that the recognition of N.D.H. by the government of Spain was nearing every day and realizing that he couldn't stay in Spain, he asked the minister of foreign affairs to be sent on a special mission to United States of America. On June 26, Spain recognized N.D.H.; Dučić decided to leave Spain and travel to Lisbon, where he would receive an answer from the government about his request for appointment to the U.S.A. The Minister of Foreign Affairs denied his proposal but suggested that he can leave for the U.S.A. as a civilian, which he did. By the end of July, with weak health and under the impression of Serbs suffering back home, he left Lisbon and went to his cousins in the U.S.A.[64] There he spent his last days until his death on April 7, 1943. He always regretted leaving his homeland and suffered being so far from his country. His last wish was to be buried in Trebinje, which was fulfilled in 2000.

The diplomatic career of Dučić was one that was most prominent. He spent more than thirty years working for the interests of the Serbian and Yugoslav people. As a deputy, he was stationed in nine countries during his thirteen missions (three times in Rome, two times in Greece and Spain, one time in Swiss, Bulgaria, Egypt, Romania, Hungary, and Portugal). In six of those missions, he was the head. This is a feat which none of our other writer-diplomats can claim. He started with the lowest rank in diplomatic circles, gradually being promoted, and at the end of his career he got the well-deserved title of ambassador, thus becoming the first in Yugoslav history. During his life, he dedicated his diplomatic and poetic career to Serbia and later to Yugoslavia, in which he initially believed a lot, but as time went on and Croatian politicians showed their true face, Dučić realized that the idea of Yugoslavia was wrong and more and more disastrous for Serbia and the Serbian people.[65] Yugoslav writers, who performed diplomatic duties, proved to be worthy and capable in one of the most

difficult moments of their homeland. Jovan Dučić continued his life and work in emigration, disappointed with the fratricidal war in his homeland, but forever committed to trying to encourage and inspire peace and avoid war for all the people residing in the Balkans.

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←128 | 129→Bertol, Ivana. "*U potrazi za veznicima: Jugoslovenska vanjska politiak od 1929. godine do 1941. Godine*" [*In search for conjuctions: Yugoslav foreign policy from year 1929. to year 1941*]. Bachelor thesis, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Zagreb, 2018.

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1 The new state was officially called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. However, the official name of the state was changed to "Kingdom of Yugoslavia" by King Alexander I, on October 3, 1929.

2 Marseille assassination happened on October 9, 1934. Ustasha terrorists with help of Macedonian liberation organization planned and succeed in killing King Aleksandar Karađorđević. Later investigations led to believe that Italy and Hungary helped the terrorists with their plans.

3 Bogoljub Jevtic was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1932; he enjoyed a great reputation with King Alexander, and on the basis of this trust he retained this position even after the assassination of King Alexander in Marseilles. Srđan Mićić, *Од бирократије до дипломатије: историја југословенске дипломатске службе 1918–39* [*From bureaucracy to diplomacy: history of yugoslav diplomatic servise 1918–39*], (Belgrad: Čigoja Štampa, 2018), 137. All translations of titles originally published in a foreign language are my own unless otherwise noted.

4 Miladin Stojadinović became Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs at the invitation of Regent Prince Pavle after the 1935 parliamentary elections. He remained in that position until 1939. Tonka Župančić, *Збирка Милана Стојадиновића 1914–44* [*Collection of Milan Stojadinović 1914–44*], (Belgrade: Yugoslav Archive, 1990), 8–10.

5 Aleksandar Cincar-Marković (1889–1947) became Minister of Foreign Affairs at the start of 1939, influencing the change of diplomatic discourse. Milan Zečević, *Vojna diplomatija* [*Military diplomacy*], (Belgrade: Military Publishing and News Center, 1990), 162.

6 Zečević, *Military diplomacy*, 162–3.

7 "Aleksandar Cincar-Marković went to 'Wilhelmstrasse' (the seat of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and visited Ribbentrop explaining him that a crisis suddenly broke out in Yugoslavia, but that this change would in no way affect the foreign policy of the new government. Cincar-Marković promised that he would seek to further deepen relations between Germany and Yugoslavia and that he would examine the possibility of Yugoslavia's accession to the Pact against Comintern." Bogdan Krizman, *Vanjska politika jugoslavenske države 1918–41* [*Foreign policy of Yugoslav state*] (Zagreb: School Book, 1975), 103.

8 Pavle Karađorđević was the only son of Prince Arsen Karađorđević, the brother of King Peter I and the first cousin of King Aleksandar Karađorđević with whom he had a very close relationship. Prince Pavle was educated at Oxford, England, from 1913, where he lived a peaceful family life with his wife, the Greek Princess Olga, maintaining good relations with the British royal family and aristocracy. It was not until 1925 that he came to Yugoslavia. As far as is known, until the assassination of King Alexander I in 1934, Pavle did not engage in politics at all, but continued to live in seclusion in Yugoslavia with his family—his wife and children Alexander, Nicholas, and Elizabeth. He was a great connoisseur of painting and art in general

and in his home, at the White Palace, he collected many works of art, especially paintings by old masters. However, his life changed drastically after the murder in Marseilles. Prince Pavle Karađorđević became *de facto* the ruler of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1934, named as one of the three deputies by King Alexander. Having great confidence in his uncle's brother, King Alexander asked Prince Pavle to preserve Yugoslavia until September 1941, when the heir to the throne Peter the Second would turn 18 and sit on the throne. Thanks to this, as well as the fact that he belonged to the ruling dynasty, Pavle soon imposed himself as the only real authority in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, while the deputies Ivo Perović and Radenko Stanković were only symbolic figures. Source: http://www.27mart.com/main.php?pages_id=92&languages_id=2

9 Mićić, *From bureaucracy to diplomacy*, 140.

10 Ivo Andrić (1892–1975) was born in the village of Dolac, near Travnik, in 1892. After spending his youth in his native Bosnia, he studied philosophy at the Universities of Zagreb, Vienna, and Cracow. Andrić started his literary career as a poet. During the Second World War, in the leisure imposed on him by the circumstances, Andric wrote his three large works, all of which were published in 1945: The bridge on the Drina, Bosnian story, and Women from Sarajevo. From 1920, until 1941, Andrić was in the diplomatic service. Following the World War II, Andrić was named to several ceremonial posts in Yugoslavia, which had since come under communist rule. In 1961, the Nobel Committee awarded him the Nobel Prize in Literature. On March 13, 1975, he died aged 82. Source: https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/literature/1961/andric/biographical/

11 Milan Rakić (1876–1938) was writer, poet, and diplomat. He was head of the consulate in Pristina, consul general in Shkodra, and ambassador to Copenhagen, Sofia, and Rome. Miladin Milošević, "Српски писци у дипломатији Краљевине Србије и Краљевине Југославије" ["Serbian writers as Diplomats of the Kingdoms of Serbia and Yugoslavia"] in *Bicentenary of modern Serbian diplomacy* eds. Čedomir Popov, Dragoljub R. Živojinović, and Slobodan G. Marković, (Belgrade: Insitute for Balkan studies of the Serbian Academy of sciences and arts, 2015), 195–207.

12 Branko Lazarević was born in 1884. He graduated from the Faculty of Philosophy at University of Belgrade in 1911. During World War I, he was wounded while fighting in the Serbian army; after the retreat of government and army to Corfu he was named as editor of *Serbian newspapers*. After the war he was accepted in the Ministry of Foreign affairs; he served in U.S.A., Germany, Albania, and Poland among many others. His service lasted for twenty-one years, for more see Milošević, "Serbian writers as Diplomats", 195–207.

13 Rastko Petrović (1898–1949) was poet, novelist, travel writer, essayist, ethnographer, gifted sketcher, cameraman, and photographer. He graduated in law in France, and on his return to Yugoslavia he worked as an art and literary critic. After this he was employed in the diplomatic service and posted to Italy and the U.S.A. He is one of the most important and most influential Serbian writers in the period between the two world wars. Radovan Popović, "Животопис Растка Петровића" ["Life of Rastko Petrović"], in *Collection Revelation of another heaven*, eds. Mihajlo Pantić and Olivera Stošić (Belgrade: Cultural Center Belgrade, 2003), 12.

14 Jovan Dučić was one of most prominent writers and representatives of literature modernism in Serbia. His first book came out in 1901 and was called simply *Songs*. In 1908, he worked as an editor of literary cronical in the newspaper *Politika,* and in the same year he published two more books. In his later years, he continued to write: in 1929–30, he published several poetry books, establishing himself even more among Serbian writers. He cemented his position in 1932 publishing the book *King's Radovan treasure* which many considered his best work. See more about his poetic career Vladimir Kosijer, *Јован Дучић-Песме* [*Jovan Dučić-Songs*], (Novi Sad: Budućnost, 2003), 353–4.

15 Exact year of birth is not clear. We took for good the opinion of the author quoted. For more please see Miladin Milošević prelude in *Дипломатски списи Јована Дучића* [prelude in *Diplomatic files of Jovan Dučić*] (Višegrad: Andrić Institut, 2020), 7–8.

16 These two songs named "Bosnia" and "Homeland" were filled with patriotic feelings undermining the rule of Austro-Hungary in Bosnia and Herzegovina; because of this, he was banned to work in Serbian schools, nevertheless he spent next two years working in a school at Monastery Zitomislic. Milošević, *Diplomatic files*, 8.

17 Milošević, 9.

18 The annexation crisis occurred in 1908. When Austro-Hungary proclaimed annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was seen as dissolution of treaties from Berlin Congress. In Serbian state circles this was seen as a direct threat to Serbian interests in Bosnia and Herzegovina and a step back toward liberating rest of Serbs under foreign rules. Dimitrije Đorđević, *Историја модерне Србије* [*History of modern Serbia*] (Belgrad: Institute for textbooks, 2017), 345–51.

19 Milošević*, Diplomatic files*, 9.

20 He entered the diplomatic service of Kingdom of Serbia in 1903 and stayed there until he retired in year 1920. He was Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1912 and after that deputy minister in 1914 and 1915. Ksenija Arsenijević, *Збирка Јован Јовановић-Пижон 1870–1939* [*Collection of Jovan Jovanović-Pižon 1870–1939*] (Belgrad: Yugoslav Archive), 8.

21 Milošević, *Diplomatic files*, 49–50.

22 *Annessione della Bosnia e dell Erzegovina e la questione Serba* [Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbian question], brochure published and delivered to Italian deputies in parliament. Miladin Milošević, Dušan Jončić, *Јован Дучић у дипломатији-каталог изложбе* [*Jovan Dučić in diplomacy–catalog of exhibit*], (Belgrad: Yugoslav Archive), 8, 2012), 6.

23 Dučić's reports during his time in Sofia can be found in Milošević, *Diplomatic files*, 52–62.

24 Milošević, 11–12.

25 Đorđević, *History of modern Serbia*, 366–69.

26 Milošević, *Diplomatic files*, 64.

27 Milošević, 64.

28 Milošević, 65.

29 Milošević, 65. Dučić expresses his feelings that as an old contributor to *Tribune* he can count on them to report his articles as he wrote them because they did it before. At the end he states that the *Tribune* is semiofficial newspaper.

30 League of Nations was created in Versailles, mostly by American commitment. It began to function on 10 January, 1920, when the first Council was elected; members of the League were all signatories of peace conference in Versailles, except five defeated states and thirteen neutral states, for more see Čedomir Popov, *Од Версаја до Данцига* [*From Versailles to Danzig*], (Belgrade: Newspaper publishing institution, 1995)159–161.

31 Milošević, *Diplomatic files*, 16.

32 For more about his life and career, see Milan Gulić, "Jugoslovenske kraljevske diplomate u Poljskoj" [„Royal Yugoslav diplomats in Poland"] presented at the Conference „International thematic collection of papers from conference Yugoslav-Polish relations in twentieth centtury," eds. Momčilo Pavlović, Andrzej Zaćmiński, Pawe ł Wawryszuk, (Belgrade: Institute for modern History Belgrade, 2017), 59–60.

33 Nikola Pašić was one of greatest Serbian statesmen during late nineteenth and early twentieth century. As leader of Radical party, he shaped internal and external politics of the Kingdom of Serbia and later the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. For more about Nikola Pašić, see Vukašin Živković,

Споменица Николе П. Пашића [*Memorial to Nikola P. Pašić*] (Belgrade: Printing house Pavlović and comp.,1926).

34 Milošević, *Diplomatic files*, 16.

35 Milošević, 18.

36 Dučić's report from July 13, 1932, gives us insight into the mood that surrounds public in Hungary. After a brief introduction he continues to say: "However, I consider it necessary to mention here another motive of Hungarian optimism, which is the strangest of all, and which causes perhaps the most excitement in the masses of the Hungarian people. This is the news that a coup will soon break out in Yugoslavia, which does not allow us to see all the consequences". Milošević, *Diplomatic files*, 180.

37 After the proclamation of the dictatorship by King Alexander of Yugoslavia, the terrorist organization Ustasha led by Ante Pavelic was formed in Croatian emigration. Their main lines of action came from Italy and Hungary, and the Ustashas themselves had contact with the Hungarian intelligence services. During the summer of 1931, a camp was opened in Janka-pustza, which later grew into a training center for Ustasha terrorists and the main place from which all actions were initiated, especially in the border areas. An action was planned here for the murder of the Ban of the Sava Banovina, and the date was chosen for December 1, 1934, at the celebration of the anniversary of the unification, but the action did not take place. Police actions near the border during 1934 and the arrest of Ustasha associates changed the position of emigrants in Hungary, which was shaken, and the camp was disbanded in 1934; however, some residents of that camp soon participated together with the Macedonian terrorist organization V.M.R.O. in the assassination of King Alexander in Marseille. Vladimir Sadek, "Logor Janka-puszta i razvoj ustaske organizacije u Podravini do 1934", ["Camp Janka-pustza and development of ustasha organization in Podravina until year 1934"], Podravina 11, no 21. (2014): 47–56.

38 Milošević, *Diplomatic files*, 180

39 Milošević, 180–83

40 He was a Croatian politician and successor to Stjepan Radić as president of the H.S.S. (Croatian Peasant Party), considered the most important Croatian politician of the 1930s, and a great opponent of the January dictatorship of King Alexander and the growing centralization of the state. On the other hand, he supported the idea of creating a Croatian banovina as well as the increasing federalization of the state, and this was achieved by an agreement with Cvetkovic in 1939, when the Croatian-majority banovina was created. Source: https://www.britannica.com/biography/Vladko-Macek

41 Milošević, *Diplomatic files*, 183.

42 This report and Dučić's view on current situation regarding the statement of Vlatko Maček can be found in Milošević, *Diplomatic files*, 179–93.

43 Milošević, 193. At the end of his report, Dučić says that this is not an official report, but rather a view of a psychological moment that should be important for every Yugoslav, and that his intention is to make a modest contribution to the betterment of Yugoslavia.

44 Milošević, 194.

45 Danube Confederation was an idea created after the Great Depression, to form a regional economic block which could easily confront the economic crisis, for more see Ivana Bertol, "*U potrazi za veznicima: Jugoslovenska vanjska politiak od 1929. godine do 1941. Godine*" [*In search for conjuctions: Yugoslav foreign policy from year 1929. to year 1941*], (Bachelor thesis, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Zagreb, 2018), 44.

46 The Treaty of Trianon, signed in 1920, took away a large part of Hungary's territory, which now belonged to Yugoslavia, Romania, and Czechoslovakia, the countries of Little Antante. The

consequences of this treaty will be felt throughout the interwar period, and Hungary will constantly seek ways to revise the treaty that led to the loss of its territory. Because of this, in its policy of weakening Yugoslavia, it will support the Ustasha movement as well as the VMRO, which will often lead to incidents on the Yugoslav-Hungarian border. Relations were further strained by the assassination of King Alexander in Marseilles, after which Yugoslavia filed a lawsuit against Hungary and Italy in the League of Nations. Bertol, *In search for conjunctions*, 62–3.

47 Milošević, *Diplomatic files*, 200–1.

48 Milošević, 206–8.

49 Fulvio Suvich was Italy's Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs until the arrival of Count Ciano as Minister of Foreign Affairs in June 1936, cited in Milošević, *Diplomatic files*, 204.

50 The assassination attempt on King Alexander took place on December 17, 1933, during his visit to Zagreb. Authorities discovered the plan in time and successfully prevented the assassin, Petar Oreb, and his two accomplices. The training of conspirators took place in camps in Italy, where Ustasha emigration found refuge. The event itself and its failure have several reasons, Petar Oreb himself gave one version during his testimony, saying that he changed his mind when he heard the people shouting *Long live the king*, but also because of fear when he should have dropped a bomb on the king's chariot; on the other hand, some testimonies say that for the assassins everything went wrong after their arrival, because they wrongly predicted the time of arrival of the royal couple. This failed Ustasha emigration action helped the Yugoslav authorities gain insight into the Ustasha organization as well as the support they received abroad, most of it in Italy. Ines Kokor, "Posjeti Aleksandra I. Karadjordjevica Savskoj banovini u vrijeme diktature" ["Alexandar's I. Karađorđević visit to the Sava banovina during dictatorship"]. (Bachelor thesis, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Zagreb, 2017), 29–34.

51 Milošević, *Diplomatic files*, 208.

52 Milošević, 252.

53 Milošević, 252–3.

54 For more about Marseille process see, Bogdan Krizman, *Ante Pavelic i ustase* [*Ante Pavelic and Ustashe*] (Zagreb: Globus, 1978), 224–31.

55 Stanislav Sretenović, "Two centuries of Italian-Serbian diplomatic relations", *The review of international affairs*, Vol. LXX, No. 1176. (2019): 5–33.

56 Milošević, *Diplomatic files*, 23.

57 Milošević, 345.

58 Milošević, 377.

59 Romanian political agitator and leader of country's principal fascist party Iron Guard was exposed to anti-Semitism early, and during his college years he participated in many activities against Jews and communists. In 1927 he formed the League of Archangel Michael, and three years later he formed a military wing of the party, called Iron Guard. His party even with all persecutions became third largest in 1937 and was named All for Fatherland. But King Carol II dissolved the party, and Codreanu was soon arrested and shot while being transported between prisons, for more see https://www.britannica.com/biography/Corneliu-Codreanu

60 Milošević, *Diplomatic file*, 407–10.

61 Milošević, 411–13

62 Milošević, 433.

63 Milošević, 26–7. For the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, there were two very important factors in establishing diplomatic relations. The idea appeared already during the first war conflicts; it was considered that to secure the court post office between Belgrade and London, a diplomatic mission in London would be needed. In addition, the port of Lisbon became one of the most

important ports, where all endangered ships came, including ships from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

64 Milošević, 28.

65 For more see Jovan Dučič, *Vjerujem u Boga I srpstvo* [*I believe in God and Serbian people*] (Chicago, 1942).

CHAPTER 6

Yugoslav Diplomats in Albania, 1945–1948: Josip Djerdja

BOŽICA SLAVKOVIĆ MIRIĆ

Abstract: After the end of the Second World War, Yugoslavia and Albania established political and diplomatic relations. Our chapter deals with Josip Djerdja as a Yugoslav diplomat in Albania during the Yugoslav-Albanian cooperation of 1945–48. In the introduction we will give an overview of the establishment of good relations in the mentioned period. In the main part of our research, we will use the historical method, including the use of archival material. The research questions cover the ideas, goals, role, and importance of Yugoslav diplomat Josip Djerdja in Yugoslav-Albanian cooperation and his impact on Albanian leader Enver Hoxha and other Albanian politicians. In the conclusion, we will present the summarized results of our work. This chapter should be considered a new opening of research on Yugoslav-Albanian relations, especially as an example of good practice in cooperation between two countries.

Keywords: Albania, diplomats, Josip Djerdja, U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia.

YUGOSLAV-ALBANIAN RELATIONS 1945–1948[1]

During the Second World War, good relations were established between the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (C.P.Y.) and the Communist Party of Albania ←131 | 132→(C.P.A.).[2] It continued after the war and consisted of ideological, political, economic, healthcare, military, and cultural cooperation. Yugoslav-Albanian relations were modeled on the Yugoslav-Soviet relations

established after World War II. Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R. were ideologically and politically close, which was accompanied by cooperation in culture, art, science, and especially the economy. Economic cooperation took place through foreign trade, Soviet loans to Yugoslavia, and the establishment of joint ventures. That was the same model that Yugoslavia applied to relations with Albania.[3]

Incredibly significant was the economic assistance that Yugoslavia gave to Albania, in the realization of which Yugoslav diplomats in Albania played a great role. They controlled and insisted on fulfilling Yugoslav obligations written in the treaties and on informal agreements of assistance that also existed.[4] Yugoslavia and Albania signed two treaties in 1945: one in the form of a military alliance for the joint fight against German occupation forces, which was to be extended in the postwar years, and a second constituting a treaty on economic cooperation ←132 | 133→between Yugoslavia and Albania.[5] With the Trade Agreement, the total value of mutual deliveries amounted to about 40 million dinars.[6] The highlight of the cooperation between Yugoslavia and Albania was Enver Hoxha's visit to Yugoslavia in mid-1946.[7]

The established Yugoslav-Albanian cooperation contributed to Albania's economic and political recovery of a war-destroyed economy.[8] In spite of Yugoslav ←133 | 134→economic assistance, Albanian leaders also feared Yugoslavia's aspirations to annex Albania to its federation. That was the reason why the Albanian leader Enver Hoxha wanted direct cooperation with the U.S.S.R. The crisis in Yugoslav-Albanian relations was particularly felt after Enver Hoxha's visit to Moscow in mid-1947 without first consulting with Yugoslav authorities.[9] The official separation came after the publication of the Informbiro Resolution in June 1948.[10] Albania agreed to this resolution and terminated all treaties with Yugoslavia except the Friendship Treaty, which Yugoslavia terminated on November 12, 1949.[11] All ongoing projects were put to a stop and Yugoslav experts had to leave Albania. All the aid that was provided from 1945 to mid-1948 was portrayed as the desire of Yugoslav authorities to exploit Albania's natural resources, divert its industry for the benefit of Yugoslavia, and turn it into a colony.[12]

Yugoslavia and Albania renewed their diplomatic relations in 1954, but relations between the two countries remained cold and reserved.[13]

In our chapter we will deal with the Yugoslav ambassador to Albania, Josip Djerdja, in the period from the establishment of diplomatic relations to the termination of cooperation: 1945–1948. We will use unpublished and published ←134 | 135→historical material, which we will analyze and put in context with the professional literature. The primary goal of our research is to show what his role was in maintaining good relations between the two countries. We will also analyze the attitude of the Albanian leadership toward him, his role, and the importance they gave him on all issues of cooperation.

A BRIEF PROFESSIONAL BIOGRAPHY OF JOSIP DJERDJA

Josip Djerdja was born in Arbanasi, near Zadar, on February 11, 1911. He was a diplomat, publicist, participant in the People's Liberation Struggle, and a socio-political worker of Yugoslavia and Croatia. After finishing four grades of classical high school, he fled from Zadar to Yugoslavia in 1930 with his father and brothers. Arriving in Zagreb in 1933, he joined the communist movement and became a member of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in 1934. Due to his communist activities, he was arrested and sentenced to prison in Sremska Mitrovica, which he served from 1935 to 1938.

In 1941, he joined the People's Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia. He was the secretary of Agitprop of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia and edited *Vjesnik* [*Herald*] until January 1943. Then, until mid-1944, he started and edited the newspaper *Naprijed* [*Forward*], Journal of the Communist Party of Croatia. After the war, he worked as a head of department in the Presidium of the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, but soon moved to the diplomatic service, serving as ambassador, head of mission, adviser, and assistant secretary of state for foreign affairs (1945–63). He was the ambassador of Yugoslavia to Albania

(1945–8), Hungary, Bulgaria (1948–9), India (1950–1), Burma and Egypt (1956–63). He was one of the theorists and interpreters of nonaligned politics.

Josip Djerdja was also elected to the highest bodies of political organizations: a member of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia (1948–58) and the Presidency of the Socialist League of the Working People of Yugoslavia (1966–70). He was a member of the Federal Assembly (1963–72) for several terms, and then its vice-president (1970–2). Djerdja resigned from that position in 1972, announcing publicly that he did not agree with the suspension of the policy pursued by the leadership of the Socialist Republic of Croatia until the twenty-first session of the Presidency of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in Karadjordjevo in 1971. He died on February 18, 1990, in Belgrade.

Josip Djerdja wrote about international politics and diplomatic relations and the policy of nonalignment in the journals *International Politics* (1952–71) and ←135 | 136→*International Problems* (1952–71, and 1975) and as a regular commentator in the weeklies and dailies *Liberation*, *Labor*, *Herald on Wednesday*, and *Today*.[14]

THE ROLE OF JOSIP DJERDJA AS A YUGOSLAV DIPLOMAT IN ALBANIA

Josip Djerdja became the new Yugoslav ambassador to Tirana, after Velimir Stojnić, on November 10, 1945.[15] The Yugoslav representative was to work on establishing greater trust with the Albanian leadership toward Yugoslav interests. It is important to point out that Djerdja was of Albanian origin and that he spoke Albanian solidly, which should have led to the strengthening of ties between the two sides.[16]

At that time, Albania was still searching for its foreign policy position. Enver Hoxha sought recognition of his government from the then great powers (the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union). The

relations between Albania and America, seen through the eyes of the Yugoslav diplomat Josip Djerdja, were "cold and correct".[17] The Americans had their military mission in Albania, under the leadership of Joseph Jacobs. America did not want to lose previously obtained concessions during the rule of the Albanian king, Ahmed Zogu[18], so it monitored the economic and political situation carefully.[19] The Albanians did not want to accept the renewal of the provisions on giving the United States the status of most privileged nation. They had Yugoslav support in that, given Yugoslav diplomats supported the positive development of the foreign policy
←136 | 137→
situation in Albania. On the other hand, the Americans believed that Albania should respect its international obligations if it wanted to join the United Nations. They demanded that Albania agree in writing to respect previous international agreements. They also thought that the Albanians did not treat the American mission in Tirana very well. Soviet envoy Dmitry Stepanovich Chuvahin advised the Albanian government to consider continuing the U.S. military mission in Tirana, but Josip Djerdja, the Yugoslav delegate, advised Albanians not to do so. Relations between Albania and the United States improved with the departure of Joseph Jacobs and the arrival of Ambassador Henderson, but the conflict persisted until the American severance of relations with Albania in the fall of 1946.[20] The situation was similar in relations between France and Albania. The French government asked the Albanian government to return to prewar concessions. The Albanian government, with the support of Yugoslavia, responded similarly to the French government.[21] The Yugoslav delegate, Josip Djerdja, considered the French in Albania and the French representative to be "ordinary whispers (prišipetlje) of the English".[22]

The elections for the Constituent Assembly were an opportunity for Albania to establish a better foreign policy position.[23] That was one of the conditions for the United States to recognize the Albanian state if they were free, with the participation of all anti-fascist forces.[24] Djerdja, after the victory of the Popular Front and its representative Enver Hoxha in the elections for the Constituent Assembly on December 2, 1945, stated that Enver Hoxha's government had primary cooperation with Western powers

and Italy, while Yugoslavia was put in the background. This was confirmed by a diplomatic report in which Djerdja pointed out that by the end of 1945 a difference had occurred:

> The immediate, strong enthusiasm for brotherhood and closest unity with the Balkan peoples, primarily with the peoples of Yugoslavia, had subsided, which was also expressed in the somewhat romantic moods for federation and erasing borders. At the same time, of course, in the cities, and to a lesser extent in the villages, the semi-feudal bourgeoisie and for the most part the national-political degenerate intelligentsia continued to operate. Economic life lay in a certain stagnation, motionless and without new perspectives. Liberalism of the worst variety has taken hold in the entire domestic politics, in the front and around it, and the same liberalism has prevailed in relation to agents, representatives and politics of the West, at whose expense illusions have spread. ←137 | 138→The peak was manifested in a certain general aspiration of the press, in intelligence, etc. to escape from the Balkans, to ignore the Balkan reality and to flee to the West—to the cultural, libertarian, and friendly West. No phrases or occasional declarations have been able to hide the real aspiration of many even leaders, ministers, and senior officials, to seek a guarantee in the West, for Albanian independence and help in maintaining and consolidating that misunderstood independence, no matter what it costs, no matter what she paid for herself.[25]

Djerdja, like his predecessor Velimir Stojnić, insisted that the promises made by the Yugoslav side be fulfilled. Therefore, in December 1945, he asked the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Trade for a capable trade attaché to work with him. He insisted that the Yugoslav side do everything to send the agreed goods to the Albanians, "because that will break the arguments out of the hands of the dissatisfied, who are the most numerous in the economic sector."[26] In the next report, a few days later, Djerdja again insisted that the contracted goods be shipped to Albania in the most orderly manner.[27] He also insisted on cooperation at other levels. The medical team that was sent from Yugoslavia, during the time of Velimir Stojnić, completed its mission of a month's stay in Albania at the beginning of Djerdja's engagement as Yugoslav representative. Djerdja considered that they "performed their mission very successfully" and that their experiences were "very interesting and politically useful".[28] The Yugoslav ambassador insisted that the ties between Yugoslavia and Albania continue, "even with certain temporary casualties". He pointed out that the relations between these two countries were on the rise. In one of his reports, he stated that "things are getting better. In the press and in public cultural life, they propagate Yugoslavia along with

the U.S.S.R. in the first place. At the party conference at the end of January, many and most youth leaders sought closer ties and fuller cooperation with Yugoslavia."[29]

In February 1946, he pointed out that all obligations had been fulfilled on the Albanian side, while it was noted that "those obligations had not been fulfilled on our part". Djerdja cited as a special example the fact that five wagons of corn were not sent to Kuks, "because due to the state of communication, delivery is impossible". He prayed that "something be done to sort out these things".[30] In order to facilitate cooperation, the plan to hold Serbo-Croatian language courses in Albania continued. According to Djerdja's report, the Albanians were ready to provide all the necessary facilities and premises for the course in the city center. ←138 | 139→The Yugoslav delegate requested that two teachers be sent who would also know Italian or French. He emphasized that Enver Hoxha appeared as a candidate for learning the Serbo-Croatian language.[31]

Enver Hoxha was aware that Albania was in a great crisis and in a bad economic situation, which was not the only case in the Balkans after World War II. The situation was similar in Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. It was all those countries that saw the Soviet Union as the main protector. Here, after the end of the war, parties came to power with the idea of unity and the reconstruction of their war-ravaged countries.[32] Due to the previous Albanian economic policy, according to Djerdja, "the people received almost nothing from the new government, while the agrarian reform[33], although a large amount of capital was invested, included only a part of the people, so that capital was poorly used."[34] The Albanian government had begun work to improve the country's economic situation, with the participation of the Yugoslav state through Djerdja in Albania. He emphasized: "Albanians are only now taking more vigorous measures that were in our country in the spring of last year."[35]

Border trade was of great importance for connecting Yugoslavia and Albania. So, in mid-April 1946, the Agreement on the Establishment of Border Traffic between Yugoslavia and Albania was signed.[36] Djerdja took part in talks with Albanian leaders on the issue and its implementation. Enver

Hoxha insisted with Djerdja that it would be good for the decree to enter into force immediately. Djerdja later commented that this conversation "was very cordial".[37] Relations between the two countries were on the rise. This was also indicated by Djerdja at ←139 | 140→the end of April at the opening of the photo exhibition "National Liberation War of Yugoslavia", in the Central House of the Army in Tirana. On that occasion, he pointed out that the relations between Yugoslavia and Albania were "a rare example of mutual understanding and can serve as a model for many countries."[38]

It was also very important to resolve the issue of Yugoslav experts in Albania, who were sent to Albanian requests to help develop the economy. Djerdja wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in May 1946 that the Albanian Minister of Agriculture had asked for ten more surveyors to be sent. At the same time, he asked for an agronomist with experience in organizing farms of state-owned agricultural companies.[39] The Yugoslav Ministry of Labor agreed to send the required number of surveyors, but did not approve the departure of the agronomist because Yugoslavia needed agricultural experts.[40] The Yugoslav state sent experts to Albania, following the example of Soviet aid to Yugoslavia, which was also reflected in sending experts, drafting projects, and the like.[41] Then, the Albanians needed engineers and technicians for their factories. Thus, for the installation of machinery for a medium-sized textile factory bought from Czechoslovakia, according to Djerdja's report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they were looking for a textile engineer, a fitter, a weaver, and a spinner. They were also looking for five machinists for machines that would help clean the mud and stones from rivers, swamps, and the like. In the same report, Djerdja asked for a decision from the Yugoslav government on admitting Albania's best young people to learn trades in Yugoslav companies.[42] Given the high demand from Yugoslav experts, it was important to officially resolve their position on Albania. The signing of this Protocol was at the insistence of Djerdja, based on the examples of the behavior of Yugoslav experts in Albania. Namely, in May 1946, Josip Suter, as well as the brewing expert Eng. Kostic, came to repair the automatic power plant "Erikson"[43] but according to Djerdja, they did not perform their duties adequately. Djerdja

played an important role in resolving such issues. He reported on this to the F.N.R.Y.'s Foreign Trade Directorate and said that a general agreement must resolve the issue of salaries and employment of Yugoslav experts in Albania, "because everything is going slowly and sloppily here, people are getting into a situation of making nonsense and inconveniences and they become dissatisfied".[44] That was the reason ←140 | 141→why the Yugoslav and Albanian governments signed the Protocol on Yugoslav Experts in Albania.[45]

Josip Djerdja emphasized to Josip Broz Tito that he should cooperate more closely with Albania, so in a report from June 1946 he wrote that "the Minister of Economy has warned them on several occasions of their readiness for closer economic relations with us. At the same time, he believes that we could take on the role of taking over Albanian surpluses and procuring from abroad for Albanian exports because they do not have the funds to do so. I don't know how topical you think it is, but it seems to me that you should somehow put your hand on this thing while it's hot, because it is possible that someone else will be interested. For example, they could establish a mixed commission of experts to study the possibilities of closer economic cooperation and the like."[46] In order to further develop cooperation, Djerdja visited, with the press attaché, the Albanian industrial center of Kučova. He wrote in the report that "it was a private visit" and that "it was the first time that a foreigner visited Kučova, because Albanians strictly guard it". His stay there was filled with "great manifestations" for Marshal Tito and Yugoslavia, as well as "pictures and slogans about Yugoslavia".[47] He had a similar welcome during a visit to cities in Albania (Argirokastra, Delvini, Saranda, and Himari) in October 1946, when "gathered people shouted slogans", and in Argirokastra they even carried him in their arms.[48]

In order to continue and strengthen cooperation between Yugoslavia and Albania, the Yugoslav leadership invited Enver Hoxha to an official visit[49], which was to last from June 26 to July 2, 1946. Djerdja informed Tito: "They received your news with undisguised enthusiasm. Hoxha kept me at home for an hour, took me for a walk in the garden and repeated: 'Now we will see Marshall'. They say this is the most they could have wished for and

expected. The day of arrival, the time of stay and the rest are accepted without discussion."[50]

According to Pero Zlatar, Hoxha wanted to impress Tito during the visit and bring him a gift. He prepared three old Turkish holsters that were confiscated in the apartment of a runaway quisling. Hoxha then asked Djerdja for advice on ←141 | 142→which to choose, and the Yugoslav ambassador told him that Tito would like all three. That was the reason why Hoxha took three Turkish holsters as a gift to the Yugoslav president. Hoxha was accompanied by Djerdja, who was supposed to be translator for the talks between Tito and Hoxha.[51] During the visit of the Albanian leadership to Belgrade, on July 1, 1946, agreements on economic cooperation, payments, and loans were signed.[52] An agreement on friendship and help was announced, which was done on July 9, 1946 in Tirana.[53] Djerdja played an important role in signing this agreement and connecting Yugoslavia and Albania because he participated in the preparations of the Albanian leader for coming to Belgrade and was his immediate companion. He also monitored reactions in Albania to the signing of the agreement. These agreements were praised and enthusiastically written about in the press, and friendship rallies were held in Albanian cities.[54] However, there were also negative reactions to the trade negotiations in Belgrade, which was noted by Djerdja:

> According to the information here, the Albanians believe that the negotiations are proceeding slowly and without much success. They say they see our difficulties, but they think our prices are too high for the items we are asked to do. They are forced to take under all conditions dynamite, wood, and mothballs, but they need many more things. But the conditions are too difficult. The Minister of Economy says that he was promised a commodity loan, but that according to the latest information, it all came down to a reciprocal loan. On the other hand, there are small misunderstandings in the conversations that spoil the atmosphere. For example, our people allegedly say that the Albanians came unprepared and that they should look at politics while at the same time saying that friendship is one thing and business is another.[55]

After the signing of the agreements, it was very important to instill confidence in Yugoslavia on the Albanian side. Djerdja believed that it was crucial to develop Yugoslav propaganda in Albania.[56] In his report from July 1946, he ←142 | 143→wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that it would be useful to send books, brochures, paintings, etc. to cultural centers in Korca,

Argirokastra, Saranda and all other places in Albania.[57] For closer ties with Yugoslavia, he also found confirmation that Soviet economic experts and technical workers had left Albania. In October 1946, Djerdja, in a report to Tito, stated that this was "a consequence of the good relations of this country with Yugoslavia. Experts and other Russians who lived in Albania stated that it was a natural consequence of the correct and increasingly close economic orientation to Yugoslavia."[58]

THE END OF COOPERATION BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND ALBANIA

The beginning of the development of economic cooperation between the two countries ended with the Extended Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.A. (December 18–20, 1946), at which economic relations with Yugoslavia were discussed and confirmed.[59] Despite the emphasis on cordiality and cooperation, the Albanian leadership still had a certain amount of distrust toward the Yugoslav fulfillment of obligations, due to the problems that arose during the implementation of the agreement. Djerdja tried to point out to the Yugoslav leadership the need to establish the trust of the Albanian leadership by regularly fulfilling Yugoslav obligations.[60] At the end of 1946, Djerdja, in a worried tone, reported to Tito that "skepticism was emerging at the top regarding Yugoslavia's ability to fulfill the obligations assumed by the economic agreement. Trade between our two countries flows to a certain extent, so that it gives some reason for such skeptical views among the uninformed or unintentional, because lately the import of our goods to Albania has not kept pace with the export from Albania."[61] He suggested that "some things are going better on our part, at least maintaining a balance between imports and exports, if what has already been achieved according to our import plan over Albania's exports cannot be achieved."[62]

The decline of Yugoslav-Albanian relations began in 1947, when Albania turned to the U.S.S.R., after Enver Hoxha's visit to Moscow in mid-1947

without ←143 | 144→first consulting with Yugoslav authorities. The crisis culminated in 1948, after the Albanian acceptance of the Resolution of the Informbiro, when Albania turned against its neighbor and sided with the U.S.S.R. Djerdja, as the representative of Yugoslav politics and government in Albania, tried in every way to maintain Yugoslav supremacy over Soviet domination.[63] Representatives of the Soviet government in Albania thought that the Yugoslav influence was very strong, but on the eve of the Eighth Plenum[64], the Soviet *charge d'affaires* in Albania expressed doubts about the Marxist belief of Tito. Djerdja replied that Yugoslavia and Albania were firmly connected and that the suspicion of Josip Broz Tito would be primarily against Albanian interests. Djerdja's analysis of the whole situation was not adequate, because the Albanian leadership had already determined that it would turn to the Soviet side.

In order to improve Yugoslav-Albanian relations, the Yugoslav president tried to resolve disputed issues. Djerdja participated intensively in the discussion of Hoxha and Tito. He brought a letter from the Yugoslav president to the Albanian leader on April 22, 1948, asking him to explain why there was no trust in the sincerity of Yugoslavia's intentions toward Albania and why Yugoslavia's material assistance to Albania was not recognized in practice on a proper basis.[65] Enver Hoxha did not respond to Tito's letter until May 23, in which he stated, among other things, that they "accept criticism by other fraternal parties, and especially by the Yugoslav party, but we cannot accept that our party's right to discuss is postponed."[66] Djerdja brought the Yugoslav answer in which it was advised to send a delegation to Yugoslavia. Djerdja assessed that "Tirana concluded that the moment was for the greatest possible pressure on Yugoslavia" and he believed "that they were given encouragement from a certain place for this attitude." Djerdja also stated that they started "presenting all Yugoslav weaknesses and mistakes, so that they could prove the unsustainability of the relations between Yugoslavia and Albania."[67]

←144 | 145→Hoxha had a conversation with Djerdja on June 2, 1948. He emphasized that "Yugoslavia had barely delivered 170 million of the planned 800 million dinars of goods by then and the food situation is very difficult,

people are starving and then attacking and robbing shops." On that occasion, Djerdja replied that "Albanians link economic issues to any political combinations." This was important because Djerdja believed that the Albanian leadership was making political ties on various sides, not relying on the opinion of Yugoslav leadership. Hoxha said that he wanted cooperation and good relations with Yugoslavia, but he did not mention Tito, to which Djerdja replied that "there is no conversation without Marshall (Josip Broz Tito)".[68] The Albanian leader justified himself by saying that the Yugoslav press (and at the same time took *Borba* out of his pocket) did not mention him in any article about Albania.[69] Koci Xoxe, Minister of Internal Affairs of Albania, told Djerdja a day later that he was "full of faith that the issue will be resolved," because "they have good will," and that "the foundations of the relationship are healthy."[70] Due to the poor development of Yugoslav-Albanian relations, in one of the conversations, Koci Xoxe confided to Djerdja that he felt as if "someone had cut him in two with a knife through his stomach".[71]

Yugoslav influence was erased from all parts of Albanian everyday life, so even Djerdja, who was esteemed among the Albanian leadership, was not wanted in Albania anymore. Among other things, during the visit of the group of Maribor railway workers "Angel Besednjak", the Albanian press left out that Djerdja and Yugoslav advisor Drago Košmrlj were present at the visit.[72] Due to the deterioration and final severance of Yugoslav-Albanian relations, Djerdja left Tirana in June 1948. Drago Kosmrlj stated in his telegram that no one from the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs bid him adieu, only the Yugoslav leaders of the Coordination Commission.[73] The Soviet leadership supported the Albanian reaction to Yugoslav policy in Albania, which could be seen in Molotov's conversation with Hoxha, in which Molotov pointed out that "Albania is on the right path, freeing itself from the influence of bad Yugoslavs."[74]

←145 | 146→After the adoption of the Resolution of the Informbiro, the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted two notes to the F.P.R.Y. Embassy: the first, that all Yugoslav experts, advisers, and other citizens working in Albania leave Albania within 48 hours; and the second, that the

Albanian government cancel all economic agreements and protocols concluded between the two countries.[75] Albania considered that the Yugoslav government, in connection with the agreements with the Albanian government, wanted to show a "dominant policy" and thus hindered the progress of the Albanian economy.[76] At the time, Albania did not cancel only the agreement on friendship and mutual assistance, "because it was and is, according to the view of the Albanian Government, an important act that concretizes the wishes of both our peoples".[77]

The Yugoslav government stated that about 81.5 percent of the entire volume of economic cooperation between the two countries went in favor of Albania, only 18.5 percent in favor of the F.P.R.Y., and that all these agreements were primarily aimed at providing Albania the most efficient fraternal assistance.[78] The Albanian government claimed that the mentioned Yugoslav percentage in aid to Albania was incorrect, that Yugoslavia fulfilled only 13 percent of its obligations in the first half of 1948, while the Albanian government fulfilled its obligations by 74 percent. The Embassy in Tirana was ordered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia to return the note due to the offensive tone.[79] On the Albanian side, it was pointed out, among other things, that "Yugoslavia did not maintain the conditions stated in the concluded agreement" and that "since the Albanians took the lead, the business has been going much faster."[80] Following the Informbiro Resolution, the situation with Yugoslav citizens in Albania was problematic. One month before the adoption of the Resolution and the severance of Yugoslav-Albanian relations, there were 597 ←146 | 147→Yugoslav experts in Albania.[81] From July 5 to 20, 1948, all Yugoslav personnel returned from Albania.[82] It was also impossible to maintain a regular connection between the F.P.R.Y. embassy and the Yugoslav government. Thus, the courier of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia did not receive an entry visa for Albania for two and a half months.[83] Also, the Yugoslav government closed the Yugoslav-Albanian border, which was not easy to implement, because the real border regime in that area was never established. The local population had a habit of crossing the border freely

and even during the years of cooperation the border features were almost neglected.[84]

After the turn of Albania to Bulgaria and the U.S.S.R. (Albania signed trade agreements with them) the Yugoslav M.F.A. decided to follow the development of the economic situation in Albania primarily through the implementation of the Albanian economic plan for 1947, using various reports, speeches, parliamentary speeches, debates, other conferences, everything that was published in the press, with one's own observations or in some other way. It was important to determine how the severance of relations with Yugoslavia affected the implementation of the Albanian plan.[85] At the end of September 1948, the Yugoslav M.F.A. sent a note to the Albanian Embassy in Belgrade, canceling further protection of Albanian interests provided by Yugoslavia in countries with which Albania had no diplomatic relations.[86] Enver Hoxha announced the definitive break with Yugoslavia and turning to the U.S.S.R. at the eleventh plenum, held from September 13 to 24, 1948.[87] Cooperation with Yugoslavia was interrupted at the First Congress of the Albanian Labor Party, which was held from November 8 to 22, 1948.[88] He believed that the Central Committee of the C.P.Y. wanted to isolate Albania from the U.S.S.R. and other countries of "people's democracy"[89], that the help provided by the Soviet government to Albania was "the only proper help, which brought great benefit to the Albanian people".[90] Due to the change in the ←147 | 148→Albanian attitude toward Yugoslavia[91], the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia suspended the work of the Embassy in Tirana on June 4, 1950 and dealt with the Albanian government through the Embassy in Budapest. Albania suspended its embassy in Belgrade on November 22, 1950.[92] After the normalization of relations between the U.S.S.R. and Eastern European countries and Yugoslavia, which followed Stalin's death in 1953[93], Albania and Yugoslavia reopened their embassies in 1954 in Belgrade and Tirana.[94]

EPILOGUE: THE ACTIVITY OF JOSIP DJERDJA AND HIS ROLE IN ALBANIA

After the end of the Second World War, Yugoslavia and Albania continued the cooperation that was established during the war, when their goal was to fight against a common enemy. Yugoslavia was the first state to recognize the People's Republic of Albania in April 1945, after which diplomatic relations were established. Colonel Velimir Stojnić, who was first sent to Albania as an instructor to help the Communist Party of Albania, became the first Yugoslav envoy. He remained in that position until November 1945. The new envoy after him was Josip Djerdja. In this chapter we have dealt with this Yugoslav diplomat and his significance in Yugoslav-Albanian relations between 1945 and 48.

For research while writing, we looked for archival material in the Archives of Yugoslavia and in the Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia. In the Archives of Yugoslavia, the fund of the Office of the Marshal of Yugoslavia contains material on the visits of the Albanian delegation, transcripts of the talks, and notes on the messages exchanged by high-ranking statesmen. In the same fund we also found material on relations and cooperation between Yugoslavia and Albania, from which we can conclude how much Yugoslav aid to Albania was given and how much Yugoslavia was present in Albanian state politics. The Tanjug Fund contains news bulletins from foreign and domestic agencies on Yugoslav-Albanian relations, the Yugoslav presence in Albania, and Albanian renewal and development, thanks to Yugoslav economic assistance. The fund that was most important to us in the preparation of the chapter is the fund of the Commission for International Relations, in which there was a large amount of data on Yugoslavia's assistance to Albania, Yugoslav experts in-country, and reports of Yugoslav representatives. Data on sessions, important decisions, and international relations can be found in the fund of the Presidium of the National Assembly of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Presidency of the Government. In the Diplomatic

Archive, we looked at the fund of the Political Archive for Albania. It contains numerous reports related to Yugoslav-Albanian relations.

Josip Djerdja played an important role in establishing good relations between Yugoslavia and Albania. He spoke Albanian, which was very important for the position he represented. He worked on building greater trust from the Albanian leadership to the Yugoslav side. He insisted that Yugoslav promises be fulfilled, especially those related to economic agreements. He was involved in all events across Albania. He participated in determining Albania's foreign position, including relations with America, France, and England. He also followed the internal organization of Albania and the measures they took, primarily under ←149 | 150→the growing influence of the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia. Considering the Yugoslav experts who were working in Albania, he insisted that their issues be resolved so that an agreement was always reached. On his initiative alone, the Albanian leadership was invited to Belgrade.

Enver Hoxha appreciated him, often talked to him, and accepted his advice, especially during the preparations for the departure of the Albanian delegation to Belgrade. During the visit, the Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual assistance was signed. Djerdja believed that the relations between Yugoslavia and Albania were "a rare example of mutual understanding and can serve as a model for many countries"[95].

When Albania began to turn to the Soviet Union, Djerdja tried to maintain Yugoslav dominance in Albania. He actively participated in the correspondence between Enver Hoxha and Josip Broz Tito regarding the solution of mutual relations. In talks with Enver Hoxha, he insisted that the Yugoslav president not be bypassed. Nevertheless, Yugoslav-Albanian relations began to decline. Yugoslav-Albanian cooperation was terminated in June 1948, after which the Yugoslav ambassador ended his duty. The two countries reopened their embassies in 1954 in Tirana and Belgrade, but relations remained reserved. If anything, this chapter serves as a subtle reminder of a diplomatic fact of Post-War Soviet political life that is often overlooked and undervalued in Western research: there was no perfect monolith of Soviet domination within Eastern Europe after WWII. Thus, this

chapter represents what is hopefully just a beginning step to opening a new era of research where the diversity and disagreements of diplomatic life behind the Iron Curtain can be examined more openly and accurately. In so doing, we will all get a much clearer understanding of the Cold War in general and bilateral relations between Iron Curtain countries in specific.

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15 Colonel Velimir Stojnić, who was first sent to Albania as an instructor to help the Communist Party of Albania, became the first Yugoslav envoy. He remained in that position until November 1945 (D.A.M.F.A.R.S., P.A., 1945, doc. 16, sign. 6136, November 13, 1945).

16 A.Y., 507/9, box 1, 1/1–37, November 14, 1945.

17 D.A.M.F.A.R.S., P.A., 1945, doc. 4, sign. 7110, December 18, 1945.

18 Ahmed Zogu was the leader of Albania from 1922 to 1939. He first served as the Albanian prime minister (1922–24), then as president (1925–28), and finally as king (1928–39) (Bernd Fischer, *King Zog and the Struggle for Stability in Albania* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1984). Owen Pearson, *Albania and King Zog: independence, republic and monarchy 1908–39* (London, New York: Centre for Albanian Studies in association with IB Tauris Publishers, 2004); Saša Mišić, *Albania: friend and adversary. Yugoslav policy towards Albania 1924–27* (Belgrad: Službeni glasnik, 2009).

19 Borozan, *Greater Albania*, 511.

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28 D.A.M.F.A.R.S., P.A., 1945, doc. 9, sign. 6500, November 30, 1945.

29 A.Y., 507/ 9, box 1, 1/1–44, February 9, 1946.

30 D.A.M.F.A.R.S., P.A., f. 2, 1946, doc. 16, sign. 2719, February 1946.

31 D.A.M.F.A.R.S., P.A., 1946, f. 3, doc. 4, sign. 218, January 3, 1946.

32 See more: Krempton, *The Balkans after World War II.*

33 In order to consolidate the state after the war, agrarian reform was done, which was the most extensive that Albania has ever had. It began in July 1945 in Elbasan, and then continued throughout the country on September 6. They received the help of Yugoslav surveyors (D.A.M.F.A.R.S., P.A., 1945, doc. 7, sign. 2453, 1945). This was based on the Soviet model, as the Yugoslav state applied a model of behavior similar to that of the U.S.S.R. in Yugoslavia, as one of the countries of "people's democracy". So that policy included agrarian reform, nationalization of industry and finance, the introduction of a planned economy, and the acceptance of Soviet influence (Aleksandar Rakonjac, "Reconstruction of old and establishment of new trade relations (1945–47). Yugoslavia, U.S.S.R. and the state of 'people's democracy'", *Currents of history* no.1 (2018): 58. In November 1946, the process of agrarian reform in Albania was completed. Each peasant house that had 5–6 members was supposed to get five hectares of land. Thus, with the agrarian reform, 200,000 people got land (A.Y., 112–800–801, November 17, 1946).

34 A.Y., 507/9, box 1, 1/1–43, February 7, 1946.

35 D.A.M.F.A.R.S., P.A., 1946, doc. 22, sign. 4459, April 19, 1946.

36 A.Y., 112–792–793, April 17, 1946.

37 D.A.M.F.A.R.S., P.A., 1946, doc. 4, sign. 4307, April 15, 1946.

38 A.Y., 112–792–793, April 24, 1946.

39 D.A.M.F.A.R.S., P.A., f. 2, 1946, doc. 1, sign. 7238, May 19, 1946.
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47 D.A.M.F.A.R.S., P.A., f. 1, 1946, doc. 5, sign. 6777, June 10, 1946.
48 D.A.M.F.A.R.S., P.A., f. 2, 1946, doc. 10, sign. 14512, December 7, 1946.
49 Branislav Ilić and Vojislav Ćirković, eds. *Hronologija revolucionarne delatnosti Josipa Broza Tita* [*Chronology of the revolutionary activity of Josip Broz Tito*] (Belgrad: Export-press, 1978), 107. Josip Broz Tito visited the countries with which Yugoslavia concluded agreements in 1946 and 1947, but he was not in Albania (Slobodan Selinić, "Yugoslavia, the U.S.S.R. and Eastern European countries 1944–48", in *Liberation of Belgrade 1944,* ed. Aleksandar Životić (Belgrad: Institute for Recent History of Serbia, 2014), 400.
50 A.Y., 507/9, box 1, 1/1–71, June 19, 1946.
51 Zlatar, *Enver Hoxha: a political biography,* 112.
52 Komatina, *Enver Hoxha and Yugoslav-Albanian relations,* 48.
53 Dedijer, *Yugoslav-Albanian relations: 1939–48,* 152–54.
54 A.Y., 112–796–797, July 7, 1946.
55 A.Y., 507/9, box 1, 1/1–66, July 1946.
56 Yugoslav propaganda in Albania reflected Soviet propaganda in Yugoslavia. In Yugoslavia, Soviet manuals, brochures, screenings of Soviet films, organized guest appearances by Soviet artists and athletes, students and officers were educated in the U.S.S.R. (Marko Pejović, "Sovjetski filmovi prikazani u Jugoslaviji 1945–48, organizaciji Društva za kulturnu saradnju Jugoslavije sa S.S.S.R.-om" [Soviet films shown in Yugoslavia 1945–48, organized by the Society for Cultural Cooperation of Yugoslavia with the U.S.S.R.], *Yearbook of Social History* no.1 (2010): 89–103; Milan Vesović, "Press and journalism of the C.P.Y. on the U.S.S.R. 1938–48" in *Jugoslovensko-sovjetski sukob 1948 godine* [*Yugoslav-Soviet conflict in 1948*], ed. Petar Kačavenda (Belgrad: Institute of Contemporary History, 1999), 309–21; Sava Živanov, "Causes and consequences of conflict", *Yugoslav-Soviet conflict in 1948*, 23.
57 D.A.M.F.A.R.S., P.A., f. 1, 1946, doc. 15, sign. 8613, July 19, 1946.
58 A.Y., 507/9, 1/1–102, October 9, 1946.
59 A.Y., 507, 1/1–1–126, December 1946.
60 Tadeusz Czekalski, *The Shining Beacon of Socialism in Europe. The Albanian State and Society in the Period od Communist Dictatorship 1944–92* (Krakow: Jagiellonian University Press, 2013), 32.
61 A.Y., 507/9, 1/1–122, December 23, 1946.
62 A.Y., 507/9, 1/1–122, December 23, 1946.
63 The Soviet leadership was well informed about Yugoslav-Albanian relations because Soviet intelligence and advisers, and especially Dmitry Stepanovich Chuvahin, with whom Enver Hoxha had constant contact, as well as the Soviet embassy in Belgrade, Sadchikov, sent detailed information about Yugoslav-Albanian relations. In addition to monitoring the situation and the development of relations, the Soviets instructed Albanians to cooperate with Yugoslavia (Momčilo Pavlović, "Albanija između Tita i Staljina" ["Albania between Tito and Stalin"], in

Balkans after the Second World War, ed. Petar Kačavenda (Belgrad: Institute of Contemporary History,1996), 306.

64 Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.A. (February 26 – March 8, 1948), which analyzed the internal situation in the party. The plenum underlined the importance of strengthening ties with Yugoslavia (A.Y., 507/9, 1/ 2–111, March 27, 1948).

65 A.Y., 507, 1/1–174 v., April 22, 1948.

66 A.Y., 507, 1/1–178, May 31, 1948.

67 Komatina, *Enver Hoxha and Yugoslav-Albanian relations,* 86.

68 A.Y., 507, 9, 1/1–167a, June 2, 1948.

69 A.Y., 836, 1–3–в/40, June 6,1948.

70 Komatina, *Enver Hoxha and Yugoslav-Albanian relations,* 86.

71 Vladimir Dedijer, *Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita* [*New contributions to the biography of Josip Broz Tito*] (Rijeka: Liburnija, Zagreb: Mladost, 1981), 487.

72 D.A.M.F.A.R.S., P.A., 1948, f. 1, doc. 12, sign. 414031, May 22, 1948.

73 D.A.M.F.A.R.S., P.A., 1948, f. 3, sign. 415459, June 6, 1948.

74 "Zabeleška o razgovoru ministra inostranih poslova S.S.S.R. V.M. Molotova sa premijerom Albanije i prvim sekretarom C.K. K.P.A. E. Hodžom, Varšava, June 24, 1948" ["Note on the conversation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. V.M. Molotov with the Prime Minister of Albania and the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P.A., E. Hoxha, Warsaw, June 24, 1948"], in *Yugoslav-Soviet relations 1945–56*, 363–6.

75 A.Y., 836, 1–3–v/44, July 1, 1948.

76 A.Y., 507/9, 1/1–196, July 1, 1948.

77 A.Y., 507/9, 1/1–196, July 1, 1948.

78 A.Y., 507/9, 1/1–127–242, July 3, 1948. The economic reports, which we find in the Archives of Yugoslavia, amount to Yugoslav investments in the Albanian economy. By the end of 1947, the loan had been utilized with 1,356,811,698.49 (83 percent), while goods of Yugoslav production, worth 912,637,758 (80 percent), were shipped or were on their way to Albania. In addition, goods imported by Yugoslavia for Albania, worth 111,683,436 (22 percent), were also delivered or were on the way to Albania. Analyzing the sources of budget revenues, only 21.1 percent of all revenues came from Albanian sources, while 78.8 percent were of foreign origin and this was about 20 percent in U.N.N.R.A. assistance and 56.75 percent in the Yugoslav's commodity credit which Albania used for buying goods (A.Y., 50–49–490; A.Y., 50–48–690)

79 A.Y., 507/9, 1/1–127–242, July 21, 1948.

80 A.Y., 507/9, 1/1–197, July 29, 1948.

81 There were 29 engineers, two geologists, six architects, two doctors, 67 technicians, 24 accountants, eight geometers, many professional technical staff, draftsmen, accountants, traffic officials, managers and skilled workers, and administrative officers.

82 A.Y., 50–57–119, July 1948.

83 D.A.M.F.A.R.S., P.A., 1948, f. 1, doc. 22, sign. 432113.

84 Aleksandar Životić, "Nemirna granica. Pogranične tenzije između Jugoslavije i Albanije 1948–54" [Restless border. Border tensions between Yugoslavia and Albania 1948–54], *Historical records,* no. 1–2 (2009): 109–10.

85 A.Y., 836, 1–3–v–46, September 28, 1948.

86 Stojković, *Balkan Treaty Relations: 1876–1996,* III, 177–79.

87 A.Y., 507/9, 1/2–111, September 1948.

88 A.Y., 507/9, 1/2–119, November 1948.

89 A.Y., 507/9, 1/2–11, November 1948.

90 Slobodan Selinić, *Partija i diplomatija u Jugoslaviji 1945–52* [*Party and diplomacy in Yugoslavia 1945–52*] (Belgrad: Institute for Recent History of Serbia, 2013), 300–02. With the arrival of Soviet goods, food prices temporarily stabilized. It was said among the population that "they lived better while the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia plundered them than when the U.S.S.R. helped them." The mood of the people is reflected in an event in a state warehouse in Tirana. During the division of goods, the director said that the goods would be because "there is no Yugoslavia to steal goods". One woman asked where the jam that bears the label of the Yugoslav factory came from, and the other joked "maybe the jam is Trotskyist, so it will harm us" (A.Y., 507/9, 1/1–239, November 30, 1948). Also, a Yugoslav archival report states: "The masses of the people looked with distrust on Albania's trade agreements with Bulgaria and the U.S.S.R., fearing that they would have to give too much oil for Soviet and Bulgarian grain, which is the only food that it was acquired as a follow-up." (A.Y., 836, 1–3–v/50, September 10, 1948).

91 *Bela knjiga o neprijateljskoj politici Vlade Narodne Republike Albanije prema Federativnoj Narodnoj Republici Jugoslaviji [White Paper on the Enemy Policy of the Government of the People's Republic of Albania towards the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia]* (Belgrad: State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, 1961), 139; Dimitrije Bogdanović, *A book about Kosovo (*Belgrad: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1986), 303; Miomir Gatalović, *Kosovo and Metohija in the state policy of Yugoslavia 1958–65* (Belgrad: Institute of Contemporary History, Society of Historians of Serbia "Stojan Novakovic", 2016), 50; *About the counter-revolutionary and slanderous campaign against socialist Yugoslavia* II (Belgrad: Borba, 1949), 193–95.

92 Vladimir Cvetković, "Diplomatske misije F.N.R.J. u Sofiji, Bukureštu i Tirani 1953–54: povratak ambasadora, uslovi rada i incidenti" ["Diplomatic missions of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Sofia, Bucharest and Tirana 1953–54: return of ambassadors, working conditions and incidents"], in *Jugoslovenska diplomatija 1945–61*, ed. Slobodan Selinić (Belgrad: Institute for Recent History of Serbia, 2012), 206.

93 Djordje Borozan, "Jugoslovensko-albanski odnosi u prvoj deceniji Hladnog rata" ["Yugoslav-Albanian relations in the first decade of the Cold War"], in *Great Powers and Small States in the Cold War 1945–55, The Case of Yugoslavia*, ed. Ljubodrag Dimić (Belgrad: Faculty of Philosophy, Department of History of Yugoslavia, Archives of Serbia and Montenegro, Institute of Recent History of Serbia, London: Cold War Research Center, 2005), 137. More on the normalization of relations between Yugoslavia and Albania and the countries of the "people's democracy" in the neighborhood 195–58. See: Vladimir Cvetković, *A look behind the Iron Curtain: Yugoslav policy towards the neighboring democracies 1953–58* (Belgrad: Institute for Recent History of Serbia, 2013).

94 Komatina, *Enver Hoxha and Yugoslav-Albanian relations*, 95.

95 A.Y., 112-792-793, April 24, 1946.

PART II

THE BALKANS: THE "SHADES" OF INTELLIGENCE AND DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES

CHAPTER 7

The "Shades" of Bulgarian-Turkish Cooperation (1919–1923): Informal Diplomacy and Revolutionary Activities

TSVETELINA TSVETKOVA

Abstract: The end of the First World War led to the establishment of the Versailles system, which imposed severe peace treaties to the former allies of the Central Powers. The wish of the Entente to reshape Europe following their victory would ultimately be challenged by the nations put under "punishment" and isolation. The Turkish National Movement was just such a threat to the planned new European order, but at the same time it was a chance for smaller counties like Bulgaria to try for revision of their treaties. When the national interests of Bulgarians and Turks came to a crossroads, *informal diplomacy* started to play an important role for cooperation not only between the Bulgarian and Turkish Ankara governments, but also between the representatives of the respective revolutionary organizations in Macedonia and Thrace. The period under consideration here is related to intensive secret negotiations and revolutionary activities, which will be examined in this chapter, revealing the most important "shades" in Bulgarian-Turkish informal relations.

Keywords: informal diplomacy, Aleksandăr Stambolijski, Mustafa Kemal, revolutions.

INFORMAL DIPLOMACY IN BULGARIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS

The topic of Bulgarian-Turkish cooperation during the period 1919–23 was partially investigated as separate aspects concerning Bulgarian and foreign historiography. The aim of this chapter is to present this cooperation in a larger perspective through the prism of informal diplomacy. It was the main means used by Bulgaria to establish secret relations with the Ankara government, though not officially ←157 | 158→recognized. Furthermore, non-governmental actors, such as respective revolutionary organizations, had an important role in these informal processes and put their efforts to solve common problems. The significance of such individuals, professional diplomats or not who had unofficial relations with one another, was that they relied on their own specific (local) knowledge and informal networks, thus contributing to intergovernmental and international relationships.

The turbulent postwar situation made Bulgarian-Turkish informal diplomacy focus on national interests, engaging their minority populations in Macedonia and Thrace. These territories, due to their historical and geostrategic significance, were an object of serious international attempts to reconcile the "powder keg of Europe"—the Balkans. The main channels for conducting informal diplomacy were both governmental and revolutionary. The first created communication and activities between the Bulgarian and Ankara governments. The second *was* between the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (I.M.R.O.), the Internal Thracian Revolutionary Organization (I.T.R.O.), and Mustafa Kemal`s representatives. Examples for both will be addressed, providing different "shades" on the relations between Bulgaria and Turkey.[1]

This chapter assesses the topic through historical narrative, which presents Bulgarian-Turkish cooperation in its development and the related historical facts that created the framework for informal diplomacy. Analysis of primary and secondary sources reveals important details about the channels of its realization, specific characteristics, and unique aspects of related historical processes. The critical approach to the primary sources and to some already published works offers a different perspective and makes new contributions to the literature.

NATIONAL INTERESTS: THE INTERSECTION POINT FOR BULGARIAN-TURKISH COOPERATION

The situation for the Bulgarian government after signing the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine was complicated due to the mistrust of neighbors: mainly, a fear of Bulgaria striving for territorial revision or supporting a revolutionary movement amongst common Bulgarians, who were stranded within territories lost by Bulgaria to Serbia, Greece, and Romania.[2] The rapprochement with these countries ←158 | 159→and establishing amicable relations was of primary importance for Prime Minister Aleksandăr Stambolijski.[3] He persistently pushed the priority of peaceful revision of the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine and protecting the rights of Bulgarian refugees under United Nations patronage, especially concerning the possibility to return to their homes.[4] In particular, the "Thrace question" was the one that made the resurgence of relations with Turkey inevitable. The priorities were as follows: (1) the return of Western Thrace; (2) access to the Aegean Sea with the right to use the port of Dedeağaç (Alexandroupolis, Greece) under the Treaty; (3) and the return of Bulgarian refugees to Eastern Thrace. An attempt to solve the refugee issue was based on a statement by the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs on December 21, 1920, that Bulgarian refugees from the region of Çatalca were allowed to return if the Bulgarian government granted the same possibility to Muslim refugees from Bulgaria. Unfortunately, the proposal was unfeasible as Turkish families were already settled in Bulgarian properties and most of the Muslim refugees sold their possessions in Bulgaria.[5]

The return of Western Thrace and access to the Aegean Sea was hindered by the so-called "Treaty of Thrace"[6], signed on August 10, 1920, in Sevres between the Great Powers and Greece, where Western Thrace was transferred to the latter. Bulgaria was not officially informed about this treaty and, as it was not ratified, Stambolijski pretended that it did not exist, grounding Bulgarian demands only on the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine. In the spring of 1919, the Entente started the occupation of territories across the

Ottoman Empire, inflaming protests and ←159 | 160→providing the main prompt for the formation of the Turkish National Movement, led by Mustafa Kemal. Its principal aims, formulated at the Erzurum Congress (July 23 to August 4, 1919) and Sivas Congress (September 4–11, 1919)[7] were to keep the country whole and resist foreign occupation.[8] Additionally, the "Society for the Defense of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia", with Mustafa Kemal elected chairman of the Representative Committee, united all patriotic and nationalist formations.[9] The last step in formulating national interests and foreign policy created by the Ankara government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (G.N.A.) was the *Mîsâk-ı Millî* [*National Pact*][10], voted on January 28, 1920. It considered Eastern Thrace to be part of the homeland of the Turkish nation. For Western Thrace, the population itself would determine its future by referendum.

In the quest for solving the "Thrace question", Stambolijski did not exclude possible cooperation with the Ankara government. *In fact*, the idea of a referendum in Western Thrace gave him some hope of retrieving the territory or at least having autonomy there. Regarding to the eastern part, he aimed to achieve some success in the eventual return of refugees. After the Greek occupation of Thrace, resistance against it became a common point for joint Bulgarian-Turkish cooperation in the region and in Aegean Macedonia. It facilitated a secret Bulgarian-Turkish collaboration and even an unofficial support for Turks in the Greco-Turkish war. The Bulgarian Prime Minister hoped that Turkish resistance against the Treaty of Sevres would bring reconsideration of the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine and unification with Western Thrace.

GOVERNMENTAL INFORMAL DIPLOMACY: SECRET MISSIONS BETWEEN SOFIA AND ANKARA

Allied Powers were suspicious about reestablishing official relations between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the High Commissioners of France, Great Britain, and Italy refused the Bulgarian

government to accredit their own representatives in Constantinople (Istanbul, Turkey) before the ratification of the Treaty of Sevres by the Ottoman government. Bulgaria continued to be ←160 | 161→represented by the Swedish legation.[11] This lack of access made Bulgaria turn to informal diplomacy with the newly established Ankara government.

After the opening of the G.N.A., Mustafa Kemal sent a note to the Bulgarian Prime Minister on April 30, 1920, which, due to extraordinary circumstances, arrived on August 14, 1920.[12] He informed Stambolijski that after the arrest of national representatives in the Ottoman Parliament on March 16, 1920, the G.N.A. was convened and took over the country. It is important to emphasize that Mustafa Kemal, having been Military Attaché in Bulgaria, was known to many Bulgarian public and political figures and was a friend with some of them. Presumably, Mustafa Kemal was present at some of the sessions of the Bulgarian National Assembly, where he had the opportunity to get acquainted with Stambolijski.[13] The personal relations between Bulgarian politicians and Mustafa Kemal played a serious role in establishing informal diplomacy, providing access to the highest political circles, and facilitating a confidential communication between Bulgarian and Turkish decision-makers.

Having assessed the international situation and the course of the Greco-Turkish War, the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (B.A.N.U.) government sent several secret diplomatic missions to Ankara in 1921–1922. Sent in the second half of May 1921, the initial delegation consisted of Angel Grozkov (P.M. from B.A.N.U.), Cap. Grigor Pisarev (adjutant of gendarmerie), and Paskal ←161 | 162→Enčev (tradesman).[14] Traveling officially as tradesmen, their aim was to establish direct relations between the Ankara government and the B.A.N.U. government. A. Grozkov met with Mustafa Kemal and G. Pisarev—with İsmet Paşa (İnönü). In return for support of the Ankara government, the mission had to receive Mustafa Kemal's consent "да предпочете (…) не Гърция, а България за западен съсед на Турция" [to prefer (…) not Greece but Bulgaria for a western neighbor of Turkey][15] at future international conferences. The Bulgarian delegation also visited some

of the frontlines at Eskişehir, İnebolu, Kastamonu, Antalya, Sivas, and Kütahya.

Furthermore, from January-March 1922, Dimităr Ačkov,[16] accompanied by his nephew and secretary Petăr Mončev, visited Mustafa Kemal in Ankara to gather political and military information.[17] Before leaving for Ankara, the latter had a meeting with the Bulgarian consul in Constantinople, Todor Pavlov.[18] In his report to the Bulgarian Prime Minister, Pavlov wrote that D. Ačkov was not charged with a mission by anyone, but the impression was his activities were in accordance with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Figure 7.1: Representatives of the Bulgarian revolutionary and political circles (from left to right Todor Aleksandrov, Dimităr Ačkov and Petăr Acev), (Date unknown).

Reproduced with permission from the Bulgarian State Archives/ C. S. A., f. 1933K, op.3, a.e.71, 1.

a) Todor Aleksandrov b) Dimităr Ačkov c) Petăr Acev

Additionally, a document from the French diplomatic mission in Constantinople testified to an agreement between the Bulgarian and Turkish governments, allegedly signed on March 10, 1922.[19] The existence of such an agreement is questionable, but it contains information which, with small deviations, described the undertaken joint activities between Bulgarians and Turks in Macedonia and Thrace since 1920. There was the expected contraband of weaponry from Bulgaria to the Kemalists, which the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control in Sofia and Bulgarian government reported.[20] Participation of Muslim volunteers from ←162 | 163→Bulgaria in Mustafa Kemal's Army was among the other points. An interesting fact is that Bulgarians from Macedonia and Thrace, who were forcedly mobilized in the Greek army, deserted from it, and joined the army of Mustafa Kemal and fought against the Greeks.[21] The cited document posed the question of why, if French intelligence possessed serious proof of a Bulgarian-Turkish "agreement", were there no consequences for Bulgaria?

As close unofficial relations between Bulgaria and the Ankara government were already a fact, it is not surprising that on his way to a London Conference at the end of March 1922 Yusuf Kemal visited Sofia and was warmly welcomed.[22] Unable to meet Stambolijski, Yusuf Kemal met with the chairman of the Bulgarian Parliament and the Minister of Finance, confirming good mutual relations. The "Thrace question" was also discussed according to publications in the Bulgarian press, reporting that Yusuf Kemal proposed two solutions for Thrace: the first suggested autonomy; the second *was that* Western Thrace would be given ←163 | 164→to Bulgaria and Eastern *Thrace* to Turkey.[23] Having in mind that Eastern Thrace was seen as an inseparable part of Turkey, the first option, if really proposed by Yusuf Kemal, was just imaginary and probably aimed to influence the public. The second depended on the outcome of the Greco-Turkish War as well as the Bulgarian-Greek and Bulgarian-Entente`s relations, which were not in Bulgaria's favor. Nevertheless, this statement might be an additional stimulus for Bulgarian representatives at the Genoa Conference (April 10 – May 19, 1922) to propose a conditional separation of Thrace.[24]

The “fragile” position of Bulgaria did not prevent the sending of secret missions. At the end of 1922, Ceko Pukaničarov—Bulgarian tradesman—was invited by Aleksandăr Stambolijski to fulfill a secret visit to Mustafa Kemal and discuss with him important topics, amongst which were Turkish schools in Bulgaria and the refugee issue.[25] The tradesman was accompanied by Boris Ačkov—private secretary of Cevat Abbas[26] during his stay in Sofia. They left for Ankara in December 1922, meeting first with Abbas and then with Kemal.

Pukaničarov mentioned in his memories the interesting plans of the Turkish leader in foreign affairs, which included the establishment of four republics—Anatolian, Thracian, Macedonian, and Bulgarian—to be united into one union. This information had to be delivered to the Bulgarian Prime Minister.[27] The only “strange” part was regarding the union. The rest was according to the plans of I.M.R.O. for an independent Macedonian state, supported by the Turks; cooperation in Thrace with autonomy for its Western part; Anatolia would be considered the new Turkish state to appear very soon on the map, and all of them united, including Bulgaria. The reaction of Stambolijski to this suggestion is unfortunately unknown.

←164 | 165→At the end of 1922, Stambolijski sent the Bulgarian Consul in Adrianople (Edirne, Turkey), General of the Army Reserve Todor Markov,[28] to Mustafa Kemal with a “secret mission”. On January 26, 1923, traveling under a false identity, Markov arrived in Izmir, where he had three meetings with Mustafa Kemal. Among the questions discussed were Western Thrace, Bulgarian access to the Aegean Sea, the “refugee question”, Bulgarian Exarchate, mutual trade, and establishment of diplomatic relations. Regarding the “Thrace question” in his report from February 8, 1923, Markov wrote that Mustafa Kemal stated they had never seriously thought to take Western Thrace, regardless of it being a part of the National Pact. He was personally convinced that if Turkey took possession of this region, it would not become stronger but on the contrary it would become weaker. He acknowledged that for Bulgaria the region was of vital importance, and they were ready to support the position of the Bulgarian government.[29] During the very same meeting in Izmir, Mustafa Kemal said a telegram in this direction

was sent to the leader of the Turkish Delegation at the Lausanne Conference, İsmet İnönü, to support Bulgarian demands. The latter was stated to have been made at one of the plenary sessions of the conference.[30]

Meanwhile, in August 1920, the government of Aleksandăr Stambolijski managed to send an unofficial representative to the Swedish legation in Constantinople, Todor Pavlov, who was providing consular services. On March 1, 1923, he was replaced by Adrianople Consul General Todor Markov. Yet, as official relations could not be established before the Lausanne Conference, he was instructed that only "officious relations" with the Ankara government could be sustained. He had to use the secretary of the Legation Ivan Altănov for missions in Ankara as Markov being there would create a "great stir", while the presence of the secretary would escape notice.[31] One more mission took place in the period March–April 1923, that of the Bulgarian metropolitan Stefan, who was sent ←165 | 166→officially by Stambolijski to the Bulgarian legation in Constantinople to support the resolution of all ecclesiastical matters.[32] Supposedly, his real mission was to lead the first serious probing and even to start secret negotiations with the Turkish government about current and future Bulgarian-Turkish relations.[33]

On the part of Ankara—Cevat Abbas (Gürer) Bey was the personal envoy and confidant of Mustafa Kemal, who was incognito in Bulgaria at the end of 1920–1921 as an officious representative of the Ankara government.[34] He was engaged in establishing contacts with the B.A.N.U. government, organizing military and financial support for Turkey, in order to undertake steps for realizing common Bulgarian-Turkish *četnik* (armed illegal bands, which opposed the official government) activities against the Greeks in Macedonia and Thrace. Regarding the last, he arranged meetings with the leaders of I.M.R.O. General-lieutenant Aleksandăr Protogerov[35] and Todor Aleskandrov.[36] They also met with Fuat (Balkan) Bey, who was appointed to coordinate the *četnik* movement in Macedonia and especially Western Thrace. According to British intelligence, the aim of joint *četnik* activities in these regions was to compel Greek military commands to bring back to Thrace the division which was directed toward Asia ←166 | 167→Minor.[37] Cevat Abbas Bey was in permanent contact with many politicians from the

ruling party and not only with them. He could not receive any support from the Bulgarian government because of pressure from Great Britain, even though the latter could not prevent him from being backed up by part of the Bulgarian society. Bulgaria wanted neither to offend the Turks nor risk losing the outlet to the Aegean Sea from Western Thrace, which was under Allied control.[38]

All these "conspiratorial" activities were not a secret from the Entente Powers intelligence in Bulgaria and for neighboring countries Greece, Serbia, and Romania, which accused Bulgaria of supporting *četnik* activities and insisted urgent measures against them.[39] Especially irritated were the British, whose concerns were that every act of provocation or illegal action against Greece would impact the course of the Greco-Turkish War.[40] The suspicion toward the real intentions of Bulgaria made the Bulgarian government write regular rebuttals about its supposed relations with the Ankara government.[41]

INFORMAL DIPLOMACY AND JOINT BULGARIAN-TURKISH ACTIVITIES IN MACEDONIA

The "Thrace question" and the one about Bulgarian refugees from Aegean Macedonia kept tension between Bulgaria and Greece. Searching for assistance in future negotiations, Aleksandăr Stambolijski decided to gain the benevolence of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Yugoslavia). In return, Bulgaria would support Belgrade's aspirations to Thessaloniki. Stambolijski was no stranger to the idea of establishing a federative state with Yugoslavia.[42] Therefore, ←167 | 168→he was ready to renounce all Bulgarian pretentions to Vardar Macedonia and to neutralize any illegal activities on Yugoslavian territory which could discredit the image of Bulgaria. This put the Bulgarian Prime Minister in a direct conflict with the reestablished I.M.R.O., aggravating the internal political situation[43] and causing accusations from Yugoslavia and Greece to Bulgaria of sending *četi* to their territories.[44]

The I.M.R.O. leaders Aleksandăr Protogerov, Todor Aleksandrov, and Petar Čaulev, turned to armed resistance in 1920 after failing to peacefully protect and secure the safety of Bulgarians in Macedonia. As unification with Bulgaria was impossible, their main aim became an autonomous Macedonia under the protectorate of some of the Great Powers or creating a totally independent state from its parts, shared between Yugoslavia, Greece, and Bulgaria.[45] The leaders of I.M.R.O. wanted to unite their efforts with the other peoples living in Vardar and Aegean Macedonia. The Turkish minority was already predisposed, as they were ready to defend their rights under new occupational conditions.[46] An additional external factor was the Greco-Turkish War. Turkey was in favor of illegal Bulgarian-Turkish *četnik* activities not only in Vardar but also in Aegean Macedonia. They would distract the Greek army on several fronts, while the Turks concentrated their main forces in Anatolia. In 1920 there was already information about the activities of the Turks in Macedonia, led by "(…) някакъв таен комитет на младотурци с център гр. Сяр и с обхват на дейност цяла Македония" ["some secret committee of Young Turks centered in the city of Ser (Serres, Greece, a.n.) and with a scope of activity throughout Macedonia"].[47] In October 1920, the Greek newspaper *Patris* reported on a "Macedonian committee"—an unofficial Bulgarian government—the leaders of which were to be found amongst the ←168 | 169→high-ranking officers of the Bulgarian and Turkish Army. Their joint activities aimed at spreading unrest in Macedonia and Thrace.[48]

The negotiations for cooperation between I.M.R.O. and the Turkish Macedonian Committee started with Ankara representatives in 1921.[49] The project protocol for an agreement from April 1921 was finalized between the representatives of I.M.R.O. (most probably Kiril Părlichev) and of Mustafa Kemal—Cevat Abbas Bey.[50] The joint decision of Bulgarians and Turks to struggle for the liberation of Macedonia was declared. To establish an autonomous country independent from other Balkan states was also accepted. It would have its own constitution and institutions with a proportional representation of the population based on nationality. To achieve their goal, the Bulgarians, and Turks (including other Muslims) would use revolutionary

struggle and separate campaigns. The legal measures foresaw joint voting during elections for parties that defended their rights. Revolutionary organizations would have "foreign representation" and the borders of Macedonia were officially marked.[51]

Based on the arrangements, Todor Aleksandrov prepared a proclamation to Macedonian Muslims, informing them about cooperation between the Bulgarian and Turkish revolutionary organizations to struggle in Macedonia against their common enemies—the Serbs and the Greeks.[52] I.M.R.O. started to initiate armed resistance. As a legal measure it was decided to support the Yugoslavian Communist Party in parliamentary elections in Yugoslavia in 1920, as it was the only party to recognize the Bulgarian national minority and its rights. It had serious success in Vardar Macedonia, sending 15 deputies (out of 58 representatives) ←169 | 170→to the parliament of Yugoslavia[53], but the pre-electoral statements proved to be pure propaganda. The activities of the Turks in Macedonia were not as intensive and organized as the Bulgarian ones, but the movement had its famous leaders, actively agitating and organizing Turkish peasants.[54]

In Aegean Macedonia, I.M.R.O. aimed to preserve Bulgarian consciousness and prevent the implementation of the Convention between Bulgaria and Greece for the Voluntary and Mutual Emigration of Minorities of November 27, 1919.[55] Representatives of the Bulgarian minority prepared a petition to Greek authorities for permission of legal-social activities, such as having schools and churches opened. These were rejected and the people that signed the petition were arrested. This made I.M.R.O. reject peaceful methods.[56] Meanwhile, the instructions of the Greek government for tolerant and favorable politics toward the Muslim population was often met with opposition at the local level. Not very successful was also the use of Muslims from the Bulgarian and Greek parliaments to oppose Bulgarian and Turkish aspirations in Aegean Macedonia and Thrace.[57] The beginning of the Greco-Turkish War and the atrocities related to the occupation of Izmir became a foundation for mistrust toward the Muslim population by local administrations.

The established cooperation between Bulgarian and Turkish organizations was implemented through the formation of *četi* at the borders with Greece, as well as coordinating propaganda amongst the population and conducting sabotage within Greek territories. These activities intensified after the London Conference in 1921 and encouraged a closer unofficial cooperation between the Bulgarian and Turkish governments.[58] Bulgarian-Turkish cooperation and coordination between I.M.R.O. and B.A.N.U. in respect to Greece came from two sources: one was information provided by the British plenipotentiary in Sofia—Arthur Peel.[59] ←170 | 171→He was very suspicious about the content of the meeting between the Bulgarian Minister of Internal Affairs Aleksandăr Dimitrov and the Yugoslavian Prime Minister Nikola Pašič in the summer of 1921. Peel claimed it was highly possible that Pašič and Dimitrov had discussed how to share Greece if it lost the war. He also informed the Foreign Office about secret negotiations in Stara Zagora on June 16, 1921 between Kemalists and agents of Soviet Russia on one side and Bulgarian Thracian and Macedonian committees on the other. The aim was to achieve autonomy of Macedonia and the incorporation of Western Thrace in Bulgaria. In case of Entente's operation in Asia Minor, a second front against Greece in Eastern Thrace was to be opened.[60] In fact, earlier in May, suggestions for joint military actions against Greece were coming to Yugoslavia from Bulgaria and Turkey.[61]

The second source was from the Greek archives, testifying for a secret agreement between the B.A.N.U. government and I.M.R.O. in 1921. According to it "I.M.R.O. would curtail its activities on Yugoslav territory, while the government would grant tacit support for I.M.R.O. action in Greek Macedonia."[62] The agreement would be valid until the end of Bulgarian-Yugoslavian negotiations. In fact, there was a letter from Todor Aleksandrov to an unknown representative of the Bulgarian government, dated May 1921.[63] He stated that he was asked by the government not to send any *četi* in order to not hinder expected Yugoslav-Bulgarian negotiations in Belgrade. No groups had already been sent as T. Aleksandrov did not want to give reasons to justify Serbian actions. Aegean Macedonia was not mentioned.

Joint Bulgarian-Turkish activities in Macedonia were not officially supported by the Bulgarian government, but it wanted to profit from them for establishing official relations with the Ankara government. This can be seen in the meeting between General Todor Markov and Mustafa Kemal in 1923. The Bulgarian consul emphasized that "(…) едно искрено разбирателство между двете държави ще се яви като силна морална опора за турците и българите от Македония и Северна Албания" ["(…) a sincere understanding between both countries will be a strong moral mainstay for the Turks and Bulgarians from Macedonia and North Albania"], and added: "Като македонец наверно Ви е известно, че там турци и българи под гнета на общата зла участ са си подали братски ръка задружно да ←171 | 172→извоюват политическата си независимост" ["As a Macedonian[64] you are probably familiar that there Turks and Bulgarians under the oppression of the common evil fate had fraternally passed their hand to each other to jointly gain their political independence."].[65] Thus, the cause of the Bulgarians in Macedonia, neglected and even hindered by Bulgarian politicians, became a tool to ground political cooperation between Bulgaria and Turkey.

After the Lausanne Conference, when Turkey achieved its political aims, cooperation in Macedonia was no longer of interest. An additional obstacle for I.M.R.O. was the Treaty of Niš between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, signed on March 23, 1923. Later, on May 7, came the decision of the Council of Ministers that all such revolutionary organizations must be dissolved and their leaders and other illegally working persons on Bulgarian territory arrested and interned in camps.[66]

INFORMAL DIPLOMACY AND JOINT BULGARIAN-TURKISH ACTIVITIES IN THRACE

After the end of the war the destiny of both parts of Thrace was to be solved at the Paris Peace Conference. The fear that the territory would be given to Greece made the leaders of the Bulgarian and Turkish populations from

Eastern Thrace discuss eventual cooperation at the conference. The initiative was started by Turkish leaders, including the commander of the First Military Corps—General Cafer Tayyar (Eğilmez).[67] In Eastern Thrace, an organization for defending the rights of Turks was already established in December 1918—*Trakya Paşaeli Müdafaa-i* ←172 | 173→*Heyeti Osmaniyesi* ("Ottoman Defense Committee of Thrace-Paşaeli").[68] The Committee initially followed politics in Eastern Thrace, based on President Woodrow Wilson's principles. They wanted to establish a state from Western and Eastern Thrace under the mandate of a Great Power. These ideas, considered harmful for nationalist struggles, were abandoned later as the Committee followed the *Mîsâk-ı Millî* [*National Pact*].[69]

Bulgarian resistance was organized by the Internal Thracian Revolutionary Organization (I.T.R.O.), which originated from the Bulgarian Macedonian-Adrianople Revolutionary Committees, established at the end of nineteenth century.[70] The main aim of I.T.R.O. was to gain full political independence of Eastern and Western Thrace and their eventual unification with Bulgaria. The *četnik* activities, starting in 1919, became more organized later. In August 1920, a decision for coordination of the separate bands and clear revolutionary activities was made.[71] Meanwhile, prominent Bulgarians from Western Thrace decided to contact influential Turkish leaders. After organized meetings, the readiness for joint armed resistance against eventual Greek occupation was confirmed.[72] There was also active communication between Turkish military officers and politicians with I.M.R.O. leaders such as Protogerov and their representatives abroad. In the period May–September 1919, Dr. Georgi Nikolov—representative of I.M.R.O. in Constantinople—reported regularly to the Sofia headquarters about the conviction of the Turkish Thracian Committee that Thrace would be given to Greece. Therefore, they wanted to cooperate with Bulgarians and to proclaim an independent Thracian Republic under common European protection.[73]

The topic about Thrace was discussed in a meeting between Dimităr Ačkov, Arif Bey,[74] and Mustafa Kemal in Ankara in March 1920. The Bulgarian liaison ←173 | 174→officer at Eastern Army headquarters in

Constantinople, Colonel Petrov, provided information to the Chief of Staff of the Army in Sofia with a copy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[75] Mustafa Kemal stated that if Western Thrace did not receive autonomy, then he would order the Turkish population there to work with the Bulgarians for the region to rejoin Bulgaria. The rest of Thrace, including Adrianople up to the Maritsa River, had to be within the borders of Turkey. He did not recognize any Thracian committees. Military actions against the Greeks and French were planned for the following spring. The Turks took examples from the Bulgarian *četi* in Macedonia and would use similar activities.

After the occupation of Constantinople on March 16, 1920[76] by the Entente, General Cafer Tayyar cut off relations with the Ottoman government and started to follow instructions from Ankara. He declared martial law and general mobilization in Eastern Thrace, informing the local British Military Representation that he was dictator of the region, determined to fight against any occupational army.[77] In April and May, Cafer Tayyar had unofficial communication with the General Counsel in Adrianople, General Markov. The Turkish commander requested the support of the Bulgarian government for their struggle against the Greeks as corresponding to Bulgarian interests. Ensuring access to the Aegean Sea through diplomatic means, Bulgaria ultimately could only promise to accept temporary Turkish forces or population if such request was to be received.[78]

Informal diplomacy on a revolutionary level was more effective and probably secretly enhanced by the Bulgarian government. Grounds for this assumption come from another report of Colonel Petrov, dated March 24, 1920.[79] Containing a separate part about Thrace and Cafer Tayyar's actions, it summarized a conversation with General Franchet d'Espèrey, who informed Colonel Petrov about a probable transfer of Western Thrace to the Greeks. The Bulgarian officer was certain the Greeks would prevent Bulgaria's economic access to the Aegean Sea, thus leaving no other option but to use force as the Turks did. Colonel Petrov asked if a campaign, coordinated between I.M.R.O. and the Turks from Eastern Thrace, was not possible in Western Thrace? This required unification of both parts in autonomy under the protectorate of some Great Power. According to

Colonel Petrov, the Turks already agreed to work with the Bulgarians, as stated by Mustafa Kemal in the meeting with Ačkov.[80] The events that followed gave clear answer to Colonel Petrov's question and revealed full "synchronization" between official and unofficial stakeholders.

In April 1920, due to the expected Greek occupation, a secret meeting was held by T. Aleksandrov, Al. Protogerov, Tanjo Nikolov, and Petăr Darvingov in Mestanlı (Momčilgrad, Bulgaria) with representatives of the Turkish Thracian Committee. Most likely the final decision for coordinated Bulgarian-Turkish armed struggle in Thrace and Macedonia was accepted at this meeting.[81] According to French Intelligence, a General Staff of the armed struggle of Bulgarians and Turks in Western Thrace was established. The leaders responsible for its governance were Al. Protogerov and Arif Bey.[82]

The decision of the San Remo Conference (April 19–26, 1920) to transfer Thrace to Greece prompted strong discontent among Bulgarians and Turks. In the beginning of May 1920, representatives of the Bulgarian and Turkish communities gathered in Karaağaç. Among those present were A. Popaleksov, Dr. Nenčev, Cap. Bojadžiev, P. Mutafov, Fuad Bey, Cemal Bey, Ali Galib Bey, Necmetin Bey as well as Cafer Tayyar, who came with the commanders of his corps.[83] They signed a bilateral protocol for joint actions against Greek occupation. Autonomy for the whole of Thrace was requested as well as a referendum organized by a provisional government of Turks and Bulgarians to explicitly define the new political regime. On May 15, they handed a joint petition to General Charpy[84] where the autonomy of Thrace under the protectorate of France or some other Great Power was proposed.

On May 25, 1920, representatives of the Bulgarian and Turkish populations in Western Thrace gathered in Himitli, Gümülcine (Organi, Komotini, Greece) and proclaimed the "Temporary Government for National Defense" with Prime Minister Ahmed Tefik Bey. It consisted of seven Turkish and three Bulgarian ministers, half of whom had experience in the Supreme Administrative Council to General Charpy's administration.[85] This was a crucial moment in the cooperation between the two nations as a counteraction to Greek occupation and created an unusual "shade" of Bulgarian-Turkish relations, considering their historical antagonism. Later,

Bulgarian and Turkish populations[86] in the region decided to ←175 | 176→organize revolutionary activities to protect their rights and independence. These were also in favor of the Bulgarian and Turkish governments, whose political interests found a common ground.

The new government started to organize its own army based on the already existing Bulgarian-Turkish *četi*. The main support came from Tayyar Bey, Aleksandăr Protogerov, and officers from the Turkish and Bulgarian movements in Thrace and Macedonia.[87] On May 26, the Prime Minister Ahmed Tefik Bey handed to General Charpy a Declaration of Independence of Western Thrace. The rejection to conform to the San Remo Conference decisions was announced with a proclamation in Bulgarian, Turkish, and French. The government did not receive any official support by Bulgaria or Turkey but its army, commanded by Fuat (Balkan) Bey, gave strong resistance to the Greek army, announcing a total mobilization of the male population of Western Thrace.[88]

The Bulgarian government was never officially supportive of the joint Bulgarian-Turkish actions, but unofficially it kept contact with its leaders.[89] Quite indicative was the support the Bulgarian government provided for Cafer Tayyar and more than 25,000 military personnel and civilians[90] that escaped Eastern Thrace after falling in resistance to the Greek army. Cafer Tayyar was accused of not organizing properly the defense of Eastern Thrace.[91] He also could not provide the expected military support to the Bulgarians and Turks in Western Thrace. As the eastern part was a natural rear block for the western, the defeat of Tayyar's regiments made the situation for the Thrace government desperate, forcing it to escape to Bulgaria. Stambolijski forbade bands to be organized and ←176 | 177→armed on Bulgarian territory as well as to cross the border from both sides.[92] Nevertheless, the Bulgarian-Turkish "battalions" of the Thracian army did not cease activities and in the period 1921–22 committed armed campaigns against Greek military formations.[93]

Figure 7.2: The main figures of the Bulgarian-Turkish Internal Thracian Revolutionary Organization (B.T.I.T.R.O.): (1) Tanjo Nikolov; (2) Fuat (Balkan) Bey; and (3) Ihmet (Hikmet) Bey (Thrace, 1922). Reproduced with permission from the Bulgarian State Archives/ C.S.A., f. 1738K, op. 1, a.e.84, 1.

a) Fuat (Balkan) Bey b) Tanjo Nikolov c) Ihmet (Hikmet) Bey

The defeat of the Greek army by Mustafa Kemal in August-September 1922 and its retreat from Eastern Thrace stimulated a new meeting of Bulgarian and Turkish leaders of the Thracian movement in November in the village of Kazaklı (Kazacite, Bulgaria). They established the Bulgarian-Turkish Internal Thracian Revolutionary Organization (B.T.I.T.R.O.). The Central Committee included Chairman and Chief *vojvoda*—Tanjo Nikolov, Secretary—Pejo Popnikolov and members Fuat Bey and Kemal Bey. The main aim was "(…) да обедини всички угнетени и недоволни елементи в пределите на Тракия до реката Струма, без разлика на народност, за извоюване на пълна политическа независимост" ["(…) to unite all

oppressed and discontented elements within the borders of Thrace up to Struma River, without difference in nationality, for gaining full political independence"].[94] The same month almost the entire management body ←177 | 178→of I.M.R.O. came to Plovdiv to discuss the eventual coordination of actions in Macedonia and Thrace, but without success.[95] The newly formed revolutionary organization intensified armed attacks against Greek regiments from the end of 1922 to the beginning of 1923. In the spring of 1923, the *četnik* operations decreased due to demoralization, lack of armament, and new realities after the Lausanne Conference, where Mustafa Kemal gave an order for the Turkish *četnici* to withdraw from Western Thrace.[96] This was the de facto end of joint Bulgarian-Turkish revolutionary cooperation in Western Thrace. After the *coup d'etat* in Bulgaria (June 9, 1923), all activities of B.T.I.T.R.O. were forbidden and the *četi* disarmed.

POSSIBLE CONTINUED COOPERATION

The Bulgarian-Turkish cooperation in the period 1919–23 was an exceptional example of informal diplomacy after the Balkan Wars. It was realized through official governmental and unofficial revolutionary actions and had to coordinate joint diplomatic undertakings at an international level. Illegally, it was stimulated by the national interests of Bulgaria and Turkey, overcoming the risk of permanent accusations from both the Entente Powers and neighboring countries. The Bulgarian and Turkish governments wanted the revision of severe treaties that established the Versailles system and to find supporters internationally. These revolutionary organizations, through informal diplomacy implemented on a local level, strove for the same. Yet, they contributed to the Bulgarian and Turkish populations in Macedonia and Thrace, affected directly by the Entente`s decisions, to unite their efforts for independence in unprecedented joint revolutionary activities. The members of the organized *četi* were not only local people but also refugees that believed an autonomous status would give them the right to return to their homes and be part of the decision-making process for their own futures.

Thus, informal diplomacy proved to have its strengths and mechanisms to prepare the political ground for further cooperation. As the Bulgarian and Turkish governments could not officially sustain any relations and their connections were obstructed by an internationally hostile environment, informal diplomacy proved effective and a viable option to violate externally forced regulations. It had ←178 | 179→its objective limitations, however, due to concrete national interests and the long-term hardships in defending them. Macedonia, which was not part of any territorial pretensions of the Ankara government, was seen by the Turks as an additional tool to distract and exhaust the Greek army. From the Bulgarian side, represented by I.M.R.O., Turkish support in Macedonia was important for achieving their main aim—an autonomous Macedonia as independent country or as a part of a federation, where the rights of the ethnic minorities would be recognized and protected. For the official policy of the Bulgarian government the "Macedonian question" was not a priority when it came to the normalization of relations with Yugoslavia, but not in the case with Greece.

As for Thrace, Greece became the common enemy for Bulgaria and Turkey. In fact, both sides had plans to annex this territory or parts of it. Autonomy was seen just as a step for future unification aspirations. However, the view of transferring this territory to the enemy was a bigger threat; therefore it seemed better to reconcile with the eventual existence of a future autonomous state and to work for unification of the Bulgarian and Turkish minority populations. The *četnik* activities were also the result of cooperation achieved through informal diplomacy. They exerted political and military pressure on Greece, bringing part of the Greek army to a standstill in Thrace.

Bulgarian-Turkish cooperation reappeared after a period of intolerant (not to say brutal) politics, respectively directed toward Bulgarian and Turkish minorities in the interwar period. In addition, the severe treaties, "the divide between the favored Versailles states," and the disgraced "revisionist states"[97] played in favor of Bulgarian-Turkish rapprochement against any perceived unfair decisions of the Great Powers. The benefits of the Bulgarian-Turkish cooperation during the period of 1919–23 could be seen

mainly in the development of informal diplomacy that provided a stable base for future solutions of important issues between the two countries. Understanding these shades and subtleties should be further emphasized in future research, as it is clear from this chapter that during these tumultuous periods some of the most important and influential behaviors and initiatives only occurred because of informal diplomacy. The Great Powers simply isolated and restricted as a matter of policy any formal diplomatic maneuvers from smaller countries. As a result, failing to intensify the research on informal diplomacy means a great many important aspects of global and regional politics will remain cut off in the shadows.

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1 In this chapter, the term "Turkey" has a particular role as synonym of the new formation, established with the beginning of the Turkish National Movement in Ankara and represented by the Grand National Assembly and the government there.

2 1,339,000 Bulgarians were left outside the territories of the Tsardom of Bulgaria, which represents 29.7 percent of its population, numbered 4,500,000. See: Dimităr Gjudurov, "Bălgaro-turskite otnošenija i malcinstvenijat văpros (1919–28)" ["The Bulgarian-Turkish Relations and the minority question (1919–28)"], *Godišnik na department "Istorija" N.B.U.* [*Yearbook of*

the Department of History N.B.U.], T. IV (2009): 28–9. All translations of titles originally published in a foreign language are my own unless otherwise noted.

3 Aleksandăr Stoimenov Stambolijski (1879–1923) was a Bulgarian politician, leader of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (B.A.N.U.). He was the Prime Minister of Bulgaria in the B.A.N.U. government (1919–23) and leader of the party. A republican and pacifist by conviction, Stambolijski strongly opposed Bulgaria's participation in the First World War and joining the Central Powers. In 1915 he was removed from the parliament and sentenced to life in prison. In September 1918, released to negotiate with the participants in the so-called *Soldiers' Uprising*, he took the lead of it. After it failed, he absconded and then in December 1918 was amnestied. After the abdication of Tsar Ferdinand, he was appointed Prime Minister on October 14, 1919. On March 20, 1920, B.A.N.U. won the national elections and Stambolijski was confirmed as Prime Minister. He signed the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine. Stambolijski was ousted in a military coup in June 1923. He attempted to raise a rebellion against the new government but was captured by I.M.R.O. As they detested him for renouncing Bulgarian claims on the territory of Macedonia, he was brutally tortured and killed.

4 Gjudurov, *The Bulgarian-Turkish Relations*, 28.

5 Gjudurov, 35–6.

6 Dimităr Mitev, *Bjalo more—izgubenata mečta. Bălgarija, Velikobritanija i Trakijskijat văpros* [*White Sea—the Lost Dream. Bulgaria, Great Britain, and the Thrace Question*] (Sofia: IK "Arka", 2014), 57–73.

7 Kate Fleet, Suraiya Faroqhi, and Reşat Kasaba, *The Cambridge History of Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 125.

8 *Erzurum Kongresi'nin bildirisi ve kararları* [*Proclamation and decisions of Erzurum Congress*], http://www.atam.gov.tr/nutuk/erzurum-kongresinin-bildirisi-ve-kararlari.

9 William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1744–2000* (London: Routledge, 2002), 46.

10 A. Suat Bilge et. al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politika Tarihi (1919–65)* [*Turkish Foreign Policy History with Facts (1919–56)*] (Ankara: AÜSBF Yayınları, 1969), 13–14.

11 Nevertheless, in all Bulgarian official documents the Bulgarian section in Constantinople is referred as "Bulgarian legation". At the beginning of 1921, the Bulgarian consulate in Constantinople separated from the Swedish legation and began more independent activities. When the government of Dragan Tsankov came to power, on June 9, 1923, the Bulgarian section of the Swedish legation was closed and, in its place, a Bulgarian legation was created with General Todor Markov as a head. Ljudmil Spasov, "Bălgaroro-turski diplomatičeski otnosheniya 1925–34" ["Bulgarian-Turkish Diplomatic Relations 1925–34"], *Military History Collection*, Book 2 (2014): 119. Kalina Peeva, "Bălgaro-turskite diplomatičeski otnošenija 1879–1928" ["The Bulgarian-Turkish Diplomatic Relations 1879–1928"], *Drinovs'kyj Collection*, 10 (2019), 212. Marija Mateeva, Hristo Tepavičarov, *Diplomatičeskite otnošeniâ na Bălgarija (1878–1988)* [*The Diplomatic Relations of Bulgaria (1878–1988)*] (Sofia: B.A.N., 1989), 283.

12 Tsentralen Dăržaven Arhiv [Central State Archives of Bulgaria hereafter C.S.A.], f. 176K, op. 4, a. e. 551, 148, 152.

13 Nikolaj Šestakov, "Mustafa Kemal' Atatûrk – voennyj attaše Turcii v Bolgarii (1913–15)" ["Mustafa Kemal Atatürk – Military Attaché of Turkey in Bulgaria (1913–15)"], *Moscow University Bulletin. Ser. 13. Oriental studies*, no. 3 (2009), 80. Ömer Turan, "Sofya'da Türk Askeri Ateşesi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk" ["The Turkish Military Attaché in Sofia Mustafa Kemal Atatürk"], in *Uluslararasi Osmanli ve Cumhuriyet dönemi Türk-Bulgar Ilişkileri Sempozyumu, 11–13 Mayıs 2005: bildiriler kitabi* [*International Symposium on Turkish-*

Bulgarian Relations in the Ottoman and Republican Era, 11–13 May 2005. Book of Proceedings], (Eskişehir: Osmangazi University, 2005), 140, 142.

14 Stefan Velikov, *Kemalistkata Revoljucija I bălgarskata obštestvenost (1918–22)* [*The Kemalist Revolution and the Bulgarian Society (1918–22)*] (Sofia: B.A.N. Publishing House, 1966), 66.

15 Kemal Rašid, "Bălgarskata dăržava i kemalistkoto dviženie v Trakija" ["The Bulgarian State and the Kemalist Movement in Thrace"], *New Bulgarian University History Department. Yearbook*, vol. 9–10 (2014–15): 268.

16 A Bulgarian politician, diplomat, and collaborator of I.M.R.O. Close friend of Mustafa Kemal with whom he studied in Thessaloniki.

17 Dimităr Mitev, "General Aleksandăr Portogerov văv fokusa na intelidžăns sărvis (Britanski razuznavatelni dokumenti za revoljucionnata dejnost na general Protogerov 1920–23) [*General Aleksandăr Portogerov in the Focus of Intelligence Service (British Intelligence Documents for the General Protogerov's Revolutionary Activity 1920–23)*], *Military History Collection*, Book 5, (1991):161–2.

18 C.S.A., f. 176K, op. 4, a. e. 2577, 1r.–v.

19 Spyridon Sfetas, "Thrakien als Zugang Bulgariens zur Ägäis in der Aussenpolitik der Regierung Stambolijski (1920–9 Juni 1923)" [*Thrace as Bulgaria's Outlet to the Aegean Sea in the Foreign Policy of the Stambolijski Government (1920 – June 9, 1923)*], *Balkan Studies*, vol. 33, no. 2 (1992): 256.

20 C.S.A., f. 321K, op. 1, a. e. 2746, 6 and 47–9.

21 Rašid, *The Bulgarian State*, 277–8. Esra S. Değerli, "Türk-Bulgar İlişkilerinde Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1919–23) ["Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the Turkish-Bulgarian Relations (1919–23)"], *Dumlupınar University Journal of Social Sciences,* no. 18 (August 2007): 306–7.

22 Spyridon Sfetas, *Makedonien und Interbalkanische Beziehungen 1920–24* [*Macedonia and the Inter-Balkan Relations (1920–24)*] (München: Hieronymus, 1992), 107.

23 İbrahim Kamil, "Bulgaristan Diplomatik Belgelerine Göre Trakya'da Millî Mücadele ve Türk-Bulgar İlişkileri (1919–22) ["National Struggle in Thrace and Turkish-Bulgarian Relations According to the Bulgaria's Diplomatic Documents (1919–22)"], *Journal of Contemporary Turkish History Studies*, XVII/35 (Fall 2017): 104. Rumyana Kumsalova, "I. Dünya Savaşı sonrası Bulgar-Türk ilişkilerinde Trakya sorunu (1919–25)" ["The Thrace Problem in Bulgarian-Turkish Relations after the First World War 1919–25)"], in *International Symposium on Turkish-Bulgarian Relations in the Ottoman and Republican Era, May 11–13, 2005. Book of Proceedings*, 130.

24 Still, in private conversations with Lloyd George and Louis Barthou, Stambolijski requested Thrace to be autonomous or Bulgarian following the Treaty of London (1913) as a solution both for the sea outlet and "refugees' question". See: Mitev, *White Sea*, 131. Gjudurov, *The Bulgarian-Turkish Relations*, 40.

25 C.S.A., Č.P., 478K, 1.

26 Mehmet Cevat Abbas Gürer (1887–1943) was an officer of the Ottoman Army and Turkish Army. He was an adjutant of Mustafa Kemal. A politician of the Republic of Turkey and several times deputy in G.N.A.

27 C.S.A., Č.P., 478K, 2.

28 Todor Markov (1870–n.d.) was a Bulgarian officer, Major-General of the Bulgarian General Staff. He was the first head of the established Intelligence Section at the Army Headquarters in January 1908. Todor Markov was a military attaché in Constantinople, where supposedly his contacts with Mustafa Kemal began.

29 C.S.A., f. 176K, op. 4, a. e. 2976, 2–16. In Mustafa Kemal's speeches in Izmit, January 16/17, 1923, there was the same concept about the disadvantage for Turkey to possess Western Thrace, but a totally different view of who had to obtain it: "On the basis of its strategic position, the advantages to be gained by holding it could not balance the force needed to obtain it. Thus, the real solution of the matter is to leave it to Greece. Simultaneously it will be a continuous source of conflict between the Bulgarians and the Greeks", in: Vemund Aarbakke, "The Muslim Minority of Greek Thrace" (PhD thesis, University of Bergen, 2000), 25.

30 Džengiz Hakov, *Atatjurk, Bălgaria i Balkanite. Naučni studii i statii* [*Atatürk, Bulgaria, and the Balkans. Scientific Studies and Articles*] (Sofia: Paradigma, 2014), 40.

31 Aleksandăr Stambolijski, *Telegram to the Bulgarian Legation (B.L.) in Tsarigrad (Istanbul – a.n.) with Instructions to sustain Relations with the Government of Mustafa Kemal in Ankara,* April 2, 1923, in *Vănšnata politika na pravitelstvoto na BZNS – noemvri 1919 – juni 1923* [*The Foreign Policy of the B.A.N.U. Government – November 1919 – June 1923*], eds. Panajot Panajotov and Todor Dobrijanov (Sofia: B.Z.N.S. Publishing House, 1989), 332.

32 Stambolijski, *Telegram to the governing the B.L. in Carigrad for the Mission of Metropolitan Stefan in Carigrad*, March 6, 1923, 326.

33 C.S.A., f. 1909K, op. 2, a. e. 286, 10–11.

34 Rašid, *The Bulgarian State*, 285. February–July 1921 according to Veysi Akın in: "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Bulgaristan arasında siyasi ilişkilerin kurulmasında 1925 dostluk antlaşması'nın yeri ve önemi" ["The Place and Importance of the 1925 Treaty of Friendship in the Establishment of Political Relations between the Republic of Turkey and Bulgaria"], *Journal of Balkan Research Institute*, vol. 1, Issue 1 (2012): 44. On October 20, 1920 Cevat Abbas was sent to Sofia until end of 1921, according to Volkan Şenel in "Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün Derince'deki arkadaşı Cevat Abbas Bey" ["Cevat Abbas Bey, friend of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Derince"], in *International Kara Mürsel Alp and Kocaeli History Symposium – II*, eds. Haluk Selvi, M. Bilal Çelik, Ali Yeşildal (Kocaeli: Kocaeli Metropolitan Municipality, 2016), 1460. The stay of Cevat Abbas in Sofia was more than a year according to İbrahim Kamil, *National Struggle*, 101.

35 Aleksandăr Protogerov (1867–1928) was a General-lieutenant from the Bulgarian Army, politician and revolutionary. One of the leaders of the Bulgarian revolutionary movement in Macedonia and member of the Central Committee of I.M.R.O. He was responsible for the intelligence activities of the organization. Protogerov was a Bulgarian Freemason and held a leading position (Grand Master) in the lodge where he was a member.

36 Değerli, *Mustafa Kemal*, 313; Todor Aleksandrov Poporushev (1881–1924) was a Bulgarian revolutionary, army officer, and politician. He was a member of the Internal Macedonian-Adrianople Revolutionary Organization (I.M.A.R.O.) and later of the Central Committee of I.M.R.O.

37 Mitev, *White Sea*, 104.

38 Akın, *The Place*, 45.

39 Athanasios Loupas, "From Paris to Lausanne: Aspects of Greek-Yugoslav Relations during the First Interwar Years (1919–23)", *Balcanica*, Issue 47 (2016): 272. Richard Crampton, *Makers of the Modern World: Aleksandŭr Stamboliĭski. Bulgaria* (London: Haus Publishing Ltd., 2009), 107.

40 Ilko Drenkov, *Velikobritanija i Makedonskijat vâpros (1919–1948)* [*Great Britain and the Macedonian Question (1919–48)*] (Sofia: Macedonian Scientific Institute, 2017), 46.

41 Stambolijski, *Resolution on a telegram from BL to Carigrad refuting the rumor of Angel Grozkov's official mission to Ankara*, not earlier than June 29, 1921, 160. Stambolijski,

Telegram to BL in Bern to refute the rumors in connection with the Soviet and Kemalist government], June 13, 1921, 163. Stambolijski, *Note-refutation to the Western states for the relations of Bulgaria with Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey, as well as for the implementation of the peace treaty*], July 20, 1921, 165–8.

42 Vlasis Vlasidis, "The 'Macedonian Question' on the Bulgarian Political Scene (1919–23)", *Balkan Studies*, vol. 31, No.1 (1991): 72. *Pravitelstvoto na Stambolijski i Makedosnkoto osvoboditelno dviženie. Spored Danni na Vătrešnata makedonska revoljucionna organizacia* [*The Stambolijski's Government and the Macedonian Liberation Movement. According to the Data of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization*] (Sofia: Autonomous Macedonia Printing House, 1923), 38–9, accessed October 17, 2020, http://www.strumski.com/books/VMRO_za_Stambolijski.pdf.

43 This included murders of politicians and instability in Pirin Macedonia due to armed confrontation between federalists and autonomists. See: Kostadin Paleshutski, *Makedonskoto osvoboditelno dviženie sled Părvata svetovna bojna (1918–24)* [*The Macedonian Liberation Movement after the First World War (1918–24)*] (Sofia: B.A.N. Publishing House, 1993), 107.

44 Loupas, "From Paris to Lausanne", 271–2.

45 Paleshutski, *The Macedonian Liberation Movement*, 109. Ivan Mihajlov, *Spomeni II. Osvoboditelna borba 1919–24 g.* [*Memories II. Liberation Struggle 1919–24*] (Louvain: A. Rosseels Printing Co, 1965), 119. Dimităr Tjulekov, *Obrečeno rodoljubie. VMRO v Pirinsko 1919–34* [*Doomed patriotism. I.M.R.O. in Pirin Region 1919–34*] (Blagoevgrad: "Neofit Rilski" University Publishing House, 2001), 5.

46 Mihajlov, *Memories*, 77–8.

47 Palešutski, *The Macedonian Liberation Movement,*107.

48 *An article from the Greek Newspaper "Patris", "Greece and the Macedonian Committee*", Athens, October 21, 1920, in *B.Z.N.S., Aleksandăr Stambolijski i V.M.R.O. Nepoznatata vojna* [*B.A.N.U., Aleksandăr Stambolijski and I.M.R.O. The Unknown War*], ed. Čočo Biljarski (Sofia: Aniko, 2009), 138–9.

49 It was not the first time such cooperation was established. See: Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu, *Die Jungturken und die Mazedonische Frage, 1890–1918* [*The Young Turks and the Macedonian Question, 1890–1918*] (München: Oldenbourg, 2003), 375–6. Valentin Kitanov, *Aspekti na političeskite otnošenija na V.M.O.R.O. s Turcija 1903–14 g.* [*Aspects of the Political Relations of I.M.R.O. with Turkey 1903–14*] (Blagoevrad: "Neofit Rilski" University Publishing House, 2009), 179–210.

50 Čočo Biljarski and Valentin Kitanov, eds., *Oficialnata i tajnata bălgaro-turska diplomacija (1903–25). Dokumentalen sbornik* [*The Official and Secret Bulgarian-Turkish Diplomacy (1903–25). Documentary Collection*] (Sofia: State Agency Archive, 2009), 449–51. Kiril Părličev, *36 godini văv V.M.R.O. Spomeni na Kiril Părličev* [*36 Years in I.M.R.O. Memories of Kiril Părličev*] (Sofia, 1999), 121–2.

51 Biljarski and Kitanov, *The Official and Secret,* 453.

52 Biljarski and Kitanov, 460.

53 Palešutski, *The Macedonian Liberation Movement*, 111–12. Kostadin Palešutski, *Jugoslavskata komunističeska partija i Makedonskijat văpros 1919–45* [*The Yugoslav Communist Party and the Macedonian Question 1919–45*] (Sofia: B.A.N.,1985), 59–60. Sfetas, *Macedonia and the Inter-Balkan*, 56. Loupas, "From Paris to Lausanne", 271.

54 Mihajlov, Memories, 158.

55 Palešutski, *The Macedonian Liberation Movement,* 108–9. C.S.A., f. 1933K, op. 2, a. e.7, 2 r.–v.

56 Dobrin Mičev and Stojan Germanov, eds., *Nacionalno-osvoboditelnoto dviženie na makedonskite i trakijskite bălgari 1878–1944. V četiri toma, tom 4, Osvoboditelnite borbi sled Părvata svetovna vojna* [*The National Liberation Movement of the Macedonian and Thracian Bulgarians 1878–1944. In four volumes, volume 4, The Liberation Struggles after the First World War*] (Sofia: M.N.I. – Sofia, II–B.A.N., 2003), 102.

57 Ioannis Glavinas, "The perception of Muslim minority in Greece in Greek and Bulgarian policy and strategy (1912–23)", *Etudes Balkaniques*, No 4 (2005): 168–9.

58 Glavinas, "The perception of Muslim", 14.

59 Ilko Drenkov, "Britanskite diplomatičeski predstaviteli v Bălgarija 1919–41 g." [*The British Diplomatic Representatives in Bulgaria 1919–41*], *International Politics*, Issue 1 and 2 (2013): 175–7.

60 Dimitâr Mitev, Makedonskijat vâpros v bâlgaro-britanslite političeski otnošenija (1919–23) [*The Macedonian Question in the Bulgarian-British Political Relations (1919–23)*] (Sofia: IK "Arka", 2019), 70–1. Drenkov, *Great Britain and the Macedonian Question*, 46. Sfetas, *Thrace as Bulgaria's Outlet*, 252.

61 Loupas, "From Paris to Lausanne", 273.

62 Vlasidis, *The "Macedonian Question"*, 74.

63 C.S.A., f. 1933K, op. 2, a. e. 32, 1 r.–v.

64 Here "Macedonian" refers to the geographical belonging of Mustafa Kemal's origin, who was born in Thessaloniki.

65 Cengiz Hakov et al., *Belgelerle Mustafa Kemal Atatürk ve Türk-Bulgar İlişkileri (1913–38)/Mustafa Kemal Atatjurk i tursko-bălgarskite otnošenija v dokumenti (1913–38)* [*Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Turkish-Bulgarian Relations in Documents (1913–38)*] (Ankara: General Directorate of State Archives, 2002), 231.

66 "Iz protokol ot zasedanieto na Ministerskija săvet za săzdavaneto na konclageri za dejcite na makedonskoto osvoboditelno dvijenie" ["From the minutes of the meeting of the Council of Ministers for the establishment of concentration camps for the functionaries of the Macedonian Liberation Movement"] in *B.A.N.U., Aleksandăr Stambolijski and I.M.R.O.,* 324–27.

67 Vălčo Zlatilov, *Bălgari i turci văstavat sreštu Njojskija diktat (1919–23)* [*Bulgarians and Turks Revolt against the Neuilly Dictate (1919–23)*] (Veliko Tărnovo: Faber, 2017), 24–5. On October 24/25, 1919, Cafer Tayyar received a telegraph message from Mustafa Kemal, who considered Bulgaria was in similar situation as Turkey. Having common enemies, a support for Turkey's actions against the Greeks and an establishment of long-lasting good relations was expected. See: Değerli, *Mustafa Kemal*, 304.

68 Hüsnü Özlü, "Istiklal Savaşi'nda Doğu Trakya'da Teşkilatlanma Süreci, Lüleburgaz ve Edirne Kongreleri" ["Organization Process in Eastern Thrace in the War of Independence, Lüleburgaz and Edirne Congresses"], *International Journal of Eurasian Social Sciences,* Year: 3, Issue 6 (2012): 25. Keleş, *Thrace Region*, 1022.

69 Özgür Mert, "Işgalden Kurtuluşa Doğu Trakya" [*Eastern Thrace from Occupation to Liberation*], *Ankara University Turkish Revolution History Institute Journal of Atatürk Road*, Issue 58 (2016): 147.

70 Dino Kjosev, Goce Delčev. Pisma i drugi materiali [*Goce Delčev. Letters and Other Materials*] (Sofia: Publisher on B.A.N., 1967), 21–4. Konstantin Pandev, *Nacionalnoosvoboditelnoto dviženie v Makedonija i Odrinsko 1878–1903* [*The National Liberation Movement in Macedonia and Edirne Region 1878–1903*] (Sofia: Gutenberg, 2000), 140–1.

71 Michev and Germanov, *The National Liberation Movement,* 135.

72 Zlatilov, *Bulgarians and Turks,* 26.

73 Zlatilov, 44–51, 55–9.
74 Mehmet Arif (Ayıcı) (1883–1926) was the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Army, Lieutenant-Colonel Arif Bey was a classmate of Mustafa Kemal in the Military Academy in Constantinople. He joined Mustafa Kemal in Samsun in May 1919 to start the National Struggle. Arif Bey was a deputy of Eskişehir in the second G.N.A. in 1923. Found guilty of the assassination attempt on Atatürk in Izmir, he was executed in 1926.
75 C.S.A., f. 175K, op. 4, a.e.551, 83, 83 r.–v., 84, 84 r.–v.
76 To force the Ottoman government submit their peace terms and control the indigenous events in Turkey, the Allied powers started a military occupation of Constantinople on March 16, 1920, followed by arrests of Nationalists and dissolution of the Parliament.
77 C.S.A., f. 175K, op. 4, a. e.551, 63–4.
78 Stajko Trifonov, *Bălgarskoto nacionalno osvoboditelno dviženie v Trakija (1919–34)* [*The Bulgarian National Liberation Movement in Thrace (1919–34)*] (Sofia: Science and Art, 1988), 57–9.
79 C.S.A., f.176K, op. 4, a. e.551, 106–107.
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CHAPTER 8

The Special Operations Executive in Albania: A Bitter Aftermath

BISSER PETROV

Abstract: The main role in carrying out operations against the Axis in Albania was assigned to the legendary Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.). The main Albanian resistance camps, which were at enmity with each other, were the communist-led Partisans and the nationalists. Eventually, collision between the camps escalated into an open civil war. After the Second World War, the S.O.E. officers, who had been attached to the nationalists, explained their defeat in the civil war by the fact that Great Britain had left them in the lurch. Additionally, they complained that their own efforts to save Albania from communism had been purposefully sabotaged behind their back by some communist moles within the S.O.E. itself. Those accusations and conspiracy theories were being thoroughly maintained in the Cold War years. The aim of this chapter is to answer the question to what extent these assertions were well-grounded or were they just the result of the ideological and political beliefs of their authors?

Keywords: Albania, WWII, Special Operations Executive, Resistance, Cold War.

INTRODUCTORY NOTES

This chapter does not intend to retell in detail the history of the S.O.E. in Albania, but to offer conclusions and assessments of its activities there in a concise manner. The survey is not exhaustive. Rather, it focuses on the

driving motives that shaped British policy toward Albania in the Second World War. This was affected by a lot of factors and went through different stages of manifestation. ←185 | 186→For example, in the early stages of the war, when Italy was still officially neutral, the attitude of the British government was predetermined by the belief that its neutrality could be stimulated by granting various concessions. However, when Italy entered the war in the summer of 1940, and especially after its attack on Greece in the autumn of the same year, Albania was already seen as a place where subversive operations in the Italian backyard could and should be organized. The S.O.E. was just an instrument at the disposal of the British government's will, despite the attempts by some S.O.E. officers to formulate and propose to political and military leadership their own Albanian policy. This did not ultimately happen, but they would have reason to reconsider it in the postwar years when the Cold War was in full swing.

The chosen research approach is chronological, rather than problem-based, because the latter orientation would make the chapter inevitably less informative. In this way, it seeks to a greater consistency and clarity without ignoring the necessary plethora of facts needed for a better understanding of the examined events and processes. With the passage of time and passion, it is possible to finally deliver a scholarly objective picture of the S.O.E. that is more complete as to its activities. The chronological scope is from the spring of 1940 to the autumn of 1944, when Enver Hoxha's Partisans seized political power in Albania after the German withdrawal and S.O.E. activities in Albania practically came to an end.

Over time, the bulk of scholarly, memoir, and publicist literature on the role of the S.O.E. in Albania in WWII has progressively increased. We will focus only on the most significant pieces which cover the topic most directly and marked the stages of historiographical developments. First, almost without exception, all scholars who examine British policy toward Albania in WWII use the memoirs published by S.O.E. officers who happened to be in Albania during those turbulent years. These were Dayrell Oakley-Hill[1], Julian Amery[2], Edmund Davis[3], David Smiley[4], Peter Kemp[5], Anthony Quayle[6], Alexander Glenn,[7] and Harold William Tillman. These postwar

memoirs, whether written soon after the events described or long after them, inevitably bear the imprint of the ideological and political views through which their authors frame their narrative. From a serious ←186 | 187→monograph study perspective, Elisabeth Barker's book *British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War*[8] is worth mentioning. It remained for a long time a basic guide for all those who explored wartime British policy in the Balkans, Albania included. Barker herself had worked in the Foreign Office at that time and had first-hand knowledge of the policy-making process. Scholarship got a new impetus and gained more nuanced dimensions in the early 1990s with the release of Reginald Hibbert's book, *Albania's National Liberation Struggle: The Bitter Victory*[9]. The author himself had spent some time in wartime Albania as a liaison officer and gained a lot of personal impressions from his stay. Hibbert took the trouble to gather all the sources available at that time—documentary and secondary—in such a way as to present both the Albanian resistance against the occupiers and British policy toward it. At the very end of the last century, the fundamental monograph of Bernd Fischer, *Albania in War, 1939–45,*[10] was published, which also discussed the issue of British intervention. It was the product of his many years of studying Albanian history and was perhaps the most objective and compete study by a foreign author on wartime Albania, to which all other colleagues would refer.

At the beginning of this century, the book that made a revolutionary contribution to the study of S.O.E. activities in Albania was Roderick Bailey's *The Wildest Province:* S.O.E. *in the Land of the Eagle.*[11] Its value lay primarily in the fact that it was built entirely on declassified S.O.E. documents at the end of the last century. The author was the first to introduce these documents, shedding abundant light on policy pursued on the ground.

THE IMPOSSIBLE REVOLT: 1940–1941

The Italian aggression of April 7, 1939, which led to the occupation and annexation of Albania, faced almost no resistance by Albanians. The British

government, despite warnings from various sources, was caught by surprise. However, it turned a blind eye to this blatant violation of international law. The reason for this lay in the fact that fascist Italy was treated with deliberate benevolence in the hope of separating it from Nazi Germany. Later, the British government de facto ←187 | 188→recognized the occupation and annexation of Albania. This happened at the end of October 1939, when it agreed to downgrade the British legation to the rank of consulate general after the liquidation of the Albanian Foreign Ministry and all international issues concerning Albania were taken over by Rome. At the time of the outbreak of the new world war, the British, concerned about Italian neutrality, did not consider serious opportunities to stimulate Albanian resistance. Yet, in early April 1940, the government demanded that the Imperial General Staff, with Italy's entry into the war, elaborate plans for organizing and carrying out subversive activities both in Italy proper and its colonies.[12]

At that point, two British secret services were designed to conduct operations in the Italian rear. One was Section D, established after the annexation of Austria in March 1938. It was part of the Secret Intelligence Service (S.I.S., also known as M.I.6 or "C.") and was run by the Foreign Office, although it included Navy, Army, and Air Force departments. The functions entrusted to Section D were to examine the possibilities for actions behind enemy lines, such as provoking acts of sabotage, riots, inflation, and similar actions aimed at weakening its military potential.[13] The other was Military Intelligence (research), or MI, set up in the autumn of the same year as a new analytical department of the General Staff to explore methods of guerrilla warfare. Distinction between the two services was not clearly defined, but after the occupation of Czechoslovakia, when the clouds of war were thickening, a decision was made for M.I. to deal with tasks performed by people in uniform, and Section D with covert operations.[14] Eventually, Section D was charged with the task of fomenting a revolt in Albania. The center of its activity was established in Belgrade, where the British hoped to find suitable Albanian political emigrants for their plans.

The young diplomat Julian Amery[15] was assigned to gather information about the country and recruit suitable ←188 | 189→Albanians.[16] For the needs of the planned action, Section D agents had to unite potential Albanian rebels in the first place. They managed to conclude a temporary truce between Albanian exiles with opposing political beliefs—the enemies of the fugitive King Zog—the brothers Gani and Said Kryeziu from Kosovo, his staunch supporter—gendarmerie major Abas Kupi, and the communist Mustafa Gjinishi—all people who would have fought and killed each other in different circumstances.[17]

On June 10, 1940, Italy abandoned its sham neutrality and entered the war on the side of Nazi Germany, declaring war on Great Britain. Thus, in the end, London's policy of appeasing Mussolini ended in complete failure. With these new developments, the hands of the British to conduct anti-Italian operations were untied. At the end of June, Section D office in Belgrade suggested instigation of a revolt in Albania from the territory of Yugoslavia, requiring 5,000 rifles for the undertaking. The Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East, General Archibald Wavell, however, did not want an uprising at that moment and opposed the plan. Britain's Mediterranean strategy at this stage excluded the Balkans as a possible theater of operations, although Italy was already an undisguised enemy.[18]

Meanwhile, the changed situation in Europe called for a unification of all British services capable of operating in the enemy's rear. Thus, in July 1940, Section D and MI (plus the Department for black propaganda "Electra House" at the Foreign Office) merged into the legendary S.O.E. which, in Churchill's words, was to "set Europe ablaze." It was placed under the political command of Hugh Dalton, the Minister of Economic Warfare.[19] At the same time, Section D prepared from the territory of Greece, including recruitment of agents and storing ammunition dumps near the Albanian border. By the end of August, the Middle East High Command approved the Section D program for Albania. The Foreign Office also gave its approval for subversion action.[20]

←189 | 190→On October 28, 1940, Italy invaded Greece from Albanian territory. After some penetration, however, the Italian army encountered an

unexpectedly strong resistance. The regrouped and reinforced Greek units not only checked the Italian advance, but in turn also made a successful counter-offensive on Albanian territory. Under the circumstances, the British saw an excellent opportunity to cause trouble in Albania. Events also pushed forward the figure of King Zog, who had taken refuge in Britain, and was eager to ride the auspicious wave. He was to be transferred to Greece to address his compatriots on the radio on Albania's national holiday, November 28. Ultimately, the plan did not get a green light because of the obvious unwillingness of the Greek Prime Minister, Ioannis Metaxas, to see him on his territory.[21] The explanation for this reluctance is found in the Greek victories in Albania, after which the Greek government obviously wanted to retain its territorial acquisitions and rectify the border in its favor. The British position guarded the interests of Greek allies and remained cautious, restricted only to the "liberation of Albania from its fascist yoke". At the same time, the idea of instigating a revolt in Albania from abroad was not discarded, however, without giving any promises of independence, Zog's restoration, and postwar borders.[22]

Meanwhile, the S.O.E. office in Belgrade came up with a new plan for revolt in Northern Albania with the active involvement of Gani Kryeziu, who was to be supported with air supplies. It was also planned to establish a provisional Albanian government which would be recognized immediately by Britain.[23] The plan was approved by the Foreign Office, the War Office, and the Air Ministry. Nevertheless, it was foiled by Athens again. At that point the Greeks were still reaping success on the front in Albania and an approval of a large-scale uprising could bring Greece unwanted complications.[24] But S.O.E. agents in the Balkans did not despair and did not stop. This time it was the office in Istanbul, where Colonel Michael Stirling was charged with Albanian affairs as he had served under a contract before the war in the Albanian gendarmerie. He and other ex-army British officers were invited in the early 1920s by Zog to reform and train Albanian security forces to British standards. The British gendarmerie mission in Albania played the role of advocate for British interests in the interwar period, mainly against Italian ones.[25] Under Stirling's tutelage, prominent Albanian

political exiles established the Albanian Committee for Liberation, chaired ←190 | 191→by the former ambassador in London, Mehmet Bey Konitsa. The Committee appealed to the British Government to come up with a declaration that Albania would be restored within its borders of April 7, 1939 (an unequivocal warning against Greek territorial aspirations) and immediate establishment of an Albanian national government. However, the Foreign Office did not take any stand on this initiative.[26]

After the failure of this hasty venture against Greece, Mussolini was forced to reluctantly ask Hitler for help. As early as November 12, 1940, the Fuhrer signed a directive to attack Greece. On March 27, 1941, with the participation of the S.O.E., a *coup d'état* was carried out in Belgrade[27]. Hitler, without waiting for possible declarations of loyalty, decided to smash Yugoslavia "militarily and as a state".[28] At last an operation in the Italian rear was organized. The undertaking was led by another British officer reassigned to the S.O.E. who had served in the prewar Albanian gendarmerie, Lieutenant Colonel Dayrell Oakley-Hill. In November 1940, he arrived in Belgrade from Istanbul and reactivated the conspiracy network established by Amery. Immediately after the coup in Belgrade, Oakley-Hill, and Albanian conspirators, led by the Kryeziu brothers and Kupi, decided that the right moment for action had come. On April 7 (the second anniversary of the occupation of Albania), a group led by Oakley Hill, Gani Krieziu, Kupi, and Gjinishi crossed the Albanian border from Kosovo and headed for Shkoder. Unluckily, besides the lack of logistical support, the action coincided with a German attack on Yugoslavia and Greece on April 6. The group faced an unexpected setback—units of the defeated Yugoslav army were also entering Albanian territory and the local population, which did not harbor good feelings for its northern neighbors, restrained from any armed action. Eventually, without any local support and with declining morale, the leaders decided to disband the party and return to their starting point in Kosovo. From there Oakley-Hill, disguised as an Albanian refugee, made his way to Belgrade in an attempt to take refuge in the Turkish and American legations. After being denied this in both places, he was forced to surrender

to the Germans.[29] Thus, the British plans for a revolt in Albania came to a catastrophic end.

Ultimately, the reasons for the failure of the S.O.E. to raise a revolt in Albania were mainly due to the lack of a real motive for the Albanians to join British plans. British politicians and military officers did not offer them any political ←191 | 192→incentives to stimulate them, despite the intention of some S.O.E. officers to do so. On the other hand, S.O.E. schemes were quite adventurous and even reckless. They did not consider the feeling of the population and were based on wishful thinking rather than on a realistic assessment of the situation in Albania. In the long run, the ad hoc policy did not lead to any practical results but did create a strong distrust of the Albanians to the "Perfidious Albion".

REBORN HOPES AND UNWANTED EMBROILMENTS: 1943–1944

After Nazi Germany occupied Yugoslavia and Greece and turned the Balkans into a remote Axis rear, Great Britain's interest in the region as a whole and in Albania specifically faded away for a long period of time. When major war fronts shifted back to the territories held by the Axis, however, the Balkans came into the Allies' field of vision once more. At the beginning of 1943, the war in the Mediterranean entered its decisive stage as the strategic goal was to bring Italy out of the war. After it was clarified that the place of the Allies' landing would be Sicily, cooperation with Balkan resistance became extremely important. At that initial point the S.O.E. had set itself just two limited tasks: to seek military impact and promote unity among resistance movements. However, the consequences of its involvement in Balkan affairs became much more complex.[30] At that time, the S.O.E. already had established cooperation with the resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece. The officers stationed there were not S.O.E. agents anymore but were granted the status of British Liaison Officers (B.L.Os.).[31] So, at the very end of 1942 and the beginning of 1943, Great Britain renewed its interest and was ready

to come back into Albania to cause troubles for the Axis. In the meantime, the situation there had begun to change rapidly. In the first half of November 1941, at a clandestine meeting in Tirana, various communist cells agreed to join and establish the Albanian Communist Party (A.C.P.). Enver Hoxha, a young communist functionary, was appointed the leader of the Party's Provisional Central Committee.

By following the tactics which the Communist International had suggested, as well as the experience of Yugoslav communists, the A.C.P. called for a nation-wide conference in mid-September 1942. The delegates decided to set up the National Liberation Movement (*Lëvizja Nacionalçlirimtare* or L.N.C.), which had to unite all Albanians against the invaders with the final aim of building ←192 | 193→a free and democratic Albania. Its leadership included both communists and nationalists. Among the latter, the figure of Kupi stood out, who had returned to his native area of Mati after the ill-fated adventure of Oakley-Hill in April 1941. Concerned by the emergence of the A.C.P. and the strong influence of communists within the growing resistance, a group of more conservative and nationalist-minded Albanians decided to abandon their contemplative behavior and in November 1942 founded their own organization called the Balli Kombetar (National Front). Its leadership consisted mainly of large landowners and various opponents of Zog, united by strong nationalism and anti-communism.

By the end of April 1943, two years after the catastrophe of Oakley-Hill's action, the first British military mission, codenamed "Consensus" [sic], set foot on Albanian soil. It was transferred by land from Greece and included: Major Neil (Billy) McLean (Commander), Captain David Smiley (second-in-command) and Lieutenant Gavan (Garry) Duffy (demolition expert).[32] At the beginning of the second half of the year, in accordance with the new policy for reinforcement of S.O.E. activity in the Balkans, six more officers were parachuted in, each of them accompanied by a wireless operator. They were briefed to get in touch with all kinds of resistance groups. As Commander of the "Consensus", McLean held the position of senior British liaison officer and had the authority to send, in coordination with the S.O.E. —Cairo, subordinates wherever he deemed necessary.[33]

By the end of the summer, the B.L.Os., who were dispatched to different parts of Albania, began sending reports depicting a more complicated and multifaceted country pattern. They could be divided, depending on their operational areas, into two major groups—those dealing with the Partisans (A.C.P. and L.N.C.) in the South and those credited to the nationalists (Balli Kombetar, Zog's supporters and several independent leaders, mainly tribal chieftains) in the North. No doubt the British had a liking for the latter category of Albanians, notwithstanding the fact that they could not comprehend their stubborn unwillingness to engage occupiers. Since material support was directly dependent on the conduct of concrete operations against the enemy, Partisans received the lion's share of dropped loads.[34]

The occupation of Sicily by British-American forces (operation "Husky") in July 1943 allowed them to disembark and get a firm bridgehead at the beginning of September in the southernmost harbor of the Italian boot. On September 8, Marshal Badoglio's government formally announced the surrender of Italy. This made the Germans take control of Balkan territories, which the Italian army had occupied so far. At that time the resistance in Albania had reached its climax ←193 | 194→and the revived hopes for forthcoming liberation seemed quite real. The line of conduct which the B.L.Os. in Albania had to pursue remained unchanged – to support all organizations fighting wholeheartedly against occupiers, regardless of their political orientation. In order to achieve such ambitious goals, it was decided to send a larger and higher-ranking mission to Albania.[35] It was led by Brigadier Edmund Davis (known by his nickname "Trotsky"). He came to replace McLean and Smiley, who were to be evacuated by sea and taken to Cairo for debriefing. Davies found the country on the verge of civil war and ascertained that those skirmishes between the L.N.C. and Balli Kombetar were already something quite common. He met with Hoxha and the leadership of the Front in an attempt to reconcile them, but his efforts did not crown with success.[36]

At the end of November 1943, Kupi, who in the meantime had alienated from the L.N.C., proclaimed officially the foundation of his new organization. It resembled Balli Kombetar in many ways with the only

difference being that the restoration of the monarchy was its goal, on the grounds that Zog had been turned out of the country for a certain time but was still vested with full royal authority. That was the reason why the organization was called Legaliteti [Legality][37]. Kupi recruited for his cause not only staunch supporters of the monarchy and anti-communists, but also those who Balli Kombetar had let down or those who thought Zog was the only figure capable of bringing the country back to order. At the very end of 1943, Davis figured out that Balli Kombetar and Zog's supporters were openly collaborating with the Germans and concluded that they should be denounced. Ultimately, he recommended issuing an open declaration in favor of the L.N.C.[38] But at the beginning of January 1944, in a German anti-guerrilla offensive, he was wounded and captured by a Balli Kombetar band and handed over to the Germans. The change in British policy he recommended did not materialize. In this case, the opinion of the head of the S.O.E. Albanian section Major Philip Leake prevailed. He took a quite different view—that the break with the Balli Kombetar and the Zogists would hinder actions against the enemy and would dash the hopes of a general uprising at the end of the war. Besides, total support for the L.N.C. would mean political intervention in a purely Albanian conflict. He therefore recommended not breaking with the Ballists and Zogists if they adopted an openly anti-German position.[39]

In general, British efforts in Albania at the beginning of 1944 did not yield encouraging results. The main goal—to stimulate and intensify resistance against ←194 | 195→the Germans—did not prove to be within the power of S.O.E. missions. The political component of their activities began to prevail over the purely military one, simply because at that time Albania was rapidly plunging into civil war. The large-scale counteroffensive in the winter of 1943−44 disrupted all plans for coordination and control over the resistance and the B.L.Os. themselves were dispersed and had to struggle just for their own survival in an extremely hostile environment. At the beginning of January 1944, McLean and Smiley arrived in London where they met several influential figures, Anthony Eden and Zog among them. At that time, the idea suggested by McLean to rejoin Kupi and urge him to act proactively and

reconcile with Hoxha took shape little by little. The plan was endorsed by the Foreign Office and by Eden himself. In April, McLean, Smiley, and Amery, who joined them in the capacity of political officers, were sent back to Albania (their mission was known under the "Concensus II" designation).[40] By the spring of 1944, Great Britain had not taken sides explicitly in the internal Albanian conflict yet. After Balli Kombetar had fallen into disrepute for collaboration, the S.O.E. and Foreign Office had a vision for a new option – to set up Kupi as an open counterweight to the L.N.C. It would be of some interest to specify whether that choice was dictated by political or ideological considerations. Hibbert thought that only considerations of a military nature should be considered.[41] Barker, who worked at that time for the Foreign Office Political Intelligence Department, maintained the opposite opinion. For her, the decision to bet on Kupi was based on prevailing political reasons, no matter how difficult it might be to realize them.[42]

The total number of B.L.Os. working with Partisans in 1944 never exceeded 11, while those with nationalists in the north had never been less than 13 and in April their number reached 16.[43] The senior British officer attached to Hoxha's headquarters was Lieutenant Colonel Norman Wheeler. He reported to Bari, where S.O.E.'s office for the Balkans had moved, that the L.N.C. was certainly the largest, best-equipped, and best-trained armed body in the country, which could easily crush any opposition in the event of internal strife.[44] After Wheeler's departure, the highest-ranking officer with Partisans remained his deputy, Major Alan Palmer. He suggested that a correction was needed in Britain's official position. Otherwise, a breach of relations with Hoxha would be unavoidable.[45] To clarify the situation, in a desperate attempt to reconcile Hoxha and ←195 | 196→Kupi, it was decided to send to Albania the head of the S.O.E. Albanian Section, Leake himself. However, his meetings with Hoxha did not yield results and relations between the two even deteriorated, as the latter demanded immediate withdrawal of all British missions with nationalists in northern Albania and establishing Partisan representation in Italy.[46] This course of events put the British in an awkward position as their top priority—reconciliation between

communists and nationalists—became increasingly problematic. McLean, Amery, and Smiley were trying to navigate the whole situation into their desired direction. They were not discouraged at any point in their stay and did their best to build up a strong opponent of the L.N.C. from Kupi and the nationalists from the North. The leader of Legaliteti [Legality], however, did not help much in this regard, stubbornly refusing to act against the Germans. He excused his passivity with the harsh winter, German reprisals, and his intention to rise in the coming season.[47]

On top of that, the opinion of the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, General Henry Maitland Wilson, was entirely negative about the Zogists. The Chiefs of Staff Committee also expressed doubts whether any action whatsoever initiated on McLean's suggestion would contribute to the Allies' cause.[48] The S.O.E.-Bari for its part sharply reevaluated the situation in Albania, pointing out that the Legaliteti [Legality] movement was immature and not very popular, while its armed forces were not a serious military factor. The organization included persons without any political weight whatsoever. It had only local influence and did not cover a considerable part of the country's territory. In addition, there had been multiple cases of collaboration with the quisling government in Tirana. In conclusion, it was suggested that before seeking any reconciliation whatsoever, Kupi must be compelled to take the field and no action, considered as unfriendly by Hoxha, be taken in his support.[49] In fact, it turned out that the position of the Foreign Office, which relied on Kupi, was not shared or supported by the S.O.E.-Bari and the Allied Command Headquarters—institutions most aware of the situation on the ground and were in direct contact with the Albanian resistance. This illustrated conflicting short-term military goals with long-term political considerations.

In early June 1944, the Germans launched a large-scale mopping up operation in the South. Partisan units fought successfully, winning the sympathy of British officers with them, who in these conditions tried to provide them with the necessary weapons and equipment. The German offensive made contacts between the B.L.Os. and Bari irregular and occasional. Unluckily, the most senior of them, ←196 | 197→Leake, was killed

in a German air raid. The situation was similar to that of half a year earlier, when Davies was taken prisoner of war by the Germans. British policy toward the resistance was deadlocked again, without hope for improvement. Its main goal to prevent civil war seemed to become more and more unattainable.

In these complicated conditions, the question of what to do with Kupi was becoming highly pressing in London. The S.O.E. proposed to give him an ultimatum, urging him to take concrete action against the enemy.[50] The Foreign Office, however, reacted irritably to the assessments of the S.O.E. and Allied Command Headquarters, trying to find their own way. Thus, a compromise decision was made to leave things in the hands of the B.L.Os., who would monitor the situation on the spot and act as arbitrators.

After Leake's death, Major Eliot Watrous was appointed head of the S.O.E. Albanian section in Bari. He did not share McLean and Amery's enthusiasm for an uprising in the North at the last possible moment and worried that support for nationalists would worsen relations with Partisans, thus minimizing the chances of an agreement between the belligerent parties. The B.L.Os. with Hoxha were skeptical of such reconciliation and opposed the presence of their colleagues in the North with Kupi. Watrouse, like Leake and Palmer, prioritized the effective fight against the Germans, while McLean and Amery apparently focused their efforts on rescuing Albania from communism. However, the two had connections in the Foreign Office, which allowed them to delay the decision to abandon Kupi.[51]

In June, the Allied Air Force, committed to aid resistance movements in the Balkans, was reorganized into a new unit called the Balkan Air Force (B.A.F.) within the composition of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces Command. It was assigned the task to exercise control over special operations in Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Albania. It included the Policy Committee (which was responsible for close monitoring of the situation and initiating political decisions for Albania) and the Special Operations Committee, which was responsible for day-to-day military operations. The S.O.E. Albanian section, under the designation Force 366, was part of the Special Operations (Mediterranean) Headquarters, established a couple of

months earlier.[52] The S.O.E. representative in the Policy Committee at B.A.F. was the head of its office in Bari, Lieutenant Colonel William Harcourt. He was the most aware of what was happening on the ground in Albania, having been directly involved in the decision-making process. All plans and actions of the Albanian section were under his jurisdiction, and he worked closely with both staff officers and those returning from missions.[53]

←197 | 198→At the end of July 1944, a three-member Partisan delegation arrived in Bari to hold talks with the B.A.F. Although political issues were previously excluded from the negotiating agenda, Hoxha's envoys made two formal demands. The first was for the recognition of the Partisan provisional government and the second was for permission to establish a permanent Partisan mission in Bari.[54] General Wilson rejected the first request but did not object to the second. The main point of contention that arose during negotiations was the way in which the distribution of supplies would be carried out, but in the end the problem was solved. This allowed the signing of the agreement at the end of August.[55] In the summer and autumn of 1944, the S.O.E. gradually withdrew most of its officers from nationalists and considerably increased the number of those attached to Partisans. At the same time, the British undertook amphibious operations along the Albanian coast, ostensibly giving support to Partisans.[56] Finally, in late September 1944, the Foreign Office was compelled to admit the bitter truth that Albania would be under Hoxha's rule after the war.

As for "Concensus II", the mission was recalled but not immediately, lest they show weakness. It was a month later that "Concensus II" was evacuated by sea. At that point another problem cropped up—what should they do with Kupi? When Eden was informed about it, he gave orders for evacuation of their protégé out of the country without Hoxha's knowledge. In the end, Kupi found his own solution and helped the British out of the tight spot. In early November, a British minesweeper towed his helplessly drifting boat with five companions, including two of his sons, to Brindisi.[57] The final decision to get rid of Kupi was the logical end of British policy toward the resistance movement in Albania. Unfortunately, the end turned out to be as bad as its start. It was unprincipled and ambiguous which, in the final analysis, made it

inefficient and futile. The lack of clearly defined priorities in Albania brought about confusion and inconsistency in the decision-making process and led to improvisations and opportunism. The non-coordination between the various British institutions and services dealing with the situation in Albania was obvious.

Meanwhile, events followed their relentless course. On November 17, after heavy street fighting, Tirana was liberated. On November 28, Hoxha's provisional government arrived and was established. Shkoder was seized on the following day, thus marking the definitive liberation of the country. Albania was the only Balkan state which was not occupied by an army of the anti-Axis coalition. Hoxha managed unaided to do away with his domestic enemies and establish a ←198 | 199→Stalinist regime. That was the main reason why he felt strong enough to pursue an independent foreign policy and make cruel experiments at home. Moreover, as Barker noted ironically, as if to give some slight comfort to Great Britain, it could be assumed that the S.O.E. officers in Albania had also fostered his self-confidence in such a way that he could stand up against the Soviet Union at a later stage.[58]

POSTWAR DOUBTS AND ACCUSATIONS

At the beginning of December 1944, the Policy Committee at B.A.F. discussed the situation in Albania and decided not to recognize Hoxha's provisional government and not to send a diplomatic mission to Tirana. By that time, S.O.E. officers in Albania were tasked to support guerrilla warfare; therefore, they had to be recalled as soon as possible. The only judicious decision was to accredit a military mission, subordinated to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, to Hoxha's headquarters. Thus, S.O.E. activities in Albania ended.[59] Eventually, formal relations between the two states were not immediately restored. This would happen much later, only in 1991, in a radically changed geopolitical environment.

Very soon after Hoxha's government came to power, relations between Albania and the Western Allies deteriorated rapidly. Tirana took a negative stance toward Britain and the United States, which were apparently denying it membership in the United Nations and were supporting unfriendly Greece. London and Washington began to have no illusions about Hoxha's unwavering tyrannical regime, which steadfastly steered the country toward Moscow and Belgrade. The tension in relations between Albania and Britain, not resting on a formal diplomatic basis, reached its climax at the end of 1946, when two British destroyers ran into sea mines in the waters of the Strait of Corfu, near the Albanian coast. As a result of the blasts, they sustained considerable human and material losses.

The split between Tito and Stalin in the spring of 1948 affected Albania in a most direct way. The A.C.P. sided with Stalin, rejecting Yugoslav Communist Party's (Y.C.P.) heavy-handed patronage. However, the country was now geographically cut off from the rest of the Soviet bloc. These unexpected developments got back in the saddle those S.O.E. officers who had been attached to Hoxha's political rivals during the war. These were, of course, Amery, McLean, and Smiley, ready at any moment to renew their personal war against Hoxha, with whom they had old accounts to settle. Their planned revenge would have ←199 | 200→not only a local impact but would also unchain a domino effect on the entire communist camp. They firmly believed that British aid to Partisans and leaving anti-communist leaders in the lurch were the decisive factors that predetermined the Communists' victory in Albania.[60]

After a visit to Greece in mid-1948, Amery conceived "the germ of a plan" for action against Albania. He concluded that in order to deal successfully with Greek anti-government guerrillas, they must be deprived of their secure bases on Albanian territory. Moreover, such an action in Albania, aimed at overthrowing its communist regime, would thwart Stalin's plans for a strategic outlet to the Adriatic. After activating his old connections in intelligence and political circles, he managed to win over influential lobbyists for his cause.[61] The operation was designed as part of something bigger—the neutralization of Albania would lead to the

disintegration of the entire satellite system bounded up with the U.S.S.R. This purpose won over the American allies—*especially* the Office of Political Coordination (O.P.C.), which initially dealt with such operations in Eastern Europe, before its replacement by the C.I.A. From the autumn of 1949 until the early 1950s, M.I.6 and the O.P.C./C.I.A. infiltrated by land, air, and sea several subversive groups in Albania, largely composed of Albanian political emigrants. Unfortunately, the fate of most of them was sealed because Albanian security forces easily located and neutralized them. The failure of the joint operation codenamed Valuable/BGFIEND was attributed to Kim Philby's betrayal, but this could serve only as a partial and convenient excuse.

The disastrous result, the consequences of which ultimately remained largely at the expense of the United States, was due to two prime causes—British unlearned lessons in WWII and American ignorance. As for the former S.O.E. officers, who suggested the whole undertaking, they stepped back long before the end of the shameful fiasco. It turned out that their WWII experience, knowledge, and connections were not that useful in the Cold War. In the final analysis, the lack of a realistic and adequate approach by Great Britain, from 1939 onward, logically led, one way or another, to a bitter end to all its plans concerning Albania. After the Second World War, British advocates of the nationalist camp in Albania explained its defeat mainly through Great Britain's betrayal. The officers who had been with the nationalists were particularly active in their accusations, claiming that their country, with its attitude and material support provided, had almost served the victory to the Communists on a silver platter. They complained that their efforts had been purposefully sabotaged behind their back by communist ←200 | 201→moles within the S.O.E. itself. These allegations and conspiracy theories were maintained during the Cold War—the *époque* of a complete world polarization.

CONCLUSION

For decades after the events in Albania, information about them was drawn mainly from the memoirs left by these officers. Those who were with Partisans did not leave memoirs and did not appear in the public and political domains after the war. Things balanced somewhat after the release of Hibbert's book, in which he presented his point of view, sharply differentiated from that of his colleagues. Hibbert was not afraid to argue with them and challenge their claims about how their favorites were defeated and how Hoxha won the civil war. In a review of Smiley's book, he reminded the author, among other things, that he himself was responsible for the equipment and training of the First Partisan Brigade in 1943, which the following year was turned into the strike force that annihilated nationalists in the north.[62]

In the review of Nicholas Bethell's book *The Great Betrayal*, explaining the failure of operation Valuable/BGFIEND entirely and solely through Philby's betrayal, Hibbert noted that those who served in the North in 1943–44 and were in Kupi's close circle created the misconception that there were favorable conditions for an uprising in Albania in 1949. He also took a stand on the author's declaration that in 1944 he himself was one of the leftists in the Albanian section of the S.O.E. In his defense, Hibbert pointed to the fact that at that time he was only 22 years old and was politically uninformed. He speculated that the allegations were most likely the result of insinuations by his colleagues McLean, Smiley, and Amery.[63] However, things did not remain in the field of memoirs, but in real life as well. Twice, in 1951 and 1980, in his successful postwar career at the Foreign Office, Hibbert was anonymously accused of being a communist and subjected to inquiries. In both cases, the warnings had been filed by former S.O.E. officer Rowland Winn, with whom Hibbert had met for only three days in Albania in late September 1944.[64] It turned out that the stay of S.O.E. officers in occupied Albania had marked them for a lifetime and that the echo of their severe experiences would never die down and haunt them forever.

←201 | 202→Indeed, Britain provided considerable material assistance to the Albanian resistance, most of which went to Partisans. However, this was not dictated by any ideological or political preferences, but by the

precondition that its allotment depended on actions taken against the enemy. In this purely material aspect, the significance of which should not be underestimated, the aid provided to Partisans was not of such an importance as to decide the outcome of the civil war. The drama came later when the truth about Hoxha's regime emerged. Nevertheless, British wartime policy to Albania has not been criticized. The fact that the weapons given to Partisans were used not only to deal with their domestic opponents but also to fight occupiers should not be overlooked. Moreover, their contribution to the liberation struggle exceeded many times that of all other organizations, local leaders, and notables combined. In a broad sense, the failure of operation Valuable/BGFIEND was far more thunderous and humiliating than the fact that Hoxha had been provided with British weapons before usurping power. With or without material British support, he would have certainly won the civil war simply because his domestic opponents did not have the vigor, influence, and doctrine to attract the bulk of the population. The B.L.Os. attached to nationalists, acting on their own, nurtured illusions of outside help and salvation at the last possible moment before German withdrawal. However, they had neither the authority nor the instructions from their superiors to do so. They were not neutral arbitrators, but because of their social and professional background, they were initially right-wing oriented and heavily biased.

The cause for the series of failures must be sought more deeply in the fundamental British attitude toward Albania and Albanians. For the British, this country was absolutely unknown. They were not aware of its history, traditions, or mentality. For most, this remote and exotic country was nothing more than a territory from which the Axis can be hurt. Their opinion on locals was formed only based on how willing they were to cooperate and carry out their orders. If the people they have been dealing with were like-minded and politically suitable, they were heroes and patriots—if not—they were openly disliked. As for the promoted version that a communist mole working for Hoxha had infiltrated the Albanian section of the S.O.E. in Bari, the declassification of S.O.E. documentation provided the answer. Indeed, since the summer of 1944, after the death of its head Leake, and even before

the civil war broke out, the section pursued a pro-Partisan policy. Suspicions of sabotaging the efforts of "Concensus II" led to the man who called its members "fascists". This was Captain John Eyre from the Department of Political Intelligence, who did profess a Marxist-Leninist theory of class struggle. But at that time, the role of the S.O.E. in implementing policy on Albania was already marginalized. ←202 | 203→From July 1944, the Balkan Air Force took control over operations in Albania, thus placing the S.O.E. in a subordinate position. The governing bodies of all British services, ministries, headquarters, and departments in Italy and London were aware of the decisions of the Policy Committee of the Balkan Air Force and approved them. Although Eyre was a communist there was no evidence of his malicious activity. It should be borne in mind that the S.O.E. Albanian section had to consider not only the opinion of the officers attached to nationalists, but also that of the officers with Partisans, who were wondering what their colleagues in the North were doing and why they were still dealing with Kupi.[65]

In short, the convenient conspiracy theory explaining the failure of British policy in Albania in World War II by treason from within did not stand the test of examination. The vulnerability of the conspiracy theories resulted from the fact that they deliberately obliterated the differences between wartime and postwar realities. Whatever excuses for the chosen line of conduct the nationalists' proponents might set forth, one should not forget that the war was fought against fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, not against the communist Soviet Union.

The small Balkan state of Albania turned out to be a hard nut to crack for the mighty British Empire which, although in decline, still possessed enormous resources and strength. During the whole turbulent decade from 1939 to 1949, it was going through severe trials, putting its very existence at stake. Albania was not one of them and this fact could serve as the only universal justification for all the ill-fated British initiatives in this country.

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15 Harold Julian Amery, Baron Amery of Lustleigh (1919–96), is the son of the Secretary of State for India, Leo Amery. His elder brother John, the black sheep in the family, became a supporter of Nazism and served the Germans during the war for which after its end was sentenced to death for treason and executed. Julian studied at Oxford but left and took part in the Spanish Civil War as a military correspondent. In 1939 he left Spain to travel in the Balkans. Later, thanks to his father's connections, he was appointed assistant press attaché at the British Legation in Belgrade. He was recruited to Section D in May 1940, and this was initially unknown to the rest of the diplomatic staff. According to the characteristics of his file, he was characterized by impulsiveness and indiscretion. Subsequently, he became involved in several unauthorized political conspiracies in the Balkans, provoking the irritation of his superiors. Atkin, *Section D / Appendix 2*, 6–7. For more about his life, military and political career, see: Richard Bassett, *Last Imperialist: A Portrait of Julian Amery* (London: Stone Trough Books, 2015).
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46 Bailey, 242–3.
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CHAPTER 9

Balkan States' Development Immediately after World War II: Through the Eyes of Czechoslovak Diplomats

MILAN SOVILJ

Abstract: In the interwar period, Czechoslovakia successfully maintained diplomatic ties with each Balkan country. However, World War II instigated the cessation or interruption of most contacts, except for the emigrant Czechoslovak-Yugoslav-Greek ties in Great Britain. Soon after the end of World War II, Czechoslovakia started gradually renewing most of its diplomatic ties with Balkan countries, but under completely different circumstances. Following the development of each of the Balkan States and their relations with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia gradually became involved in collaboration with the new people's democracies. This chapter aims, through the eyes of Czechoslovak diplomats, to focus on the way new communist regimes were established in Balkan countries (Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania). This is based on the analysis of sources from Czech archives, a small number of memoirs, and other relevant literature.

Keywords: Czechoslovakia, diplomacy, Balkan States, postwar development, communism.

BACKGROUND PERSPECTIVES ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE BALKAN STATES UNTIL 1945 AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER WORLD WAR II

The cultural and economic relations between the Balkans and Czechs and Slovaks were established long before most Central and Southeastern European states were formed at the end of WWI. The Czech civilizing and cultural missions to Romanian and Bulgarian territories and the territory where the Yugoslav State ←207 | 208→was formed in 1918 were also of importance.[1] The newly formed Czechoslovakia established diplomatic relations with Balkan States and launched political and military collaboration—e.g., Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the Yugoslav State formed the political-military alliance known as the Little Entente.[2]



Figure 9.1: The Little Entente (from left to right King Carol II of Romania with his son Michael; Czechoslovak President Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk and Foreign Minister Edvard Beneš, who also later became the President of Czechoslovakia; King Alexander I of Yugoslavia with his son Peter. Top of the photo the silhouettes of capitals, and bottom of the photo the national emblems of Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. Date unknown). Reproduced with permission from Archive of the T. G. Masaryk Institute, Prague, collection: T. G. Masaryk no. 17-3-001.

Although WWII brought an end to these activities, there were exceptions—the relations between the governments-in-exile of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (and partially Greece) in Great Britain, on one hand, and the limited relations among German allies—the Slovak State, the Independent State of Croatia, Romania, and Bulgaria—on the other. The many political changes that took place across most of the Balkans at the end of WWII and immediately after—ultranationalist or radical regimes close to Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy during WWII met their demise and left-wing forces strengthened their positions—provide a good opportunity to study the subsequent development of Balkan States, as well as to examine the attitude of Czechoslovak diplomacy toward these countries.[3]

←208 | 209→←209 | 210→Immediately after WWII, Czechoslovak foreign policy carried on the activities of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile and its Foreign Minister in London, as well as picking up where the country had

left off in 1938.[4] The end of WWII and especially the beginning of the division of spheres of interest among the leading Allied Powers also affected the foreign political orientation of postwar Czechoslovakia. While in the prewar period, relations with Western European countries played an important role in Czechoslovak foreign policy, immediately after 1945 the country started to establish and strengthen political and economic ties with the Soviet Union.[5] The Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty on Friendship, Mutual Assistance, and Post-War Cooperation of December 1943 served as a model,[6] according to which similar treaties were signed by Czechoslovak politicians immediately after WWII with other Eastern, Central, and Southeastern European countries, including countries in the Balkans. In relation to the Balkan States, Czechoslovakia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague headed by Jan Masaryk,[7] who had held the same office in the Czechoslovak government-in-exile in London between 1940 and 1945, was able to renew some of its previous relations, especially with Yugoslavia and partly with Romania as former members of the Little Entente.

Figure 9.2: Meeting of Czechoslovak Diplomacy representatives, Yugoslav Embassy in Prague, 1947 (Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk (left), with Yugoslav Ambassador to Czechoslovakia Darko Černej (in the middle) and Antonín Zápotocký, a senior officer of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (right)). Reproduced with permission from Archive of the T. G. Masaryk Institute, Prague, collection: T. G. Masaryk, no. 4b-1-002.

In the case of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia was able to continue relations between both governments-in-exile in London, although their relations were rather reserved during WWII.[8] It is also important to note that while the Yugoslav ←210 | 211→exile representation lost its recognition at the end of WWII and, most importantly, was deprived of any chance of returning to Yugoslavia due to the growing power of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the guerrilla movement of Josip Broz Tito, the Czechoslovak exile representation headed by President-in-Exile, Edvard Beneš,[9] returned to

Czechoslovakia as the winner. Shortly after, Jaroslav Lípa,[10] Czechoslovak Envoy to Yugoslavia, who had held the same post from June ←211 | 212→1938 to March 1939 (until the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia) and served as Envoy-in-Exile to the Yugoslav government-in-exile in London from September 1941 until the end of WWII, was sent from Prague to Belgrade. Unlike the period shortly before WWII, when political power in Yugoslavia was mainly in the hands of various coalitions and the period of WWII, when there was no left-wing ideology among the members of the Yugoslav government-in-exile, Lípa could sense a change in the political situation immediately after his arrival in Belgrade.

Apart from Yugoslavia, Greece—or rather King George II and the Greek government-in-exile—was the only political authority to maintain diplomatic relations with the Czechoslovak exile authorities during WWII. To a certain extent, they continued their relations from the interwar period. However, with the rise to power of the Greek politician General Ioannis Metaxas in 1936, their relationship cooled considerably.[11] Proper bilateral contacts were interrupted as a result of the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939 and were only resumed to a limited extent in August 1942 in London during the appointment of Pavel Baráček-Jaquier[12] as Czechoslovak Envoy to the Greek government-in-exile.[13] However, the end of WWII did not bring about the "transfer" of diplomatic relations from exile to Prague and Athens. The very difficult political situation in Greece immediately after 1945 and its subsequent escalation into a civil war left practically no room for postwar diplomatic relations between Czechoslovakia and Greece. Unless we count the individual—and sometimes even personal—contacts between some persons from the Balkans and ←212 | 213→the Czechoslovak exile authorities during WWII, it can basically be said that no other Balkan States maintained official diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia between 1939 and 1945.

The resumption of Czechoslovakia's diplomatic relations with Albania after WWII could only be based in part on their relations from the interwar period, as the two countries had nothing in common at that time, neither in the form of government nor in foreign policy. The only area in which successful

collaboration was achieved was the export of industrial goods from Czechoslovakia to Albania.[14] King Zog I of Albania, who adopted a more or less pro-Italian foreign policy during the 1930s, remained in British exile even after the end of WWII. From there, he sent a letter to President Beneš in Prague via the Czechoslovak Embassy in London, congratulating him on his successful return to Czechoslovakia and reminding him of their time together in exile in Great Britain during the War.[15] The leaders and diplomats of postwar Czechoslovakia could clearly see that the situation in Albania had changed considerably at the end of WWII and that the political conditions prevailing in the country before 1939 would never be the same again.

In late June 1945, the Czechoslovak state authorities received information about the situation in Albania from the Albanian and Yugoslav authorities and the Soviet military mission there. The information was acquired by Major Dalibor Korejs, Commander of the Czechoslovak military mission in Albania and sent from Belgrade to Prague by Jaroslav Lípa, the Czechoslovak Envoy to Yugoslavia.[16] In Lípa's letter of June 25, 1945, which was attached to Major Korejs's report, it was strongly suggested to "take into quick and favorable consideration" the information about the friendly mood prevailing in Albania toward Czechoslovakia and the suggestion to establish mutual economic cooperation.[17] Considering the badly damaged infrastructure and economy in Albania during WWII, ←213 | 214→it makes perfect sense that new Albanian communist leadership sought to secure a partner for economic cooperation and especially for the import of necessary goods. Leading figure of the Albanian Communist Party and Prime Minister, Enver Hoxha, also needed to secure international recognition for Albania, which would further strengthen the importance of the new communist regime. It can be said that it was only a matter of time and the fact that the Czechoslovak side was asked to "take into quick and favorable consideration" the above-mentioned suggestions only confirm this assumption. Indeed, at the end of his letter, Lípa emphasized that "a substantial change of the government or regime in Albania can hardly be expected."[18]

Despite the expectations of the Albanian side, the Czechoslovak coalition government led by Zdeněk Fierlinger[19], a prominent figure of the Czechoslovak Social Democrats, did not agree to recognize Albania quickly and to establish diplomatic relations with the country. The documents of November 13, 1945, sent by the Czechoslovak Office of the Prime Minister to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague, stated the reasons for this decision: the unclear political situation in Albania. Only Yugoslavia had established official diplomatic relations with Albania until June 1945.[20] Other countries took this step later. There was still the unresolved legal status of Albania: the country had been part of Italy during WWII and it was unclear whether the Peace Treaty with Italy would also apply to Albania. Later, the situation changed and the 1939 Italian annexation was legally repealed. Given that the circumstances improved in favor of the international position of Albania between late June and November 1945, as assessed by the Czechoslovak government, it was decided that Czechoslovakia would recognize Albania *de jure*. This took place on November 16, 1945.[21] However, at ←214 | 215→a meeting of the Czechoslovak government that took place on the same day, a debate was held concerning the rank of diplomatic representations in Prague and Tirana. Prime Minister Fierlinger was against the establishment of an independent embassy in Albania[22] due to the high financial costs involved. It did not, however, affect the final decision for Czechoslovakia to recognize Albania *de jure*. The government decided that "the way and form of the exchange of diplomatic representatives remain reserved."[23] During the first postwar years, Josef Korbel[24] served as Czechoslovak Envoy to Albania, while also holding the post of Czechoslovak Envoy to Yugoslavia and residing in Belgrade—he replaced Jaroslav Lípa in this office in the early autumn of 1945.

The diplomatic relations that Czechoslovakia maintained with Romania in the interwar period within the Little Entente were also of importance when restoring their relations immediately after WWII. However, the 1938 Sudetenland crisis over the position of the German minority in Czechoslovakia, during which Czechoslovakia was threatened by Nazi Germany and toward which Romania took a rather reserved stance (like

Yugoslavia), did not contribute to the improvement of Czechoslovak-Romanian postwar relations. In addition, the Czechoslovak exile authorities in Great Britain and Romania with its Prime Minister General Ion Antonescu were on opposite sides during most of WWII.[25] Nevertheless, it is true that individual Romanian opposition politicians (Iuliu Maniu, Gheorghe Tătărescu) maintained contact with Czechoslovak exile authorities in Great Britain via various embassies in neutral countries (Switzerland, Turkey, ←215 | 216→and Sweden) during the War.[26] Thanks to these Czechoslovak exiled politicians, mostly President Beneš, who had relatively good contacts with the Soviet Union, the Romanians in opposition to Antonescu's regime could establish good relations with the Soviet Union too. This later played a certain role in Romania's withdrawal from the Nazi coalition and its involvement in the fight against Nazi Germany from the summer of 1944.[27] The fact that the Romanian Army took part in the liberation of Czechoslovakia on the side of the Allies at the end of WWII, losing a considerable number of soldiers[28], could also have contributed to the resumption of Czechoslovak-Romanian relations.

Based on archival sources of Czechoslovak provenance that were analyzed by historian Miroslav Tejchman about 20 years ago,[29] the Soviet Union played a key role—and also had an interest—in the renewal of Czechoslovak-Romanian relations. At first, the Soviet side that was present in Romanian territory from the end of WWII did not support the suggestion of Czechoslovakia to establish an embassy in Romania in November 1944, but that attitude changed in the spring of 1945.[30] The turning point came shortly after the resolution of the domestic political crisis that erupted in Romania at the turn of February and March 1945, when the left-wing National Democratic Front came to power with the help of the Soviet Union.[31] In the correspondence of March 21, 1945, among the leading and still active Czechoslovak exiled politicians, the Czechoslovak government-in-exile first arrived in Košice, eastern Slovakia, in April 1945 and only then returned to liberated Prague in May of the same year, it was stated that Jaroslav Kraus[32], Chief of the Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

←216 | 217→in exile and prewar diplomat, would become the new Czechoslovak Envoy to Romania.[33]

It can be said that Bulgaria found itself in a similar situation to that of Romania at the end of WWII. However, unlike Romania, Czechoslovakia could not rely on any significant interwar collaboration with Bulgaria. In the period between the world wars, Czechoslovak-Bulgarian relations mainly focused on relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, the different views of Bulgarian and Yugoslav politicians on the question of Bulgarian borders, the attitude of Bulgaria toward Macedonian territory, and relations between Macedonians and Bulgarians.[34] During WWII, the Czechoslovak exile authorities and Bulgaria found themselves in opposite camps—as in the case of Romania, the Czechoslovak government-in-exile formally declared war on Bulgaria in the summer of 1941 and therefore was at war versus all the countries fighting against the Soviet Union and the Western Allies.[35] Another obstacle to the resumption of Czechoslovak-Bulgarian relations may have been the fact that Bulgarian ruling circles maintained contact with one of the allies of Nazi Germany during the War—the Slovak State—although such collaboration—or rather the attempt at it—did not yield any great results.[36] At the end of WWII, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs in exile in London received information about the situation in Bulgaria, which was described by Michal Hanák, Czechoslovak Envoy to Turkey, on January 20, 1945, as "better and calmer compared to Romania."[37] Although he also noted that "the Bulgarians are willing to accept the Soviet dictate and administration over everything, if only to gain the support of the Russians against the claims of the Allies."[38]

According to the report of the meeting that was held in Moscow on March 21, 1945, between Soviet representatives led by V. M. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, and the Czechoslovak exile authorities—President Beneš, Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk, and Zdeněk Fierlinger, ←217 | 218→Czechoslovak Envoy to the Soviet Union—who became Prime Minister in April 1945[39]—the Soviet side agreed to send Czechoslovak diplomatic representation to Romania and Bulgaria.[40] In late May 1945, Jaroslav Kraus departed for Bucharest as a delegate of the

Czechoslovak government,[41] but regular diplomatic relations had not yet been established. After the arrival in Košice of the Czechoslovak government from exile in London, the government program of April 5, 1945, even stated (Article IV) that within "the Slavic line of its foreign policy" the government would find "new forms of relations also with Slavic Bulgaria."[42] However, the finding of such "new forms" took several months.

In September 1945, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria put forward several initiatives to establish mutual diplomatic relations. Through the agency of their diplomatic representatives in Moscow, both countries expressed their willingness to establish mutual diplomatic collaboration.[43] Nevertheless, during the Autumn, Bulgaria still did not comment on Czechoslovakia's proposal to establish diplomatic collaboration.[44] Although some economic collaboration was established later[45], it took several months before Stefan Simov was appointed Bulgarian Envoy to Czechoslovakia (February 7, 1946) and František Kubka[46] took up the post of Czechoslovak Envoy to Sofia (April 27, 1946).[47]

CZECHOSLOVAK DIPLOMATS IN THE BALKAN STATES AT THE BEGINNING OF COMMUNIST REGIMES

The Czechoslovak diplomatic view on the development of Balkan States immediately after WWII largely depended on the general attitude of Czechoslovak diplomats toward the growing influence of communism, which was initially rather reserved and cautious. Given that Czechoslovakia was one of the "people's democracies" at that time, while still maintaining a pluralistic political system, perhaps it was the best they could do. However, the situation entailed a diplomatic and political "balancing," as Czechoslovak diplomats who were sent to different Balkan States could observe how these countries had changed politically and how communism gradually became the leading political ideology. Some of these diplomats

adopted a very critical attitude toward these changes, which caused some stir in diplomatic circles.

Jaroslav Lípa, the first postwar Czechoslovak Envoy to Yugoslavia, departed from Prague to Belgrade on April 22, 1945. In one of his first letters sent from Belgrade directly to Czechoslovak President Beneš on May 16, 1945, he wrote that the beginning of his diplomatic mission in Yugoslavia was rather difficult given that it was not easy at the end of WWII to bring diplomatic personnel to Belgrade. However, Lípa's attention was drawn mainly to the political changes that had taken place in the Yugoslav State at the end of WWII. According to Lípa, the political situation was horribly unclear. The new political regime kept peace in the country with a firm hand, while widely misusing words like "democracy" and "freedom."[48] He also noticed that those who disagreed with the communist regime in Yugoslavia put their hopes for change of the situation on Western Allies.[49] Although Lípa's impressions of meeting Josip Broz Tito were positive, he emphasized a very negative attitude toward the new regime, which significantly lacked capable, far-sighted, and experienced people.[50] From a political point of view, he was right: none of the prominent communist politicians had much experience in active political life—after all, the Communist Party had been banned in Yugoslavia for a long time during the interwar period—but they all had a wealth of practical experience from the war.

In his next report, this time sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague and to President Beneš on June 20, 1945, he further criticized the situation in-country. He complained about the very limited news services and the insufficient ←219 | 220→information presented to Yugoslav citizens. Although newspapers were published in Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana, they were "directed" by the new regime.[51] He also pointed to the dissatisfaction of one part of the population with Tito's regime and the fact that the prisons were already full of supporters of the opposing (defeated) side in the war, especially the followers of General Dragoljub Mihailović's Chetnik movement. As in his previous report of May 1945, he again emphasized the need for Western Allies to assist Yugoslav inhabitants and the involvement of the Big Three (Great Britain, the U.S.A., and the Soviet

Union) in Yugoslav affairs at the forthcoming Potsdam conference.[52] There were obviously anti-communist tendencies in Lípa's political views, but the Czechoslovak Envoy had experienced Yugoslavia immediately before the outbreak of WWII, when the Communist Party was banned, and was also in touch with Yugoslav politicians in exile who all held anti-communist views. Therefore, he was able to compare the situations and, through his own experience, create his own view of Yugoslavia's postwar development.

During the Summer of 1945, the Yugoslav Communists, led by Tito, gradually eliminated most of their opponents from political life and even some of their coalition partners with democratic views who had participated in the establishment of the provisional coalition government.[53] Lípa kept criticizing the steps of Tito's regime. For example, he pointed out the poor state of the Yugoslav economy—although it was mainly due to the recently ended war[54]—and the unfavorable political situation that affected every part of Yugoslavia.[55] He also mentioned the dissatisfaction of the Czech and Slovak minorities[56], some members of which had been waiting to return from Yugoslavia to Czechoslovakia.[57] It was mainly due to Lípa's criticism and some of his uncompromising attitudes toward the policy ←220 | 221→of Yugoslav leadership regarding the nationalization of Czechoslovak property in Yugoslavia,[58] that Tito considered Lípa a *persona non grata*, unsuitable for the post of Czechoslovak Envoy under his regime. Mostly for this reason, he was removed from his post of Czechoslovak Envoy to Yugoslavia and sent back to Prague in September 1945.[59]

Unlike Jaroslav Lípa, Josef Korbel, the new Czechoslovak Envoy to Yugoslavia, adopted a more cautious attitude toward the Yugoslav regime and did not add any personal comments to his reports from Belgrade to Prague, avoiding any criticism of Yugoslav conditions. In some of his later reports, he even expressed a mostly positive attitude toward Tito's regime and the way in which socialism had developed in Yugoslavia.[60] However, after 1948, he took an openly negative stance toward communism, although not until December 1948, when he became a political emigrant in the United States. Only then did he publish some of his texts relating to Tito's regime and his diplomatic mission in Yugoslavia.[61] Nevertheless, it cannot be said,

based on his later negative views of communism, that he held these views during his diplomatic mission in Yugoslavia between 1945 and 1948. The available archival sources on his diplomatic mission in Yugoslavia do not confirm any such conclusions.

In the publication on Tito's regime, published in the U.S.A. in 1951, for example, Korbel claimed that, prior to his departure for Belgrade to take up the post of Czechoslovak Envoy to Yugoslavia, President Beneš advised him to be careful as he did not trust Tito. According to Korbel, it was President Beneš who ordered confidential information not be sent from Belgrade to Prague by diplomatic mail, as the employees of the Soviet Embassy would know everything the next day. For this reason, when Korbel visited Prague, he had to hand over all his confidential reports to Beneš in person.[62] Their content is unknown, but the archival documents from the Czech Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague covering the period of October 1945 through May 1948 do not contain any major criticism of Tito's regime.

Jaroslav Lípa and Josef Korbel were important Czechoslovak diplomats in the Balkans, not only because of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, but also with Albania. Through Lípa and the reports of Major Korejs, Commander of ←221 | 222→the Czechoslovak military mission in Albania, the Czechoslovak state authorities had already learned in detail about the political situation in Albania by late June 1945.[63] It was probably then that Czechoslovakia adopted its rather patient attitude toward the new Albanian regime[64], as it took several months before the country decided to recognize Albania *de jure*. It was already clear back then that the Czechoslovak Embassy in Belgrade would play a significant role in the possible establishment of diplomatic relations between Czechoslovakia and Albania. Therefore, it is not surprising that reports about the Yugoslav attitude toward Albania or Yugoslav-Albanian relations reached the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague from Belgrade, as they were written and sent by Czechoslovak diplomats in Yugoslavia. For example, on June 22, 1945, Jaroslav Lípa reported to the Foreign Ministry in Prague that Yugoslav-Albanian relations were cordial because, as he emphasized, the regimes of both countries were the same.[65] Unlike Lípa, Josef Korbel did not add his

personal comments about Albania in his reports to Prague. In one of his numerous reports, dated November 23, 1945, he mentioned that the Yugoslav press noticed the political situation in Albania, but also published the speeches of Enver Hoxha.[66]

Both Lípa and Korbel wrote about the tendencies of Yugoslav politicians to connect Albania to Yugoslavia—Lípa rather explicitly in June 1945 and Korbel implicitly in November of the same year.[67] Despite the relatively good political and economic relations between Yugoslavia and Albania immediately after WWII[68], this potential was never realized. In fact, over time, the relations between the two countries even began to deteriorate, resulting in their gradual distancing, although Yugoslavia used to be Albania's important partner in diplomatic relations with other countries, as Albania did not have diplomatic representation in 16 countries immediately after the war[69], including Czechoslovakia.

←222 | 223→As already mentioned, Czechoslovakia recognized Albania *de jure* on November 16, 1945.[70] However, it remained open as to what form of diplomatic representation would be chosen. Given that the Czechoslovak government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not established any diplomatic mission in Albania, just as Albania had not in Czechoslovakia, it remained for a "third party" to play an important role in establishing possible Czechoslovak-Albanian relations. In this case, it was Yugoslavia. This is evidenced by the correspondence of March 1947 between the Yugoslav Embassy in Prague and the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Yugoslav Embassy informed the Ministry that, at the request of the Albanian government, they should take care of the protection of the rights and interests of Albanians living in Czechoslovakia.[71] Similarly, the Czechoslovak Legation (Embassy) in Belgrade acted as a mediator of diplomatic matters between Czechoslovakia and Albania.[72] Unlike Yugoslavia, where Czechoslovak diplomats were physically present and therefore could closely monitor the development of the political situation in Yugoslavia, this was not the case with Albania during the first postwar years.

The establishment of the first diplomatic relations between Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria after WWII also took considerable time. On

April 27, 1946, František Kubka, the new Czechoslovak Envoy to Bulgaria, during his inaugural audience at the Bulgarian Regent's Council[73], stressed the positive significance of the change in Bulgaria's domestic and foreign policy compared to that of WWII.[74] He also emphasized the importance of the Soviet Union as a liberator of Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, the collaboration between independent Slavic countries, and the fact that Bulgaria was already ruled by the people.[75] Undoubtedly, he alluded to all the changes that Bulgaria had undergone since September 1944 and the ←223 | 224→overthrow of the regime that had been allied with Nazi Germany, emphasizing that Bulgaria was already one of the "people's democracies." In his first report of May 3, 1946, sent from Sofia to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague, Kubka emphasized the importance of the leading Fatherland Front in Bulgarian political life. He pointed out that, compared to other coalition parties, the communist Bulgarian Workers' Party, which was part of the Fatherland Front, had the largest number of members—about 450,000 members committed to communist ideology—and that it was the strongest party compared to the opposition.[76]

Shortly before the referendum on abolishing the monarchy and establishing a republic took place on September 8, 1946, Kubka noticed that the "internal agitation apparatus" of the coalition government would be enough for "the nation to really vote for a republic", considering that the preparations for the referendum that were launched in May 1946 were accompanied by an intense campaign in favor of a republic and carried out with the help of the police.[77] Although Kubka initially described the numerous arrests of political opponents of the Fatherland Front as "harsh methods," he justified this form of government and police intervention: "The government is doing its duty and all sentimentality is useless when it comes to the country's future."[78] On September 9, 1946, in his next report, he was able to confirm his previous assumption that a republic would be declared, as the results of the referendum, which he described as free and anonymous, clearly expressed the wish of Bulgarians for the abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of a republic—with 93 percent voting in favor of it.[79]

The parliamentary elections to the Grand National Assembly, which took place on October 27, 1946, were yet another step in consolidating the power of the Bulgarian communists. The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague was informed about the election results.[80] In mid-November 1946, immediately before the formation of the new government, Kubka reported that the leader of the Bulgarian communists, Georgi Dimitrov, had explained to him what the new form of government in Bulgaria would look like. Besides the Communists, ←224 | 225→the government would also consist of some members of the Fatherland Front. In this way Dimitrov sought to weaken and gradually wipe out the opposition.[81] Kubka considered Georgi Dimitrov as "Bulgaria's greatest personality" and also the "most beloved as well as hated person in the country."[82] He correctly estimated that Dimitrov was a man possessing unlimited power in the country and was the one who had the last word in every decision.[83] In the new government formed on November 22, 1946, which Kubka referred to as "the first government of the Bulgarian Republic", Dimitrov was appointed Prime Minister and Kimon Georgiev of the Zveno Party, the former Prime Minister, became one of the Deputy Prime Ministers.[84] Similarly, Kubka more or less expressed his understanding and sympathy toward the Fatherland Front and antipathy toward the Bulgarian opposition. He concluded that the opposition would become a great problem in Parliament and that it would be difficult "in such a composition, to draw up a constitution without the dictate of the majority."[85]

The further development of events in Bulgaria indicated that the problem of the opposition was resolved by the gradual elimination of such politicians, while the Communist Party considerably strengthened its position. As Czechoslovak Envoy to Bulgaria, Kubka was one of the trackers of these events until September 1948, when he was moved from Sofia to Prague. His later career was mostly dedicated to writing. Among others, in 1949 he published diaries from Bulgaria.[86]

The political situation in Romania took a very similar course. As already mentioned, Jaroslav Kraus arrived in Bucharest on May 26, 1945, despite encountering many difficulties on his journey.[87] Given that diplomatic

relations between Czechoslovakia and Romania had not yet been properly established and Romania had not sent its diplomatic representative to Prague, Kraus initially held the post of Government Delegate, not Envoy. However, he managed to meet and speak with several Romanian high officials—especially Gheorghe Tătărescu, Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister[88]—about whom he regularly informed the ←225 | 226→Foreign Ministry in Prague. His monthly reports always included an overview of the political situation in Romania and the country's foreign policy. In his first reports of June 1945, he described the domestic political situation in the country and the activities of the People's Courts that tried and punished those who were charged with war crimes.[89] He also reported on the speeches of prominent Romanian politicians—especially Prime Minister Petru Groza, and sometimes King Michael I—as well as on various economic problems and negative social phenomena affecting the life of the Romanian population (the lack of food, the black market, etc.).[90]

The government crisis, which became the main focus of Kraus's reports in the late summer of 1945, did not bring about any major changes, although the resignation of some leading Romanian politicians, including Groza, was expected.[91] However, in his monthly report of September 1945, Kraus informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague that Groza's government "is still in place and it does not seem that it will resign or be reconstructed in the near future, all the more so as it is fully supported by the Soviet Union."[92] In late November 1945, he stated that the political situation in Romania had not changed much and there was still the ongoing dispute between Prime Minister Groza and King Michael I which, according to Kraus, actually reflected the disagreements amongst the countries formerly known as the Big Three, with Great Britain and the U.S.A. on one side and the Soviet Union on the other.[93] There was yet another important detail that attracted Kraus's attention—the forthcoming congress of the Romanian Communist Party that was to be held in late October 1945. The support of the government toward some of its members outside the Communist Party—military figures, academics, and others from the political and cultural life of Romania—

according to Kraus, was a sign of an improvement of the Party's position in Romanian society and in the country.[94]

According to Kraus, it was not until January 1946 that the government crisis was resolved by adding new members of the opposition to the government, which ←226 | 227→enabled the resumption of collaboration between government and King.[95] Kraus also emphasized that the forthcoming parliamentary elections in 1946 would be one of the most significant. Even though the Electoral Law had not yet been finalized, the Czechoslovak diplomat provided information that pre-election agitation was very tumultuous in Bucharest and the countryside. Its main slogan was "defascization." As he stressed, general political opportunism and the lack of significant personalities and moral authorities in Romanian political life also contributed to the difficult political situation in the country.[96] Kraus[97] considered the long-announced parliamentary elections, which eventually took place on November 19, 1946, as "an historic moment for Romania," as after the elections "the unconstitutional period of the decree government" would finally end.[98] Furthermore, women were allowed to vote—this was not only the case in Romania, similar changes also took place in other Balkan States such *as* Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.[99] In his report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague, Kraus stressed the importance of the new Electoral Law, which was to extend the right to vote to those classes of Romanian society that had not previously been allowed, and also allowed all political parties to participate in elections. This was of great importance to the Communist Party, which had been illegal during the interwar period.[100]

In his report of late November 1946, Kraus provided detailed information of the political parties and the results of the elections.[101] He did not comment on ←227 | 228→possible further political developments in Romania. However, shortly after the elections, in early December of the same year, Kraus wrote to the Foreign Ministry in Prague that the Democratic Bloc had proven to be the strongest political force in Romania. He refused to admit any claims of the opposition that the election results had been manipulated. He even wrote that "it is simply impossible to terrorize millions of people or to falsify elections on such a large scale unless there is a special organization for that

purpose."[102] Further developments in Romania, about which Czechoslovak diplomats in Bucharest regularly informed the Foreign Ministry in Prague, involved the political elimination of some opposition leaders, as well as changes in the government's composition, as some of the less suitable members were replaced—among others, Foreign Minister Tătărescu, a prominent figure in the National Liberal Party.[103] The abdication of King Michael I in late 1947 also did not come as a surprise, according to Czechoslovak diplomats.[104] Thus, the path was clear for the declaration of a people's republic. Kraus remained as Czechoslovak Envoy to Romania until January 1948. His diplomatic career ended in December 1951.[105]

Greece is the only country under review in this chapter in which communism did not take root and was one of the few Balkan States with which Czechoslovakia did not establish normal diplomatic relations in the first postwar years. During the Greek Civil War, from 1946 to 49, the position of the Greek far right gradually strengthened at the expense of the left, while in Czechoslovakia, Communists grew stronger and civic democratic parties were significantly weakened, although under completely different political conditions.[106] The only significant contact between the two countries—albeit outside a diplomatic framework—was the material and financial support provided by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to Greek Communists from 1946 to 1947. After the February 1948 political changes that resulted from the victory of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia, military material and other goods from Czechoslovakia began to be supplied to Greek communist insurgents, according to instructions from the Soviet Union.[107] The split between the leaders of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, ←228 | 229→Joseph Stalin and Josip Broz Tito, that culminated in late June 1948, led directly to the cessation of Yugoslav aid to Greek Communists, later on resulting in their early defeat in a clash with royalist right-wing groups. As a result, the aid of communist Czechoslovakia also lost its significance.

CONCLUSION

Czechoslovak foreign policy toward Balkan States immediately after WWII can be based on the overall course of Czechoslovak postwar diplomacy, which still intended to cooperate with Western European countries to some extent. However, it can also be said that prominent Czechoslovak politicians were aware of the growing importance of the Soviet Union in international relations and gradually began to build their foreign policy on mutual collaboration. In this context, with the development of ideas about the political, economic, and cultural interconnection of Eastern, Central, and Southeastern European countries into a united group of "people's democracies" under Soviet influence, Czechoslovakia also launched its collaboration with Balkan States, more or less influenced by the Soviet Union.

The Czechoslovak attitude toward Balkan countries immediately after 1945 was said to be based on the relations that Czechoslovakia had maintained with individual Balkan States in the interwar period, as well as on the relations that the country had established with the Yugoslav and Greek exile representations during WWII. However, over time, it became clear that the interconnectedness of communist ideology was of the greatest importance and significantly influenced further collaboration between Czechoslovakia and Balkan States. Therefore, the present chapter may contribute to a better knowledge of the extent to which Czechoslovakia openly or implicitly carried on the tradition of military and political alliance from the interwar period, the question of the development of Czechoslovak foreign policy toward Balkan States, the roots of the Czechoslovak attitude toward the Soviet-influenced Balkan States, and the view of Czechoslovak diplomacy on the strengthening of communist parties.

Further research may also yield answers to some other relevant questions, such as what view Czechoslovak diplomacy held on some of the contentious issues among Balkan States—their relations with Moscow and attitudes toward rebellious Yugoslavia from the summer of 1948, the Greek Civil War from 1946to 49, and how they assessed issues directly concerning Czechoslovakia—(re)emigration of Czechs and Slovaks from Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria after 1945, the question of Czechoslovak property in

the Balkans, etc. It is also necessary to examine the personnel of the departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague, who dealt with Balkan States, and the diplomatic representatives serving ←229 | 230→there (envoys and other personnel). Only then will it be possible to arrive at an overall picture of the attitude of Czechoslovak diplomacy toward Balkan States from 1945 onward. Finally, an analysis of the questions above could provide answers as to whether and how much influence the Balkan experience exerted on leading Czechoslovak politicians in dealing with similar problems that their country was soon to face.

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1 Czechs and members of the Czech minorities who had been settled in the Balkans participated in the establishment of educational systems and some cultural institutions mostly from the 1880s. Various companies with Czech capital (in industry, in banking systems) that were based in the Balkans were important for the economy of the Balkan States too. See Jana Škerlová and Tomáš Chrobák, "Czech-Serbian relations", in *Czech relations with the nations and the*

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2 The Little Entente was created in the early 1920s with the aim of preventing Hungary from revising the Treaty of Trianon. In the mid-1930s, the alliance began to deteriorate because of Germany's expanding foreign policy against some Central and Southeastern European countries. In late September and early October 1938, after the Sudetenland crisis was resolved in favor of Nazi Germany, the Little Entente collapsed completely. Drahomír Jančík, *Německo a Malá dohoda. Hospodářské pronikání Německa do Jugoslávie a Rumunska v první polovině 30. let* [*Germany and the Little Entente. Germany's economic penetration into Yugoslavia and Romania in the first half of the 1930s*], (Prague: Charles University, 1990), 152–58. Zdeněk Sládek, *Malá dohoda 1919–38: její hospodářské, politické a vojenské komponenty* [The Little Entente 1919–38: its economic, political, and military components], (Prague: Karolinum, 2000), 194–206. See recently published documents about Romania and the Little Entente: Carmen-Sorina Rîjnoveanu, Doru Liciu and Șerban Liviu Pavelescu, eds., *Romania in the Little Entente. The Defensive Alliance at its Centenary. Documents* (Bucharest: Military Publishing House, 2021). All translations are my own unless otherwise stated.

3 Numerous Czech and foreign historians have dealt with the development of practically the entire Balkan Peninsula from 1945 onward. However, historians have not so far examined in detail the question of how Czechoslovak diplomats observed the situation in the Balkan States in the period immediately after 1945. Specific contributions have been made concerning Czechoslovakia's stance on Greece and Greek emigration in Czechoslovakia during and after the end of the Greek Civil War. Apart from the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav diplomatic relations after 1945 and some aspects of the Czechoslovak-Romanian contacts, the relations between Czechoslovakia and other Balkan countries have been studied only in outline or have only been mentioned in Czech studies devoted to the history of Greece, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, and the South Slavic environment, i.e., Yugoslavia.

4 Jindřich Dejmek, *Diplomacie Československa. Díl I. Nástin dějin ministerstva zahraničních věcí a diplomacie 1918–92* [*Diplomacy of Czechoslovakia. Part I. Outline of the history of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diplomacy, 1918–92*], (Prague: Academia, 2012), 119–27.

5 Emil Voráček et al., *V zájmu velmoci. Československo a Sovětský svaz 1918–48* [*In the interest of the great power. Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, 1918–48*], (Prague: Institute of History, 2019), 431–39, 450–52.

6 Jan Němeček, "Československá vláda, prezident a československo-sovětská smlouva z r. 1943" ["Czechoslovak government, president, and Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty of 1943"], in *Československo-sovětská smlouva 1943* [*Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty of 1943*], eds. Jan Němeček et al. (Prague: Institute of History, 2014), 9–48.

7 Jan Masaryk (1886–1948), Czechoslovak diplomat and politician, served in Czechoslovak diplomacy during all the interwar period, WWII and immediately after WWII until 1948 and his death. In 1925–38 he was Czechoslovak Envoy to Great Britain. As Foreign Minister, he was active from 1940 (firstly in exile) until 1948. His father, Tomaš Garrigue Masaryk, was a professor, politician, and the first President of Czechoslovakia (1918–35). For a brief biography of Jan Masaryk. Jindřich Dejmek, Jan Němeček and Slavomír Michálek, *Diplomacie Československa. Díl II. Biografický slovník československých diplomatů, 1918–92*

[*Diplomacy of Czechoslovakia. Part II. Biographical dictionary of Czechoslovak diplomats*], (Prague: Academia, 2013), 155–57.

8 Jonáš Pospíchal, "Odtažitost a vyčkávání: Vztahy exilových vlád Československa a Jugoslávie v letech 1941–43" ["Distance and Waiting to See What Happens. Relations Between the Exile Governments of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia 1941–43"], *Slavonic Review*, vol. 102, no. 3 (2016), 451–502. Milan Sovilj, "The Beginnings of the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Exile Governments in London during the Second World War: Expectations, Possibilities, and Reality, *Czech Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. VIII, (2020); 5–28.

9 Edvard Beneš (1884–1948), Czech and Czechoslovak politician, who was politically active before WWI and during the War. From the establishment of Czechoslovakia in 1918, he served as Foreign Minister. In 1935 he became the second Czechoslovakian President and remained in that position until 1938. As President of Czechoslovakia in exile during WWII, he stayed mostly in Great Britain. At the end of WWII, he returned to Prague, where he resumed his former position as President. He remained in that post until June 1948, when he resigned after the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia took control. For a brief biography of Edvard Beneš see Dejmek, Němeček and Michálek, *Diplomacy of Czechoslovakia. Part II*, 29–32.

10 Jaroslav Lípa (1886–1966) worked in Czechoslovak diplomacy from 1918 until 1948 in several posts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague and in a few countries (Italy, U.S.A., Latvia). He served several years (from 1938 to 1939, and from 1941 to 1945) as Czechoslovak Envoy to Yugoslavia and to the Yugoslav government-in-exile. After a short period in the post of Envoy to Yugoslavia in spring and summer of 1945, he returned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague, where he stayed until 1948, when he was dismissed after the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia took power. See: Dejmek, Němeček and Michálek, *Diplomacy of Czechoslovakia. Part II*, 144.

11 Pavel Hradečný and Konstantinos Tsivos, "Czech-Greek relations", in *Czech relations*, eds. Hladký et al., 311–12.

12 Pavel Baráček-Jacquier (1885–1969) served as a Czechoslovak diplomat in Switzerland and Holland, before being appointed as Envoy to Greece in 1928–33. Immediately before the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia in mid-March 1939, he was Czechoslovak Envoy to Latvia. His second mandate as Envoy to Greece, precisely to the Greek government-in-exile, lasted until 1945. After WWII, he worked again for the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs until 1949 and his retirement at its own request. See: Dejmek, Němeček and Michálek, *Diplomacy of Czechoslovakia. Part II*, 25–6.

13 Archive of the T. G. Masaryk Institute, Prague (hereinafter A.T.G.M.I.) collection Edvard Beneš, section III, public activity (1916–44), 1945–48 (hereinafter E.B. III), box file 69, no. 336, sign. Foreign Affairs 1/P 69c, without number, Restoration of Relations between Czechoslovakia, and Greece.

14 Pavel Hradečný and Ladislav Hladký, "Czech-Albanian relations", in *Czech relations*, eds. Hladký et al., 299.

15 A.T.G.M.I., collection Edvard Beneš, section IV-2, Personal correspondence (1904), 1910–48 (E.B. IV/2), box file 31, sign. K.O.R.-100, Zog I of Albania, no. 342/conf./45. The Letter of King Zog I, London, July 19, 1945.

16 A.T.G.M.I., E.B. III, box file 65, no. 273, sign. Country 1/P. 65, no. 672/B/1945. The Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with Albania, Prague, June 25, 1945. Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague (hereinafter A.M.F.A.), collection Political Reports (hereinafter P.R.), Belgrade, 1945, no. 9560. Outline of the Situation in Albania in Early June 1945, Belgrade, June 20, 1945 (the document was incorrectly dated as April 20, 1945).

A.M.F.A., collection Territorial Departments-Ordinary 1945–59 (hereinafter T.D.-O. 1945–59), Albania, 1945, box file 4, no. 9560. The Situation in Albania, Prague, July 18, 1945.

17 A.T.G.M.I., E.B. III, box file 65, no. 273, sign. Country 1/P. 65, no. 672/B/1945. The Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with Albania, Prague, June 25, 1945.

18 A.T.G.M.I., E.B. III, box file 65, no. 273, sign. Country 1/P 65, no. 672/B/1945.

19 Zdeněk Fierlinger (1891–1976), WWI Czech legionnaire, diplomat, and politician, served in the interwar period as Czechoslovak Envoy to Holland, Romania, U.S.A., Switzerland, Austria and immediately before WWII in the Soviet Union. In December 1942, he was appointed as Envoy of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile to the Soviet Union. In 1945–46, he was the first postwar Czechoslovak Prime Minister. He remained in the functions in the leadership bodies of Communist Czechoslovakia after February 1948. See: Dejmek, Němeček and Michálek, *Diplomacy of Czechoslovakia. Part II*, 62–3.

20 The Yugoslav government recognized Albania and Hoxha's government already on April 28, 1945 and opened its embassy in Tirana in May of the same year. Boris Suljagić, "Odnos jugoslavenskoga i albanskoga komunističkog vrha od kraja Drugog svjetskog rata do prekida odnosa 1945–48" ["Relations between the Yugoslav and Albanian Communist Leadership from the End of World War II to the Break-up of Relations 1945–48"], *Journal of Contemporary History,* vol. 51, no. 1 (2019): 215.

21 The National Archive, Prague (hereinafter N.A.), collection The Office of the Prime Minister – Ordinary Record Office (O.P.M.-O.R.O.), box file 1320, sign. 2032/7, no. 15678/VII-217/45, Prague, November 21, 1945. See also A.M.F.A., T.D.-O. 1945–59, Albania, 1945, box file 4, no. 15678/VII-217/45, The *de Jure* Recognition of Albania, Prague, November 21, 1945.

22 During the interwar period, Czechoslovakia changed the rank of its diplomatic representation in Albania several times. At first, there was a Consulate General in Tirana (1925–27), then a diplomatic agency (1927–29) and eventually an embassy (1929–39). See: Hradečný and Hladký, "Czech-Albanian relations", 299. It is important to note that the form of government changed in Albania in the second half of the 1920s as well (the principality was replaced by a republic in 1925, only to be replaced by a kingdom three years later). See: Miroslav Tejchman, *Balkán ve 20. století* [*The Balkans in the twentieth century*], (Prague: Charles University, Karolinum Publisher 2016), 94–7.

23 N.A., collection Klement Gottwald 1938–53 (hereinafter C.P.C.-C.C.-100/24), box file 139, archival unit 1499, Minutes of the fourth meeting of the Second Government held on Friday, November 16, 1945, at 3 p.m. in the building of the Office of the Prime Minister. Article III. – The Recognition of Albania.

24 Josef Korbel (1909–77, until 1945 Josef Körbel), served as Czechoslovak diplomat in 1934–48. He spent almost three years in 1945–48 as Envoy to Yugoslavia. At the end of 1948, he went into exile and stayed in the U.S.A., where he taught Political Sciences. See: Dejmek, Němeček and Michálek, *Diplomacy of Czechoslovakia. Part II*, 117–18.

25 Šisler and Tejchman, "Czech-Romanian relations", 244.

26 Miroslav Tejchman, "Prezident dr. E. Beneš a zahraničně politické snahy rumunské opozice za druhé světové války" ["President E. Beneš and the External Political Efforts of Romanian Opposition During World War II"], *Slavonic Review*, vol. 85, no. 2 (1999), 233–38.

27 Miroslav Tejchman, "Obnova československo-rumunských vztahů po druhé světové válce" ["The Renewal of the Czechoslovak-Romanian Contacts after World War II"], *Slavonic Review,* vol. 87, no. 4 (2001): 539.

28 Tejchman, "The Renewal of the Czechoslovak-Romanian Contacts". Šisler and Tejchman, "Czech-Romanian relations", 245.

29 Tejchman, "The Renewal of the Czechoslovak-Romanian Contacts", 540–41.

30 Tejchman, 540–41.
31 Richard J. Crampton, *The Balkans since the Second World War*, (London: Longman, 2002), 75–7.
32 Jaroslav Kraus (1894–1969) served in Czechoslovak diplomacy in 1920–51 in several functions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague, and in foreign countries (U.S.A., Great Britain). He was the first Czechoslovak diplomat to Romania after WWII. He was retired in 1951. For a brief biography of Jaroslav Kraus see: Dejmek, Němeček and Michálek, *Diplomacy of Czechoslovakia. Part II,* 122–23.
33 Jan Němeček, Jan Kuklík, Blanka Jedličková and Daniela Němečková, eds., *Československá zahraniční politika na sklonku války 1945, 1. leden–16. květen 1945* [*Czechoslovak foreign policy at the end of the war in 1945, January 1, 1945 – May 16, 1945*], (Prague: Institute of History, 2015), 298–99, doc. no. 107.
34 Rychlík, Penchev and Kouba, "Czech-Bulgarian relations", 278–80.
35 Rychlík, Penchev and Kouba, "Czech-Bulgarian relations", 285. Šisler and Tejchman, "Czech-Romanian relations", 245.
36 Jan Rychlík, "Politická situácia v Európe a na Slovensku v rokoch 1941–43 v správach bulharských diplomatov ["Political situation in Europe and Slovakia in the years 1941–43 in the reports of Bulgarian diplomats"], *Historical Journal*, vol. 47, no. 2 (1999): 265–305.
37 Němeček, Kuklík, Jedličková and Němečková, eds., *Czechoslovak foreign policy, 1945*, 160, doc. no. 31.
38 Němeček, Kuklík, Jedličková and Němečková, eds.
39 Němeček, Kuklík, Jedličková and Němečková, eds., 290–97, doc. no. 106.
40 Němeček, Kuklík, Jedličková and Němečková, eds., 306, doc. no. 111.
41 A.M.F.A., P.R. Bucharest, 1945, no. 1/conf./1945, report no. 1, Bucharest, June 14, 1945.
42 Němeček, Kuklík, Jedličková and Němečková, eds., 349, doc. no. 138.
43 A.M.F.A., T.D.-O. 1945–59, Bulgaria, 1945, box file 2, no. 23700/1945, The Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with Bulgaria, August 25, 1945. A.M.F.A., T.D.-O. 1945–59, Bulgaria, 1945, box file 2, no. 31806/1945, The Restoration of Diplomatic Relations with Bulgaria, Prague, September 12, 1945. A.M.F.A., T.D.-O. 1945–59, Bulgaria, 1945, box file 2, no. 40231/1945, The Restoration of Diplomatic Relations with Bulgaria, September 29, 1945.
44 A.M.F.A., T.D.-O. 1945–59, Bulgaria, 1945, box file 2, no. 61074/II-2/45, The Restoration of Diplomatic Relations of Czechoslovakia with Bulgaria, Prague, November 13, 1945.
45 Rychlík, Penchev and Kouba, "Czech-Bulgarian relations", 285.
46 František Kubka (1894–1969), Czech and Czechoslovak writer and diplomat, former WWI legionnaire, served in 1937–39 in the news agency of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague. Immediately after WWII, he started to work again for the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The diplomatic mission to Bulgaria in 1946–48 was his first and last diplomatic function in any foreign country. In September 1948, he was moved from Sofia to Prague and later dismissed from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For a brief biography of František Kubka see: Dejmek, Němeček and Michálek, *Diplomacy of Czechoslovakia. Part II*, 130.
47 Rychlík, Penchev and Kouba, "Czech-Bulgarian relations", 286. See also memoirs of writer František Kubka on his diplomatic service in Bulgaria in 1946–48, František Kubka, *Bulharský deník. Zápisky spisovatele a diplomata* [*Bulgarian Diary. Writer's and Diplomat's Notes*], (Prague: Czechoslovak writer, 1949). An abridged and slightly modified version of this publication entitled *Listy z bulharského deníku* [*Letters from the Bulgarian Diary*] was later published as part of Kubka's numerous travelogues: František Kubka, *Z cest* [*From the roads*], (Prague: Czechoslovak writer, 1958).
48 A.M.F.A., P.R. Belgrade, 1945, no. T. 81/45, Belgrade, May 16, 1945.

49 A.M.F.A., P.R. Belgrade, 1945, no. T. 81/45.
50 A.M.F.A., P.R. Belgrade, 1945, no. T. 81/45.
51 A.M.F.A., P.R. Belgrade, 1945, no. 61/conf./45, report no. 1, Belgrade, June 20, 1945.
52 A.M.F.A., P.R. Belgrade, 1945, no. 61/conf./45, report no. 1.
53 Crampton, *The Balkans since the Second World War*, 20.
54 A.M.F.A., P.R. Belgrade, 1945, no. 68/conf./45, report no. 3: The Economic Situation in Yugoslavia in late June 1945, Belgrade, June 28, 1945.
55 A.M.F.A., P.R. Belgrade, 1945, no. 73/conf./45, report no. 4, Belgrade, June 28, 1945.
56 A.M.F.A., PR Belgrade, 1945, no. 226/conf./45, Belgrade, August 10, 1945.
57 The exact number of Czechs and Slovaks in Yugoslavia immediately after WWII, both those who were already Yugoslav citizens as well as those who still had Czechoslovak citizenship, cannot be ascertained. According to the Czechoslovak data of September 10, 1945 (the Foreign Institute in Prague), a total of 90,000 Slovaks and 60,000 Czechs lived in Yugoslavia at that time. According to the data from Czech and Slovak minority associations, about 20percent of them planned to leave Yugoslavia and move to Czechoslovakia for political reasons, as they disagreed with the new Yugoslav regime. See: Milan Sovilj, *U potrazi za nedostižnim. Jugoslovensko-čehoslovačke kulturne veze 1945–49* [*In the Search for Unreachable: Yugoslav-Czechoslovak Cultural Relations 1945–49*], (Belgrade: Institute of Recent History of Serbia, 2012), 142, 144.
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CHAPTER 10

Warm Friendship in the Cold War? The Development of Diplomatic Relations between Switzerland and Albania since 1970

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Abstract: In this chapter we seek to show how the two states, Albania, and Switzerland, have come together during the last hundred years, culminating in the official establishment of diplomatic relations in the middle of the Cold War in 1970. This is even more extraordinary because Albania entered its most severe phase of isolation in the previous decade. The role of the protagonist Hans Keller, who had previously served as ambassador for nonaligned Switzerland in China, and Yugoslavia, is also examined in greater detail. Thanks to his efforts, as a connoisseur of socialist states, official diplomatic relations were finally established and have solidified to this day. We discuss how the two states gradually moved closer together after 1970, what considerations lay behind this decision, and why Switzerland hesitated for almost fifty years before finally taking the step toward a diplomatic relationship.

Keywords: Switzerland, Albania, diplomacy, Cold War, nonaligned states, communism, democracy.

SWITZERLAND AND ALBANIA: A LOOK BACK AT THE LAST 50 YEARS

As a result of centuries-long Ottoman domination, a delayed nation-building process, and decades of isolation due to the dictatorship of Enver Hoxha,

Albania remained relatively devoid of international attention. The small state on the Adriatic Sea is often referred to in the same breath as Kosovo or is simply missing from ←233 | 234→many international political agendas. In comparison, Switzerland is frequently seen as a hub for international politics, acting as a host for the nations of the world, providing them with a neutral space to work out their diplomatic relations and agreements. Although Albania and Switzerland appear strikingly different at first glance, they hold several shared qualities and goals which brought them together in the twentieth century and which has helped maintain their transnational connections into the present day. With our contribution we hope to shed new light on these diplomatic relations, which began in the middle of the Cold War and are still little-known today.

This chapter is foremost the result of research conducted during a project in the autumn of 2020 which was initiated by the Swiss Ambassador in Tirana, Adrian Maître, to commemorate the fifteenth anniversary of diplomatic relations between Switzerland and Albania. This anniversary presented us with a unique opportunity to discuss the past 50 years and take a closer look at the history of the development of these intergovernmental relations. Therefore, the research put forward will discuss the complex history of diplomatic relations between Switzerland and Albania and assess how the nature of this contact has developed and changed over time. By discussing both the Swiss and Albanian perspectives, we will seek to show not only how diplomacy between the two countries has evolved since 1970, but also how it has been perceived by individual countries locally, as well as at the international level and context.

The first part of this chapter will discuss the eventful first half of the twentieth century in Albania. Events of particular significance will include: (a) the proclamation of Albanian independence on November 28, 1912 by the Albanian national movement under the leadership of Ismail Qemali[1]; (b) the aftermath of the two Balkan Wars of 1912/1913 in Albania; (c) the appointment of Prince Wilhelm zu Wied[2] in May 1914; (d) Albania's path to democracy under Fan ←234 | 235→Noli[3]; (e) the seizure of power by Ahmet Zogu[4] and the transition into a dictatorship; (f) the growing dependence on

and later occupation by fascist Italy in April 1939; (g) the enlargement of Albania to a "Greater Albania" after the German-Italian Balkan campaign in April 1941; (h) the Italian capitulation in September 1943 followed by the occupation of Albania by Nazi Germany; (i) the victory of the Communist Albanian Liberation Front in late 1944 and finally; (j) the ensuing dictatorship of Enver Hoxha which lasted from 1944 until his death in 1985.

In the second part of the chapter, against the background of international developments (1945−90), the first unilateral Albanian contact and growing cooperation between socialist Albania and democratic Switzerland will be discussed. In particular, the role of the first Swiss ambassador to Albania, Hans Keller, will be central to the text. Keller played a distinctly influential role since it was not until his appointment in 1970—a whole 48 years after Switzerland had recognized Albania—those diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of Albania were officially established. To this day, Switzerland and Albania go beyond international cooperation by taking part in numerous political, social, and economic exchanges. Notable examples of these exchanges include Switzerland's current involvement in the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (T.A.P.) project on the 870 km long natural gas pipeline as well as Swiss support for the victims of the November 2019 earthquake in Albania.

This chapter is based in particular on the evaluation of primary sources, i.e., files from the Swiss Federal Archives, the U.N. and League of Nations Archives in Geneva, the Archives of Contemporary History (Archiv für Zeitgeschichte, A.f.Z.) at E.T.H. Zurich, the Historical Archive of the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (M.E.F.A.) in Tirana, the Austrian State Archives (Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Oe.St.A./H.H.St.A.), digitized documents from the ←235 | 236→Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland (Dodis.ch), which includes the Swiss Federal Archive (B.A.R.), as well as documents made available by the historical service of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (E.D.A.). Secondary literature on Swiss-Albanian diplomatic relations and contemporary newspaper articles covering significant historic events are also included in order to illustrate the

reactions from both the Swiss and Albanians, as well as the international public.

ALBANIA ON ITS WAY TO INDEPENDENCE

In the long stretch of time between 1478/79 and 1912, Albania—along with numerous other areas of the Balkans—was part of the Ottoman Empire and divided into various administrative districts referred to as *vilayets*. During the eighteenth century, it was commonplace that these *vilayets* further divided their respective populations into groups according to religious affiliation known as *millets*. Among the *millets,* Muslims were accorded the highest status and were allowed specific privileges such as protection from Slavonic and Greek encroachment, paying fewer taxes, and being allowed to bear arms. Over time, numerous Albanians converted to Islam to reap the benefits that came with religious conversion and therefore, "the Albanian Muslims thus became the pampered children of the empire."[5] However, despite Albania being granted a certain level of privilege and self-autonomy, it was still not an independent state, but rather belonged to the periphery of the Ottoman Empire.[6]

It is during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when it was still under Ottoman rule, that Albania's first mention in Switzerland's diplomatic files can be found. Throughout the sources analyzed from this period, Albania was repeatedly mentioned as a possible destination for Italian expansionist desires.[7] In a letter from March 4, 1897, the Swiss delegate in Paris, Charles Lardy, wrote to the President of the Confederation, "(…) it is to be feared that the Italians have certain ambitions in Albania (…)."[8] Several years later, in 1901, the Swiss ←236 | 237→delegate in Rome, Gaston Carlin, wrote a letter which outlined foreign ambitions in Albania, stating "(…) there is, as I have already written to you, a special understanding between Italy and Austria-Hungary on the question of Albania."[9] This circumstance shows that Albania, although still part of the Ottoman Empire, was already being treated as a place of investment.

As a direct result of Ottoman rule, a nation-state movement formed relatively late in Albanian territories compared to other European states. In the autumn of 1912, representatives of the Albanian independence movement, led by the statesman Ismail Qemali, felt it was the right time to put their goals into practice and founded an Albanian state. Prior to the Balkan Wars, Qemali had spent time composing proclamations, forming alliances with other notable Albanian figures, and traveling through European capitals such as London and Paris in an attempt to gain international support for the creation of an independent Albanian nation.[10] The Ottoman Empire had recently found itself otherwise occupied by participating in the First Balkan War with Serbia and Bulgaria and therefore had no means of reprimanding or acting against Albanian secessionists.[11] The representatives, who traveled from the Albanian provinces of the Ottoman Empire, finally proclaimed Albanian independence on November 28, 1912, in Vlorë, a city in southern Albania. This declaration of independence was followed by three different letters of recommendation to the Swiss government, but Switzerland found it difficult to declare that Albania was, in fact, a truly independent country.[12] In December 1912, the Great Powers convened at the London Ambassadors' Conference to reach a solution concerning Albanian independence. It was during this conference on December 16, 1912, that the major European powers of Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy, the German Empire, and Great Britain formally recognized Albania's separation from the Ottoman Empire.[13]

FROM ALBANIAN INDEPENDENCE TO THE OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR II: 1912–1939

The official creation of an Albanian state only came about after the end of the Second Balkan War—and not under Ismail Qemali. Rather, the six major powers, Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Russia, recognized the independence, sovereignty, and neutrality of Albania at the fifty-fourth session of the London Ambassadors' Conference on July 15,

1913, and quickly appointed a foreigner, Prince Wilhelm of Wied, as the Albanians' new ruler.[14] After his coronation on May 3, 1914, Prince Wilhelm sent a letter to the Swiss government. However, the Swiss government was still hesitant to recognize the Adriatic state because they argued that Austro-Hungary, which the Swiss representation in Vienna considered as the "*Créatrice de l'Albanie*" ("creator of Albania"), had not yet recognized the young state itself.[15] At the outset of World War I in July 1914, Switzerland completely denied recognition of Albania, Prince Wilhelm fled, and over the course of the Great War Italian, Serbian, Greek, Austro-Hungarian, and French units crossed into Albanian territory freely.[16]

It was only on March 3, 1922 that the Swiss government decided to recognize the newly formed Albanian state, *de jure*.[17] Benedikt (Benoît) Blinishti, who represented Albania in the League of Nations, addressed Federal Councilor Giuseppe Motta with these enthusiastic words, "I am convinced that the Albanian Government, whose sole aim is the rapid development of the country, will make every effort to consolidate and develop good relations between Switzerland and Albania."[18] As a result, two Albanian consuls (the names are not known, ←238 | 239→like many in Albanian history) in Bern and Geneva began their work during the interwar period. Even though Albania had a relatively short national history, the country held one progressive advantage over Switzerland: women's suffrage was introduced as early as 1920—more than 50 years before Switzerland.[19] Under Fan Noli, the country embarked on a path toward democracy. Noli had come to power in early 1924 during the Democratic Revolution when he and his supporters chose to withdraw from the Tirana government and set up opposition in Vlorë. Shortly afterward, the Tirana government fell, and its leader Ahmet Zogu was forced to flee to Belgrade. Ultimately, Noli's time in power was short-lived and his progressive government was overthrown in late December of 1924, by Zogu with the help of former Russian White Guards, refugee Albanians, Serb regulars, and the government in Belgrade.[20]

FASCIST AND NATIONAL SOCIALIST OCCUPATION OF ALBANIA AND ITS RECOGNITION BY SWITZERLAND

Following the self-appointment of King Ahmed Zogu in 1928, Albanian foreign policy exhibited a clear and growing dependence on Italy.[21] This was most vividly illustrated in the First and Second Tirana Pacts of 1926 and 1927. On the one hand, Italy's economic and military influence further increased, while on the other hand, Albania's independent foreign policy was curtailed. The First Tirana Pact, signed on November 27, 1926, was established for five years as a "friendship and security pact." In the Second Tirana Pact, the "Defense Alliance" was even extended to twenty years.[22] Other foreign entities were forced out of the country ←239 | 240→by the Italians and although Switzerland recognized Zogu as King of Albania in 1928, ultimately, Italy was the sole country he could turn to for cooperation.[23] When Zogu became aware of this overwhelming dependence, he desperately sought support from the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente[24]. However, both refused. The end point of this development culminated in the Italian invasion of Albania in April 1939 by fascist leader Benito Mussolini. Albania became part of the fascist "mare nostro" and a *de facto* Italian colony.[25]

On April 7, 1939, Mussolini and his troops occupied Albania. Although this occupation was followed by an outbreak of resistance and protests in Albania, the Swiss government immediately recognized the new *status quo*.[26] In addition, Switzerland officially represented the interests of the Albanians alongside the American government, as the U.S.A. had not approved the Italian takeover of Albania. Finally, fascist Italy capitulated in September 1943. However, this did not mean the end of the war for Albania because it was subsequently occupied by the German Wehrmacht.[27] This historic chapter concluded with the retreat of German forces in November 1944, when the Albanian Communist Liberation Front (*Lëvizja Nacional-Çlirimtare*) was victorious in the war against the occupiers and domestic adversaries with the help of Western—namely British—support. Ultimately,

this development helped pave the way for the beginning of Enver Hoxha's dictatorship.[28] Diplomatic contact between Switzerland and Albania continued to exist even during the period of near complete isolation of Albania, in large part because Switzerland was nonaligned and therefore held greater independence about whom they could create diplomatic relations with.[29] ←240 | 241→However, this should not obscure the fact that Switzerland was also exposed to the turmoil of the Cold War with its unmanageable network of political traps, as will be shown during the period of the 1960s.

SPORADIC DIPLOMACY DURING THE COLD WAR: 1944–1970

Albanian foreign policy during the period of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania from 1944 to 1990 can be divided into four phases: the first three being the Yugoslav, Soviet, and Chinese phases, which were all subsumed by a final fourth phase—one of total isolation from other socialist states and, for the most part, from the western world. It is striking that, after varying levels of contact between 1944 and 1969, Switzerland appointed a permanent representative in Albania from 1970 while the Chinese phase was still ongoing for another eight years:

The Years Under Yugoslav Patronage, 1944 to 1948: Only a few months after the end of the Second World War, on November 9, 1945, during a congress of the Red Cross Societies, an Albanian delegation submitted a request for contact and exchange to the Swiss representation.[30] Although the Swiss representation was still waiting for socialist Albania to be recognized as a state, there was already great interest among official representatives in regard to economic exchange as early as 1946. Diplomatic records show that the Yugoslav diplomatic mission was in fact representing the interests of Albanian citizens in Switzerland during this period and thus acted as a link between the two states. However, in autumn 1948, Hoxha broke with Tito's

Yugoslavia and, after the closure of the Albanian legation in Belgrade, the Swiss legation in Belgrade was no longer able to fulfill its obligations to Albania.

The Years Under Soviet Patronage, 1948 to 1961: In the following years and until autumn 1954, the Swiss representation in Budapest was responsible for Albania. After that, sporadic contact was established via Belgrade since, once again, the Albanian embassy had an existing branch there beginning in 1954. In the period up to 1961 (the period of Russian patronage), Swiss-Albanian relations were limited to only a few passing exchanges. However, as the following quote shows, there were a growing number of Albanian requests to establish lasting relations with Switzerland.

Switzerland, on the other hand, was hesitant namely because of the tense situation which existed during this phase of the Cold War. Under no circumstance ←241 | 242→did Switzerland want to jeopardize its reputation as a neutral state because of some indiscriminate rapprochement with a socialist country:

> A few years ago, in January 1956, the Albanians expressed their desire to our representatives in Budapest and, through their delegation to the European Economic Commission in Geneva, to representatives of the trade department to establish diplomatic relations with our country and to conclude a trade agreement. In June 1958, this request was again verbally expressed to our representation in Belgrade, and last December the Albanian envoy in Paris finally reached out to our ambassador in the same way. We have not followed up on these propositions. Our representatives still have instructions to avoid anything in their official dealings with the Albanians anything that could be interpreted as recognition of the People's Republic or the establishment of diplomatic relations.[31]

The Years Under Chinese Patronage, 1961 to 1978: a 1961 report by the Swiss legation in Belgrade discussed deteriorating relations between Albania and Yugoslavia.[32] Half a year later, on November 12, 1961, the Albanian Ambassador to France, Dhimitër Lamani, visited the Swiss Embassy and again proposed the establishment of diplomatic relations to the Swiss Ambassador, Agostino Soldati.[33] Soldati replied during his return visit that the strengthening of interstate contact should take place primarily on a commercial basis. Switzerland's economic interest in Albania was aroused at this point.[34] However, due to rising tensions between Russia and China,

Switzerland decided in 1962 to continue waiting for official recognition of the Albanian state. Through this approach Switzerland hoped to avoid any possible accusation of taking sides from any of the involved states. As early as March 1962, the Albanian Minister of Economy confirmed the trade of iron, chrome, and oil sands with Switzerland. From the Albanian point of view, they held onto the hope that economic ties would also lead to stronger diplomatic ties. Switzerland placed its first order as early as May of the same year.[35] Although diplomatic relations remained inconsistent due to the political climate, Swiss-Albanian trade intensified between 1965 and 1968.

In March 1969, there were already concrete ideas about what future cooperation between Switzerland and Albania might look like.[36] To keep up appearances, ←242 | 243→a slight trick would be used in everyday diplomatic life. As the following document shows, Swiss outposts would act under the impression that Switzerland had long before recognized Albania. The declaration was as follows: "Switzerland would indirectly recognize Albania by approving the two Albanian consulates in Bern and Geneva in the interwar period."[37] In a note to the Federal Council dated June 26, 1962, the following procedure was therefore proposed:

> Explicit recognition is hardly an option today. Against the background of the ideological conflict between Moscow and Beijing, it would risk being interpreted abroad as partisanship and, on the other hand, causing an unnecessary disturbance among the Swiss public. We therefore believe that a proposal should be made to the Federal Council to authorize the Department to simply instruct our outposts to behave in the future towards Albanian representatives as if we had already recognized the people's democracy in Albania.[38]

THE BEGINNING OF PERMANENT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

In May 1970, the Swiss Ambassador to Belgrade, Hans Keller, wrote a letter to the Federal Department of Political Affairs (*Eidgenössische Politisches Department*, E.P.D.) encouraging the establishment of diplomatic relations with Albania. Keller's suggestion came as no surprise since the Albanian mission had previously expressed the same desire to him during his term of

office in Beijing in 1966. China's patronage of Albania lasted until 1978 and it was a great advantage in the development of permanent Swiss-Albanian diplomatic relations that the first Swiss ambassador for Albania, Hans Keller, had already been appointed ambassador to Beijing from 1963 to 1966. Keller himself stated that during his term of office in Beijing he had been in contact with three diplomatic representatives from Albania, including former diplomat Nesti Nase[39], who was appointed in 1969 as the Albanian Foreign Minister. In order to get a clearer picture of the situation within the country itself, Keller and his wife traveled to Albania for several days in early summer 1969.[40] During his stay he was even allowed to visit some factories—an incredibly rare opportunity in Albania at the time. Keller also ←243 | 244→reported that the visa applications for himself and his wife were issued quickly—in contrast to other people he knew who had also applied for visas.[41]

Keller was born in Zurich on August 19, 1908. He studied law in Zurich and Lausanne and was awarded a doctorate in political science. During the Second World War Keller served as a delegate in Bratislava and liaison man between Switzerland and Slovakia and was appointed Vice-Consul of Switzerland in 1942 after opening official consular representation there. He participated in the rescue of persecuted Jews by issuing so-called "letters of protection." At the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Army took him to Budapest and interned him. But the Russian internment did not seem to have diminished his interest in Eastern European states. In 1945 he was the Second Secretary of the Swiss legation to Prague. From 1946 to 1949, he served as First Secretary at the newly opened Swiss legation in Moscow. From 1949 to 1952, he moved to the Swiss Legation in Ankara as First Secretary. In the second half of the 1950s, he was active as a Swiss business manager in Colombo (Ceylon) and Bangkok. In 1960 he was elected Head of the new Technical Cooperation Service in the E.P.D. and Delegate of the Federal Council in Asia and Africa. He then served in Beijing as Swiss ambassador from 1962 to 1966 and established first contact with Mongolia and Vietnam. With this rich experience, Keller finally returned to Europe, where he was posted as Swiss ambassador in Belgrade from 1967 to 1974.

From 1970, he also served simultaneously as ambassador in Tirana. He died on December 14, 1999.[42]

Truly, Hans Keller is crucial to the development of diplomatic relations between the two states. In the spring of 1970, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Albania was rigorously discussed within the Swiss government. On July 1, 1970, the Federal Council finally took an affirmative decision: Hans Keller would be appointed the first Swiss ambassador to Albania, 58 years after the first proclamation of an independent Albanian state.[43] Franz Blankart, secretary to the head of the Federal Department of Political Affairs (E.P.D.)—known today as the E.D.A.—congratulated Keller in a letter and emphasized the positive influence of the intensification of diplomatic contact between the two states. He wrote, "Once again you are called upon to perform a pioneering diplomatic feat. (…) A step whose negative consequences I believe has always been overestimated has now become possible and has been accepted without criticism by the public and by Moscow. This is essentially your merit and shows that—contrary to the often-held opinion—an ambassador has the possibility of feedback, i.e., ←244 | 245→of influencing the decisions of headquarters, by all means is given."[44] The official decision by the Swiss Federal Council to establish diplomatic relations with Albania reads as follows:

> The Swiss Federal Council on July 1, 1970, decides:
>
> (1) To authorize the Political Department to establish diplomatic relations between Switzerland and the People's Republic of Albania and to accredit the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Switzerland in Belgrade in the same capacity.
> (2) To instruct the Political Department to implement this measure and to inform the press at the time it deems appropriate.[45]

Following this official decision, from September 28 to October 5, 1970, Keller traveled to Tirana for his inaugural visit.[46] The fact that Keller was simultaneously serving as ambassador to Belgrade and accredited as "Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary" in Albania was not unusual since such side-by-side accreditations still exist to this day in the Swiss

diplomatic service. What was particularly extraordinary about Keller's dual role was that he was deployed between two countries that had a tense relationship with one another.[47] However, this fact did not prevent him from being on very good terms with both states and their representatives. Keller's strength was the personal touch he was able to give to his work as a Swiss diplomat. So, it is not surprising that Tito invited him to a hunt when he resigned.[48]

What immediately stands out in Keller's career is his tenure as First Secretary in the newly opened Swiss legation in Moscow from 1946 to 1949 and his ←245 | 246→time as an ambassador in Beijing from 1963 to 1966. Switzerland was one of the first Western countries that had established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and was already recognized on January 17, 1950. Therefore, Keller can be considered a diplomatic pioneer when it came to establishing and maintaining stable political contact with socialist states. It is hardly surprising after his service in Beijing that Keller was sent to the two Southeastern European countries mentioned above. The documents in Keller's estate in the Archiv für Zeitgeschichte [Archive for Contemporary History] at E.T.H. Zürich also provide insights into the fact that Keller was extremely critical of autocratic leadership styles. However, he always had an eye on the positive aspects of socialist states and opportunities for economic exchange—and was able to build a bridge between those states and Western ones through his own personal commitments. Keller reported on his inaugural visit to Belgrade that Haxhi Lleshi and Spiro Moisiu expressed their pleasure in establishing diplomatic relations and proclaimed:[49]

> After this overture, the President brought the conversation back to relations with Switzerland. Both he and Vice-President Moissi (Moisiu) and Deputy Foreign Minister Malile expressed their satisfaction that the Federal Council had accepted Tirana's offer to establish diplomatic relations "after lengthy preliminary work on both sides" (hinting at our Bernese pace!).[50]

Figure 10.1: Keller's inaugural visit to Tirana on October 13, 1970 (from left to right: Translator; Spiro Moisiu, Vice President; Hans Keller, Swiss Ambassador; Haxhi Lleshi, President of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Albania; Charm Malil; Musin Kroi; Koco Prifti; Secretar). Reproduced with permission from Swiss Federal Archives: Keller's report on his inaugural visit to Tirana, October 13, 1970, B.A.R., E2001E#1980/83#907, dodis.ch/34485.

The few Albanian newspapers reported briefly while Swiss newspapers included more detailed reports. An article from the Albanian newspaper *Zeri i Popullit* [*The Voice of the People*], on July 21, 1970, titled "Diplomatic Relations are established between the Republic of Albania and the Swiss Confederation" stated:

> Tirana, July 20 (A.T.S.H.[51])—The Government of the People's Republic of Albania and the Government of the Swiss Confederation agreed to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries and to exchange diplomatic representatives in the rank of ambassadors.[52]

The same article was published a day later in another Albanian newspaper, ←246 | 247→*Bashkimi* [*Union*].[53] A more extensive article announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations was published in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* [*New Zurich Newspaper Union*], on July 22, 1970. The article was titled "Diplomatic Relations with Albania: Universality of Foreign Policy:"

> The Governments of the Swiss Confederation and the People's Republic of Albania have agreed to establish diplomatic relations and exchange representatives at ambassadorial level. For this purpose, the Federal Council has appointed Hans Keller, Swiss Ambassador to Yugoslavia, as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Albania. Ambassador Keller retains his seat in Belgrade. The decision to exchange diplomatic representatives with Albania at ambassadorial level is based on the fundamental idea of our foreign policy of universality of diplomatic relations. An exception to this rule has so far been made only with respect to divided states. Albania in its present form has been an autonomous, independent state under communist leadership since 1944. It joined the United Nations in 1955 (…).[54]

←247 | 248→The inauguration was preceded by a meeting between Keller and Mehmet Shehu, Prime Minister of Albania, during which Keller's important role in building diplomatic relations between the two states was emphasized. Keller replied that he agreed entirely with Shehu that although there were different social regimes in Switzerland and Albania, this was no reason to hinder the development of relations between the two countries. Despite the differences that existed, Keller was confident of the opportunities available to cooperate in many areas.[55] Both the Prime Minister and the newly appointed Swiss Ambassador agreed that economic relations would be of great interest to both countries. Switzerland was interested in raw materials and investment opportunities. For example, Keller mentioned to Shehu that the Albanian ruling elite now intended to electrify the whole country. A major project beckoned here.[56] Shehu affirmed this intention and stressed that Albania wanted to modernize and recover from its economic backwardness. To this end, the electrification of all villages was planned.[57] According to such project proposals, it may be unsurprising that the appointment of a Swiss ambassador to Albania had not escaped the attention of various interested parties in the economy. For example, as early as 1970,

the Basel-based company Tourist Consult advertised possibilities for tourism at Lake Ohrid and other destinations throughout Albania.[58]

For the Swiss side this also meant accepting deviations from the democratic norm to advance Swiss economic interests in Albania. Politically, however, they soon found themselves on thin ice. They were in far less agreement about the past than they were about economic cooperation. Shehu was happy to meet a Swiss individual because he himself had fought against Franco's troops in the Spanish Civil War (1936–39) and had been acquainted with a group of anti-fascists in Spain who had made a great impression on him. The Swiss, on the other hand, had all been convicted upon their return to Switzerland and many of them had been imprisoned.[59] Keller therefore saw them as mercenaries in a foreign service and were thus illegal participants in conflicts in a foreign country. Shehu, however, vehemently corrected him: "No, they were not mercenaries, but conscientious and favorable anti-fascists."[60] Since it quickly became apparent that the two countries' ←248 | 249→views on coming to terms with the past were not congruent—they agreed on less complicated topics that still set the agenda for cooperation between the two countries today: cultural and scientific exchange.[61]

STRENGTHENING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, 1970–1985

After his visit to Albania, on October 7−14, 1971, Ambassador Keller wrote in his report of numerous perceptions made during his first year as the Swiss Ambassador to Albania. He always tried to emphasize the positive and sought to advance cooperation despite the numerous obstacles. Today, cultural, scientific, and social cooperation is in the foreground. However, in Keller's time economic aspects seemed to be of the greatest interest:

> Economically, Albania is still a humble economic partner. But even so, this market, as small as it is, should not be neglected. The urge for better living conditions grows stronger year after year. Like everywhere else, Albania will not be stopped. The sooner you put down business roots there, the more likely you will be to make your mark in later years. Therefore, it should be

worthwhile for the further development of this country to closely follow the expansion of bilateral economic relations and not to grow tired despite the difficulties.[62]

One year after Switzerland appointed its first ambassador to Albania, the first Albanian ambassador to Bern was also accredited in 1971.[63] However, figures from 1976 show that the economic relationship remained one-sided: Albania's exports to Switzerland were tobacco, tomatoes, essential oils, and various types of carpets. Goods from Switzerland to Albania differed a lot and were exported in much larger quantities and at higher prices: television equipment and spare parts, medicines, coffee beans, chemical dyes, various other chemicals, including triacetin and cellulose acetate, which was used, among other things, to manufacture textiles.[64] There were never any major political clashes between the two countries, even though they behaved very differently in foreign policy. Albania, for example, refused to participate in the Helsinki conference of 1973 on the establishment of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (C.S.C.E.) because the Albanian leadership did not expect any added value precisely because of the participation of major powers. Switzerland behaved differently. According to Keller, ←249 | 250→it believed despite its small size it could positively influence the course of the conference through its participation.[65]

During his stay from May 27 to June 3, 1976, then ambassador Hansjörg Hess noticed that he and his wife were often able to move around the country without further accompaniment or supervision. Although he reported to the Federal Political Department (E.D.A.) and the Federal Department of Economic Affairs that there was limited selection offered for purchase in the stores, most people were happy. Overall, Albania made significant progress in providing for its population since World War II and political independence allowed the regime's disadvantages to fade into the background.[66] Economically, Albania was unable to catch up over the last two decades of socialist rule. In fact, Enver Hoxha's turning away from China and his growing fear of possible attacks from both the West and the East plunged Albania into an economic crisis.[67] Instead of investing urgently needed funds for education and social services, Hoxha pushed ahead with the construction of over 200,000 single and multiperson bunkers.[68] However, as mentioned

earlier, Albania had long been a major step ahead of Switzerland in one essential way—women's equality was well advanced in the public sector. For example, women worked as mechanical engineers and performed military service long before this was ever made possible in Switzerland.[69]

Figure 10.2: "Women in Albanian military", 1980.

Reproduced with permission from Swiss Federal Archives,

B.A.R., E2200.48#1994/167#21.

The death of Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito in 1980 also had indirect impact on Albania as the unity of Yugoslavia began to crumble. In 1981 there was severe unrest in Kosovo: ethnic Albanians, including numerous students, demonstrated in Pristina and in other towns throughout Kosovo against discrimination in the social and educational system. The Yugoslav government reacted with brutal reprimands.[70] Therefore, Albania became a country of refuge for ethnic Albanians ←250 | 251→from Yugoslavia.[71] For foreigners from Western European countries, however, Albania remained a closed country, as the *Tribune de Lausanne* wrote on October 20, 1980:

“Pays sans églises, sans voitures, sans tourists” [“Country without churches, without cars, without tourists”].[72] For many Swiss, Albania was still “the Land of the Skipetars”—a title created at the end of the nineteenth century by the novelist Karl May, who himself had never traveled to Southeastern Europe at the time he was writing his novels.[73]

It was a country far removed from the Swiss way of life and whose head of state, Enver Hoxha, was only known to have allowed a select few compatriots to leave the country and was not interested in letting tourists enter. Therefore, the *Tages-Anzeiger* proudly announced an exclusive reader’s trip planned for autumn 1979, since it was precisely this secrecy that had aroused the interest of Swiss investigative journalists.[74] Albania did not behave like the rest of Europe—no ←251 | 252→country, whether capitalist or socialist, could be compared to it. The fact that a certain admiration resonates in those early reports becomes clear when one reads the advertisement for the *Tages-Anzeiger*’s reader’s trip more closely: “Albania, the small state in the southwest of the Balkan Peninsula, is probably the most peculiar phenomenon on the map of Europe. Irrespective of developments in East and West, Albania has since the end of the Second World War unswervingly sought its own form of state, economy, and society.”[75] Ultimately, even for admirers and interested persons, the journey to Hoxha’s realm was paired with certain personal restrictions, as the newspaper warned: “Bearded people must go home. Journey to communist Albania—probably the most closed country in Europe.”[76] When Switzerland subsequently invited Albanian journalists to visit the country at the end of 1979, Javer Malo, head of the Committee for *Cultural and Friendly Relations with the Outer World* in the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said that it was not out of the question that Albanian journalists could accept an invitation. But the Albanian Foreign Ministry did not think so highly of these plans and the Swiss ambassador in Tirana, Hansjörg Hess, was convinced that Albanian media workers would not be allowed to travel to Switzerland.[77]

Even during this period of maximum isolation, economic ties between Albania and Switzerland remained intact. In addition, there was the

admiration of leftists for Hoxha's go-it-alone approach. In January 1978, the Albanian government heard about the founding of the association "Friends of Socialist Albania" in Switzerland. Roland Rimoz held the chair. Such opportunities were quickly seized by Albanian agencies abroad. The Albanian Embassy in Vienna established contact with this Swiss group and sent propagandistic material.[78] Although the persecution of political opponents had already begun in the last year of the war and Hoxha had a surveillance apparatus set up immediately after his election as head of state with the "Sigurimi" (the Albanian Secret Police) at its head, critical voices of Albanian intellectuals often did not penetrate as far as Switzerland.[79] This was to change at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, as Swiss newspapers wrote about the treatment of dissenters in Albania, for example, about the imprisonment of entire families, camps, and repression. Although ←252 | 253→the isolation of Albania declined in the last phase of the Cold War, state critics were still treated with extreme severity. As early as 1979, Amnesty International estimated the number of forced labor camps to be around 31.[80] In 1984, another report by Amnesty International enlightened the Swiss people for the first time about the situation on the threats faced by Albanians who disagreed with Hoxha's government.[81] Foreign journalists immediately noticed that a two-tiered society was a part of normal everyday life: in 1980, for example, reporters from the magazine *Stern* reported on separate beach sections, with one designated for party officials and another for the common people.[82]

Despite this difficult starting point and the obvious absence of democratic values, Albania slowly opened, particularly after Hoxha's death in 1985, and Swiss-Albanian relations further intensified. For example, in scientific fields, Tirana inquired if a total of six scientists could study hydrology, cereal crops, and methods of diagnosing and treating livestock diseases in Switzerland for a period ranging between several months to a full academic year. On the Swiss side, it was suggested that the president of the Albanian Academy of Sciences should be invited, together with a maximum of four other scientists, to show them around some of the prominent research institutions in Switzerland.[83] In 1984, economic talks were held explicitly to

"promote the further development and prospects of economic relations between Switzerland and Albania". Switzerland's ambassadors, Benedikt von Tscharner and J.-F. Riccard, and Albania's delegation, led by Pajtim Ajazi, Vice-Minister of the Department of Foreign Trade, participated in these talks. The head of the Swiss delegation also met the Foreign Trade Minister, Shane Korbeci, himself during these negotiations. Regarding bilateral economic relations between Switzerland and Albania, Ajazi expressed his government's wish that commercial bilateral exchange should be further intensified based on mutual interests. Up to this point the period between 1981 and 1983 was mainly Albania bringing in imports from Switzerland, while exports from Albania to Switzerland remained low.[84]

←253 | 254→

AN END TO ISOLATION AND THE START OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 1987–2020

At the end of the 1980s visits became more numerous. In June 1987, the Vice-Minister of the Albanian Foreign Ministry, Sokrat Plaka, visited Switzerland and was received ceremoniously by Federal Councilor Pierre Aubert.[85] An invitation from the Swiss government for another visit of Albanian parliamentarians was already made at the end of January 1989 and was planned for the end of August 1989.[86] The continuous opening of the socialist state on the Adriatic was also seen from the Swiss side in terms of future economic opportunities. In contrast to other countries in Southeastern Europe, Albania emerged after the collapse of the socialist state and not following a bloody civil war. However, the conflicts between former constituent republics and provinces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which ran along ethno-religious lines, had burdensome effects on Albania. Unlike the former Yugoslavia, problems in opening up Albania, in its transformation into a democracy, and on its path toward European integration were not due to ethno-religious tensions, but rather a result of

mismanagement and corruption of old and new elites. Swiss and German newspapers supported this claim in their many reports.[87]

The precarious living conditions in which a large part of the Albanian population found themselves made it possible for many members of the former elite to settle abroad and destroy any files or reports which might incriminate them. However, despite these existing gaps in the archives, Albanian historians have been working since the beginning of the 1990s to critically examine the socialist past as well as the transition and make it accessible to the public. An important example of this critical historic examination is the "House of Leaves" Museum in Tirana, which features several exhibitions on the Albanian secret police or *Sigurimi*.[88]

Since the end of the 1980s, Albania's foreign policy has opened slowly, the first visible sign of this being its participation in the first Balkan Conference ←254 | 255→in Belgrade in February 1988 and its willingness to establish relations with the European Community (known today as the European Union). Nevertheless, people abroad, including those in Switzerland, were aware that the domestic political transition would need to continue for a long time to come. Various formative institutions such as the *Sigurimi* would not cease to exist only in a matter of days. Reports from Switzerland estimated that in 1990 there were still some 20–40,000 political prisoners in Albania.[89] At the beginning of the 1990s, many Albanians left their country because of the precarious situation and, in spring of 1991, Switzerland offered its help to Italy as the first host country. In September, a Swiss delegation traveled to Albania to ascertain what aid was most urgently needed. It classified the food supply as insufficient and medical care as critical. The opening of a Swiss embassy in Tirana was also an important signal. Up to this point, the Swiss ambassador in Belgrade had also been deployed as ambassador to Tirana, which meant that there was no representative embassy building in the Albanian capital.[90]

The fact that unrest broke out despite the largely peaceful transition was primarily due to economic and human security reasons. The Albanian economy collapsed at the end of 1996 because of a hugely corrupt banking system: speculators who lured their customers in with pyramid schemes and

then robbed them of their savings. Mass protests erupted, namely in Vlorë, and also in other Albanian cities.[91] People accused the government of violating its supervisory duties and profiting off the schemes of speculators. In 1997, a humanitarian emergency occurred: people in Albania were starving and 3,081 Albanians subsequently asked for Swiss asylum. Since Switzerland and Albania had already been exchanging information for more than 25 years at that time, Albania was one of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation's (S.D.C.) so-called partner countries, and the S.D.C. ran a coordination office in Tirana, it was possible for Switzerland to provide rapid emergency aid. In 1997, Switzerland's financial support for Albania in the technical cooperation sector amounted to nine percent of the total funds deployed in Central, Southeast, and Eastern Europe and seven percent in financial cooperation. In total they included expenditures in political state-building, economic, educational, scientific, cultural, health, social, agricultural, energy and environmental sectors.[92]

DIPLOMACY AT THE PRESENT TIME

In an interview on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the opening of the Swiss Embassy in Tirana in 2017, Christoph Graf, then Swiss Ambassador to Tirana, said: "Since the 1990s, Switzerland has invested 330 million Swiss francs in development funds in Albania. Due to the good results of the projects and the will to reform, the funds have been increased in recent years."[93] There are good reasons why around 20 million Swiss francs a year are spent in Albania: on the one hand, Albania is developing rapidly—therefore, the money is well invested. On the other hand, Albania remains one of the poorest countries in Europe, with youth unemployment at almost 30 percent. Supporting Albania is also an act of European solidarity, Graf said in an interview, a European solidarity that is based on geographical circumstances and is not bound to the European Union.

Switzerland and Albania are still engaged in several vital political, social, and economic exchanges today. A significant example is the recent Swiss participation with the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (T.A.P.) project on an 870 km long natural gas pipeline. Although trade between the two countries is modest in volume, it has grown steadily over the past twenty years. Several large and a growing number of small and medium-sized Swiss companies have established themselves in Albania, making the total number of Swiss companies to be around thirty.[94] Albania is also a priority country for the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (S.D.C.) and the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (S.E.C.O.).[95] In this context, a comprehensive cooperation program was set up, which also made it possible for Switzerland to provide rapid support for the victims of the November 2019 earthquake. Concerning relations between the two countries, great importance is also attached to social, educational, and humanitarian levels. For example, the Swiss representation in Tirana, with S.D.C. funds and the help of Norway and the U.N.D.P., have procured emergency respiratory equipment for Albania during the current and ongoing COVID-19 crisis.

Despite being well-known for decades of self-imposed isolation under the totalitarian leader Enver Hoxha, Albania experienced frequent intervals of foreign ←256 | 257→intervention and took part in a variety of international exchanges throughout the twentieth century. In the years prior to the first diplomatic exchanges with Switzerland, Albania experienced several major international conflicts (the Balkan Wars, the First World War, and the Second World War) as well as numerous power struggles between political and national leaders who were all vying for control. All these factors combined to create ongoing tensions between Albania and its neighboring countries. This meant that entering diplomatic relations with the small Adriatic nation would always be challenging. Nonetheless, Switzerland recognized the potential of establishing contact with Albania early on and laid a strong foundation for diplomacy in 1970.

Fifty years is a significant amount of time. In the past five decades the world has undergone innumerable radical changes. From a Cold War in the past which changed so many aspects of diplomatic exchange to a new kind of

Cold War in the modern age, Swiss-Albanian relations began in 1970 when Albania stood as one of the most isolated countries in Europe. Credit is especially due to Hans Keller, whose competence as an experienced diplomat ensured the viability, upkeep, and growth of these relations—from their inceptions to the lively economic and social exchange we witness today. However, it also became clear that the interests of the two states were always of a primarily economic nature. Thus, human rights violations during Enver Hoxha's dictatorship were given a blind eye by democratic Switzerland—although Amnesty International and other organizations had been publicizing them since the end of the 1970s. Economic cooperation has steadily increased in recent decades though Albania remains one of the poorest European countries. However, Albania enjoys an increasing popularity in the Swiss media in other respects: as a travel destination, the country on the Adriatic Sea offers a lot to Swiss tourists, owing to the cosmopolitanism and linguistic talent of its inhabitants and to its wonderful natural beauty—which neither the Cold War, nor state socialism, nor encroaching capitalism managed to subdue or degrade. This chapter concludes with the hope this burgeoning relationship, always slowly but progressively advancing forward, will continue to advance and improve this small nation that still remains far too ignored by too many countries.

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1 Ismail Qemali (Ismail Qemal bey Vlora) took part in the counterrevolution against the Young Turks in 1909 and founded the Liberal (*Ahrar*) party. In late November 1912, he traveled to Vlorë where he led the national assembly that declared Albanian independence on November 28, 1912. He was forced to resign in January 1914 and went into exile in Spain, France, and eventually Italy where he died in Perugia in January 1919. See: Robert Elsie, "Vlora, Ismail Qemal Bey", *Historical Dictionary of Albania, Second Edition* (Plymouth, UK: Scarecrow Press, 2010), 475–6.

2 Prince Wilhelm was born on March 26, 1876, in Neuwied on the Rhine. The Great Powers offered him rule over the newly independent Albania in October 1913. His rule began upon his arrival in Durrës, on March 7, 1914; however, he was forced to abandon the throne just six months later in September 1914 due to the turbulent political situation in Albania and a lack of financial and military support. See: Elsie, "Wied, Wilhelm, Prince zu", *Historical Dictionary of Albania*, 482.

3 Fan Noli (January 1882–March 1965) also known as Theophan Stylian Noli was a prominent political and religious leader of the Albanian American community. In 1920, he was selected to lead an Albanian delegation to the League of Nations in Geneva where he helped Albania gain admission into the League. After Ahmet Zogu was forced to flee Albania, Noli became prime minister in July 1924. Several months later, in December 1924, Zogist forces overthrew the government and Noli was forced to leave Albania and his political life behind to live out the rest of his days in the United States. See, Elsie, "Noli, Fan", *Historical Dictionary of Albania*, 329–30.

4 Ahmet Zogu (October 1895–April 1961), also known as Ahmet Zogolli or King Zog, acted as minister of the interior and later as minister of defense under Sulejman bey Delvin, from 1920 to

1922. In December 1922, Zogu formed a conservative government which was in power until he was forced to flee to Yugoslavia in 1924 after the Democratic Revolution. Over the next several years, Zogu aligned himself with fascist Italy and with their support, he declared himself as Zog I, King of Albanians (September 1, 1928). When Italian troops invaded Albania in April 1939, Zogu was once again forced into exile. See: Elsie, "Zogu, Ahmet", *Historical Dictionary of Albania,* 498–500.

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CHAPTER 11

"Weapons for the Republic of Macedonia": Intelligence at the Center of a War between State Institutions

KRASIMIRA TODOROVA

Abstract: The chapter focuses on the arms scandal that arose in the final months of the government of Filip Dimitrov, which ruled Bulgaria from November 8, 1991, to December 30, 1992. On September 18, 1992, during a press conference, the director of the National Intelligence Service, General Brigo Asparuhov, accused an unnamed government adviser of negotiating an arms deal with the Republic of Macedonia in violation of the current arms embargo on the countries of the former Yugoslavia imposed by the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council Resolution 713. This led to the outbreak of a diplomatic scandal with the Republic of Macedonia. The chapter examines in detail the relationship between the government, intelligence, the Prime Minister's attempts to reform the National Intelligence Service (N.I.S.), and the genesis of the arms scandal.

Keywords: Bulgarian transition to democracy and market economy, war between institutions, arms affair, operation "Labrador", operation "Opera".

THE SCANDAL AS RESEARCH TOPIC

Bulgarian historiography lacks distinct and in-depth studies of the scandal "Weapons for the Republic of Macedonia." Information about it can be found in research[1] dedicated to the rule of Prime Minister Filip ←261 | 262→Dimitrov[2], in documentary research[3], in general research[4] on the

transition period in Bulgaria, and in works[5] dedicated to Balkan history after the end of the Cold War. This chapter aims to look at the scandal using both declassified documentary sources and completely new and hitherto unknown documents. Its purpose is to fill the existing gap in historiography on the subject. The main contribution is making the connection between the Bulgarian arms affair and the operations of Yugoslav Army Counterintelligence (K.O.S.)— "Labrador" and "Opera"—indicated by the director of the National Intelligence Service General Brigo Asparuhov[6] in his report for the Prime Minister's Adviser Konstantin Mishev[7] to the Republic of Macedonia. The research questions are assessed by performing geopolitical, historical, and comparative analyses of the situation in Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia. The period from the victory of the Union of Democratic Forces (U.D.F.) in the 1991 elections to the condemnation of Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov by the National Assembly for threatening the country's security and the fall of his cabinet on October 28, 1992, was chosen as the main chronological framework. The expected results of the study suggest that the affair erupted because of a combination of two trends in Bulgarian politics—the war between state institutions and the government's distrust of intelligence. This amalgam turned what was just a domestic political scandal into an international diplomatic one after several details were published.

A WAR BETWEEN INSTITUTIONS: THE BULGARIAN TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AND THE U.D.F.'S PATH TO POWER

The end of the 1980s found Bulgaria in a severe economic, social, demographical, and energy crisis. The beginning of the "Velvet revolution" in the country began with the overthrow of Todor Zhivkov on November 9, 1989. Although the event was carried out as a palace coup with M.

Gorbachev's support, it became a catalyst for many future changes in the country.[8] On December 7, 1989, the political agreement for the establishment of the U.D.F. was signed. Its chairman became the dissident Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev.[9] The first democratic elections took place in the summer of 1990. The opposition took second place after the ruling Bulgarian Socialist Party (B.S.P., former Bulgarian Communist Party). But on October 13, 1991, during the next parliamentary elections, U.D.F. won 34.36 percent, B.S.P. won 33.14 percent, and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (M.R.F.) won 7.55 percent of the vote[10]. This marked the end of the "Velvet revolution". After the opening of the 36th parliament, M.R.F. gave its support to the U.D.F. to form Bulgaria's first democratic government. Its leader, Ahmed Dogan, did not set conditions for participation in the cabinet and did not even create a coalition agreement with the U.D.F.[11]

The new government made a sharp turn to the West and engaged in radical decommunization, restitution, privatization, and the return of lands to private owners. These events coincided with the impact of three powerful processes that intertwined: (1) the collapse of the geopolitical system; (2) a security vacuum; and (3) the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The last process created a larger crisis as close neighbor Bulgaria experienced all the negatives of this ethnic war and the subsequent embargo imposed by the U.N. Sofia put great efforts in a diplomatic resolution of the conflict. Acting as a stability factor on January 15, 1992, the government of Filip Dimitrov recognized the former Yugoslav republics as independent states. According to its position, this recognition would establish peace and cooperation in the Balkans and would serve as a step forward in the process of European integration.

After Zhelyu Zhelev managed to win the presidential election on January 19, 1992, he gradually began to distance himself from U.D.F. leadership and ←263 | 264→criticized the policies of the government.[12] His desire to act as a corrective to the cabinet was combined with unestablished constitutional practice. There were numerous problems in relations between authorities, which required interventions by the newly adopted Constitutional Court. Attempts to act on prerogatives and limit the constitutional powers of rivals quickly led to a full-scale war between these institutions. It ultimately

focused on the struggle for control over the National Intelligence Service (N.I.S.) between the president, to whom it was formally subordinate, and the government, which wanted to transfer it under its supervision.

In late August, it became clear that the government was preparing a new Defense Law, which curtailed the president's powers as commander-in-chief.[13] This coincided with the U.D.F.'s rapid law preparation to bring the N.I.S. under government control. The increased pressure on the president, combined with a hostile campaign in the press, led him to publicly announce his criticism of the government at a special press conference on August 30, 1992. Zhelev announced that the government had declared war on trade unions, the press, the extra-parliamentary democratic opposition, the Holy Synod, and provoked a war between state institutions based on an illegal seizure of constitutional powers. According to the President, this would lead to deep isolation and early elections. He therefore called for the unification of all political forces in the name of democratic reform.[14]

The escalating political conflict brought to the fore the idea of forming a new government without Filip Dimitrov and his inner circle. Ahmed Dogan also supported the idea for a new cabinet, but this time he wanted to sign a coalition agreement. He took actions in this direction and on September 17, 1992, submitted a request for the resignation of Parliament Chairman Stefan Savov. Zhelev considered the removal of the main figures on which the government relied to be the most realistic way to change the cabinet quickly.[15] At the same time, negotiations for signing a coalition agreement stalled. M.R.F. proposed to U.D.F. to find new politicians with whom they could work with deep mutual respect.[16] However, this strategy did not succeed.

THE OUTBREAK OF THE SCANDAL

As a result of the alliance between the president and the M.R.F., the government was attacked by two key factors. The first was the demand for

the resignation of Stefan Savov. The second was the participation of General Asparuhov in a press conference at which he presented information accusing the executive power of an illegal arms trade. With this action the general became actively involved in the war between state institutions. He took the side of the president, to whom he was subordinate.

The press conference, entitled "The Armed Forces, Production and Trade in Arms, National Security, and the Police," was held on September 17.[17] Its organizer was presidential adviser General Stoyan Andreev. In his speech, Asparuhov announced that the draft law prepared by the U.D.F. aimed to create a "tank fist" by unifying the secret services, which was typical for *fascist regimes*. The general was adamant that he had no intention of concealing such information, even if it related to persons close to the government or any other state institution. He also informed the public that the N.I.S. had reliable data about the involvement of one of the government's advisors in the arms business. Asparuhov ended his speech with a remark that some people skillfully raised the slogan "Крадци, дръжте крадеца!" ["Thieves, hold the thief!"].

Asparuhov's speech did not go unnoticed, but the U.D.F.'s main attention was still focused on parliament. On September 23, 1992, Stefan Savov resigned. According to Dimitrov's predictions, the lack of a parliament chairman would trigger a political crisis and early elections. With a 44 percent rating, the U.D.F. could win an independent majority in the next parliament.[18] In fact, a simple majority was needed for electing a new chairman, so the Prime Minister's accounts were not correct. At the same time, Dogan waited for the U.D.F. to propose a candidate and was ready to support it. In turn, he expected his coalition partner to stop peddling compromising documents related to his party.[19]

In parallel with these events, the weapons scandal was growing. The Prime Minister required General Asparuhov to report to him personally on the issue but received a letter from him that it was appropriate to be acquainted with the President in the presence of the representatives of the Prosecutor General, the Ministry of Interior, and the leadership of the National Security Commission of the National Assembly.[20] Thus, on October

2, 1992, a meeting on the issue was ←265 | 266→held.[21] Asparuhov revealed that the intelligence services of the Republic of Macedonia, at the request of the Prime Minister Nikola Kljusev, had been exploring the possibility of an urgent delivery of weapons by Turkish, Italian, or Bulgarian companies for the needs of its army and police. Contacts were established with the Bulgarian company Kerry 91. In early August 1992, the National Intelligence Service received information that an adviser of the Prime Minister and two representatives of the company had visited Skopje and discussed arms deliveries. The information was reported to the President and it was established that: (1) the Macedonian government granted a license to Kerry 91 on August 7, 1992; (2) the deal would be realized by the companies of Tome Kostadinkovski, an employee of Bulgarian intelligence; (3) Kerry 91 was informed that Skopje wanted to purchase defense weapons for 200 million U.S.D., paid with German marks and strategic raw materials; (4) one of the decisive considerations to seek delivery from Bulgaria was the lower price, provided services, and purely political reasons; (5) after eight meetings in Skopje, the list was supplemented with Mil Mi-6 and Mil Mi-8 helicopters; (6) the representatives of the Republic of Macedonia insisted on discretion, fearing reprisals from Serbia.

At the end of his report, Asparuhov announced that the advisor who arrived in Skopje on July 22, 1992, was Konstantin Mishev. He led the talks on personal instructions from Dimitrov. In conclusion, according to the N.I.S assessment, a 200 million U.S.D. deal with Macedonia was impossible due to its very limited financial resources and its aim to bypass the embargo on the Yugoslav federation.[22] Without going into details, the general declared that the plan created by the K.O.S. was for destabilizing the Republic of Macedonia and to worsen its relations with Bulgaria.[23] Filip Dimitrov's reaction to the report was extremely angry. According to him, the N.I.S. was engaged in meaningless activity and false provocations. He insisted General Andreev remember that the issue was discussed in the Regulation and Control of the Regime for the Production and Trade with Military and Special Products Commission. He then stated that the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been requested and that he had ←266 | 267→held talks

with the ambassadors of the United States, Great Britain, and France, after which it was considered that such a deal was not appropriate. Since Mishev himself could not conclude a deal because it required a license from the Commission, Filip Dimitrov was inclined to treat the behavior of General Asparuhov as a political provocation.[24]

General Andreev claimed not to remember such details and not to have complete information but in the ensuing dispute with Dimitrov he acknowledged that contacts with diplomats had been discussed. The Prime Minister continued to wonder why information was given to the media when the issue was resolved at the governmental level. To end the dispute, President Zhelev said that things had been resolved and an apology from the general should satisfy the Prime Minister. For Filip Dimitrov, however, this was far from enough. Dimitrov explained that the government received information that representatives of Kerry 91 would travel to Skopje on July 22, 1992, and urgently decided that Mishev should join them in order to monitor the meeting.[25] At that point, Asparuhov tried to explain that traveling with a private company was dangerous, especially when proven Serbian agents were present at the meeting. But these remarks infuriated the Prime Minister, who defended his adviser and accused the general of attacking the government and failing to carry out his sworn duty. The Prime Minister was not at all worried about possible leaks, because the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France were also aware of the visit.[26] Finally, everyone agreed General Asparuhov should apologize to the Prime Minister for refusing to provide requested information and to inform the media that Mishev performed his task correctly.[27]

Asparuhov apologized publicly, but the Prime Minister began looking for other ways to obtain his resignation. At Dimitrov's request, the issue was submitted to the National Assembly for discussion in the National Security Commission. The situation worsened when publications about the affair provoked a reaction from the Republic of Macedonia. In an interview on October 6, 1992, Asparuhov commented that 60–70 percent of Macedonia's special services were pro-Serbian, and that the republic was trying to obtain weapons for Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This and many other

publications on the subject led Macedonia to send a note of protest to the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, refuting the allegations. Skopje hoped that the Bulgarian government would issue an official statement and take necessary responsibility. For its part, Macedonia's Interior Minister Ljubomir Frčkoski said to Radio Skopje that Asparuhov's ←267 | 268→allegations were unworthy and fabricated. President Kiro Gligorov called the accusations against Konstantin Mishev and Filip Dimitrov's cabinet ridiculous and, in turn, attacked the general for his comments about Skopje's services. Asked by journalists whether bilateral relations with Bulgaria were threatened, Gligorov replied that this had to be clarified.[28]

A session of the National Security Commission was held on October 6, 1992, at which the Prime Minister and the director of the National Intelligence Service tried to ameliorate the conflict between them. Dimitrov wanted the Commission to discuss the political machinations against the government which involved the actions of the President and his advisers. He emphasized the fact that Asparuhov refused to provide him with information, something he was constitutionally obligated to do. The Prime Minister did not hide his complete distrust of the N.I.S. He doubted that its director knew who in Macedonia was working for Serbia. He criticized Asparuhov's laziness for taking several months to find the advisor's identity. The Prime Minister was displeased that taxpayer money was spent on such things. Filip Dimitrov dedicated the last part of his speech to attack his political opponents. Without considering that Mishev's mission raised too many questions, he insisted on a concrete answer to the incident with Zdravko Popov. Finally, the Prime Minister urged the Commission to convene a parliamentary session to discuss Asparuhov's behavior. Filip Dimitrov expected a declaration to be adopted, assessing the activities of the general and his subordinate service.[29]

Asparuhov explained that the practice was for the government to ask intelligence for information and assistance when an envoy is entrusted with a special mission. Asparuhov also rejected the accusations because he did not target either the government or the advisor. He again apologized for not

showing up to report. In the end, the general made accusations against the Prime Minister. He reminded that the service was subjected to constant attacks, leading to its destabilization and demotivation, even though it worked actively and regularly to provide reliable intelligence data—over 260 reports had been sent to the Ministry of the Interior since the beginning of 1992 and over 240 to the Prime Minister—but there was no feedback how that information was acted upon. Asparuhov returned to the Mishev case and pointed out that a pro-Serbian government was in power in Skopje and in the special services 70–80 percent of the staff was pro-Serbian. Guided by this, the National Intelligence Service stood on the position that negotiations about an arms deal were too dangerous.[30]

The first comments from the MPs related to the public ugliness of the case. The U.D.F. representatives asked Asparuhov why he refused to report to the ←268 | 269→Prime Minister and why he allowed himself to leak information at a press conference. The opposition was interested in why the Prime Minister did not ask for intelligence support for Mishev's mission; whether it was necessary to check on the efficiency of the intelligence services; why a private company without license was chosen; how it would be ensured that the embargo was not violated and whether there was no personal interest in the arms transaction.[31] It is clear from Filip Dimitrov's answer[32] that he was dissatisfied with the quality of the materials sent to him by the N.I.S. The Prime Minister assured that if he could have received guarantees that the deal was not a violation of the embargo, he would have made a deal with Macedonia a long time ago.

The MPs put forward various proposals concentrated around three options: (1) to get acquainted with the transcript of the meeting with the President; (2) to discuss the issue in a closed plenary session; (3) to abandon the topic because it was not within the competence of the National Security Commission. Some of them shared the opinion that the problem was related to the Constitutional Court and it caused the conflict between the Prime Minister and the President.[33] Finally, the commission decided that at the next session MPs should get acquainted with the materials from the meeting with

Zhelev. It was also voted to hold a closed plenary session of the National Assembly, to which the President should be invited.

A new session of the National Security Commission was held on October 8, 1992. There was a new dispute between the ruling party and the opposition. U.D.F. MPs insisted on discussing only the legality of the actions of the director of the National Intelligence Service, without clarifying whether the facts he had made public were true or false. The opposition MPs took the position that the two things were connected and in order to assess the actions of the general it was necessary to understand in what context they were committed.[34] Finally, it was decided to hear the report without classified information, as well as the speech of the Prime Minister at the meeting with the President. Asparuhov clarified that he acted at his own conviction. He described his actions as a blunder.[35] At the end of the meeting, the deputies agreed that the National Intelligence Service should have dealt with Mishev's mission and had done its job competently, but its director had no right to refuse to inform the Prime Minister and to disclose information at a press conference.[36]

←269 | 270→Zhelev also filed a petition requesting parliament to consider the information provided by Asparuhov. It became clear that the Prime Minister could not rely on his own parliamentary group. The next day, M.R.F. submitted a proposal on behalf of 31 members of the Parliament (hereafter MPs), including U.D.F. members, for a closed session on October 20, 1992, to consider "the legality of the actions of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria Filip Dimitrov and his advisor Konstantin Mishev in connection with an arms deal for a neighboring country, the actions of the National Intelligence Service, set out in a report by the director of the service, Brigo Asparuhov, as well as his behavior in connection with this case."[37] The National Coordinating Council of the U.D.F. decided that their MPs would leave the session the next day. It was also decided that the transcript of the meeting with the President would be published.

On the same day, Minister of Interior Yordan Sokolov met with Macedonian Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski. They commented on the arms scandal and the statements of General Asparuhov. The Macedonian side

was extremely outraged by the accusation that it may be interested in violating the embargo.[38] A Macedonian military delegation, led by Defense Minister Vlado Popovski, arrived in Sofia on October 20, 1992, to meet with Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov, the Defense Minister Alexander Staliyski, the Deputy Defense Minister Nikola Daskalov and the Chief of Staff of the Bulgarian Army. The two sides guaranteed that there were no Bulgarian weapons on the territory of Republic of Macedonia and no illegal trade was detected from Sofia to Skopje.[39]

THE CLOSED SESSION OF THE PARLIAMENT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The closed session of the parliament was held on October 20, 1992. The director of the National Intelligence Service informed deputies about all facts and circumstances acquired by his office on the subject. He first informed them on the late 1991/early 1992 operation codenamed "Opera" in two versions:[40] (1) subversive terrorist acts on the territory of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, aimed at weakening the armed resistance against the Yugoslav army, destabilizing the situation as a whole; and (2) destabilizing the Republic of Macedonia by conducting complex intelligence activities in all spheres of socio-political life, deteriorating ←270 | 271→its relations with Bulgaria and Serbia. The operation was conceived by Air Force Headquarters. The implementation was entrusted to K.O.S. officers, a secretive agency within the former republics and the "Labrador" Group. The entire leadership was entrusted to K.O.S. General Aleksandar Vasiljević and his deputy, General Sergei Tumanov. Operation "Opera" was organized as a network of private arms trading companies on the territory of all former republics, as well as in countries like Germany, Austria, Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, and Bulgaria.

The main part of Asparuhov's speech was dedicated to the mission of Konstantin Mishev. He told deputies that according to an inspection

conducted by the service, the foreign exchange reserves of the Republic of Macedonia were about 30 million U.S.D. and did not allow the purchase of weapons for over 200 million. In addition, its army and police did not need such weapons and (re)export deals were likely to be planned to bypass the embargo.[41] This information was followed by a detailed explanation of how Mishev's mission went. On July 22, 1992, the advisor and two representatives of Kerry 91—its president Valeri Kerin and his employee Zhivomir Vassilev, arrived in Skopje.[42] The talks were held at the Interior Ministry in the office of the Director of the Administration for Security and Counterintelligence Slobodan Bogoevki. The participants in these meetings were Pavle Trajanov, Deputy Interior Minister, the commander of Internal Troops, agent of Serbian counterintelligence, Bosko Petrevski, presented as a financial expert, but in fact head of the Finance and Quartermaster's Office of the Ministry of Interior, as well as a government advisor. The main issue discussed was the need for the Republic of Macedonia to grant a license to Kerry 91 to carry out the deal.[43] The National Intelligence Service also had information how the presence of Konstantin Mishev in Slobodan Bogoevski's entourage was discussed. It was commented that his visit was a favorable factor because he assured that the deal would take place, referring to his personal authority being connected to the Prime Minister of Bulgaria. As a result of the meeting on August 7, 1992, Slobodan Bogoevski personally traveled to the Bulgarian border and handed over to the representatives of Kerry 91 a license to purchase weapons from Bulgaria.[44]

Then the general elaborated his interpretation of the events. The license had been signed by Interior Minister Ljubomir Frčkoski, who was a K.O.S. agent. Serbian counterintelligence had assigned him the operation to lure Bulgarian companies to import weapons to Skopje. Therefore, K. Mishev's visit was a definite success. Its goal was to compromise the Republic of Bulgaria and its government. Asparuhov was proud to announce that the National Intelligence Service ←271 | 272→received timely information about this operation and managed to prevent it. He assured that the service would continue its work to fully clarify the K.O.S. plan to destabilize the Republic of Macedonia and to worsen its relations with Bulgaria.[45]

The questions which arose were when exactly the National Intelligence Service found out about operation "Opera", whether the information was reported to the Prime Minister, and why Asparuhov had to personally take measures to prevent the "arms deal". The transcript shows that the Prime Minister had been asked several times how he reacted to the information about the K.O.S. plan and whether the government had judged it to be untrue. It is not possible to determine from his answers when exactly he was informed. Filip Dimitrov commented that he had serious grounds to look with reservations at the information provided by Asparuhov.[46] Nikolai Slatinski, on the other hand, accused the general of constantly adding new motives, which he did not say to the President or to the National Security Commission.[47]

It is highly likely that Asparuhov informed about "Opera" at the meeting with the president, because none of the reports mentioned by him imply that Filip Dimitrov was notified. They are related to attempts by Macedonia to establish contacts for the purchase of weapons from Bulgaria and are dated April 29, 1992, and May 6, 1992. Their content lacks information about "Opera", which suggests that the intention of Skopje to purchase weapons should be linked to immediate needs. This can be confirmed by analyzing the situation in the republic from January to April 1992. With the adoption of the Defense Law on February 14, 1992, the republican Army was created, which turned the Yugoslav Army (J.N.A.) into a foreign armed force. The Government of the Republic of Macedonia chose the strategy of diplomatic settlement of the issue and on February 21, 1992, signed an agreement with the J.N.A. for its deployment by April 15, 1992. The army withdrew not only its members from the republic, but also the weapons, ammunition, material, and technical means and all movable property that belonged to it. In addition, the Yugoslav army exported military equipment from the republic, leaving the state virtually defenseless. These facts affirm the urgent need of Skopje to equip its army.

Asparuhov's report had some contradictions. He accused Minister Ljubomir Frčkoski of being a K.O.S. agent and trying to compromise Bulgaria and its government through the arms deal with Kerry 91, but

according to the report submitted to Filip Dimitrov on May 6, 1992, the order to look for opportunities to buy weapons belonged to Prime Minister Nikola Kljusev. Even if we assumed that Frčkoski acted on behalf of the K.O.S., tricking the Bulgarian government ←272 | 273→into violating the embargo would not only compromise Sofia, but it would also have severely impacted the Republic of Macedonia itself, as well as Serbia, if (re)exports happened.[48] Arms transactions were carried out through the issuance of licenses and were subject to state control, which meant there were no winners. (Re)export of Bulgarian weapons by the Republic of Macedonia would be disastrous for the republic, which was fighting for international recognition of its sovereignty. The consequences for the alleged K.O.S. agent Frčkoski would also be very serious, as his signature were on the documents for the deal.

It is also not clear from the report what the benefits were for the K.O.S. and J.N.A. by discrediting Bulgaria through an arms deal. The army withdrew from the Republic of Macedonia three months before Mishev's visit to Skopje. If it aimed to destabilize the republic, it could have done so at any time while residing on its territory. After its dislocation, the Republic of Macedonia became the second republic (after Slovenia) from which J.N.A. withdrew. The two countries were not of interest to Slobodan Milošević because they did not have large Serb minority communities, unlike Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, from which he tried to annex territories through war. This raises the question of where Asparuhov got information that operation "Opera" aimed to destabilize the Republic of Macedonia. Due to the limited number of available and declassified documents, the answer is difficult to ascertain. Scarce information can be found in the transcript of the closed parliamentary session.

During his report General Asparuhov announced that the full clarification of the plan of the K.O.S. would continue. But a little bit later he stated that there was no need to look for evidence of the existence of such a plan because it was enough to read the details about the trial against General Vasiljević in Greek newspapers. Information about this plan was leaked from witnesses questioned at the trial.[49] In contrast to the extremely detailed

information about Mishev's mission, Asparuhov spoke quite generally about "Opera". This raises questions about what can be established about the operation from available sources. In this case, the greatest value is the so-called "Izjava" ["Statement"] by Radenko Radojčić, a member of the "Labrador" group, as well as the testimony of General Aleksandar Vasiljević and Colonel Mustafa Čandić at the trial against Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević for crimes against humanity in Kosovo, held in The Hague. Information can also be found in various Serbian and Croatian newspaper articles.

At the beginning of the break-up of Yugoslavia, when Slovenia and Croatia began to take steps to leave the federation, the J.N.A. proved to be the ←273 | 274→only institution with the capacity and desire to block all attempts at secession. K.O.S. armed paramilitary formations of Serb minorities in the republics in 1990–91 and set itself the task of infiltrating the Croatian government, police, and media.[50] For this purpose, the secret operations "Labrador" and "Opera" were carried out. Colonel Mustafa Čandić testified[51] that during "Labrador" terrorist attacks were launched in Zagreb on August 19, 1991 , namely five Jewish graves were blown up in the Mirogoj City Cemetery and a bomb exploded in the Jewish center on Palmotićeva Street.[52] A terrorist attack was also planned at a Jewish synagogue in the Croatian capital but did not take place as members of the "Labrador" group were forced to leave the country because of the danger of arrest. After their arrival in Belgrade in the second half of August 1991, a propaganda war department was set up, called "Opera" for short.[53]

According to Colonel Čandić, operation "Opera" was intended to serve as a psychological and propaganda activity on the territory of Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some of the main actors in it were Radenko Radojčić, Colonel Ivan Sabolović, and Slavko Malobabić.[54] The main goal was to influence the psychology, thinking, and beliefs of people in Serbia through propaganda, misinformation, manipulated wiretapped conversations and to give the impression that Croatian authorities were fascist and wanted to have ethnically clean areas inhabited only by Croats. M. Čandić also testified that the participants in operation "Opera" were

arrested at the suggestion of a J.N.A. military prosecutor and tried in a case in which he appeared as a witness.[55]

Significant information about the two operations can be found in Radenko Radojčić's "Izjava" ["Statement"].[56] He was a K.O.S. agent under the pseudonym Ljudevit and participated in both operations. According to his words, "Opera" was formed because no martial law was declared in Yugoslavia and a Department ←274 | 275→for Information and Political Activity could not be formed at the Air Force and Air Defense of J.N.A. Its aim was to portray the Croatian authorities as leading the country to totalitarianism.[57] One of the special tasks that "Opera" received was to develop an Orientation Plan for Psychological and Propaganda Activities on the deployment of the J.N.A. from the Republic of Macedonia. It was drafted personally by Radenko Radojčić.[58] The plan envisioned a Macedonian-Albanian, Macedonian-Serbian, Macedonian-Greek, and Macedonian-Bulgarian confrontation. At the confessional level, the starting point was to provoke conflict between Muslims and Orthodox and between Catholics and Muslims.[59] The conflicts and tensions caused in this way were planned to be synchronized through gray propaganda, small psychological diversions, explosions at the places where Serbs and Albanians gather, burning the flag of the Republic of Macedonia in front of the Prohor Pčinjski Monastery by an Albanian group, etc. However, the final plan was rejected in the end.[60]

A serious blow to operation "Opera" was inflicted in September 1991, when the premises of the Second Detachment of the Air Force and Air Defense Command in Zagreb fell into the hands of Croatian services.[61] Shortly after, the entire intelligence network was arrested.[62] Part of the "Labrador" group had been exchanged for Croats arrested by Serbian authorities. In Belgrade, they witnessed purges in the J.N.A. between January 1 and March 15, 1992. The national composition of the Air Force and Air Defense, which consisted of 48 percent Serbs and Montenegrins and 52 percent of the other nations of Yugoslavia, became 95 percent Serbs and Montenegrins and 5 percent of the other nations. The process began with purges in the regular army in late 1991 and culminated in the mass retirement of generals in March 1992. As early as March 6, 1992, the headquarters for

"Opera" were searched, documents were seized, and rooms were sealed. Radenko Radojčić and Slavko Malobabić were accused of being spies.[63] On March 15, 1992, they were arrested, interrogated for two days, and forced to sign documents that General Aleksandar Vasiljević and General Zvonimir Jurjević were preparing a coup against Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević. On May 27, Radojčić was transferred to remand prison. He was accused of planning terror in ←275 | 276→Macedonia, espionage, forging documents and more. Part of the accusations were based on the Orientation Plan prepared by him. The trial did not end until February 1993.[64] Radenko Radojčić was released from prison after that and managed to transfer from Belgrade to Slovenia, where he remained until 1994. After encountering Croatian intelligence services, he voluntarily surrendered and during the interrogations the so-called "Izjava" ["Statement"] was created. Radenko Radojčić hoped the information he provided would benefit Croatia[65] and would receive forgiveness for his crimes.[66]

The analyses made by Ljudevit find support in other documents as well, like the testimony of General Aleksandar Vasiljević. As a victim of the events in 1992, he explained in court how the J.N.A. purge was carried out. In February, 28 generals were retired. On May 8, 1992, another 38 generals were retired, including Vasiljević himself and his deputy, Simeon Tumanov. Both of them did not meet the necessary requirements for retirement.[67] General Aleksandar Vasiljević was arrested in June and charged with terrorism, bribes, and undermining the country's defense system.[68] The media at the time cited as a reason for this his six-part interview for the weekly *NIN*, in which he made several revelations about the J.N.A.[69] A more plausible reason can be found in Colonel Ivan Sabolović's interview, in which he explained that the accusations against Operation "Opera" sought a way to reach the leadership of the K.O.S.[70] What can be said for sure is that after the arrests and the retirement of the generals, the "Opera" affair broke out in public and media began to write about it. Then very quickly all the noise suddenly disappeared. The purge in the J.N.A. was finally over and there was no longer a need to divert public attention to it.

From all the available information about the two operations, it can be said that they were connected to each other, and "Opera" was the propaganda continuation ←276 | 277→of "Labrador". Two important conclusions can be drawn: (1) no currently available documentary sources mention a plan to deceive Bulgaria into violating the U.N. embargo on Yugoslavia as part of operation "Opera" and (2) even if such a plan existed, it ceased to be relevant at least two months before Mishev's mission in Macedonia on July 22, 1992, because all involved in its implementation had retired or been arrested by the end of May and were accused of participating in "Opera." Separately, media was flooded with information on the issue and Croatian services managed to discover and liquidate Labrador's intelligence network as early as the end of 1991. The statement of General Asparuhov that the national security of Bulgaria continued to be threatened by operation "Opera" at the end of October 1992 was untenable. The information that he gave to deputies served to further tarnish the image of the Prime Minister and showed how far the war between state institutions went. The provided information was not false but outdated and skillfully manipulated to create the necessary suggestions.

During the closed session of the National Assembly, the Prime Minister mainly defended his decision to send Mishev to Skopje and accused the head of the National Security Service of creating a campaign against the government, which led to deteriorating relations with the Republic of Macedonia. A natural result of these actions was the protest note from Skopje received by the government.[71] In support of the Prime Minister, Interior Minister Yordan Sokolov criticized Asparuhov's information about the pro-Serbian people in the Republic of Macedonia and shared the Prime Minister's views that the consequences of the scandal impacted good relations between the two countries. He pointed out that the biggest outrage was that the Republic of Macedonia was interested in violating the embargo.[72] The Minister of Trade Alexander Pramatarski made a statement in which he explained that there was no such deal reached. However, opposition MPs continued to ask questions as if the deal had been struck.[73]

Asparuhov also had to answer a question about his appearance at the press conference on September 18, 1992. He explained that he had informed President Zhelev in advance of his participation but had not asked for permission. The general recalled that he had already apologized. He then said that he was scolded by the President but was not sanctioned.[74] Shortly before the end of the meeting, Ivan Palchev from the M.R.F. took the floor. According to him, the Bulgarian government had been working blindly for a year because it did not use its intelligence. His explanation for this was related to the war of state institutions because intelligence was under the president. However, Palchev was sure that ←277 | 278→once Bulgarian intelligence had received information about Mishev's mission, Serbian intelligence also had part of this information and it could be used to discredit Filip Dimitrov.[75] The Prime Minister's response was that he did not feel threatened in any way by the actions of his advisor, but he felt threatened by the actions of General Asparuhov.[76]

The deputies continued to be interested in why Mishev traveled with a private company to Skopje, because this raised questions about commitments and commissions. The Prime Minister's explanations did not sound entirely convincing. It became clear that the advisor was not required to submit a report and therefore the only documentary information from the meeting was in the form of an aide-mémoire. Dimitrov explained that after Mishev's mission the company wanted to be included in the agenda of the armaments commission, but no such step was taken and no license was issued.[77] Asparuhov again reminded that the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Macedonia made a declaration that it had never negotiated weapons with Bulgaria, even though Minister Frčkoski had signed Kerry 91's license.[78] Shortly after, the deputies from the three parliamentary groups prepared a draft decision. During its vote only N. Slatinski protested. He called the draft decision biased. For him, what needed to be condemned were the illicit, illegal, and rude actions of Asparuhov.[79]

His speech provoked a scandal. The Deputy Chairman of the National Security Commission Dimitar Yonchev opposed Slatinski and compared the U.D.F.'s National Coordination Council with the Politburo of the B.C.P. He

stated that the ruling party had voted by force to bring this issue into the parliament. Because of this, the National Security Commission was used as cover in order to make things look democratic. Yonchev defended the decision taken by parliament, as the case did not refer simply to a press conference, but to everything that caused it. According to him, reprimanding the director of the N.I.S. was punishment for a person who exceeded his own authority.[80]

The decision of the National Assembly was voted on at 12:30 a.m. on October 21, 1992. With 120 votes out of 122 deputies presented, the parliament blamed Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov. According to the adopted text the Prime Minister had created conditions for damaging the country's prestige and undermining its national security. The National Intelligence Service had acted lawfully and professionally to clarify the aims and tasks of the mission of his advisor to ←278 | 279→a neighboring country. At the same time, the National Assembly expressed its disapproval of the participation of its director in a press conference and the preliminary statements made by him there.[81] The U.D.F.'s National Coordination Council unanimously decided in the morning on October 21, 1992, to request a vote of confidence. The request was submitted at 5:40 pm on October 21, 1992, and the vote of confidence was held on October 28, 1992. After 120 votes against and 110 votes in favor, the U.D.F. government fell from power. Ironically, Filip Dimitrov left the political scene because of a scandal involving the state that he was first in the world recognizing as independent. Now, the next government faced the difficult task of restoring good relations between Bulgaria and Macedonia.

CONCLUSION

Based on this research, it can be concluded that the scandal "Weapons for Macedonia" was the natural result of a sharp political confrontation in Bulgaria during the rule of Filip Dimitrov's government. Among the reasons for it were the lack of managerial experience, problems in communication

between coalition partners, governmental stubbornness over policy, and the war between state institutions. President Zhelyu Zhelev turned out to be a serious opponent, who flatly refused to be deprived of his constitutional powers. He managed to respond reciprocally to attacks on the presidency. In this respect, the support he received from the appointed National Intelligence Service's director was significant. General Brigo Asparuhov skillfully took advantage of the Prime Minister's flawed decision to send his advisor Konstantin Mishev on a mission to the Republic of Macedonia. The subsequent mistake of Dimitrov not to distinguish himself from his advisor's actions and to seek the resignation of the head of intelligence at any cost led to the outbreak of a major public scandal. The leak of information from the media strained relations with Skopje and produced a diplomatic scandal as well. The rash public statements of General Asparuhov only intensified the problems.

It is important to note that the disclosure of classified information to the media by all parties involved in the conflict not only harmed the country's authority, but also did not allow it to be resolved quickly and professionally. In this regard, the U.D.F.'s decision to bring the issue to a closed plenary session was disadvantageous. It aimed to force the National Intelligence Service director's resignation, but at the same time provided him with a platform to accuse the Prime Minister of real and imagined sins. Referring to operational data, he presented Mishev's mission as inspired by the secret operations "Labrador" and "Opera" of ←279 | 280→Yugoslav counterintelligence. Participants in the two operations were discovered and arrested months before Mishev went to Skopje. However, the general's information that the conclusion of an arms deal with the Republic of Macedonia was part of a secret K.O.S. plan to discredit Bulgaria in violation of the U.N. embargo predetermined the fate of the government, regardless of whether it was backed by evidence. With a disintegrated parliamentary majority, the Prime Minister was blamed by the National Assembly and accused of violating the country's security. The scandal "Weapons for Macedonia" led to two important conclusions. First, it should be noted that in a war between state institutions there are no winners, and the main loser is

the state. Second, when the government does not have faith in its own intelligence agencies and pursues foreign policy without its support, the possibility of diplomatic scandals increases even with countries with which it has friendly relations. To avoid such incidents, intelligence and diplomacy should always work in sync and war between state bodies should be avoided at all costs. This seems, unfortunately, to be a lesson that Bulgaria learned far too late.

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60 Radojčić, 116.
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63 Radojčić, 132–4.
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CHAPTER 12

Bulgarian Turks Influencing Bulgarian-Turkish Relations (1989–1990)

PETYA PAVLOVA

Abstract: The issue of the Turkish community on the territory of Bulgaria has taken a central place in Bulgarian-Turkish relations since the two countries have existed. This has become an arena of struggle for influence between the Turkish and Bulgarian states, in which the two countries do not hesitate to use all possible means, including those of the secret services. The great political stakes urge the Bulgarian government to take extreme measures, thus violating basic human rights, which also strengthens the desire to emigrate among the Turkish community in the country. However, very soon serious changes began to take place in Bulgaria and the country renounced its violent policy against the Turkish community. Will the new government be able to improve relations with the Republic of Turkey and regain the trust of the Turkish community in Bulgaria? These questions will be answered by the forthcoming research, based on archival documents, and existing scientific publications on the subject.

Keywords: People's Republic of Bulgaria, Republic of Turkey, Diplomatic relations, Bulgarian Turks.

INTRODUCTION

Despite covering only one year, the period from 1989 to 1990 was full of many important events, both in relations between Bulgaria and Turkey and in domestic political plans for the two countries. For the Republic of Turkey,

this was the moment when Turgut Ozal (1927–93)[1] took over the presidency after being ←283 | 284→its Prime Minister from 1983 to 89. The Prime Minister was Yildirim Akbulut (1935–2021)[2], who remained influential in Ozal's[3] shadow. Thus, for several years, all power in the country was concentrated in the hands of President Ozal. This, combined with his political longevity, allowed him to develop an active domestic and foreign policy agenda and to position the country for entrance onto the international stage after the end of the Cold War like never before.[4]

The opposite was happening in the People's Republic of Bulgaria (P.R.B.). *The* leader of the Bulgarian Communist Party (B.C.P.), Todor Zhivkov (1911–98)[5], who ruled the country for more than 25 years, was overthrown and opposition forces were growing. This led not only to a change in the country's policy toward Turkey and Bulgarian citizens of Turkish heritage (hereafter referred to as "Bulgarian Turks") but also toward the end of the communist regime in Bulgaria. The state took its first steps in the transition from Soviet-style state socialism to parliamentary democracy and a market economy under the rule of Petar Mladenov (1936–2000).[6]

The present chapter aims to trace how relations between the two countries moved from their lowest point – due to the attempt to force assimilation of Bulgarian Turks and then their mass emigration to Turkey – to rapid relief caused ←284 | 285→by both a new international situation and changed policy on ethnic issues within the Bulgarian state after the end of Zhivkov rule. The research is based on published and unpublished documents from the Bulgarian state archives and documents covering Bulgarian-Turkish relations and the place of Bulgarian Turks within them. In Bulgarian historiography, this topic was widely studied in the period up to 1989, but for years after Zhivkov's rule publications were significantly fewer. This gives the chapter an innovative place in the literature for analyzing Bulgarian-Turkish relations after the fall of communism.

THE COMMUNIST REGIME AND BULGARIAN TURKS

A key factor determining relations between the two countries since the existence of the Turkish state was the attitude of Bulgaria and Turkey toward Bulgarian Turks. With its founding in 1923, the Republic of Turkey began active propaganda amongst the Muslim population in Bulgaria, through both diplomatic missions and Turkish intelligence. Turkey declared itself the motherland of all Turks. Thus, all Muslims were part of the Turkish nation. In this respect, the Turkish state invited them to move to its territory. It claimed to be their defender which, of course, worried Bulgarian rulers.[7] They perceived Turkey's actions as a threat to national security because Turkish propaganda fueled the feeling of Bulgarian Turks that instead of being part of the Bulgarian nation, they were part of a Turkish one. Through this influence the Turkish state could potentially interfere in the internal affairs of the country. Bulgarian rulers tried to stop these ideas from entering by imposing restrictions on the main propaganda channels, namely, schools and the press.

After the Second World War, Bulgaria fell within the Eastern bloc, whereas Turkey remained within the Western one. Consequently, Turkish propaganda faced an additional goal—to internally destabilize and externally discredit its ideological opponent.[8] In line with its ideology, the communist government in Bulgaria placed the party's position above national affiliation. Thus, Bulgarian Turks received wider rights, but the socio-economic reforms (e.g., atheistic propaganda, land cooperatives, and the like), which did not apply only to them, provoked dissatisfaction, and a willingness to expatriate.[9] With Stalin's support, ←285 | 286→the Politburo decided to allow them to emigrate to Turkey. The Turkish state instantly changed the focus of its propaganda toward equal treatment of Muslims within the People's Republic of Bulgaria and sought to limit the flow of people. The reasons for this were rooted in its desire to maintain its base of influence in Bulgaria, in the form of Bulgarian Turks, and the concern that the new emigres were carriers of the "communist contagion," as well as problems in repatriating them successfully and smoothly in Turkey. After the closure of the borders by Turkey twice, the Bulgarian state forbade such emigration overall.[10]

After failing to win over Bulgarian Turks or to reduce their numbers through expatriation, the Bulgarian Communist Party decided to "integrate"

them by overcoming their social and cultural backgrounds and minimizing the differences with ethnic Bulgarians. And so began the gradual imposition of many restrictions on the free expression of their cultural identity.[11] Concerned by their growing Turkish self-consciousness in late 1984 and early 1985, the rulers decided to change their Turkish-Arabic names to Bulgarian ones. They were forbidden to wear traditional clothes, speak Turkish in public places, etc. To overcome the discontentment, the state increased investment in these areas but this did not diminish the discontent which led to several terrorist acts. The Bulgarian Turks strongly opposed these attacks on their cultural identity.[12] The communist regime responded with even more violence. Unfortunately, there were also casualties in clashes between law enforcement and protesters.[13]

Turkish authorities reacted to events in the People's Republic of Bulgaria with caution, unlike the Turkish media, whose sharp reaction created massive public outcry.[14] Since the spring of 1985, Turkey focused on an internationalization of the problem, aiming to bring pressure from the global community with ←286 | 287→accusations of violating fundamental human rights, which was a topic of particular importance to the West since the 1975[15] Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (C.S.C.E.). The United States saw this as an opportunity to erode the communist regime in the People's Republic of Bulgaria and on March 8, 1985, before Turkey itself reacted, the U.S.A. announced that it would take the matter to several international forums. This encouraged Turkish authorities and for several years the situation of the "Turkish national minority" in Bulgaria was discussed at more than 30 international forums and organizations.

In this context, the B.C.P. launched a campaign to "explain" to Bulgarian Turks that they were of Bulgarian origin, but that the Ottoman Empire forced them to convert to Islam. Exposed to strong propaganda from both sides and strict restrictions on expressions of their ethnic identity, Bulgarian Turks began passive resistance and increased their participation in illegal groups, while Turkey doubled its intelligence contingent in Bulgaria.[16] On the eve of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, rallies were held demanding the restoration of

Turkish-Arabic names of Bulgarian Turks, respect for their language and customs, as well as permission for their free emigration. During these rallies there were clashes, resulting in many people being injured and some killed.

In early May 1989, the B.C.P. passed a law allowing free travel abroad with international passports.[17] The B.C.P. decided to allow emigration to Turkey, precisely based on the availability of these passports. Going abroad with a passport did not require a special agreement between countries and did not contradict the Bulgarian concept that Bulgarian Turks were part of the Bulgarian people.[18] This new travel opportunity, in combination with repressive measures against the Muslim population, caused an emigration fever with the majority of Bulgarian Turks selling their property, withdrawing their savings, and heading to the border. Bulgarian authorities exerted exile pressure on those who opposed state policy and tried to keep those that were more educated and accepting of the "revival ←287 | 288→process."[19] The scale of the wave of emigration and consequent negative international reactions forced the B.C.P. to quickly change its policy and take action to persuade Bulgarian Turks to stay in Bulgaria.[20]

The huge influx at Turkey's borders hampered its ability to accommodate the population and, on August 22, it closed the border. According to the data of the Ministry of Interior, 308,929 people emigrated.[21] The poor accommodation conditions, which differed from Turkish propaganda, lack of opportunity, difficult adaptation to everyday life, and linguistic differences forced thousands to return to Bulgaria.[22] Their return was possible due to the right that international passports gave their holders to stay abroad for a certain period without losing their original citizenship. It is this "citizen door" for return to Bulgaria that distinguished the 1989 situation from all previous emigrations, when those who left the country automatically lost their Bulgarian citizenship.

The strong family ties characteristic of Bulgarian Turks was also important in the decision to return. Researchers give different figures on the number of returnees. According to Evgenia Kalinova, Iskra Baeva, and Valeri Stoyanov, by mid–November 1989 they had reached 60,000 and a year later, after the fall of the regime, their percentage had reached 42 percent in

the summer of 1989.[23] The mass exodus shows the incorrectness of the original policy to change identity by grossly violating basic human rights and freedoms.[24] The actions of the state encouraged the community to close itself off to preserve its essence, which in turn led to radicalization and politicization.[25]

BULGARIA AND TURKEY IN SEARCH OF INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

So, relations between Bulgaria and Turkey were strained to the limit and the Bulgarian state suffered serious criticism abroad, "acquiring" the name of an intolerant and repressive state.[26] Bilateral relations were minimized and contacts between the states were mainly expressed in the exchange of accusations in international forums, where they sought to find supporters for their positions among other countries. Tensions between the two countries were also affecting Balkan cooperation overall. For example, for "political reasons of a bilateral nature", the Turkish state ceased to participate in the preparation of an agreement on environmental protection in the Balkans. Bulgaria presented this problem to U.S. Ambassador to Sofia Sol Polanski, expressing hope that "the Turkish state will show realism so that what has been started can be completed without undue politicization."[27] The two superpowers at the time were trying to influence the relationship using a different strategy. Apart from an attempt in mid–July 1989 to organize a summit between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and Turkey with U.S. assistance, which did not take place due to an "information leak", U.S. diplomacy put pressure on Sofia to give in to Turkish demands.[28] An example of this is the visit to Bulgaria at the end of September 1989 by Joe Gilder, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, during which he stated that until the Bulgarian government began "to look at things realistically", Washington would continue with "the strongest possible means to speak out against the position of the Bulgarian state."[29]

Events in Bulgaria were discussed at the N.A.T.O. Summit of May 1989. After the meeting, the Secretary-General issued a statement on behalf of its members. It condemned the actions of some Eastern European countries that continue to "too frequently violate human rights and basic freedoms." The text paid special attention only to Bulgaria. According to N.A.T.O., "policies of forced assimilation and repression against Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin" had lasted for nearly five years and conflicted with C.S.C.E. documents. It was noted that the situation had taken on a new dimension with the "expulsion and subsequent mass ←289 | 290→emigration of ethnic Turks, resulting from the deliberate deprivation of their basic human rights." It called for strict respect for fundamental rights and a mutually acceptable solution to facilitate emigration to Turkey.[30]

Only Greece, because of its own problems with the Turkish state, had a special attitude[31] and did not engage in the same accusations used by N.A.T.O. In this way, Greece delicately noted that Bulgaria was not the only country that was currently violating human rights. Turkey was doing this on its own territory no less.[32] The Bulgarian Foreign Ministry expressed its gratitude for the special opinion of Greece. In a conversation with its ambassador in Sofia, the Bulgarian representative shared his impression that foreign diplomats "see only the foam on the surface, not the roots of the problem" and that Turkey "has not been over with its nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire."[33] From the conversation with the Greek ambassador, an important conclusion can be drawn about Bulgaria's position on Turkey. Namely, it was categorically against the idea to evict the "Bulgarian population" and would not sign an emigration agreement with Turkey, as "there was no object for it." According to Bulgaria, it sought *de jure* rejection of the "Turkish national minority", which would enable the Turkish state to constantly influence the population and pose as its defender. The country opposed the discussion of property, special social rights, and other issues, which were resolved through its own domestic legislation, which was the same for all citizens. The Bulgarian representative said that Turkey was conducting an "incitement campaign" among the Muslim population in Bulgaria and set the signing of an emigration agreement and the promise to

not interfere with the "Turkish national minority" as essential conditions for improving relations. The official comment of the Bulgarian state was: "The People's Republic of Bulgaria will never accept ultimatums". To this, the Greek Ambassador Hristoyannis responded with: "we would not accept as well".[34] Thus, due to the common problems both countries had with Turkey, even though they were on opposite sides of the "Iron Curtain", Bulgaria and Greece found a common language. The Bulgarian state protested against N.A.T.O.'s ←290 | 291→actions in front of the American ambassador, noting that the situation in the country was not within the competence of a military alliance. The Bulgarian state also highlighted the fact that Turkey itself had been violating human rights for decades, but no action had been taken against it. Bulgaria also reacted sharply to the terms used, which, in its opinion, could be perceived as synonymous with "minority".[35] Bulgarian protests, however, in no way affected N.A.T.O. policy.[36]

The Soviet Union, unlike the United States, did not take such a firm stand in the dispute between Bulgaria and Turkey but focused its efforts on organizing a bilateral meeting to help find common ground. It sought to prevent the internationalization of the dispute, believing that a way out of the crisis could only be achieved based on an equal dialogue without preconditions.[37] Moscow mediated a meeting between foreign ministers during the 44th session of the U.N. General Assembly in the autumn of 1989. As a condition for the meeting, Turkish Foreign Minister Mesut Yilmaz (1947–2020)[38] suggested that Bulgaria's statement to the U.N. include issues such as human rights measures, the reunification of separated families, and the future departure of those from Bulgaria to Turkey.[39] To align their positions, the two states would exchange and review their statements in advance. As a positive sign for forthcoming negotiations, Bulgaria accepted Yilmaz's words, transmitted by the Soviet ambassador: "As for the rights of ethnic Turks or Bulgarian Muslims, this was a purely Bulgarian affair".[40]

←291 | 292→A step toward understanding was the abolition of the emigration agreement as a precondition for the meeting. Yilmaz even mentioned the possibility of holding a summit, but did not bind it to specific deadlines,[41] and noted that if the meeting in New York was successful,

Turkey would participate in the meeting on environmental issues in Sofia. The Soviet ambassador concluded that Bulgaria should not miss the opportunity for a bilateral meeting within the U.N. General Assembly, because the demands of the Turks were fully achievable.[42] At the last moment, however, the Turkish side set a condition for the meeting, which crossed Bulgaria's "red lines". Turkey wanted Petar Mladenov to acknowledge "the rights of the Turkish Muslim minority in Bulgaria" and the chief topic of the meeting was to be the signing of an emigration agreement.[43] Under these conditions, the Bulgarian Foreign Minister refused to hold a bilateral meeting and so the U.S.S.R.'s attempt at mediation ended without success.[44] Bulgaria's position remained unchanged until the U.N. meeting, which is why the reason for Turkey's refusal can be sought in its domestic political situation and foreign policy goals. Forthcoming elections (October 31, 1989) in Turkey were also certainly having an impact. The position expressed by Yılmaz may not have even been coordinated with Ozal.

The actions of the Turkish state could also be perceived as a test of Bulgaria's readiness for concessions. Turkey probably wanted to use an international forum to persuade Islamic states to submit to the Third Committee of the U.N. General Assembly to adopt a resolution against Bulgaria.[45] However, according to the Soviet ambassador, the Turks realized that they could not get enough votes at the U.N.[46] Thus, after the two countries failed to reach a consensus on holding a bilateral meeting, the 44th session of the U.N. General Assembly was used to exchange accusations instead. In its speech, Bulgaria called for negotiations based on the 1988 Belgrade Protocol. Turkey wanted a "comprehensive emigration agreement" signed. It believed the Bulgarian state aimed to eliminate the problem by "expelling these people from the country" and/or forced assimilation.[47] The relentless flow of emigrants hardened Ankara's tone and on August 8, 1989 it distributed a U.N. bulletin stating that Bulgaria was committing a "crime against humanity".[48] In the end, despite many attempts, Turkey failed to get Bulgaria condemned at the United Nations, mainly because of the support of

←292 | 293→the U.S.S.R. and several other countries for Bulgaria[49] and in the

fact that some U.N. member states thought Turkey could also be "on the dock" in matters of human rights.

BULGARIAN-TURKISH DIALOGUE: KUWAIT AS FACILITATORS

A statement by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (O.I.C.), initiated by Turkey, condemned the actions of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.[50] A declaration was adopted without reflecting the disagreement of some countries (Libya, Syria, Egypt, Kuwait) with its text. In the framework of the Conference, Turkey was supported by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Bangladesh, while the majority were not particularly interested in the issue.[51] Kuwait, an Islamic state with a balanced position[52], managed to organize a mission of "good services", i.e., the emirate facilitated a high-level meeting between Bulgaria and Turkey on its territory but did not interfere in negotiations and did not offer solutions. On October 30, 1989, at the initiative of the Emir of Kuwait Sheikh Jaber al-Ahehmed al-Jaber al-Sabah, a meeting was held between Turkish Foreign Minister Mesut Yilmaz and Deputy Prime Minister Georgi Yordanov.[53] In the preliminary talks with the Ambassador of Kuwait in Sofia, Talib Jalaladdin An-Nakib, it was specified that the topic of minorities would be discussed. The ambassador clarified that negotiations would refer to the "Turkish minority", but in the formal message it was written as a "Bulgarian Islamic minority." Thus, a more compromised wording was used.

←293 | 294→Bulgaria stated that it was ready to "inform each country about the condition of Muslims in Bulgaria", but not to give any country the right to "speak on behalf of these Muslims". The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was adamant that the subject of negotiations might be all issues related to relations between the two countries but not those of an internal nature.[54] At the meeting, the Bulgarian side opposed attempts of the Turkish Foreign Minister to turn the issue of the "Turkish national minority" into a

precondition for talks and offered the Turkish state draft declarations of good neighborliness, friendship and cooperation, a memorandum of trust and security, an agreement on reunification of separated families, an agreement to regulate the movement of citizens of the two countries across a common border, and a program for the development of contacts and cooperation between the two countries in political, economic, cultural, legal, and other fields.

Bulgaria presented concrete proposals at the meeting in the spirit of the 1988[55] Belgrade Protocol, but Mesut Yilmaz expressed Turkey's view that it was "stillborn", although he had claimed otherwise a month before. Bulgaria linked the request for discussion of property issues concerning emigrants in the summer of 1989 with those of Bulgarian refugees from 1913. Thus, it tried to put negotiations on a reciprocal basis. In response to the provocative talk of a "Turkish minority in Bulgaria", Yordanov said that international agreements did not mention such a minority, but that there was information about a "Bulgarian national minority in Turkey".[56]

Yilmaz, for his part, stressed that if "some of the deprived rights of our compatriots the Bulgarian Muslims" return, the relations between Turkey and Bulgaria "will soon be on the same path."[57] Thus, after five hours of negotiations, the talks ended in a conciliatory tone, agreeing that the dialogue deserved a positive assessment and that a wide range of issues of mutual interest would be discussed at the next meeting in Kuwait in November.[58] The biggest success of the meeting between the foreign ministers was its actual holding. It gave opportunity to clarify their positions and find "keys" to resolving conflict. The Turkish state initially followed its maximum plan, with the request for recognition of a "Turkish national minority," but counterclaims by the Bulgarian side and proposals for the development of bilateral relations softened the Turkish position and opened the ←294 | 295→way for ending confrontation. This ending was via the restoration of the rights of Muslims in Bulgaria.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE COMMUNIST REGIME AND ITS IMPACT ON BULGARIAN-TURKISH DIALOGUE

Todor Zhivkov's policy toward Bulgarian Turks was one of the main reasons for his fall from power.[59] After the end of his rule (November 10, 1989), Bulgaria took the path of democratization and liberalization together with other countries of the Eastern bloc. A logical step in this process was a change in attitude of the state toward Muslims on its territory. Party leadership realized that to maintain its positions and get the state out of international isolation[60] the current policy toward Bulgarian Turks had to be not only changed but also condemned. It was important for the B.C.P. that the turn be made to win over some of the Muslims on its side, as well as to keep the development of processes under its control.[61] It was decided to discuss the issue in the Politburo first, after which decisions would be presented to the Central Committee. The B.C.P. initially acted cautiously, setting up only a party commission to investigate the "deformations" of the government, including the "revival process", because it feared public reaction to a new abrupt change would be highly polarizing.[62] Bulgarian Turks expected a change in the B.C.P.'s policy toward them, namely, to restore their Turkish-Arab names and the right to emigrate.

←295 | 296→From December 1989, they began making the first attempts to create organizations to protect their interests.[63] Important to this process was the release from prison of activists who participated in illegal organizations in the second half of the 1980s and who resisted repression. One of the main figures in this process was the former State Security agent Ahmed Dogan.[64] He was preparing to create a separate political force to represent Turkish and Muslim populations in the Bulgarian parliament. Activists from the Turkish National Liberation Movement in Bulgaria (T.N.L.M.B.)[65] gathered and established a "Movement for the Rights and Freedoms of Turks and Muslims in Bulgaria", which, as its name suggests, promised to represent the interests of "Turks" all over the country. On March 28, 1990, a Constituent Conference was held in Sofia. The Bulgarian Constitution prohibited the

existence of parties on ethnic and religious grounds, which was why its legitimacy was often challenged over the years. With its founding, for the first time, a Turkish organization appeared in Bulgarian political life to transform this population from an object of state politics into an independent force.[66] The party quickly took an important place in the political life of the country. This enriched and made more nuanced an assessment of its role in Bulgarian-Turkish relations.

←296 | 297→The actions of dissident organizations in Bulgaria (the Independent Society for the Protection of Human Rights in Bulgaria, the Committee for the Protection of Religious Rights, Freedom of Conscience and Religious Values, the Independent Federation of Labor) were also essential for rethinking current policy toward Bulgarian Turks. Their leaders were the first to publicly call for the return of names and the observance of their cultural and religious rights.[67] These ideas continued to be supported even after their unification into the opposition group "Union of Democratic Forces" (U.D.F.). This happened on December 7, 1989, and quickly established itself as the main opposition to government. The U.D.F.'s founding declaration called for a "new approach to ethnic and religious minorities in line with the Charter of Human Rights." Apart from being principled, this position also had political purpose. Being on the side of Bulgarian Muslims, the party quickly gained their trust for upcoming elections while strengthening its image as opposition to the B.C.P.[68]

In the opposite direction were the views of some members of the Bulgarian Communist Party on the possible return of names, as in their opinion this would be a "step back" and "the biggest mistake".[69] There was significant difference between this and the headquarters of the Bulgarian Communist Party, as those located in Sofia had much more liberal positions.[70] Indicative of the importance of Bulgarian-Turkish contacts was that the new Minister of Foreign Affairs Boyko Dimitrov[71] held his first conversation with a foreign ambassador with Yalçan Oral. He expressed hope that the changes in Bulgaria would mark a "new beginning" in relations between the two countries. The first diplomat of the People's Republic of Bulgaria praised the Turkish decision not to set preconditions for

negotiations between the two countries and stressed the importance of refraining from statements and actions that could hinder them. The purpose of the meeting was for Bulgaria to request a postponement of the second meeting in Kuwait, scheduled for the end of November, the end of December 1989, or the beginning of January 1990, due to changes in the domestic political situation. Turkey agreed but hinted that the delay should not be too long.

←297 | 298→To the Bulgarian minister's comment, Yalçan Oral replied that the Turkish side "does not want to take advantage of temporary situations in Bulgaria to achieve its goals." In general, Bulgaria sought to focus the conversation on cooperation in areas of mutual interest: connecting telecommunications equipment for automatic telephone dialing, exchange of engineering projects on the Rezovska River, some consular issues, and healthcare. Turkey would reject this proposal because it was still "too early". The Turkish state expected Bulgaria to take bolder action to restore the rights of Muslims and condemn the B.C.P.'s assimilation policy, which was why it kept the focus on controversial issues during the conversation, emphasizing that "they have never threatened the country and its existence and is calling for the return of its revoked rights". According to Turkey, this population should be a "solid bridge of Bulgarian-Turkish relations."[72] It did this because it considered that once the dispute over the rights of this population was resolved there would be no obstacles to all other issues.

The Bulgarian state rejected the Turkish thesis, arguing that the Turkish nation was created much later than the Bulgarian one and that there were no treaties between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire that spoke of a "Turkish national minority in Bulgaria." This did not rule out the need for changes to create guarantees for the free expression of every citizen's opinion. According to Dimitrov, "there is a will for this." Oral rejected Bulgarian accusations that Turkey "manipulates the minority to destabilize Bulgaria" and noted that the anti-Bulgarian campaign was not led by the government, but by "small newspapers and magazines."[73] Dimitrov countered that statement, mentioning that Bulgaria was aware of cases in which Ozal had "declared" that the "Cypriot version"[74] could be applied to Bulgaria.

According to the Ministry of Interior, until the November plenum of 1989, Turkish authorities "prevented in any way those wishing to return to Bulgaria."[75] After that, there was an increase in the flow of returnees. These people "were told that all their rights will be restored." Among them were "a significant number of people who were known as prominent pro-Turkish nationalists."[76] Therefore, the ministry warned that in the event of non-satisfaction with Turkish demands, ←298 | 299→there may be a new incitement among Bulgarian Muslims. According to the Interior Ministry, such events could occur as early as the spring of 1990, especially since in the new Turkish government extreme nationalists had a certain predominance. This was seen as the reason to why Turkey's position remained "firm, uncompromising and devoid of common ground." Turkey was expected to use significant financial resources for anti-Bulgarian activities and increase the activities of special services.[77] This information led Dimitrov to express "concern" about "the advice they may receive from Turkish authorities returning to Bulgaria" at the next meeting with the Turkish Ambassador. The Bulgarian foreign minister mentioned that there was strong tension between Muslims and Christians in the country and if the May demonstrations were repeated it could trigger a backlash against the "insurgent population", despite attempts by Bulgarian authorities to keep things under control. For this reason, he called for "refraining from incitement and seeking to calm the situation." The Turkish ambassador replied that the concern of his Bulgarian counterpart "made him take note."[78]

IN SEARCH OF ADEQUATE POLICY TOWARD BULGARIAN TURKS

In the second half of December 1989, the Independent Society for the Protection of Human Rights in Bulgaria (N.D.H.R.)[79] organized a rally and adopted a resolution to the National Assembly demanding the immediate return of old names, the restoration of all destroyed mosques and minarets, access of Muslims to media, and seeking justice for "violators of the

Constitution of the People's Republic of Bulgaria during the assimilation period of 1970." An ultimatum was also issued on December 28 that the participants of the rally would stand in front of the parliament building "on round-the-clock watch". On the morning of the 28th, about 500,000 Bulgarian Muslims gathered around the National Assembly building.[80] On the same day, Petar Mladenov received Chief Mufti Nedim ←299 | 300→Gendjev, who also touched on the issue of freedom of religion and the possibility for those who wished to restore their names.[81]

A plenum of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party was scheduled for the next day and on its agenda was a report "On Overcoming Permitted Perversions among the Turkic-speaking and Muslim Population in the Country." Due to growing tensions and under the pressure of street protests, a new party line was formulated. It was a complete denial of the "revival process." The B.C.P. accepted the need to restore names and decided that Zhivkov and his entourage should be held responsible for the "perversions". The decision was announced and was quickly formed as a decision of both the State Council and the government. Bulgarian Turks accepted it and raised new demands: to be able to study Turkish and the Koran, restore the religious holidays of Kurban and Sheker-Bayram officially, and recognize the Muslim community as a separate nationality.[82] These demands went beyond realistic possibilities and were not accepted by either the ruling party or the opposition.

Protesters were calling for a referendum on the return of names and constitutional guarantees for the country's national security and territorial integrity. According to Evgenia Kalinova, their fears were messages planted by propaganda during the "revival process."[83] Some people from the mixed areas were upset that their opinions were not sought and believed that the actions of the government were caused by a desire to win over the population for upcoming elections.[84] They declared civil disobedience and united in organizations such as the National Committee for the Protection of National Interests (N.C.P.N.I.).[85] In the early 1990s, they organized protests in Sofia, backed by the B.C.P., according to Zhelev. In his memoirs, he wrote that the Communist Party was "so frightened" that the processes were beyond its

control that "in the face of its provincial nomenklatura, it resorted to the most desperate and dangerous means: the nationalist map."[86] This is the opinion of some scholars, such as Momchil Metodiev, who said that these structures were "explicitly or implicitly linked to the Communist Party."[87]

←300 | 301→Soon the leaders of N.C.P.N.I., Rhodope Union "Patriotism," and M.R.F. signed a joint declaration of interaction. Thus, the three leaders (Dimitar Arnaudov, Branko Davidov, and Ahmed Dogan) issued a joint statement on radio and television which said: "These social movements take responsibility for solving the national problem through civilized, political dialogue and modern political tools".[88] This declaration represented the first establishment of the MRF as a real public force.[89] The decision of the B.C.P. plenum contributed to the convergence of the positions of the B.C.P. and U.D.F. on the nationality issue.[90] On January 3, 1990, the U.D.F. declared its support for the government's policy on ethnic issues.[91] Thus, in discussions of the Round Table, the national question was not among the main topics. The topic was gradually losing its strong public interest and the two countries had already reached a consensus on it and preferred to address other important issues. Neither the ruling party nor the opposition would discuss the problems of Bulgarian Muslims outside the context of human rights and did not want to put them back in the public spotlight due to upcoming elections and the still unresolved dispute with Turkey.[92] Fortunately, soon after 1990, good contacts and coexistence between Bulgarians and Bulgarian Turks were quickly restored.[93]

The formulation of a common position on the nationality issue was entrusted to the Public Council. At its suggestion, in January 1990, the National Assembly adopted a Declaration on the National Question.[94] It gave the first official assessment of the Bulgarian state for the "revival process". It was defined as "criminal actions of the authoritarian government of Todor Zhivkov", as a result of which basic human rights were violated and "a deep gap had been dug between different ethnic groups of Bulgarian citizens".[95] The second part of the Declaration was an attempt to balance the interests of different ethnic groups, based on the principle of respect for human rights, but also to ensure national security, territorial integrity, and sovereignty. It

sought to guarantee the right of every Bulgarian citizen to freely choose a name, but also stated that the Bulgarian language was mandatory for all schools, institutions, and organizations, and that the raising of a foreign flag was unacceptable.[96] National reconciliation and unity were identified as a ←301 | 302→task of paramount importance.[97] The text of the Declaration outlined a reasonable path for changes, balanced between national security and liberalism about the rights and freedoms of the citizens of Bulgaria.

The next step was taken by the Council of Ministers in January 1990. It ruled to protect the property rights of emigrants returning from Turkey, which created problems for Bulgarians who had bought those properties. On March 5, 1990, the parliament passed a law restoring the Muslim names of Bulgarian Turks. In November 1990, the VII Supreme National Assembly adopted amendments to it, which facilitated the procedure by allowing the restoration of names administratively without judicial proceedings.[98] By the spring of 1991, requests to restore the names of some 600,000 Muslims had been granted. However, a small part of the community preferred to keep their Bulgarian names.[99]

1990: THE RESTART IN BULGARIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS

The political change in Bulgaria removed the dependence of relations on inter-bloc opposition. Turkey's desire to destabilize the ideological enemy in the north had already materialized and the conflict about Bulgarian Turks had played its part in the fall of Todor Zhivkov's regime. The new rulers in Bulgaria were taking steps to repeal and deny the B.C.P.'s repressive policies. All this contributed to the rapid warming of Bulgarian-Turkish relations. Summits between the two countries became more frequent. Bulgarian authorities had a constructive policy toward Turkey. The goal was to establish a new type of relationship. At the same time, however, the development of Bulgarian-Turkish contacts did not harm Bulgaria's relations with other countries. In the first months after the changes, the Bulgarian state set as its main goal the preparation and signing of a founding document

containing the principles of bilateral relations and measures to strengthen trust and security in the spirit of the Helsinki Process and European standards.[100]

The new situation in Europe and the radically different domestic political, economic, and social situation in Bulgaria determined the need to review and update the legal framework governing Bulgarian-Turkish relations. In addition to the ethnic issue, the two countries had to resolve issues such as the delimitation ←302 | 303→of the Black Sea, the dispute over borders at the mouth of the Rezovska River, as well as mutual property and financial claims, such as the issue of Bulgarian exarchate property in Turkey.[101] Following the onset of "warming" between the two countries, they were left for future negotiations, as relations between the two countries were seen as still too "fragile". The Turkish state did not make any preliminary demands to the new rulers in Sofia and the two countries, motivated by a common desire to restore relations, organized many bilateral summit meetings. One of the most important was the meeting of Prime Minister Andrei Lukanov with President Turgut Ozal in September 1990. It was organized by the initiative of Turkey and was used as a round table under the U.N. Development Programme, held in Antalya. The two heads of state also met outside it in Ozal's villa. Lukanov conveyed the wish of the President of Bulgaria Zhelyu Zhelev for a bilateral summit soon, which Ozal accepted "with satisfaction".[102] They discussed a wide range of issues of mutual interest with the greatest attention paid to the development of economic cooperation.

Turkey was now ready not only to talk to Bulgaria about a partnership in this area but also to take the initiative, presenting its idea of creating a "Zone for Economic Cooperation of Black Sea countries".[103] The two states reached an agreement in principle on security rapprochement, which was unthinkable only a year prior. They agreed to organize a bilateral meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the two countries. However, Lukanov expressed Bulgaria's concern about "the level of Turkish armed forces near the border," but Ozal attributed this to political and military bureaucracy, which was slow to respond to changes in the world.[104] An important sign of the softening of

Turkish positions was that during the meeting it did not seriously raise issues of a humanitarian nature about Bulgarian Muslims.[105]

The Bulgarian Prime Minister proposed to the Turkish President that the two countries agree on the conclusion of a "bilateral founding document on the principles of relations", noting that this was a matter of paramount importance for his country. The Bulgarian desire to normalize and intensify bilateral contacts in all areas: transport, telecommunications, electricity exchange, science, culture, cooperation between universities, including the establishment of departments in Turkish and Bulgarian language, tourism, humanitarian contacts and others. Despite the positive signs, Turkey continued to see Muslims in Bulgaria as a ←303 | 304→"bridge in bilateral relations". The Turkish state also presented at the meeting its proposals for changes such as visa facilitation and visa fees, establishing cross-border trade, a visit by a delegation of Turkish businessmen, led by the Minister, to discuss the use of commodity credit, as well as other issues of economic relations. In addition to the commodity loan of 50 million U.S.D., Turkey was ready to provide Bulgaria with a loan of 50 million U.S.D. for joint investment in Bulgarian industry to produce consumer goods. This proposal was proof of a new stage of Bulgarian-Turkish relations. Ozal also proposed setting up a bilateral business council and improving infrastructure connectivity for all modes of transport. In the field of energy, Turkey wanted a gas pipeline to be built and exchange of electricity to be agreed upon on a compensatory basis. Regarding telecommunications, the Turkish state was seeking an agreement on the free reception of television programs from one country to the other. Finally, however without concrete proposals, the Turkish state expressed its desire to develop cooperation in the field of culture, education, science, humanitarian contacts, and tourism.[106]

In the conversation of "four eyes," Lukanov still raised the topic of Bulgarian Turks and was carefully listened to by Ozal. The Bulgarian Prime Minister welcomed Turkey's recent restraint in propaganda and said it was crucial not to feed Bulgarian concerns because the country's nationalist sentiments were strong.[107] The meeting showed that Turkey was currently interested in the normalization of bilateral relations, which was why Ozal

did not put disputes over Bulgarian Turks at the center of the talks but preferred talks to be held on areas of mutual interest. During the talks, the Turkish President did not even mention the recent ultimate request for recognition of the "Turkish national minority in Bulgaria."[108] The reason for this was both the steps taken to restore the rights of Muslims on Bulgarian territory and the situation in the Middle East, in particular the war in the Persian Gulf, where Turkey had strategic interests.

These fruitful talks also paved the way for a summit meeting. The two presidents, Zhelyu Zhelev and Turgut Ozal, met in New York in October 1990 and in Paris in November 1990. They agreed on the further development of Bulgarian-Turkish relations by expanding contacts between them. A conversation was also held between foreign ministers during a meeting of the first diplomats of Balkan countries in Tirana. At the meeting, Turkey stressed the need to simplify the travel regime between the two countries. This would make it easier to maintain contacts and transfer ideas between emigrants and those who remained in Bulgaria and might allow for the recognition of the "Turkish minority in Bulgaria" *de jure*. The purpose of signing an emigration agreement was not only to regulate ←304 | 305→the movement between the two countries but also to resolve economic and social issues concerning Bulgarian citizens who had settled in Turkey. This new element of the Turkish position was a logical consequence of the mass exodus in the summer of 1989.

It would also be raised by First Deputy Foreign Minister Ushan Celebi, who arrived in Sofia on October 25, 1990, at the head of a Turkish economic delegation.[109] Indicative of the Bulgarian attitude was that he was welcomed at the highest level—by the President of the Republic Zhelyu Zhelev and by Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov.[110] Celebi was accompanied by representatives of ministries, banks, traders, and industrialists. As a result of the talks, a memorandum of understanding was signed, containing measures for the development of bilateral trade and economic cooperation. It set out decisions for the resumption of the Joint Bulgarian-Turkish Committee for Economic and Technical Cooperation and for taking the first steps to establish a "Bulgarian-Turkish Business Council" between the Bulgarian

Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Union of Chambers in Turkey. During the visit, the Turkish side expressed readiness to provide 400 thousand tons of fuel oil and electricity with a capacity of 350 megawatts in the form of a natural loan until the end of March 1991. Also, the granting of a commodity loan of 50 million U.S.D. for materials, semi-finished products, and food was agreed upon. To stimulate investment cooperation, the Turkish state would provide an investment loan of 25 million U.S.D.[111] In the talks with Minister Celebi, the possibility of establishing joint ventures and productions on the territory of the two countries to satisfy domestic markets and exports to third countries was also discussed.[112]

This willingness to cooperate contrasted sharply with trade relations between Bulgaria and Turkey just a few months earlier. In the early 1990s, the Turkish state liberalized the import regime, but this easing did not apply to Bulgaria and Cyprus. A complicated procedure for issuing import permits was applied to these two countries based on a secret order from the Foreign Trade Treasury Advisory Board. This order was revoked on August 7, 1990.[113]

In May 1990, because of the changed political situation both in Bulgaria and internationally, an informal meeting was organized between the two Ministers of Health – Chernozemski and Shawgan in Geneva during the W.H.O. General ←305 | 306→Assembly, at which views for future cooperation were exchanged. In July 1990, Bulgaria sent an invitation to the Director of External Relations at the Giray Department of Health to visit the country and Turkey offered a meeting of infectious disease experts from both countries in December. In September, the two countries agreed to hold a meeting between the two ministers.[114] In November, Turkish Health Minister Khalil Shevgan visited Bulgaria. A protocol on cooperation between the governments of the two countries in the field of healthcare was agreed at the meeting, which would be signed during the visit of the Bulgarian Minister of Health to Turkey in January 1991.[115]

CONCLUSION

In just one year, Bulgaria and Turkey went from a sharp conflict to a desire for cooperation in various areas of mutual interest. As a result of the forced assimilation by the Zhivkov regime against Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin, the two countries severely deteriorated their relations. Turkey refused to negotiate with Bulgaria without it first agreeing to an emigration treaty and recognizing a "Turkish national minority" on its territory. The Bulgarian state considered the acceptance of these two demands as a betrayal of national security and sovereignty and refused to comply with them. The Turkish side decided to internationalize the problem, hoping that Bulgaria would give in under pressure from the international community. Internal consensus, including within B.C.P. opposition after Zhivkov's fall from power, did not allow politicians to make such concessions. The change in the government of Bulgaria after November 10, 1989, stimulated the rapid warming of relations with Turkey. The reasons for this were both domestic and foreign. The end of the Cold War removed the element of inter-bloc opposition/competition that poisoned Bulgarian-Turkish relations and the first steps toward democratization in Bulgaria could not but be supported by Turkey, given both its alliance to the United States at the time and its demand on the removal of restrictions on the free expression of a different cultural identity of Bulgarian Turks.

The two states began to discuss economic cooperation, putting ethnic conflict and related property issues in the background, to improve the climate in their relations. Thus, within the period under review, the economic and social issues concerning the remaining Bulgarian citizens on Turkish territory, the property and financial issues related to Bulgarian refugees from Eastern Thrace, and the Bulgarian exarchate properties in Turkey remained unresolved. Focusing on areas ←306 | 307→of mutual interest paid off and the conflict between Bulgaria and Turkey was quickly minimized, yet the unresolved issues had the potential to accumulate new tensions in the future.

Given how a major portion of the Balkans would soon find itself embroiled in a bloody and expansive ethnic division, epitomized by crimes of humanity, war atrocities, and other gross violations of fundamental human rights, it is important to draw greater attention to this brief period in time and

the adapting relations between Bulgaria and Turkey. In many ways, given different choices that would have been more in line with mistakes made in other areas of the region, this conflict could have exploded into something far more tragic, violent, and bloody. That it did not and instead became a symbol of how to overcome persistent disagreements by focusing on areas of mutual interest that can be positively leveraged, bilateral relations between Turkey and Bulgaria between 1989 and 1990 should stand out as the model that could have been and possibly should have been followed by other states like the former Yugoslavia.

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1 Turgut Ozal was Turkey’s Prime Minister and President in the late-twentieth century. His “star” in politics rose under the rule of Suleiman Demirel, who since November 25, 1979, has headed the government of the Freedom Party. In Demirel Ozal’s office, he was hired as an expert on economic and financial issues. After the military coup of 1980, Prime Minister Bulent Ulusu appointed him Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy. In 1983, Ozal won the parliamentary elections with the Patriotic Party he founded and formed his own government. He served as Prime Minister until 1989, when he was elected President. Ozal held these positions until 1993, when he died in Ankara. Cihan Daban, “Turgut. Özal Dönemi Türkiye diş politikasi,” [“The Turkish policy under Turgut Oza”], *The Journal of Social Economic Research*, 17, no. 33, (Nisan 2017): 78–96.

2 Yildirim Akbulut was born in 1935 in Erzincan, Turkey. He was Minister of the Interior in the cabinet of Turgut Ozal (1984–87) and then elected Speaker of Parliament (1987–89). Leader of the Patriotic Party in the period 1989–91.

3 Dzhengiz Hakov, *Istoriya na savremenna Turtsia* [*History of modern Turkey*], (Sofia: Siela, 2017), 314. All translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

4 Petya Pavlova, “Republika Turtsia pri upravlenieto na Turgut Yozal”, [“Republic of Turkey during the rule of Turgut Ozal”], *Godishnik na fakulteta po humanitarni nauki* [*Yearbook of the Faculty of Humanities*], (Shumen: *Konstantin Preslavsky Publishing House*, 2020), 246.

5 Todor Zhivkov was born in 1911 in Pravets, Bulgaria. He held the highest positions in the Bulgarian Communist Party, First Secretary (1954–81) and Secretary General (1981–89) and in the country, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria (1962–71) and Chairman of the State Council of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria (1971–89). Iskra Baeva, *Todor Zhivkov (Sofia: Kama, 2007). Hristo Hristov, Todor, Zhivkov. Biografia (Sofia: Siela, 2009)*.

6 Petar Mladenov is the longest-serving Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, having held the post for 18 years (1971–89). He became head of state of Bulgaria (November 17, 1989–July 6, 1990) after taking an active part in the removal of Todor Zhivkov from power.

7 Evgenia Kalinova and Iskra Baeva, “Vazroditelniyat protses-varhat na aysberga” [“The Revival process—the tip of the iceberg”], in *Vazroditelniyat protses. 1. Balgarskata darzhava I balgarskite turtsi (sredata na 30-te—nachaloto na 90-te godini na XX vek)*, [*The Revival process. 1. The Bulgarian State and the Bulgarian Turks (mid 30s-early 90s) of twentieth century*], eds. Evgenia Kalinova and Iskra Baeva, (Sofia: Archives State Agency, 2009), 7 –10.

8 Kalinova and Baeva, “The Revival process”, 13.

9 Antonina Zhelyazkova, “Socialna I kulturna adaptatsia na balgarskite turtsi v Turtsia” [“Social and cultural adaptation of the Bulgarian Turks”], in *Mezhdu adaptatsia I nostalgiya.*

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10 Evgenia Kalinova, "Izselnicheski praktiki I polititka na Balgaria (kraya na XIX–kraya na XX vek)" ["Expatriation practices and the policy of Bulgaria (end of nineteenth – end of twentieth century)"], in *Migratsiite: Evropa mezdu istoricheskia opit I strahovete na savremennostta* [*The Migrations: Europe between the historical experience and the fears of the modern age*], (Sofia: Kameya Group Ltd., 2016), 116–18.

11 Kalinova and Baeva, "The Revival process", 2–35.

12 According to Islam, Allah calls people by their names to judge whether they lived sinlessly or not after death, which is why the name has a special role in their lives and self-awareness. Zhelyazkova, "Social and cultural adaptation of the Bulgarian Turks", 20.

13 Veselin Angelov, *Strogo sekretno! Dokumento za deynostta na Darzhavna sigurnost (1944–89)* [*Top secret! Document on the activities of state security agency (1944–89)*], (Sofia: Simolini Ltd., 2007), 665–6.

14 Mihail Gruev and Aleksey Kalyonski, *Vazroditelniyat protses. Myusyulmanskata obshtnost i komunisticheskiya rezhim* [*The Revival process. The Muslim community and the communist regime*], (Sofia: Siela, 2008), 146–7. Donka Dimitrova, "Turskiyat pechat za t.nar. 'vazroditelen protses' (1984–89)" ["The Turkish press for the so-called 'revival process' (1984–89)"], in *The ethnic picture in Bulgaria*, (Sofia; Klub 90, 1993): 169–73.

15 Evgenia Kalinova, "Balgarskata darzhava pred 'sada' na O.O.N.—1985–89", ["The Bulgarian State before the U.N. 'court'—1985–89"], in *The State idea in the modern era*, (Sofia: St. Kliment Ohridski University Press, 2018), 233.

16 In 1984–89, the counterintelligence conducted operational cases of espionage of 337 Bulgarian citizens. According to a 1991 Ministry of Interior report, 31 Bulgarian citizens were discovered and convicted of espionage and terrorism during the "revival process". See the *Secret report of Dimitar Popov's government on the investigation of the activities of the State Security in connection with the "revival process",* https://desebg.com/2011-01-13-09-24-44/88--2-

17 This eliminates the need to issue a travel permit in advance by the state by issuing a visa.

18 Kalinova and Baeva, "The Revival process", 30–2.

19 The Bulgarian Communist Party is conducting an active propaganda campaign aimed at justifying the forcible change of names, with the thesis that it "revives" the Bulgarian consciousness of those people with whom it is "blurred" after they have converted to Islam. This imposes the name of this process as "revival", hence the term "revival process". It is well-established in the history, which is why its use does not contain an evaluative element.

20 Kalinova, "Expatriation practices", 128–31.

21 Kalinova and Baeva, eds. "The Revival process".

22 Tsvetana Georgieva, "Preselnicheskata motivatsiya na balgarskite turtsi" ["The migratory motivation of Bulgarian Turks"], in *Mezhdu adaptatsia I nostalgiya. Balgarskite turtsi v Turtsia* [*Between adaptation and nostalgia. Bulgarian Turks in Turkey*], (Sofia: I.M.I.R., 1998), 45–55. Nadezhda Zhechkova, *Polititcheskata kultura na balgarskite turtsi* [*The political culture of the Bulgarian Turks*], (Sofia: St. Kliment Ohridski University Press, 2019), 91–6.

23 Kalinova and Baeva, "The Revival process", 32–3; Valeri Stoyanov, *Turskoto naseleniye mezdu polyusite na etnicheskata politika* [*The Turkish population between the poles of ethnic politics*], (Sofia: L.I.K., 1997), 214.

24 Zhechkova, *The political culture of the Bulgarian Turks,* 97–8.

25 Zhelyazkova, "Social and cultural adaptation of the Bulgarian Turks", 56.

26 Iskra Baeva and Evgenia Kalinova, *Bulgarian transitions* (Sofia: Paradigma, 2011), 243.

27 Iskra Baeva and Evgenia Kalinova, eds. *The Revival process, 2—International dimensions (1984–89),* (Sofia: Archives State Agency, 2010), 752–3.
28 Evgenia Kalinova, "Izselnicheskata valna ot liyatoto na 1989 g.—opiti za razreshavane na krizata v balgaro-turskite otnosheniya" ["The emigration wave in the summer of 1989—an attempt to resolve the crisis in Bulgarian-Turkish relations"], in *Balkans—Migrations and the Balkans from antiquity to the present*, no 6.1 (2017), 61.
29 Baeva and Kalinova, eds. *The Revival process*, 2, 766.
30 *Statement by the Secretary General on behalf of the allies concerning the situation of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria.* N.A.T.O. Archives Online, https://archives.nato.int/statement-by-secretary-general-on-behalf-of-allies-concerning-situation-of-ethnic-turks-in-bulgaria
31 The declaration states that "Greece stands in an unequivocal manner for the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms but believes that their application must be universal." *Statement by the Secretary General on behalf of the allies concerning the situation of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria*. N.A.T.O. Archives Online, https://archives.nato.int/statement-by-secretary-general-on-behalf-of-allies-concerning-situation-of-ethnic-turks-in-bulgaria
32 The 1982 Constitution of Turkey does not recognize the existence of minorities and to this day puts pressure on the Kurds.
33 Baeva and Kalinova, eds. *The Revival process,* 2, 757
34 Baeva and Kalinova, eds., 758.
35 Baeva and Kalinova, eds., 753–4.
36 In a *Speech by the N.A.T.O. Secretary General* on September 18, 1989, he called for no cover-up of "dark practices in Eastern Europe", such as forcing "over three hundred thousand ethnic Turks" to leave Bulgaria. See the speech of Secretary General M. Worner, "The Alliance is giving the west the conceptual leadership it needs", N.A.T.O. Archives Online https://archives.nato.int/secretary-general-worner-alliance-is-giving-west-conceptual-leadership-it-needs. In another *Statement,* from September 30, it was said that: "Bulgaria reached the horrendous figure of 250,000 expulsions of ethnic Turks". Secretary General M. Worner, "The Alliance is the conceptual force behind all our efforts to encourage, stimulate and assist the peaceful reform of the communist world", N.A.T.O. Archives Online, https://archives.nato.int/secretary-general-worner-alliance-is-conceptual-force-behind-all-our-efforts-to-encourage-stimulate-and-assist-peaceful-reform-of-communist-world
37 Evgenia Kalinova, "*Moskva*, *Vazroditelniyat protses* I krizata v balgaro-turskite otnosheniya 1985–1989 g." ["Moscova, The Revival process and the crisis in the Bulgarian-Turkish relations 1985–89"], in *Istorikat: izledovatel I populiyarizator. Sbornik v chest na 70-ta godishnina na akad. Georgi Markov* [*Historian: researcher and popularizer. Collection in honour of the 70th anniversary of the academician Georgy Markov*], (Sofia: Zahari Stoyanov, 2017), 416.
38 Mesut Yilmaz was the leader of the Patriotic Party from 1991 to 2002 and Prime Minister of Turkey in 1991, 1996, and between 1997 and 1999. He held various ministerial posts in several cabinets of Turgut Ozal, but after Ozal was elected president in 1989, Yilmaz led the internal party opposition to new Prime Minister Akbulut.
39 Baeva and Kalinova, eds., *The Revival process,* 2, 762.
40 Baeva and Kalinova, eds., 763.
41 Kalinova, "The emigration wave in the summer of 1989", 59.
42 Baeva and Kalinova, eds., *The Revival process,* 2, 763.
43 Baeva and Kalinova, eds., 767–8.
44 Kalinova, "The emigration wave in the summer of 1989, 60.
45 Kalinova, 61.

46 Baeva and Kalinova, eds. *The Revival process,* 2, 764.
47 Kalinova, "The Bulgarian State before the U.N. 'court'", 248.
48 Kalinova, 244–6.
49 Kalinova, 250.
50 The U.S. position expressed "serious concern over the ongoing inhumane assimilation campaign by the Bulgarian government". The text was edited by the Turkish O.I.C.'s permanent representative to the U.N. Baeva and Kalinova, eds. *The Revival process,* 2, 784–5.
51 Baeva and Kalinova, eds.
52 Kuwait considered Zhivkov's position that Turkey had similar claims to Greece, Cyprus, Yugoslavia, the U.S.S.R., Iraq, and Libya. According to the emirate, the mass "emigration" of Bulgarian citizens to Turkey was due to the pressure and persecution to which these people were subjected but did not exclude the role of Turkish incitement. Kuwait believed that in Turkey itself, minorities (Kurdish, Arab, Armenian, Greek) were being persecuted and restricted. The emir considered unacceptable Turkey's expectation that he will put pressure on the People's Republic of Bulgaria. According to him, Turkey had the right to "make claims against the People's Republic of Bulgaria" but had to present irrefutable evidence. Baeva and Kalinova, eds. *The Revival process,* 2, 783–4.
53 Georgi Yordanov was an M.P. from the Bulgarian Communist Party in the period 1971–90, but after the removal of Zhivkov he was removed from the Party due to his close contact with its former leader. During the rule of Todor Zhivkov, he held several positions related to management in the culture sector.
54 Baeva and Kalinova, eds. *The Revival process,* 2, 765,
55 Lyubomir Ognyanov, *Mezhdunarodni otnosheniya I vanshna politika na Balgaria 1944–89* [*International relations and the foreign policy of Bulgaria*], (Sofia: Paradigma, 2021), 176.
56 Georgi Yordanov, *Pritaeni migove. 3 Povrati* [*Hidden moments*], (Sofia: Zahari Stoyanov, 2020), 255–6.
57 Yordanov, *Hidden moments*, 258.
58 Baeva and Kalinova*, Balgarskite prehodi,* 214.
59 Birgül Demirtaş, "Turkish-Bulgarian relations in the post-cold war era: the exemplary relationship in the Balkans," (Ankara: International, 2001), 29.
60 The main reason for this was the strained relations with the United States, because of the conflict with Turkey. In his memoirs, Ivan Gavralov shared that in the autumn of 1989, the U.S. Secretary of State told him that if Bulgaria "did not radically change its domestic policy, if it did not restore the rights of Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin," it could not even think about some improvement in relations with the United States. Ivan Garvalov, *Sredishteto na vazmozhnite misii. O.O.N. v spomenite na edin balgarski diplomat* [*The hub of possible missions. U.N. in the memories of one Bulgarian diplomat*], (Sofia: GoreksPres, 2005), 256–7.
61 Evgeniya Kalinova, "Trudnoto nachalo—otrichaneto ot "Vazroditelnya protses" (10 noemvri 1989 – yanuari 1990 r.)" ["The difficult beginning—the denial rejection of the Revival process (November 10, 1989 – January 1990)] in *Tolerantniyat natsionalist. Pameten sbornik ot priyatelite na prof. Stayko Trifonov* [*The tolerant nationalist. Commemorative collection from the friends of prof. Stayko Trifonov*], (Sofia: Paradigma, 2009), 346.
62 At the first opposition rally on November 18, 1989, a call was made for the return of the Turkish names, but the gathered crowd booed the organizers, and they refused this request in the adopted resolution. Iskra Baeva, "Balgarskite turtsi v godinite na prehoda" ["The Bulgarian Turks in the transition years"], in *Balgari I turtsi* [*Bulgarians and Turks*], (Sofia Tangra TanNakRa Publishing House Ltd., 2016), 221.

63 Evgenia Kalinova, "Vazroditelniyat protses"—integrirasht ili dezintegrirasht factor prez 90-te godini na XX vek," ["The Revival process—the integration of the disintegration factor in the 90s"], in *Krayat na Studenata voina I evropeyskata integratsia/dezintegratsia prez 90-te godini na XX vek. Sbornik v chest na 65-ata godishnina na prof. Iskra Baeva* [*The End of the Cold War and the European integration/disintegration during the 90s. Collection in honor of the 65th anniversary of prof. Iskra Baeva*], (Sofia: St. Kliment Ohridski University Press, 2019), 77.

64 Ahmed Dogan is a Bulgarian politician and Doctor of Philosophy. He is a member of the seventh Grand National Assembly and a member of the 36th, 37th, 38th, 39th, 40th, and 41st National Assembly of Bulgaria. His political career still arouses polar feelings in Bulgarian society, and for most people today he is a symbol of the "backstage". The connection between the B.C.P. and Ahmed Dogan's actions, given his intelligence background, can still only take the form of speculation due to a lack of sufficient documents. So far, only his dossier has been published freely on the Internet. Ahmed Demir Dogan Register of collaborators of the State Security and Intelligence Services of the B.N.A., https://agentibg.com/index.php/bg/a-bg/127-2014-03-08-09-27-14

65 The illegal Turkish National Liberation Movement in Bulgaria (T.N.L.M.B.) was established in the autumn of 1985. Its program was prepared by Ahmed Dogan. The forced change of names was cited as the reason for its creation. According to them, the "revival process" was "the forced assimilation of a national group, separated from its people because of historical events and forced to live within the borders of Bulgaria." They saw a solution to the problem in "our free emigration to our original homeland—the Republic of Turkey." Kalinova and Baeva, "The Revival process", 281.

66 Kalinova and Baeva, "The Revival process", 36.

67 Momchil Metodiev, "Za nyakoi kosveni, no trayni posleditsi ot 'vazroditelniya protses'" ["On some indirect but lasting consequences of the 'revival process'"], in *Nasilstvenata asimilatsia na turtsite v Balgaria 1984–89* [*The forced assimilation of the Turks in Bulgaria*], (Sofia: C.I.A., 2019), 126.

68 Kalinova, "The difficult beginning", 349.

69 Kalinova and Baeva, "The Revival process", 35.

70 Kalinova, "The difficult beginning", 345–6.

71 Boyko Dimitrov is a Bulgarian diplomat and politician born in 1941. He held the post of Foreign Minister of Bulgaria in the government of Georgi Atanasov and in the first government of Andrei Lukanov in the period 1989–90.

72 Baeva and Kalinova, eds. *The Revival process,* 2, 797.

73 Baeva and Kalinova, eds., 797.

74 The government of Turgut Özal has put the "Punturk doctrine" at the heart of its foreign policy. It aims to use "Turkish minorities" in neighboring countries to secure influence throughout the region. Jordan Baev *Voennopoliticheskite konflikti sled Vtorata svetovna voina I Balgaria* [*Military-political conflicts after the Second World War and Bulgaria*] (Sofia: Ministry of Defense Publishing House Saint George the Victorious, 1995), 165. Baeva and Kalinova, eds. *The Revival process,* 2, 795–8, 801–2.

75 Baeva and Kalinova, eds., *The Revival process,* 2, 800.

76 Baeva and Kalinova, eds., 800.

77 Baeva and Kalinova, eds., 799–800.

78 Baeva and Kalinova, eds., 801–2.

79 On January 16, 1988, 16 people created the first dissident and human rights organization in Bulgaria. The founders of the organization are outspoken opponents of the communist regime,

some of them long-term political prisoners: Iliya Minev, Grigor Simov Bozhilov, Eduard Genov, Tseko Tsekov, Bozhidar, and Minka Statevi. Many people with rights trampled by the regime turn to the organization. Many of them were forcibly renamed Bulgarian Turks, who set up local branches of the organization and in May 1989 held the first hunger strikes.

80 Kalinova, "The difficult beginning", 348–9.

81 Stoyanov, *The Turkish population*, 218.

82 Evgenia Kalinova, "The Revival process", 79.

83 Kalinova, "The difficult beginning", 356–7.

84 Kalinova and Baeva, "The Revival process", 37.

85 The National Committee for the Protection of National Interests (O.K.Z.N.I.) was established on January 7, 1990, in response to the December 1989 decision of the Politburo of the Bulgarian Communist Party to return the Turkish-Arabic names to the Bulgarian Turks. It takes part in the National Round Table of the B.C.P. quota.

86 Zhelyu Zhelev, *Vapreki vsichko. Moyata polititcheska biografiya* [*Nevertheless. My political biography*], (Sofia: Kolibri Publishing House, 2010), 331.

87 Momchil Metodiev, "On some indirect but lasting consequences of the revival process", 128.

88 Orlin Zagorov, "Vazroditelniyat protses: Teza, Antiteza, Otritsanie na otitsanieto" ["The Revival process: thesis, antithesis, denial of the denial"], (Sofia: AresPres, 1993), 178–9.

89 Valeri Stoyanov, "To the early history of M.R.F. An Attempt at a Biographical Essay," 643.

90 Kalinova and Baeva, "The Revival process", 38.

91 Kalinova, "The difficult beginning", 362.

92 Kalinova and Baeva, "The Revival process", 39.

93 Zhelyazkova, "Social and cultural adaptation of the Bulgarian Turks", 21.

94 "Declaration of the National Assembly of the People's Republic of Bulgaria on the national question", *Times,* 1990, 51–3.

95 *Declaration of the National Assembly*, 51.

96 Baeva, "The Bulgarian Turks", 224.

97 Kalinova and Baeva, "The Revival process", 38.

98 Zhechkova, *The political culture of the Bulgarian Turks,* 106.

99 According to the Ministry of Interior, more than 80 percent of Muslims in Bulgaria wanted to get their Turkish names back and only a small part—mostly communist party members involved in the "revival process", as well as young people—believed that each person should decide for themselves whether to keep or change their name. Kalinova, "The difficult beginning", 345. Baeva, "The Bulgarian Turks", 224.

100 Central State Archives, hereafter C.S.A., F.1224, op. 1, a. e. 169, l. 22–3.

101 C.S.A., F.1224, op. 1, a. e. 169, l. 24.

102 C.S.A., F.1224, op. 1, a. e. 169, l. 30.

103 In general, the Bulgarian side views the proposal positively, but closely monitors the reactions of other countries and especially Greece. C.S.A., F.1224, op. 1, a. e. 169, l. 23.

104 C.S.A., F.1224, op. 1, a. e. 169, l. 31–3.

105 C.S.A., F.1224, op. 1, a. e. 169, l. 22.

106 C.S.A., F.1224, op. 1, a. e. 169, l. 32–4.

107 C.S.A., F.1224, op. 1, a. e. 169, l. 35.

108 C.S.A., F.1224, op. 1, a. e. 169, l. 36.

109 Boryana Buzhashka, *Iztochnotrakiyskiyat vapros v balgaro-turskite diplomaticheski otnosheniya (1913–2016)* [*The East Thracian question in the Bulgarian-Turkish diplomatic relations (1913–2016)]*, (Sofia: Zahari Stoyanov, 2017) 137.

110 C.S.A., F.1224, op. 1, a. e. 169, l. 1–4.

111 C.S.A., F.1224, op. 1, a. e. 169, l. 22–3.
112 C.S.A., F.1224, op. 1, a. e. 169, l. 46.
113 C.S.A., F.1224, op. 1, a. e. 169, l. 19
114 C.S.A., F.1224, op. 1, a. e. 169, l. 58.
115 C.S.A., F.1224, op. 1, a. e. 169, l. 23.

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